LIBRAEY 

OF  THE 

Theological  Seminary, 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

cBT  701  .  H37 7  1870 
Harris,  John. 

SMan  primeval,  or,  The 

constitution  and  primitive 

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PRIMEVAL: 


MAN 


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THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  PRIMITIVE  CONDITION 
OF  THE  HUMAN  BEING. 


BY 

JOHN  HARRIS,  D.  D., 

LATE  PRESIDENT  OF  CHESHUNT  COLLEGE,  AUTHOR  OF  “THE  GREAT  TEACHER,’’  “THE  GREAT 
COMMISSION,”  THE  “  PRE-AD  AMITE  EARTH,”  ETC. 


FIFTH  THOUSAND. 


BOSTON : 

GOTTLD  A  N  D  LINCOLN', 

59  WASHINGTON  STREET. 

KM'  YORK:  SHELDON  AND  COMPANY. 
CINCINNATI  :  G.  S.  BLANCHARD  &  CO. 

1  8  7  0. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/rnanprimevalorcon00harr_0 


PREFACE. 


In  the  Preface  to  the  “  Pre-Adamite  Earth,”  I  stated  that 
the  principles  or  laws  there  adduced,  and  applied  to  the  succes¬ 
sive  stages  of  the  ancient  earth,  would  be  exhibited  in  their  his¬ 
torical  development,  in  a  short  series  of  treatises  (each  treatise 
complete  in  itself)  in  relation  to  individual  man,  to  the  family, 
.0  the  nation,  to  the  Son  of  God,  to  the  church  which  he  has 
founded,  to  the  revelation  which  he  has  completed,  and  to  the 
future  prospects  of  humanity.  Accordingly,  the  principles 
which  were  there  seen  holding  their  way  through  the  successive 
kingdoms  of  primaeval  nature,  are  here  resumed,  and  are  exhibited 


On  the  day  of  man’s  creation  it  was,  that  law  first  subjectively 
reigned  on  earth.  Prior  to  that  event,  the  so-called  laws  of 
nature  were  mere  modes  of  Divine  operation,  known  only  to 
the  mind  of  the  Creator.  But  a  being;  had  now  come  who 
could  consciously  stand  face  to  face  with  them,  could  conceive 
of  them,  employ  them,  and  ascend  in  homage  from  them  to  the 


IV 


PREFACE. 


Divine  Lawgiver.  In  dm,  all  these  pre-existing  laws  were  re¬ 
capitulated,  and  otheis  were  superadded.  He  himself  was  a 
system  of  moral  government.  Not  only  was  the  grand  process 
of  the  Divine  disclosure  to  be  continued  in  man  and  by  him, 
but  he  was  so  constituted  that  to  him  the  entire  manifestation 
was  to  be  made.  The  laws  of  the  Divine  procedure,  therefore, 
are  here  distributed  into  three  Parts,  consisting  of  the  end 
aimed  at ;  the  method  of  attaining  it.;  and  the  reasons  for  the 
employment  of  that  method. 

The  grounds  for  the  adoption  of  this  three-fold  arrangement 
may  be  more  explicitly  stated  thus :  —  reverentially  assuming, 
first,  that  every  step  of  the  Divine  procedure  is  related  and 
tending  to  an  ultimate  end ;  it  may  be  inferred,  secondly,  that 
“the  only  wise  God”  who  “  seeth  the  end  from  the  beginning,” 
pursues  that  end,  not  improvidently  and  uncertainly,  but  accord¬ 
ing  to  an  all-comprehending  method;  and,  thirdly,  that  the 
method  chosen  involves  special  reasons  why  it  has  been  pre¬ 
ferred.  For  unless  we  can  suppose  the  Divine  Being  to  be 
coerced  by  a  necessity  superior  to  himself,  or  to  be  bound  by 
the  iron  mechanism  of  fate,  we  must  infer  that  He  has  intelli¬ 
gently  devised,  and  voluntarily  adopted,  the  entire  plan  of  his 
procedure ;  and  if  so,  it  follows  that  He  has  done  so  for  reasons, 
or  “according  to  the  counsel  of  his  own  will.”  These  three 
parts,  though  inseparably  united,  are  essentially  distinct. 

An  illustration  of  this  view  may  be  taken  from  Scripture ;  — 
“  the  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God.”  Here,  first,  the  end 
they  answer  is  plainly  affirmed ;  they  declare  the  glory  of  their 
Creator.  But,  secondly,  what  is  the  method  by  which  this  end 
is  attained  ?  Doubtless,  ever  since  there  has  been  an  intelligent 
eye  to  behold  them,  the  mere  splendor,  numbers,  and  magni- 


PREFACE. 


V 


tudes  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  have  been  incessantly  awakening 
convictions  in  the  human  mind  of  the  “eternal  power  and  God¬ 
head.”  Beyond  this,  however,  astronomy  enables  us  to  measure 
those  vast  masses,  to  calculate  their  distances,  and  to  determine 
their  motions.  It  shows  that  the  celestial  mechanism  is  con¬ 
structed  according  to  a  scientifically  calculated  method ,  which  is 
always  unfolding  to  the  observant  eye  ;  and  that,  being  perva¬ 
ded  by  laws,  it  is  ever  pointing  to  the  Lawgiver.  But  why 
thirdly,  the  adoption  of  the  special  method,  or  particular  laws, 
which  we  find  in  actual  operation  ?  They  cannot  be  shown  to 
be  necessary.  No  doubt,  laws  and  properties  of  some  kind, 
matter  must  have.  But,  for  aught  which  can  be  shown  to  the 
contrarv,  the  nature  or  form  of  the  laws  existing  might  have 
been  variously  modified.  They  exhibit  signs  of  having  been 
selected  and  instituted.  What,  then,  if  the  laws  of  the  celestial 
mechanism  had  been  either  indefinitely  more  simple  and  acces¬ 
sible,  or  more  complicated  and  recondite,  than  they  are  ?  Who 
does  not  see  that,  on  the  former  hypothesis,  they  would  have 
been  comparatively  valueless  as  a  means  of  man’s  intellectual 
development,  and  that,  on  the  latter,  he  must  have  remained  in 
ignorance  of  all  the  proofs  which  they  now  exhibit  of  original  ad¬ 
justment  by  a  designing  Mind  ?  If,  however,  the  earth  is  to  be 
the  scene  of  man’s  mental  and  religious  education,  the  existing 
constitution  of  the  heavens  is  admirably  adapted  to  furnish  him 
alike  with  a  portion  of  his  science  and  of  a  well-reasoned  natu¬ 
ral  theology.  And  in  this  Divine  adjustment  of  the  laws  of 
mind  and  matter,  a  true  philosophy* will  recognize,  at  least,  one 
reason  for  the  actual  method  or  mechanism  of  the  heavens. 

Though  only  a  subordinate  matter,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place 
to  state  my  reasons  for  the  space  accorded,  in  the  first  Part,  to 

A* 


vi 


PREFACE. 


the  consideration  of  the  human  constitution  and  of  natural  laws. 
While  the  present  volume  advances  only,  in  man’s  historical 
career,  to  that  opening  stage  when  first  he  awoke  to  a  conscious¬ 
ness  of  guilt,  his  constitution  is  for  all  duration.  All  his  sub¬ 
sequent  history  is  only  its  externalization  and  exponent.  Its 
permanence  alone,  therefore,  might  justify  our  prolonged  con¬ 
sideration  of  it.  But  the  study  of  it  is  also  essential  to  the 
intelligent  appreciation  of  much  of  that  Divine  revelation  which 
presupposes  and  appeals  to  it ;  as  well  as  prepares  the  way  for 
more  effectually  dealing  with  many  of  the  supposed  difficulties 
of  revelation,  or  of  showing  that  revelation  has  been  unjustly 
burdened  with  them,  since  they  belong  properly  to  the  more 
ancient  department  of  human  nature.  Revelation  only  assumes 
them  as  facts  already  and  independently  existing ;  but  it  is  no 
more  answerable  for  them  than  the  old  religion  of  Egypt  was, 
because  it  built  its  temples  and  monuments  on  the  banks  of  the 
Nile,  for  the  mystery  in  which  the  fountains  of  that  river  are 
hid ;  or  than  the  Moral  Law  is  responsible  for  the  unsolved 
problems  of  geology  and  meteorology,  because  the  Divine  Law¬ 
giver  appropriately  uttered  his  voice  from  among  the  granite 
crags  of  Sinai,  and  aggravated  the  appalling  splendors  of  the 
scene  by  piling  the  mountain  with  dark  thunder-clouds.  True ; 
the  God-made  man,  and  the  God-inspired  word,  are  two  parts 
of  one  whole  —  two  compartments  of  one  temple  —  but  he  who 
reserves  all  his  difficulties  and  questionings  for  the  inner,  shows 
that  he  has  passed  through  the  outer  court  blindfold. 

Respecting  natural  laws,  also,  I  have  been,  incidentally,  more 
specific  and  urgent  than  might  have  been  deemed  necessary, 
were  it  not  for  the  conviction  that  the  subject  has  not  received 
that  distinct  recognition  in  much  of  our  modern  religious  litera- 


PREFACE. 


Vll 

ture,  which  its  fundamental  importance  requires.  Reasons  ex¬ 
planatory,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  exculpatory,  of  this  compar¬ 
ative  neglect  might,  if  necessary,  be  easily  assigned ;  such,  for 
example,  as  the  idea  of  thereby  magnifying,  by  implication,  the 
claims  of  God’s  providential  administration,  and  of  rendering 
additional  homage  to  it.  But  one  of  the  evil  consequences  has 
been,  that  some  parties  have  been  led  to  pursue  the  opposite 
extreme ;  and  that,  by  simply  recalling  attention  to  the  course 
and  constitution  of  nature,  they  have  come  to  be  regarded  by 
many  almost  in  the  light  of  grand  discoverers  —  as  peculiar 
benefactors  of  their  species  —  as  possessed  of  a  kind  of  know¬ 
ledge  more  immediately  useful  than  any  religious  teaching  — 
and  as  being  justified  in  silently  omitting  all  mention  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  an  ever-active  Providence,  or  even  in  indirectly  pro¬ 
testing  against  it.  The  erroneous  supposition  appears  to  be, 
that  Nature  and  Providence  are  two  hostile  claimants ;  and  that 
whatever  importance  is  ceded  to  the  one  is  so  much  homage 
taken  from  the  other.  The  truth  being,  however,  that  the  for¬ 
mer  is  properly  opposed  only  to  chance  or  an  unreasoning 
caprice,  and  the  latter  to  a  blind  necessity.  Nature  is  the  pri¬ 
mary  utterance  of  Providence  —  its  first  proclamation  respect¬ 
ing  the  laws  according  to  which  it  proposes  to  govern.  But 
that  it  is  neither  restricted  to  any  given  natural  laws,  nor  ulti* 
mately  dependent  on  them,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  his¬ 
tory  of  creation  is  a  history  of  changes  and  additions  unknown 
to  all  the  previous  course  of  nature ;  man  himself  being  one 
of  the  latest,  the  crowning  addition. 

These  topics,  however,  are  only  incidental  to  the  main  sub¬ 
ject.  As  to  the  filling  up  of  my  outline  in  the  following  pages, 
with  what  may  be  called  the  Proem  of  man’s  eventful  history, 


PREFACE. 


vin 

I  leave  it  to  speak  for  itself ;  with  no  solicitude  whatever  re¬ 
specting  the  truth  and  importance  of  the  principles  involved, 
hut  with  much  relative  to  the  manner  in  which  I  have  ex¬ 
pounded  them. 


CONTENTS. 


FIRST  PART. 

THE  DIVINE  METHOD. 

CHAPTER  I.  —  HOLINESS. 

1,  The  ancient  earth  prepared  for  man.  2,  Geological  changes,  which 
preceded  his  creation,  more  remarkable  than  those  which  attended  it 
3,  Other  intelligences  already  existed  elsewhere.  4,  But  man’s  creation 
of  profound  interest.  5,  The  first  Law.  6,  The  ancient  earth  the  scene 
of  Divine  power.  7,  Of  Wisdom.  8,  Of  Goodness,  awakening  the  expec¬ 
tation  of  another  disclosure.  9,  Moral  Government ;  Holiness,  Justice-. 

10,  Will  the  different  parts  of  this  stage  be  separated  by  long  intervals  1 

11.  Holiness  already  displayed  elsewhere.  12,  Will  man  be  the  occasion 

of  a  new  disclosure  ?  13,  He  may  be  expected  first  to  epitomise  and 

exhibit  the  preceding  displays.  14,  Man’s  constitution.  15,  The  image 
cf  God . 

CHAPTER  K  — THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 

1,  The  second  law  2,  New  source  of  information,  the  Bible.  3,  Char 
acter  of  the  narrative.  4,  Anthropopathic.  5,  Optical.  6,  Specifically 
relates  to  man.  7,  Is  m  analogy  with  disciplinary  character  of  general 
Divine  arrangements.  8,  Law  illustrated  :  pre-existing  matter  employed. 
9,  Time  of  its  origination  indefinitely  remote.  10,  Probable  extent  of  the 
Mosaic  chaos  and  creation.  11,  The  Edenic  region  and  garden.  12,  State 
of  chaos.  13,  The  six  days’  work.  14,  The  conditions  of  this  law  further 
satisfied.  15,  In  the  creation  of  man.  16,  Antecedently  improbable  that 
man  would  be  closely  allied  to  preceding  nature.  17,  Yet  he  is  material. 
18.  Organic.  19,  Animal.  20,  First ,  as  to  nutrition.  21,  Secondly ,  the 
propagation  of  the  species.  22,  The  creation  of  woman.  23,  The  unity 
of  the  species.  24,  How  implied  in  Gen.  i.  ii.  25,  Difficulties  to  be 
expected,  but  diminishing.  26,  Inferred  from  anatomy.  27,  Physiologj. 
28,  Psychology.  29,  History  and  physical  geography.  30,  Comparative 
philology.  32,  Analogy.  33,  Objection  from  chronology  answered.  34. 
Plurality  of  species  involves  greater  difficulties.  35,  The  different  branches 
of  evidence  unite.  36,  Thirdly ,  Instincts.  37,  Nature  and  man  recipro¬ 
cally  related.  38,  Man’s  “  foundation  in  the  dust.”  39,  The  probable 
relation  of  the  angelic  to  the  human  economy  .  .  .  .  10 

CHAPTER  III.  — PROGRESSION. 

Section  I.  —  Sensation  and  Perception. 

1,  The  third  law.  2,  Reasons  for  it.  3,  Man,  the  being  to  whom  the 
Divine  manifestation  is  to  be  made.  4,  The  Creating  and  the  created 


X 


CONTENTS. 


minds  must  have  certain  things  in  common.  5,  General  proposition  ;  man 
must  be  placed  in  sensible  communication  with  nature.  6,  Certain  condi¬ 
tions  of  sensational  perception.  7,  That  the  perception  be  of  phenomena 
—  secondary  qualities  —  primary  qualities.  9,  That  the  intellect  appre¬ 
hend  the  object  as  it  is  —  probable  ground  of  the  distinction  between  pri¬ 
mary  and  secondary  qualities,  in  relation  to  man.  11,  That  perception 
be  immediate  —  representationalism  and  its  source  —  leads  to  idealism  — 
knowledge  of  objects  direct.  15,  That  these  conditions  be  uniform  and 
constant.  16,  Subjective  conditions  presupposed.  17,  First  sensational 
perceptions  of  the  first  man . 34 

Section  II.  —  Understanding  and  Reflection. 

1,  General  proposition.  2,  Man  must  have  the  power  of  observing 
relations.  3,  Where  do  they  exist  1  4,  Laws  of  the  mind  in  thinking  l 
Difference  between  Locke  and  Kant.  5,  Examples  ;  every  body  in  space, 
motion  in  time.  6,  Every  phenomenon  has  a  cause.  7,  Every  attribute 
implies  a  substance.  8.  Secondary  qualities  imply  externality.  9,  Ex¬ 
ternal  phenomena  sustain  relations  of  resemblance.  10,  Means  and  ends, 
or  final  clauses.  11,  Logic.  12,  Induction.  13,  Art.  14.  Here  is  a  second 
means  of  knowledge.  15,  Coincidence  of  the  objective  and  the  sub¬ 
jective  . 43 


Section  III.  —  Reason ,  speculative  and  realized. 

1.  General  proposition  ;  man  must  have  rational  beliefs,  which  account 
for  these  relations.  2,  Characteristics  of  such  beliefs.  6,  How  do  they 
arise  ?  7,  Order  of  their  development  —  distinctions  between  reason  spe¬ 

culative  and  practical.  12,  The  form  of  the  products  of  reason,  as  Beliefs 
—  different  opinions  respecting  our  views  of  the  Infinite.  16,  Number  of 
original  beliefs  —  must  include  whatever  truths  were  presupposed  in 
creation.  19,  Validity  of  such  beliefs  —  authority  of  consciousness  ulti¬ 
mate  —  for  the  spiritual  as  well  as  for  the  material.  25.  Provision  for  the 
reception  of  Divine  revelations.  26,  Ground  for  expecting  such  a  mental 
constitution.  27,  The  mind  transcends  nature.  28,  Antecedents,  logical 
and  chronological.  29,  The  arguments  a  priori  and  a  posteriori.  30,  Ne¬ 
cessary  and  contingent  truth.  31,  Synthesis  and  analysis.  32,  Co-exist- 
tenc^and  successive  existence.  33,  Deduction.  34,  Induction.  36.  Nature 
and  man  proceed  inversely.  40,  Necessary  truth  brings  the  mind  nearer 
to  God.  41,  Science  becomes  deductive.'  42,  Sense,  reflection,  reason, 
coincide  with  nature,  man,  God.  43,  God  descends  in  nature,  man 
ascends . 54 

Section  IY.  —  Imagination. 

1,  General  proposition.  2,  The  actual  not  the  measure  of  the  possible. 
3.  Imagination,  how  allied  to  the  preceding  faculties.  4,  Distinguishable 
from  them.  5,  Works  of,  anticipate  criticism.  6.  Distinct  from  fancy. 
7.  Relates  to  that  which  might  be.  8,  Its  sphere,  the  moral  as  well  as  the 
intellectual . 81 


Section  Y.  —  Man  Emotional. 

1,  Necessity  for  emotional  susceptibility.  2,  Proposition.  3,  Emotion, 
what,  as  compared  with  appetites,  sensation,  &c.  —  distribution  of  emotion 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


—  appropriative.  1 1 ,  Irapartative.  18,  Arrestive.  1 9,  Perfective  —  beauty 

and  sublimity.  20,  Remedial,  21,  Relational ;  further  generalization.  22, 
Their  relation  to  the  great  scheme.  23,  Co-extensive  with  means  of 
knowledge.  24,  Important  to  cultivate  them.  25,  So  as  to  be  moved  by 
objects  in  proportion  to  their  importance.  26,  Forming  a  scale  of  valua 
tion.  27,  Laws  of  the  emotions . 85 

Section  VI.  —  Man  Voluntary. 

1,  Viewed  hitherto  as  passive.  2,  A  will  necessary.  3,  General  propo¬ 
sition.  6,  Motives  conditionally  resistible.  10,  Force  of  motives  differing 
from  physical  causation.  11,  The  will  itself  a  conditioned  cause.  14, 
Conscious  non-restraint  in  volition  —  freedom  an  ultimate  fact  —  motives, 
not  objective  powers  —  character  and  motive  re-act  —  idea  of  a  cause 
first  given  by  the  will.  21,  But  volitions  necessarily  conditioned  by 
motives  —  each  theory  errs  by  exclusiveness  —  liberty  of  indifference  ab¬ 
surd.  25,  Can  a  particular  will  co-exist  with  a  universal  law  ?  Law  and 
liberty  co-exist  in  God.  and,  therefore,  manifested  in  man,  and  analogous 
with  it  —  Divine  and  human  agency  compatible — coincidence  of  the 
human  will  with  the  Divine  essential  to  freedom.  30,  Can  man’s  freedom 
co-exist  with  the  laws  of  material  nature  ?  This  makes  self-dedication 
possible.  32,  Power  of  the  will ;  can  call  for  various  motives.  33,  These 
suggest  others.  34,  From  which  it  can  select  —  attention,  35,  Attention 
increases  the  motive  power  of  an  object  —  hence  Belief  not  involuntary 

—  in  what  sense  necessary  to  aid  understanding.  37,  Prevents  distraction 

from  other  objects.  39,  Voluntary  acts  become  easier  by  repetition — 
habit.  42,  Muscular  system  given  to  serve  the  will.  44,  The  individual 
will  can  unite  with  other  wills.  45,  A  number  co-operating  for  good,  sub¬ 
lime.  46,  Even  one  will  united  with  the  Divine.  47,  The  Bible  assumes 
all  the  laws  of  the  will . 100 

Section  VII.  —  Conscience. 

1,  An  intelligent  will,  a  new  power  on  earth.  3,  A  reflection  of  the 
Divine  will.  4,  Constitutes  man  a  person.  5,  But  not  the  only  element 
of  responsibility  —  general  proposition.  7,  Twofold  distribution  of  moral 
science.  8,  How  does  man  derive  the  notion  of  virtue  ?  9,  He  univer¬ 

sally  recognizes  a  moral  quality  in  actions.  13,  Not  from  human  law 
14,  Nor  from  Divine  appointment.  15,  Nor  from  his  own  constitution. 
17,  Nor  as  the  result  of  intellectual  intuition.  18,  Judgment.  19,  Asso¬ 
ciation.  22,  Nor  a  calculation  of  consequences  —  Hobbes  —  Hume  — 
Paley  —  Dwight.  25.  Several  reasons  why  not.  34,  Conscience  a  dis¬ 
tinct  faculty.  36,  Its  function.  37,  Threefold.  40,  Its  relation  to  the 
different  classes  of  the  motives.  41,  To  the  will.  42,  Universal  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  movements  of  the  mind.  43,  Unintermitting.  44,  Supreme. 
46,  Influence  without  compulsion.  47,  Its  perversion  within  limits.  131 


Section  Vin.  —  Language  and  Testimony. 

1.  A  second  mind  a  means  of  knowledge.  2,  Conditions  of  this  know¬ 
ledge.  3,  First,  language,  what  —  sounds  —  articulate  —  signs  of  thought 
— harmonizing  with  laws  of  thought  —  mental  agreement  —  verbal  agree¬ 
ment —  fixed.  10.  Secondly,  the  credibility  of  testimony  must  be  ascer¬ 
tainable.  11,  Conditions.  *17,  The  mind  constituted  to  believe  such.  18, 


Xll 


CONTENTS. 


What  the  origin  of  language.  19,  Three  opinions.  22,  The  original 
unity  of  language.  23,  The  primitive  language.  24,  Erroneous  notions 
respecting  the  new-made  man . 156 

Section  EX.  —  Man's  Primitive  Condition. 

1,  His  selected  abode.  2,  Well-being  provided  for.  3,  A  Divine  in 
structor.  4,  Opinions  on  this  subject.  5,  A  second  human  being.  6,  The 
institution  of  the  sabbath.  7,  The  enactment  of  a  special  law.  8,  Dis¬ 
closing  that  God  is  the  Creator.  9,  The  existence  of  moral  government. 
10,  The  immortality  of  the  soul.  11,  Reasons  for  its  immortality,  objec¬ 
tive.  12,  Subjective.  13.  Judicial.  14,  The  death  threatened.  15,  Bodily 
dissolution  falls  short  of  it.  16,  Had  man  not  fallen,  the  universe  of 
worlds  was  open  to  hkn.  17,  God  had  now  a  son  upon  earth  .  166 

CHAPTER  IV.  —  CONTINUITY. 

1,  Serial  character  of  the  Adamic  creation.  3,  Man  in  chronological 
continuity — recency  of  his  origin.  4,  Geological  continuity.  5,  Physio¬ 
logical —  limits  of  this  idea.  6,  Part  of  the  great  system  .  180 

CHAPTER  V.  —  DEVELOPMENT. 

1.  Law  of  development.  2,  Superiority  of  man’s  physical  structure 
6,  The  social  principle.  8,  Perfection  of  man’s  perceptions  exceeds  the 
comparative  perfection  of  his  organs.  9,  Relative  proportion  of  brain  in 
the  vertebrata.  10,  Embryotic  and  transmutation  hypotheses  unfounded 
12,  Phrenology.  15,  Distinctions  between  mind  and  matter.  24,  Mind 
of  animals  —  instinct.  28,  Human  mind  differs  in  kind  and  degree.  30, 
Man’s  end  agrees  with  his  constitution.  31,  Develops  nature,  and  raises 
its  relations . 185 


CHAPTER  VI.  — ACTIVITY. 

1,  Law  of  activity.  2,  Movements  involuntary  —  voluntary.  4,  Made 
necessary  by  man’s  constitution.  5,  And  by  that  of  the  world  around  him. 
6,  Volition  incessant.  7,  Activity  a  condition  of  development  —  with  the 
first  man  —  and  in  heaven . 208 

CHAPTER  VII.  —  RELATIONS. 

1,  Law  of  relation.  2,  Relations  internal  and  co-existent.  4,  Succes¬ 
sively  existent.  5,  External  and  co-existent  —  physical  —  sentient  —  re¬ 
flective  —  rational  —  mind  to  mind  —  imaginative  —  emotional  —  volun¬ 
tary —  moral — verbal  —  to  God.  19,  Successively  existent.  20,  To 
God.  21,  Man’s  relations  complicated,  continuous,  ever-increasing,  uni¬ 
versal  .  . 212 

CHAPTER  VIII.— ORDER. 

1,  Law  of  order.  2,  Illustrated  physiologically.  4,  By  the  succession 
in  which  the  phenomena  of  intelligence  are  developed.  5,  Knowledge  is 
sought.  6,  Principles  of  action  appear.  7,  Religion.  8,  Order  of  the 
Adamic  creation .  226 


CONTENTS. 


Xlll 


CHAPTER  IX.  —  INFLUENCE. 

1,  Law  of  influence.  2,  In  pre-existing  nature.  3,  In  man,  a  self¬ 
knowing  and  self-governing  power.  5,  Capable  of  constant  increase.  6, 
Imprints  himself  on  nature,  and  subordinates  it.  7,  Influence  on  his 
fellow-man.  8,  With  God.  9,  And  is  himself  influenced  .  .  230 

CHAPTER  X.  —  SUBORDINATION. 

1,  Law  of  subordination.  2,  Man’s  nature  a  constitution.  3,  Motives, 
their  graduated  rank.  7,  Corresponding  rank  of  their  external  objects. 
9,  Supremacy  of  that  which  points  to  the  Divine  will.  10,  Influence  of 
ideas  superior  to  that  of  brute  force.  1 1,  Moral  ideas  supreme.  12,  Man’s 
influence  on  others  determined  by  his  moving  principle.  13,  The  loftiness 
of  his  aim.  14,  The  entireness  of  his  pursuit.  15,  Ranks  according  to  his 
influence.  16,  Law  of  influence,  one  of  improvement  .  .  .  235 

CHAPTER  XI.  —  OBLIGATION. 

1,  Law  of  obligation.  2,  Every  part  of  man’s  nature  under  obligation 
—  physical  —  sentient  —  reflective,  &c.  11,  Obligation  progressive.  12, 

What  he  might  have  been,  determines  obligation.  13,  His  obligations  to 
the  objective  universe.  14,  As  he  is  sentient  —  reflective,  &c.  20,  To 

obey  God,  supreme.  21,  Erom  the  constitution  of  things.  22,  And,  as 
such,  suited  to  our  nature.  23.  Obligation  continuous.  24,  Increasing. 
25,  Varying.  26,  Universal.  27,  If  violated,  by  him  remediless.  28,  De¬ 
pendence  and  duty  of  primitive  man.  29,  Ground  of  obligation  .  243 

CHAPTER  XII.  — UNIFORMITY  OF  GENERAL  LAWS. 

1,  Obligation  presupposes  Law.  2,  Conformity  to  law  of  pre-existing 
nature.  3,  Uniformity  conditional.  4,  Wrong  distinct  from  guilt.  6, 
Consequences  of  guilt.  7,  How  man  may  know  the  natural  laws  under 
which  he  is  placed.  8,  And  his  moral  obligation.  9,  Hoav  far  these  laws 
suffice  —  defects  of  natural  religion.  10,  Ignorance  and  depravity  do  not 
absolve  from  law.  12,  Nature  an  instrument  of  moral  government.  13, 
Not  exclusive  of  providential  superintendence  ....  258 

CHAPTER  XIII.  — WELL-BEING. 

1.  Law  of  well-being.  2,  Internal  conditions  of,  co-existent.  3,  Succes- 
sivelj^existent.  4,  Viewing  man  as  progressive  —  habit.  5,  From  habit 
results  character.  6,  Objective  conditions  of  well-being.  9,  Man  the 
subject  of  moral  government  —  pain.  11,  The  system  only  partially  devel¬ 
oped  here  —  punishment  inheres.  13,  Natural  religion  —  its  office  — 
insufficiency.  16,  The  kind  of  revelation  necessary.  17,  Character,  ulti¬ 
mately  a  self- formation.  18,  Primal  prohibition  meant  to  teach  this.  19, 
Man’s  yearning  after  ideal  perfection.  20,  His  departure  from  it  admits 
of  infinite  diversity . 267 


CHAPTER  XIV.  —  CONTINGENCE  OR  DEPENDENCE. 

1,  System  to  which  man  belongs  dependent.  2,  The  time  of  his  crea¬ 
tion.  3,  His  earliest  locality  —  his  constitution — that  of  the  planet  he 

B 


xiv 


CONTENTS. 


inhabits  —  and  his  knowledge.  8,  Wi  th  a  view  to  his  freedom.  9,  His 
immortality,  a  gift.  10,  Paradisiacal  arrangements.  11,  Danger  of  sup¬ 
posing  himself  independent  —  provided  against.  13,  Man,  subjectively 
dependent — three  theories.  14,  Divine  sustentation  differs  with  the  dif¬ 
ferent  parts  of  man.  15,  The  whole  an  illustration  of  Divine  Sove¬ 
reignty  .  . 285 


CHAPTER  XV.  —  ULTIMATE  FACTS. 

1,  Ultimate  facts,  what?  2,  Law, what?  3,  Not  equivalent  to  cause  — 
explains  nothing.  4,  Three  modes  of  treating  on  ultimate  facts  of  nature 
—  as  inherent  causes —  laws  —  effects  of  a  Divine  Agent.  7,  Nature,  an 
ultimate  fact  —  life  —  sensation  —  instinct  —  mind.  1 2,  Ground  of  belief 
in  external  existence,  ultimate  —  the  cause  of  man’s  existence  —  charac¬ 
ter' —  power  of  prayer  —  idea  of  amoral  quality  in  actions — of  immor¬ 
tality —  and  of  moral  evil.  19,  Every  part  of  man’s  constitution  points 
to  an  ultimate  fac4 . 295 


CHAPTER  XVI.  — NECESSARY  TRUTH. 

1,  Relation  of  ultimate  facts  to  necessary  truth.  2,  Necessary  truth 
distinguished  —  implied  —  characterized  —  instances  of.  6,  Ideas  of  free¬ 
dom —  right  —  perfection  —  law,  &c.  10,  As  conscious  of  it,  man  com¬ 
munes  with  the  Infinite  mind . 309 


CHAPTER  XVH.  — ANALOGY. 

1,  General  proposition.  2,  First ,  man,  constructed  on  a  plan.  3,  His 
intellect  related  to  the  great  system.  4,  His  emotions  classify  their 
objects.  5,  His  moral  nature  finds  its  proper  objects  without.  6,  His  well¬ 
being  proportioned  to  the  harmony  of  his  constitution  and  condition.  7, 
Original  perfection  of  the  adjustment.  8,  Secondly ,  the  human  dispensa¬ 
tion  introduced  like  others.  9,  When  the  earth  was  suited  to  man.  10, 
Without  deranging  nature.  11,  Moral  government  only  an  advance  — 
probation.  12,  Continuity  of  existence,  not  without  analogies.  14,  So, 
also,  probation.  15,  Possibility  of  failure.  16,  Direct  revelation  no  objec¬ 
tion.  17,  Difficulties  analogous.  18,  Thirdly,  universal  classification,  prin¬ 
ciples  of  —  order  —  illustration  —  characteristics.  22,  Places  man  at  the 
head  of  creation.  23,  Gives  every  man  “  his  own  place.”  24,  On  what 
grounds.  25,  The  final  classification . 4  314 


CHAPTER  XVHI.  — CHANGE. 

1,  Will  man  fall  ?  2,  Will  his  probationary  stage  be  succeeded  by 

another  ?  3,  The  law  of  change  —  illustrated.  5,  In  relation  to  proba 

tionary  man.  6,  Probationary  conditions  fulfilled  —  man  free  —  and  de¬ 
pendent —  means  of  verifying  both.  9,  His  first  sin.  10,  Made  sensible 
of  his  dependence.  11,  But  is  his  holiness  adequately  illustrated  ?  12, 

Adequately  for  whom?  14,  Conditions  of  change.  15,  The  first  inap¬ 
plicable.  16,  The  second  fulfilled  —  God  himself  satisfied.  18,  The  third 
fulfilled . 33" 


CONTENTS. 


XV 


SECOND  PART. 

THE  REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

Section  I. —  The  reason  which  belongs  to  man’s  constitution,  and  involves 

his  well-being. 

1,  Stated.  2,  Method  in  creation  essential.  3,  That  the  objective  con¬ 
ditions  of  science  might  exist.  4,  The  subjective.  5,  That  philosophy 
and  natural  theology  might  be  possible.  6,  And  man’s  development  and 
probation.  7,  His  physical  adjustment,  and  its  liabilities.  8,  Sensation, 
and  its  liabilities.  9,  His  power  of  belief  on  evidence,  of  reason,  imagi¬ 
nation,  speech,  gesture,  emotion,  and  their  respective  dangers.  15,  His 
motives,  in  which  the  material  and  the  spiritual  are  balanced  —  the  present 
and  future  —  one  and  many  —  the  limited  and  the  unlimited.  19,  Dangers 
of  the  undue  development  of  the  intellect  —  the  emotions  —  the  different 
classes  of  motives.  22,  Men  distributable  into  two  classes — one  seeking 
to  enlarge  their  freedom,  the  other  to  reduce  it.  24,  Every  period  of  life 
on  probation  —  why  —  nothing  man’s  except  by  experience  —  conditions 
of  it  —  why  are  his  powers  only  thus  ascertainable.  29,  Conditions  of  the 
trial  —  advantages  of  it  —  folly  of  pushing  the  inquiry  further  .  351 

Section  II. —  The  reason  which  relates  to  the  Divine  all-sufficiency,  and 

includes  man's  destiny. 

1,  All  possible  creations  not  desirable  —  the  possible  development  of 
man  makes  it  unnecessary.  5,  Every  individual,  community,  period,  and 
branch  of  the  human  family  different.  10,  Different  worlds.  11,  Each 
family,  nation,  age,  and  world,  treated  distinctly,  and  apart,  yet,  as  a  whole. 
16,  Reasons,  physical,  moral,  and  Divine.  17,  The  spiritual  creation  has  a 
universal  law  as  well  as  the  material.  19,  Universe  ever  receiving  acces¬ 
sions.  20,  Probable  limit  to  this  view.  21,  Some  of  the  conditions  of  a 
Revelation.  22,  Man’s  wants  multiplied  indefinitely  by  the  diversity  of 
character  which  sin  makes  possible.  23,  And  by  the  perversion  of  every 
remedial  interposition.  24,  He  may  have  to  exhaust  these  possibilities. 
25,  This  not  necessary.  26,  Divine  resources  illustrated  by  every  new 
complication.  27,  Their  inconceivableness.  28,  While  on  probation, 
each  world  probablv  has  to  confine  itself  chiefly  to  its  own  special  history. 

373 

Section  III. —  The  two-fold  reason  in  its  application  to  the  first  man. 

1,  He  takes  hiS  place  in  the  great  system.  2,  Present  existence  of 
sin  assumed.  3,  The  first  law  —  a  test  of  character  still.  5,  Implied  the 
harmony  of  man’s  constitution  with  itself  and  with  the  universe.  8,  The 
arrangement  combined  the  minimum  of  liability  with  the  maximum  of 
advantage.  9,  Reasonableness  of  the  law  —  three-fold  adaptation.  11, 
The  temptation  of  a  counterbalance.  12,  The  particular  test  selected. 
14,  Personal  consequences  of  the  Fall.  15,  The  outward  act  indicative 
of  a  state  of  mind.  16,  How  sin  began  —  how  it  depraves.  18,  Deprava¬ 
tion —  guilt  —  changed  condition  —  special  provision  withdrawn  —  ex¬ 
emption  from  dissolution  repealed.  23,  Nothing  arbitrary.  24,  Effect  on 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


posterity.  27,  Breach  of  moral,  worse  than  of  material  law.  28,  Princi 
pie  of  the  probationary  law  universal.  29,  Was  evil  foreseen?  —  could  it 
have  been  prevented  ?  —  power  and  danger  of  sinning,  distinct.  32,  Evil, 
subordinated  to  good  —  and  to  a  further  proof  of  the  Divine  resources. 
34,  God’s  subjective  hatred  to  sin.  35,  The  great  Lesson  of  man's  trial  — 
still  pursued,  as  a  leading  principle  of  Divine  procedure  .  .  392 


THIRD  PART.  • 

THE  ULTIMATE  END. 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Section  I.  —  Power. 

1,  Proofs  of,  brought  forward  —  ever  increasing.  3,  Man  himself  a 
power  —  enabling  him  to  apprehend  the  power  of  the  Creator  —  and  to 
reason  from  a  limited  cause  to  the  unlimited.  6,  His  influence  over  mind 
gives  him  the  profoundest  conception  of  power  .  .  .  419 

Section  II.  —  Wisdom. 

1,  Proofs  of,  brought  forward.  2,  New  evidences  of,  in  man’s  means  of 
knowledge  —  power  of  classification  —  emotions  —  will  and  conscience. 
6.  In  his  internal  relations  —  successively  existent.  8,  Various  illustrations 
of  design.  9,  Estimated  numerically.  10,  Tests  of.  11,  The  first  man 
exhibited  all  these  illustrations  of.  12,  Man  finds  his  wisdom  in  searching 
after  God’s . 422 


Section  III.  —  Goodness. 

1,  Past  proofs  of,  repeated  in  man,  and  exceeded.  2,  A  constitution 
for  enjoyment  —  ever-increasing.  4,  His  primitive  condition  corresponded 
•  —  activity  without  toil  —  a  help-meet  —  a  sabbath  —  progressive  develop¬ 
ment  consulted  —  Divine  instruction  —  exemption  from  death.  10,  Pro¬ 
bation,  benevolent —  its  result  made  the  occasion  of  good.  12,  As  mere 
proof  of,  all  this  in  excess  —  prospectively,  greater  still  .  •  428 

Section  IV.  —  Holiness. 

1,  Already  proved,  by  another  race.  2,  In  addition,  man  organized  for 
virtue.  3,  His  instincts  subservient  to  it  —  his  reason  —  himsc  7  a  self¬ 
judicature —  virtue  made  pleasurable  —  and  progressive.  8,  External 
arrangements  correspond  —  physical  —  instinctive  —  social  —  sympathetic 
—  infantine  —  tasteful  —  useful.  1 7,  His  mind  an  image  of  the  Divine  — 
subject  to  limits.  19,  His  probation  illustrative  of  Divine  holiness  —  and 
his  failure  —  and  its  results.  22,  Angelic  conceptions  of  that  holiness. 
23.  Possible  conjunction  of  the  two  economies  —  conjecture  falls  short  of 
reality.  25,  Man  may  well  wait  for  results.  His  first  crisis  .  436 


NOTE 

INDEX 


453 

460 


MAN. 


FIRST  PART. 

THE  DIVINE  METHOD. 


CHAPTER  I. 


HOLINESS. 

1.  Man  was  not  made  for  the  earth;  the  earth,  from  the 
first,  had  been  preparing  for  man,  and  we  are  to  suppose  that 
now,  at  length,  the  hour  of  his  creation  had  arrived.  Often,  we 
believe,  since  the  material  of  the  earth  was  at  first  called  into 
existence,  had  vast  spaces  on  its  surface  become  “  formless  and 
waste,”  and  “  darkness  ”  had  hung  “  on  the  face  of  the  deep.” 
And  as  often  had  the  creative  will  recalled  it  from  chaos,  and 
restored  it  to  order  and  beauty.  But  even  each  of  these  suc¬ 
cessive  wrecks  of  the  earth  had  looked  on.  beyond  itself,  and 
had  a  respect  to  the  coming  of  man ;  and  each  of  the  new 
creations  which  followed  had  formed  part  of  a  system  of  means 
of  which  he  was  to  be  the  subordinate  end.  For  him,  volcanic 
fires  had  fused  and  crystallized  the  granite,  and  piled  it  up  into 
lofty  table-lands.  The  never-wearied  water  had,  for  him,  worn 
and  washed  it  down  into  extensive  valleys  and  plains  of  vege¬ 
table  soil.  F or  him,  the  earth  had  often  vibrated  with  electrical 
shocks,  and  had  become  interlaced  with  rich  metallic  veins. 
Ages  of  comparative  quiet  had  followed  each  great  revolution 
of  nature,  during  some  of  which  the  long-accumulating  vege¬ 
tables  of  preceding  periods  were,  for  him,  transmuted  into 
stores  of  fuel ;  the  ferruginous  deposits  of  primeval  waters  were 
becoming  iron ;  and  successive  races  of  destroyed  animals  were 
changed  into  masses  of  useful  limestone.  The  interior  of  the 

1 


2 


MAN. 


earth  had  become  a  store-house,  in  which  everything  necessary 
was  laid  up  for  his  use,  in  order  that,  when  the  time  should 
come  for  him  to  open  and  gaze  on  its  treasures  —  on  “the 
blessings  of  the  deep  that  lieth  under,”  *  —  on  “  the  chief 
things  of  the  ancient  mountains,  and  the  precious  things  of  the 
lasting  hills,”  t  he  might  gratefully  recognize  the  benevolent 
foresight  of  the  Being  who  had  prepared,  selected,  and  placed 
them  there.  Many  of  those  great  facts  which  we  are  accustomed 
to  regard  as  alone  constituting  the  “  laws  of  nature,”  because  the 
uniformity  of  their  operation  extends  through  ages  of  duration, 
had  repeatedly  given  place  for  a  time,  and  had  owned  their  sub¬ 
jection  to  a  principle  more  comprehensive  still  —  the  principle 
that,  not  the  uniformity  of  ten  thousand  years,  but  the  change 
which  then  breaks  up  that  uniformity,  is  the  grand  controlling 
principle  of  the  universe,  —  itself,  perhaps,  of  uniform  recur¬ 
rence.  And,  for  him,  many  of  these  successive  changes  of  the 
earth  had  been  commemorated  by  geological  monuments,  which, 
when  uncovered  and  deciphered,  should  convince  him  that  all 
its  revolutions  had  been  conducted  under  the  superintending 
eye  of  Infinite  Wisdom.  All  this  may  be  said  to  have  taken 
place  for  him ;  not,  indeed,  exclusively  and  supremely,  but  in 
the  sense  that,  as  every  end  to  be  answered  by  creation  must 
be  supposed  to  be  included  in  the  Divine  purpose,  and  as  the 
coming  of  man  was  calculated  to  answer  the  highest  end  at 
that  time  attained,  every  preceding  end  may  be  regarded  as  a 
means  in  order  to  its  attainment. 

2.  The  appearance  of  man  on  the  terrestrial  stage,  therefore, 
is  to  be  regarded  as  the  great  event  of  the  Adamic  creation. 
Geologically  speaking,  more  remarkable  physical  changes  and 
organic  creations  had  signalized  preceding  epochs.  The  out¬ 
burst  of  vegetable  life  in  the  carboniferous  series,  and  the  ani¬ 
mal  forms  of  the  mammaliferous  period,  attest  creative  interpo¬ 
sitions  on  a  larger  scale  than  any  of  the  same  kind  which  have 
distinguished  subsequent  epochs. 

3.  And  there  is  ground  to  believe  also,  that  while  the  earth, 
as  the  scene  of  inorganic  change,  of  organic  life,  and  of  animal 
existence,  had,  for  unknown  ages,  exhibited  successive  displays 
of  power,  and  wisdom,  and  goodness,  other  parts  of  the  universe 
were  not  unvisited  by  sublime  disclosures  of  Divine  Perfection. 
Reasoning  from  analogy,  philosophy  assumes  the  probability 
that  the  heavenly  bodies  are  not  all  uninhabited.  From  the 


*  Gen.  xlix.  25. 


t  Deut.  xxxiii.  15. 


HOLINESS. 


3 


opening  pages  of  Revelation  we  are  led  to  infer  that,  prior  to 
the  creation  of  man,  an  order  of  intelligent  beings  had  been 
called  into  existence,  whose  generic  name,  as  known  to  us,  is 
“angels”  —  a  name  descriptive,  not  of  nature,  but  of  office. 
And  the  nature  of  their  connection  with  the  system  to  which 
man  belongs  will  hereafter  form  the  subject  of  our  considera¬ 
tion.  For  the  present,  we  have  to  regard  his  creation  as  the 
introduction  of  a  new  stage  of  the  Divine  procedure  —  as  the 
completion  and  crown  of  all  the  preceding  stages  of  the  terres¬ 
trial  economy. 

4.  Let  us  imagine,  as  an  analogous  case,  that  one  of  the 
planets  on  which,  in  the  stillness  of  evening,  our  eye  has  often 
rested,  and  which  for  untold  ages  has  been  pursuing  its  silent 
course  through  the  heavens,  were  about  to  become,  for  the  first 
time,  the  habitation  —  not  of  existence  from  other  worlds  —  but 
of  a  new  .race  of  intelligent  beings  ;  creatures  of  a  kind  hitherto 
unknown  to  the  universe  of  God ;  that  they  are  to  go  on  mul¬ 
tiplying  for  ages  ;  that,  as  their  history  advances,  it  is  to  be 
marked  by  unprecedented  events ;  to  be  the  means  of  devel¬ 
oping  new  principles  of  the  Divine  government,  new  aspects 
of  the  Divine  character ;  and  that  the  first  of  the  race  about  to 
be  created,  is  to  sustain,  in  some  way,  a  relation  to  all  that  shall 
follow,  which  shall  shed  a  peculiar  influence  on  the  whole, 
through  all  duration.  The  knowledge  of  such  an  event  impend¬ 
ing  there,  would  be  calculated  to  draw  to  it  the  interest,  and  to 
rivet  on  it  the  attention  of  the  universe.  Yet  such  was  the  pro¬ 
found  interest  —  however  unexciting  the  subject  may  have 
become  to  us  through  familiarity  —  which  attached  to  the  intro¬ 
duction  of  the  first  man  upon  the  earth. 

5.  In  proceeding  to  expound  the  sources  of  this  interest,  we 
propose  to  take  up  the  laws  of  the  Divine  Manifestation  in  the 
same  order  as  that  in  which  they  were  illustrated  in  the  trea¬ 
tise  on  “  The  Pre- Adamite  Earth,”  and  we  therefore  begin 
with  the  great  principle  that  “  every  divinely  originated  object 
and  event  is  a  result,  the  supreme  and  ultimate  reason  of  which 
is  in  the  Divine  nature.” 

6.  In  our  first  imaginary  visit  to  the  ancient  earth,  we  beheld, 
in  the  origination  of  matter  and  its  planetary  formation,  an 
expression  of  Power.  The  bare  existence  of  the  new  dependent 
substance  presupposed  the  existence  of  the  independent  and 
infinite  Substance.  The  laws  which  the  planetary  motions 
exhibited  were  His  laws,  and  proclaimed  Him  to  be  “  the  God 
of  outer.”  The  first  objective  effect  —  the  creation  of  matter  — 


4 


MAN. 


irresistibly  awoke  the  conviction  of  the  First  Cause ;  it  was  the 
solemn  utterance  of  the  Deity  on  causation.  We  beheld  the 
universe  of  matter  in  motion :  it  was  the  great  practical  lesson 
of  the  Deity  on  dynamics  —  the  doctrine  of  force  producing 
motion.  Every  idea  which  can  be  supposed  to  have  been  then 
truly  suggested  and  represented,  expressed  a  spiritual  corres¬ 
pondence,  infinitely  greater,  in  the  Divine  Creator.  But  that 
which  the  whole  —  every  property  of  matter,  every  process  by 
which  its  properties  were  developed,  every  law  which  regulated 
these  processes,  every  elementary  particle,  and  every  revolving 
planet  —  combined  pre-eminently  to  indicate,  was,  the  all-suffi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Power  of  God. 

7.  All  this,  however,  was  only  the  play  or  conflict  of  inor¬ 
ganic  matter.  Each  form  we  beheld  was  lifeless,  and  each 
motion  compelled,  or  impressed  by  a  force  from  without. 
After  the  lapse  of  an  incalculable  period,  therefore^  we  sup¬ 
posed  ourselves  permitted  to  revisit  the  earth,  in  the  expectation 
that,  during  the  mighty  interval,  another  fiat  had  gone  forth, 
and  another  effect  had  been  produced  as  wonderful  as  the  first, 
find  by  means  of  it.  And,  imagining  ourselves  in  the  situation 
of  beings  to  whom  nothing  of  the  kind  had  been  previously 
disclosed,  we  beheld  in  the  new  and  sacred  principle  of  organic 
Life,  in  which  innumerable  pre-existing  phenomena  were  now 
for  the  first  time  employed  as  means ,  for  the  development  of 
this  mysterious  principle  as  an  end,  the  display  of  Wisdom. 
We  admitted,  indeed,  that  whatever  illustrations  of  taste  in 
arrangement,  elegance  in  form,  beauty  in  color,  and  majesty  in 
magnitude  and  waving  motion,  the  botanical  kingdom  now  for 
the  first  time  exhibited,  were  to  be  regarded  as  indications  of 
the  Divine  complacency  in  the  graceful,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
sublime.  As  effects,  they  pointed  to  correspondences  infinitely 
greater  in  their  Cause.  But,  even  the  manner  in  which  each 
of  these  effects  is  produced,  is  a  proclamation  of  the  amazing 
wisdom  of  the  Maker.  Nor  could  we  have  looked  intelligently 
on  this  new,  organized,  living  kingdom  of  nature,  when  first  it 
came  into  existence,  without  feeling  that  we  were  in  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  a  Wisdom  to  us  unlimited. 

8.  A  survey  of  this  advanced  stage  of  the  Divine  operations 
prepared  us  to  expect,  that,  in  the  revolution  of  ages,  the  period 
might  come  when  forms  of  organized  being  might  not  only  live, 
but  move,  and  be  happy.  Accordingly,  another  supposed  visit 
to  the  scene  of  our  meditations  being  permitted  to  us,  a  spec¬ 
tacle  opened  to  our  view  which  compelled  us  to  exclaim,  “  How 


HOLINESS. 


5 


great  is  his  Goodness !  ”  In  the  introduction  of  animal  life, 
we  beheld  a  being  constructed  for  enjoyment ;  each  of  its  move¬ 
ments  yielding  it  gratification ;  each  of  its  senses  an  inlet  to 
pleasure ;  and  the  whole  preparing  the  way  for  greater  enjoy¬ 
ment  still,  and  finding  happiness  in  the  occupation.  If  the 
reason  for  the  existence  of  this  kind  of  life  is  to  be  sought  in 
the  Divine  Creator,  so  also  must  be  the  reason  of  its  enjoyment. 
As  every  effect  must  be,  in  some  sense,  like  its  cause,  the  origi¬ 
nation  of  even  a  single  creature  would  be,  not  indeed  formally, 
but  virtually,  a  manifestation  of  some  property  of  the  Divine 
Nature.  But  here  was  not  merely  an  individual  animal  de¬ 
signed  for  enjoyment,  nor  a  single  species,  but  a  world  —  a  suc¬ 
cession  of  worlds,  tilled  with  animal  enjoyment.  What  fact  of 
the  Divine  Creator  could  this  display  be  supposed  to  manifest, 
but  that  He,  “  the  Happy  God/’  is  good,  or  delights  to  impart 
happiness !  And  as  we  took  our  last  look  at  the  Pre- Adamite 
Earth,  we  felt  convinced  that  no  intelligent  being  could  have 
cast  back  a  mental  glance  to  the  remote  antiquity  when  the  first 
creative  fiat  went  forth,  and  then  have  called  before  his  mind 
the  long  series  of  creation  on  creation,  with  extended  intervals 
between,  which  had  since  then  taken  place,  without  admitting, 
long  before  he  had  arrived  at  the  close  of  his  retrospection,  the 
all-sufficiency  of  God  for  the  indefinite  enlargement  and  con¬ 
tinuance  of  similar  manifestations ;  and  that  long  before  he  had 
deciphered  every  symbol,  and  bowed  at  every  altar,  sacred  to 
the  Perfections  already  manifested,  he  would  have  been  pre¬ 
pared  for  the  unveiling  of  another  aspect  of  the  Divine  char¬ 
acter. 

9.  But  what  will  that  next  perfection  be  ?  If  Power,  Wis¬ 
dom,  and  Goodness  are  not  to  perpetuate  their  manifestation  by 
multiplying  physical  creations  alone,  some  other  perfection 
must  now  appear  which  shall  render  the  continuation  of  such 
additions  to  the  mere  material  world  unnecessary.  And  if  all 
which  Power,  and  Wisdom,  and  Goodness  have  done  already 
is  not  to  exist  in  vain  as  a  revelation  of  God  to  the  creature, 
a  being  must  yet  be  formed  capable  of  recognizing  these  per¬ 
fections  in  what  they  have  already  done.  The  same  reason 
which  made  it  infinitely  desirable  that,  the  glory  of  God  should 
be  made  objective  as  all-sufficiency,  clearly  implied  that,  when 
displayed,  there  would  be  beings  to  understand  it.  That  race, 
indeed,  whenever  it  shall  arrive,  may  be  expected,  in  harmony 
with  what  we  have  found  to  be  an  already  established  law  of 
tit \  manifestation,  to  assume  into  its  nature,  under  certain  qual- 

1* 


6 


MAN. 


ifications,  the  distinguishing  principles  of  the  physical,  the 
organic,  and  the  animal  creations  which  have  preceded  it,  and 
thus  to  form  a  part  of  the  actual  means  of  the  manifestion. 
But  the  great  end  and  object  of  the  whole  require,  in  the  case 
supposed,  that  the  new  race  of  creatures,  besides  displaying 
the  Power,  Wisdom,  and  Goodness  of  God,  in  common  with 
the  pre-existing  creations,  should  be  intelligent  beings,  capable 
of  understanding  the  display.  Such  a  capability  will,  of  course, 
be  associated  with  the  power  of  appreciating  what  is  under¬ 
stood  of  the  manifestation ;  for  to  understand,  and  yet  not  to 
appreciate  it,  would  be  to  defeat  the  very  design  of  the  mani¬ 
festation.  But  the  system  requires  that  beings  capable  of 
understanding  and  appreciating  the  Divine  perfections,  and  who 
are  thus  constituted  a  part  of  the  manifestation,  should  be  capa¬ 
ble  also  of  consciously  and  voluntarily  promoting  the  objects 
of  the  great  system,  and  should  be  held  responsible  for  under¬ 
standing,  appreciating,  and  intentionally  promoting  it,  to  the 
utmost  extent  of  their  means.  Now  this  is  only  saying  that 
man,  besides  having  a  physical,  organic,  and  animal  nature,  will 
be  also  an  intelligent,  moral,  and  accountable  being,  and  this 
will  bring  to  light  the  moral  perfection  of  the  Deity  —  that 
Holiness  of  nature,  or  subjective  excellence,  by  which  He  has 
complacency  in  all  moral  goodness ;  and  that  Justice,  or  objec¬ 
tive  excellence,  by  which  he  exhibits  His  holiness  in  retributive 
acts.  In  other  words,  the  earth,  sooner  or  later,  will  become 
the  scene  of  moral  government. 

10.  But  as  mighty  intervals  have  separated  the  stages  of  the 
Divine  Procedure  hitherto,  will  similar  intervals  separate  the 
coming  manifestations  ?  Will  holiness,  after  imprinting  its 
image  on  man,  reign  on  earth,  and  rejoice  in  its  likeness,  for 
an  unaccountable  period,  before  punitive  Justice  follows  and 
kindles  its  fires  ?  Will  Justice  then  burn  for  ag-es,  converting: 
earth  into  a  place  of  punishment,  before  Mercy  comes,  if  it  come 
at  all,  to  soothe  and  to  save  ?  Will  all  these  perfections  be  dis¬ 
played  in  the  history  of  the  same  race  ?  Or,  will  there  be  a 
race  for  the  display  of  Holiness,  to  be  succeeded,  when  re¬ 
moved,  perhaps,  nearer  to  the  palace  of  the  Great  King,  by  a 
second  race  for  the  display  of  Holiness  and  penal  Justice: 
And  are  these  again  to  be  succeeded,  when  removed  and  ban¬ 
ished  afar  from  God,  by  a  third  race  for  the  display  of  Holi¬ 
ness,  Justice,  and  some  other  attribute  —  say,  Mercy  ?  Or  have 
either  of  these  attributes  been  elsewhere  displayed  already? 
displayed  by  beings  who,  though  not  inhabitants  of  this  world, 


HOLINESS. 


4 


are  yet  members  of  the  great  system  of  manifestation,  of  which 
this  world,  and  all  that  it  contains,  form  a  part  ?  And  if  so,  is 
i;  not  in  harmony  with  all  the  past  history  of  the  Divine  con¬ 
duct  to  expect  that  the  introduction  of  the  new  race,  essentially 
differing  from  all  the  past,  will  involve,  or  be  attended  with,  a 
new  manifestation  ?  that,  besides  the  Power,  and  Wisdom,  and 
Goodness,  and  Holiness,  and  Justice  of  God,  already  dis¬ 
played,  the  history  of  man  will  be  made  the  occasion  of  a  new 
display  of  the  Divine  Character  ? 

11.  That  these  are  not  unimportant  nor  irrelevant  questions 
is  evident,  for  God  has  answered  them  both  in  His  works  and 
in  His  word.  A  race  of  angelic  beings,  as  already  intimated, 
had  come  on  the  field  of  the  Divine  manifestation  bright  with 
the  lustre  of  holiness.  Some,  but  only  some  of  them,  failing  to 
keep  their  first  estate,  (wherever  and  whatever  that  may  have 
been,)  occasioned  the  manifestation,  for  the  first  time,  of  the 
Divine  Justice. 

12.  How,  let  it  be  supposed  that,  on  our  revisiting  the  earth, 
we  had  known  this ;  that,  in  one  part  of  the  universe,  Holiness 
was  glowing  with  more  than  its  original  radiance ;  and  that,  in 
another  part,  the  punitive  Justice  of  God  still  maintained  its 
awful  terrors.  On  the  principle  of  progressive  manifestation 
we  should  have  expected  that,  if  a  new  race  is  to  be  formed, 
and  if  another  attribute  remains  to  be  developed,  that  new  race 
will  be  made  the  medium  of  its  revelation.  Coming  as  that 
new  race  will  on  the  stage  of  Divine  Procedure,  at  a  period 
when  Power,  and  Wisdom,  and  Goodness,  and  Holiness,  and 
Justice,  are  already  made  manifest,  we  might  have  expected 
that  the  great  design  of  another  stage  of  creation  will  be  the 
display  of  another  Divine  perfection. 

13.  But,  according  to  that  law  of  creation  already  ascertained, 
winch  requires  that  each  successive  addition  shall  unite  with 
all  that  precedes  by  embodying  its  elements,  and  thus  display 
in  its  own  individual  nature  all  the  perfections  which  are 
already  manifested,  we  may  expect  that  all  the  Divine  perfec¬ 
tions  already  known  will  be  exhibited  again,  in  the  history  of 
man,  before  the  new  display  will  take  place,  and  preparatory 
to  it  —  in  other  words,  that  the  coming  creation,  besides  its  own 
peculiar  additions,  will  be  an  epitome  of  all  that  has  gone 
before.  The  impending  stage  of  the  Divine  Procedure,  then, 
may  be  expected  to  exhibit  the  attributes  of  Power,  and  Wis¬ 
dom,  and  Goodness,  and  Holiness ;  and  of  these,  Holiness,  as 
expressed  in  a  system  of  Moral  Government,  may  be  looked 


8 


MAN. 


for  as  forming  the  grand  characteristic  of  the  new  economy  as 
compared  with  all  which  the  earth  has  yet  exhibited. 

14.  Now,  supposing  it  had  been  permitted  as  to  revisit  the 
earth  immediately  after  the  creation  of  man  and  his  introduction 
into  Eden,  anl  that  the  nature  of  his  new  constitution  had  been 
disclosed  to  us,  as  well  as  the  nature  of  his  relations  to  the 
universe,  what  a  grand  volume  would  have  been  laid  open  to 
our  contemplation  illustrative  of  the  moral  character  of  his 
Creator !  Here  was  a  being  whose  nature  is  not  only  a  virtual 
compendium  of  the  preceding  stages  of  creation,  and,  as  such, 
an  exponent  of  the  power,  and  wisdom,  and  goodness  of  God, 
but  in  him  the  laws  of  matter  are  to  find  their  interpreter,  the 
vegetable  kingdom  its  uses,  the  animal  tribes  their  sovereign, 
and  all  creation  its  subordinate  completion  and  its  end.  Here 
was  a  being  who,  besides  being  a  continuous  link  in  the  chain 
of  the  Divine  Manifestation,  could,  as  the  creature  to  whom  the 
manifestation  is  made,  turn  round  and  look  back  upon  that  chain, 
and,  by  that  very  act,  show  himself  to  be  the  most  important 
part  of  it.  The  created  universe  is  a  great  system  of  Divine 
symbols  ;  and  here  is  the  first  being  the  earth  has  seen  capable 
of  interpreting  them  • — ■  capable  of  conceiving  of  the  very  prop¬ 
erties  of  the  Divine  character  which  they  are  meant  to  express, 
the  ideas  they  are  intended  to  suggest,  and  of  making  them  the 
media  of  intelligent  and  sympathetic  intercourse  with  the 
Deity.  The  very  first  step  towards  the  production  of  an  ex¬ 
ternal  material  economy,  presupposed  the  “  eternal  power  and 
Godhead,”  and  disclosed  somewhat  of  the  internal  economy  of 
the  Divine  Nature ;  and  here  is  a  being  on  whom  this  external 
economy  reacts,  as  soon  as  he  is  placed  in  relation  with  it,  so 
as  to  disclose  an  internal  economy  of  his  own,  answering  in 
some  respects  to  that  of  the  Infinite  Creator.  In  this  new 
creature  we  behold  a  being  capable  of  knowing  that  which  is 
not  himself ;  of  breaking  away  from  the  chain  of  mere  sensa¬ 
tions  received  from  this  external  economy,  and  in  which  he 
rather  loses  than  finds  himself ;  and  of  so  looking  in  upon  the 
phenomena  of  his  own  mind  as  to  be  made  distinctly  conscious 
of  a  three-fold  object  or  element  of  knowledge  —  of  himself  as 
a  distinct  existence,  of  the  finite  creation  to  which  he  belongs 
and  from  which  he  derives  his  sensations,  and  of  the  Infinite 
Maker  of  both,  presupposed  by  their  existence.  Still  more : 
here  is  a  Person,  a  being  influenced  by  motives,  determined  by 
will,  and  having  a  high  moral  end  of  his  own ;  a  creature  in 
whose  mysterious  constitution  Law  and  Liberty  —  perfect  Law 


HOLINESS. 


9 


ancl  conscious  Liberty  —  harmoniously  co-exist ;  and  whose  vol¬ 
untary  power  renders  him  at  once  capable  of  loving,  and  a  proper 
object  of  love.  And,  beyond  all,  here  is  a  creature  who,  being 
thus  capable  of  willing,  and  loving,  and  of  imprinting  the  proofs 
of  these  powers  on  every  object  around  him,  is  also  endowed 
with  the  profound  consciousness  of  what  he  ought  to  do,  and 
with  the  capability  of  finding  his  highest  happiness  in  doing  it. 
He  is  a  law  unto  himself,  a  self-executing  law.  He  encloses 
within  himself  a  whole  system  of  moral  government  —  laws,  and 
judge,  and  prison,  and  instruments  of  torture,  if  he  violate  his 
own  constitution  —  conscious  improvement,  and  ever-increasing 
happiness,  as  the  result  of  conformity  to  it.  Here  is  an  innocent 
being  on  probation,  capable  of  conceiving  of  immortality,  and  of 
aspiring  after  it ;  his  nature  enclosing  moral  possibilities  of  the 
most  opposite  kind.  What  if  all  limitation  should  be  removed 
from  them  in  regard  to  time,  and  the  consequences  of  his  pro¬ 
bation  be  allowed  to  accumulate  and  extend  through  all  future 
duration!  Surely  “there  is  a  spirit  in  man,”  a  new  subjective 
power,  a  substance  capable  of  examining  both  its  own  phenom¬ 
ena  and  those  of  matter ;  but  finding  the  former  within,  and 
the  latter  lying  in  a  sphere  without ;  and  having  to  resort  to 
consciousness  for  the  one,  and  to  the  distinct  method  of  observa¬ 
tion  and  ex2ieriment  for  the  other. 

15.  Now  if,  according  to  the  law  under  consideration,  every 
created  object  expresses  some  property  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
how  distinct  and  solemn  an  utterance  of  the  moral  character  of 
God  is  made  in  the  moral  constitution  of  the  new  creature, 
man.  The  apparent  tautology  of  the  phrase,  “  Let  us  make 
man  in  our  image ,  according  to  our  likeness”  *  only  denotes 
more  emphatically,  according  to  a  Hebrew  idiom,  the  pre-emi¬ 
nent  moral  resemblance  of  man  to  God.  Everything  else  only 
discloses  a  part  or  property  of  the  Creator ;  here,  at  length,  is 
His  image.  If  man  is,  in  the  language  of  Clement,!  “  the  most 
beautiful  hymn  to  the  praise  of  the  Deity,”  we  could  not  have 
had  his  moral  capabilities  disclosed  to  us,  and  have  remembered 
that,  even  in  their  utmost  development,  they  will  not  measure 
the  same  Divine  perfection  in  God,  but  only  indicate  its  exist¬ 
ence,  infinitely  greater,  without  feeling  that  the  burden  of  his 
hymn  is  that  of  the  seraphim,  “  Holy,  holy,  holy,  is  the  Lord 
God  Almighty.” 


#  Gen.  i.  26. 


f  See  Cohortatio  ad  Gentes,  p.  78. 


10 


MAX. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 

1.  A  second  principle  of  tlie  manifestation  leads  us  to  expect 
that  “  all  the  laws  and  results  of  the  preceding  stages  of  crea¬ 
tion  will  be  found  brought  forwards  into  the  human  economy ; 
and  ths.t  all  that  is  characteristic  in  those  lower  steps  of  the 
process  will  be  carried  up  into  the  higher  —  as  far  as  it  may 
subserve  the  great  end ;  or  unless  it  should  be  superseded  by 
something  analogous  in  this  higher  stage.”  For,  were  it  not 
for  this  law,  the  manifestation  would  be  neither  progressive  nor 
continuous,  but  would  be  ever  beginning  de  novo.  Everything 
would  be  isolated.  After  the  Divine  Procedure  had  continued 
for  untold  ages,  all  the  past  would  be  unknown  and  lost  to  the 
present,  and  to  all  the  future.  And  the  proof  of  all-sufficiency 
for  a  connected  manifestation  would  be  forever  wanting. 

2.  An  inspection  of  man’s  constitution  alone  would  supply 
abundant  illustration  of  the  fulfilment  of  this  law.  But  we  have 
now  reached  a  point  in  the  development  of  the  Divine  Plan 
which  gives  us  access  to  the  Word  of  God,  in  addition  to  the 
more  ancient  volume  of  His  works.  The  latter,  indeed,  is  still 
available  in  indicating  the  probable  geological  period  since 
which  man  has  been  added  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth  ;  but 
the  Bible,  besides  enabling  us  to  assign,  within  certain  limits, 
the  chronological  date  of  man’s  appearance,  supplies  information 
of  peculiar  interest  respecting  the  creative  process  which  intro¬ 
duced  that  great  event.  What  circumstances  may  have  attended 
preceding  creations,  we  know  not,  but  the  record  of  man’s  crea¬ 
tion  is  deemed  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  accompanied  with 
an  account  of  the  miraculous  scenes  which  introduced  it.  And 
as  those  scenes  are  found  to  illustrate  our  law,  as  well  as  the 
constitution  of  the  newly-created  man,  to  these  we  shall  direct 
our  attention  first. 

3.  Before  proceeding  to  prove  this,  it  is  important  rightly  to 
estimate  the  character  of  the  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation. 
Having  no  reason  whatever  to  regard  it  as  a  poem,  a  myth,  a 
philosophic  speculation,  a  translated  hieroglyph,  or  in  any  other 
light  than  that  which  it  assumes  to  be  —  a  history  of  facts,  of 
Divine  origin,  conveyed  through  the  limitation  of  a  human 
medium,  and  for  human  use  —  we  find,  on  reading  it,  that  it 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


11 


exhibits  precisely  those  characteristics  which  analogy  would 
have  led  us  to  expect. 

4.  It  is  strictly  anthropopathic ,  or  in  harmony  with  the  feel 
rugs,  views,  and  popular  modes  of  expression  which  prevail  in 
an  early  state  of  society,  and  which  are  always  best  adapted  for 
universal  use.  Hence  the  colloquial,  or  dramatic,  style  of  the 
account.  For  example:  And  God  said — not  that  there  was 
any  vocal  utterance,  where,  as  yet,  there  was  no  ear  to  hear, 
(each  of  which  would  imply  a  corporeal  structure)  —  let  there  he 
light  —  let  there  he  a  firmament  —  let  the  earth  bring  forth  —  by 
which  we  are  to  understand  that  these  effects  were  produced 
just  as  if  such  a  fiat  had  been,  in  each  instance,  vocally  uttered, 
and  such  a  formula  actually  employed.  The  bare  volitions  of 
the  Infinite  Mind  are  deeds.  So,  again,  when  it  is  said  that 
<  iod  “  rested  on  the  seventh  day  from  all  his  work  which  he  had 
made ;  ”  the  truth  involved  obviously  is,  not  that  of  reposing 
from  fatigue,  for  Inspiration  itself  affirms  that  “  the  Creator  of 
the  ends  of  the  earth  faintetli  not,  neither  is  weary,”  but  that  of 
ceasing  or  desisting  from  a  process  which  has  reached  comple¬ 
tion.  The  pause  at  the  close  of  the  sixth  day,  and  the  contin¬ 
uation  of  it  on  the  opening  of  the  seventh,  resembled  the  quiet 
of  a  person  relaxing  and  at  rest  aft  er  a  laborious  and  exhausting 
process.  But  the  objection  urged  by  a  so-called  spiritual  philos¬ 
ophy  against  such  anthropopathia  is  ultimately  unfounded  and 
suicidal.  That  philosophy  itself  is  unavoidably  anthropopathic 
in  its  very  denunciations  of  anthropopathia.  Necessarily,  its 
language  is  “of  the  earth,  earthy,”  —  limited  and  colored  by 
the  sensuous  media  through  which  it  comes.  The  utmost  it  can 
hope  to  achieve  is  to  escape  from  a  gross  to  a  more  refined,  to 
ascend  from  a  lower  to  a  higher,  range  of  anthropomorphism. 
The  danger  is  less  in  proportion  as  it  gets  away  from  the  sen¬ 
sible  to  the  abstract,  it  should  find  that  it  is  leaving  behind  it  all 
definite  and  distinct  views  of  the  Deity,  and  is  emerging  into 
an  atmosphere  too  rarefied  for  piety  to  live  and  move  in. 

5.  In  order  to  interpret  the  Mosaic  cosmogony  aright,  another 
fact  to  be  borne  in  mind  is,  that  every  visible  object  is  spoken 
of,  not  according  to  its  scientific  character  —  that  would  have 
been  not  merely  improper  but  impossible,  except  at  the  price  of 
consistency  —  but  optically ,  or  according  to  its  appearance  ;  * 

*  “  Should  a  stickler  for  Copernicus  and  the  true  system  of  the  world,” 
says  J.  D.  Michaelis,  “  carry  his  zeal  so  far  as  to  say,  the  city  of  Berlin 
sets  at  such  an  hour ,  instead  of  making  use  of  the  common  expression,  the 
sun  sets  at  Berlin  at  such  an  hour ,  he  speaks  the  truth  to  be  sure,  but  his 


12 


MAN. 


just  as,  with  all  our  knowledge  of  the  solar  system,  we  speak 
even  in  scientific  works,  of  the  sun  as  rising  and  setting.  For 
example  :  had  there  been  an  unscientific  human  spectator  of  the 
creative  process,  the  atmosphere  would  have  appeared  to  his 
eye  as  it  does  still  to  every  untutored  eye,  a  firm  and  solid 
expanse,  sustaining  the  waters  above.  The  sun  mid  the  moon 
would  have  appeared  to  be  “  two  great  lights  ”  of  nearly  equal 
magnitude,  compared  with  which  all  the  astral  systems  deserved 
only  that  which  is  allotted  to  them  —  a  passing  word.  The 
describer  is  supposed  to  occupy  an  earthly  position  —  himself 
the  centre  of  the  universe.  The  earth  is  said  to  have  brought 
forth  grass,  and  the  waters  to  have  produced  living  creatures ; 
though  we  are  to  believe  that  no  creative  power  was  delegated 
to  the  elements  to  produce  them,  but  that  they  were  made  in 
full  perfection  by  the  simple  volition  of  Omnipotence  ;  but  then, 
to  a  human  looker-on,  they  would  so  appear  to  have  been  pro¬ 
duced.  And  the  fiat  is  said  to  have  been  issued,  “  Let  the  dry 
land  appear  ;  ”  when  there  was  no  human  eye  to  see  it ;  but  had 
there  been  a  spectator,  it  would  have  risen  to  his  view  as  if 
such  a  command  had  been  literally  given.  And  if  to  this  optical 
mode  of  description  it  be  objected  that  as  there  teas  no  human 
spectator,  the  account  can  only  be  received  and  interpreted  as 
an  allegorical  representation,  we  reply  that  it  is  the  very  method 
for  answering  its  great  design  —  that  of  being  popularly  intel¬ 
ligible  ;  and  that  the  way  in  which  it  becomes  both  intelligible 
and  vividly  graphic  is  by  placing  the  reader,  in  imagination,  in 
the  position  of  a  spectator.* *  But  much  more  inconsistent  are 

manner  of  speaking  it  is  pedantry.”  —  Essay  on  the  Influence  of  Opinions 
on  Language,  and  of  Language  on  Opinions.  1769. 

*  Gen.  i.  2o ;  ii.  5.  In  accordance  with  this  rule  of  interpretation,  we 
find  Gregory  of  Hyssa,  (394,)  who  wrote  an  apologetic  explanation  of  the 
six  days'  work ,  teaching  that  the  phrase,  “  1  God  said,’  should  not  be  un¬ 
derstood  of  an  articulate  sound :  a  supposition  which  were  contrary  to  the 
nature  and  unbecoming  the  majesty  of  God,  but  of  an  intimation  of  will." 
Similar  is  the  remark  that  it  “  is  the  manner  of  Scripture  to  describe  what 
appears  to  6c,  instead  of  what  really  is."  —  Ep.  de  Pythonissa,  p.  870.  And 
Chrysostom,  on  Gen.  i.  5,  says,  “Bo  you  see  what  condescension  (accom¬ 
modation  to  our  weakness)  this  blessed  prophet  (Moses)  has  used:  or, 
rather,  the  benevolent  God,  by  the  mouth  of  the  prophet  ?  .  .  .  the  Holy 
Spirit  moved  the  tongue  of  the  prophet  in  adaptation  to  the  weakness  of 
the  hearers,  and  thus  expressed  all  things  to  us  in  an  intelligible  manner 

- utters  everything  in  conformity  with  the  manner  of  men.  —  Horn,  in 

<Ien.  vol.  i.  pp.  12,  13.  Quoted  by  Dr.  Davidson  in  Bib.  Hermeneutics, 

pp.  118,  120. 

To  the  same  effect  is  the  great  Talmudic  maxim,  The  expressions  used 
in  the  law  are  like  the  ordinary  language  of  mankind  De  Sola’s  Hew  Trans- 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


13 


those  who,  while  they  would  admit  that,  in  all  instances  we 
have  named,  and  in  many  others,  the  language  is  evidently  that 
of  optical  description,  would  yet  regard  the  extension  of  the 
same  principle  of  interpretation  to  the  account  of  the  creation 
of  the  sun  on  the  fourth  day,  as  a  sacrifice  of  the  truth  of  inspi¬ 
ration  ;  although  it  is  said  that  God  made  a  firmament  or  solid 
plane  to  sustain  the  clouds  on  the  second  day,  as  distinctly  as 
that  he  made  the  sun  on  the  fourth  day.  The  former,  however, 
they  would  explain  optically ;  the  latter,  with  a  rigorous  liter- 
ality.  Surely  some  steadier  rule  of  interpretation  than  that  of 
caprice  should  be  adopted,  and  a  more  charitable  construction 
than  that  usually  held  should  be  put  on  the  conduct  of  those  who 
think  they  have  found  that  rule,  not  in  popular  whim  and  preju¬ 
dice,  but  in  the  Sacred  Record  itself. 

6.  But  not  only  is  the  language  of  the  Mosaic  cosmogony 
popular,  and  that  of  a  supposed  witness,  it  relates  specifically 
to  the  race  of  man.  Besides  being  prepared  for  man,  it  con¬ 
cerns  itself  chiefly,  if  not  exclusively,  with  what  belongs  to 
him.  Of  the  creation  of  angels  nothing  is  said.  Respecting 
the  starry  heavens  a  brief  clause  is  employed ;  for  what  are 
they  all  to  man,  in  his  present  state,  compared  with  the  sun 
which  makes  his  day,  the  moon  which  rules  his  night,  and  the 
earth  or  which  he  dwells.  In  the  account  of  the  vegetable 
creation,  no  mention  is  made  of  timber-trees,  the  giants  of  the 
botanical  kingdom ;  the  history  is  confined  to  the  production 
of  grasses,  or  food  for  cattle ;  to  herbs,  or  grain  and  leguminous 
plants  for  Ins  own  use,  and  to  fruit-bearing  trees ;  all  relating, 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  the  wants  and  conveniences  of  man¬ 
kind.  Nor  does  the  account  of  the  animal  creation  contain  a 
hint  in  reference  to  the  production  of  stationary  beings,  or  of 
microscopic  animalcules,  though  these  form  numerically  the 
vast  majority  of  animal  existences.  The  history  relates  to  the 
familiarly  known,  the  visible,  and  the  useful,  among  animals. 
Man  himself  is  described  as  created  last ;  plainly  intimating 
that  all  which  had  gone  before  was  only  a  means  of  which  he 
was  to  be  the  subordinate  end.  And  not  only  the  process,  but 
even  its  termination  is  made  to  subserve  his  welfare,  for  it  is 
laid  as  a  reason  for  the  institution  of  the  Sabbath.  If  the  crea¬ 
tion  itself  then,  be  thus  designed  to  subserve  his  welfare,  it  is 
only  in  harmony  with  this  fact  that  the  account  of  the  creation 

•ation  of  the  S.  S\,  vol.  i.  p.  19,  1844.  See  also  Dr.  J.  P.  Smith’s  Scripture 
and  Geology,  pp.  241,  266.  Sec.  Ed. 

2 


14 


MAN. 


should  be  given  in  a  style  so  familiar  as  to  be  easily  understood 
by  him ;  in  a  manner  so  graphic  as  to  make  him  present,  and 
to  paint  it  to  his  eye ;  and  that  it  should  confine  itself  chiefly  to 
that  which  more  immediately  concerns  him. 

7.  The  Scriptural  account  of  creation  is  in  strict  analogy 
with  the  prevailing  character  of  the  Divine  arrangements.  To 
have  spoken  scientifically  of  the  subject  —  in  other  words,  to 
have  made  science  the  subject  of  revelation  —  would  have  been 
to  degrade  the  character  of  revelation  by  making  it  minister  to 
man’s  curiosity ;  to  defeat  its  unique  design  by  diverting  his 
attention  from  the  permanent  to  the  passing,  aggravating  the 
very  evil  it  was  meant  to  remedy  by  absorbing  him  in  the  inter¬ 
ests  of  the  present ;  for  if  it  expounded  science,  why  not  also 
art,  political  economy,  and  all  the  formulae  of  civilization  ?  and 
to  repeal  some  of  the  deep-laid  laws  of  the  Divine  plan,  and, 
as  such,  to  impugn  the  Divine  origin  of  the  revelation ;  for  the 
entire  scheme  of  things  is  constructed  with  a  view,  not  to  ex¬ 
empt  man  from  effort,  but  to  invite  him  to  it ;  to  enable  him 
to  make  discoveries  for  himself ;  to  engage  his  powers  so  as  to 
reward  them,  and  by  engaging  and  rewarding  to  augment  them. 
But  the  sacredness  of  its  origin  is  deducible  from  more  than 
analogical  grounds.  Even  in  a  literary  respect  it  is  unique. 
Ease,  simplicity,  and  grandeur  characterize  its  statements. 
Myth  and  speculation  are  unknown  to  it ;  the  historical  element 
predominates.  No  other  ancient  cosmogony  will  sustain  a  com¬ 
parison  with  it.*  While  philosophy  was  still  breathing  mist, 
and  living  in  a  chaos,  the  opening  sentence  of  the  Bible  had 
been  shining  on  the  Hebrew  mind  for  centuries,  a  ray  direct 
from  heaven.  Nor  has  science  been  able  to  transcend  that  sub¬ 
lime  affirmation.  It  is  too  spiritual  for  materialism  to  embrace  ; 
too  personal  and  substantial  for  pantheism  to  dissipate.  True, 
the  narrative  of  the  Adamic  creation  which  follows  that  primary 
announcement  wears  a  peculiar  form ;  the  spirit  is  clothed  in 
mortal  vesture ;  but  the  Divine  image  shines  through.  Ob¬ 
scured  though  it  may  sometimes  have  been  by  the  false  glosses 
of  its  friends,  the  transfiguring  power  of  the  indwelling  truth 
cannot  be  concealed.  Science  has  had  to  recal  her  imputations 
on  it,  and  to  confess  herself  forestalled  in  her  own  department. 
Modern  scepticism  may  be  safely  challenged  even  to  imagine  a 
more  credible  account  of  creation.f  As  science  multiplies  he? 

*  Euseb.  Prasp.  Evang.  lib.  i.  cc.  9, 10.  Cory’s  Fragments,  p.  26.  Faber’s 
Origin  of  Pagan  Idolatry,  vol.  i.  p.  232. 

t  As  an  example,  see  Olcen’s  Isis,  (1819.)  p.  1117 


THE  PAST  BROEGHT  FORWARD. 


15 


ascertained  results,  new  accordances  with  the  Biblical  narrative 
come  to  light.  The  higher  deductions  of  reason  harmonize 
with  it.  Nor  can  the  time  be  hopelessly  distant  when,  in  the 
blended  radiance  of  revelation  and  science,  nothing  shall  be  left 
for  their  mutual  friends  to  deplore  but  the  long  want  of  that 
wise  confiding  patience,  and  that  candid  forbearance,  which 
would  have  hastened  their  union,  and  have  added  to  their  lustre. 

8.  Now,  the  creative  process  immediately  'preparatory  to  the 
coming  of  man ,  as  described  in  the  opening  of  the  Book  of 
Genesis,  is  remarkably  illustrative  of  the  law  at  present  under 
consideration.  Thus,  no  intimation  is  given  that  a  particle  of 
new  matter  was  originated  on  the  occasion.  The  Adamic 
“  earth  ”  was  formed  from  the  matter  which  had  been  created 
“  in  the  beginning  ”  —  at  a  period  indefinitely  distant  —  and 
every  atom  of  which  existed  still,  notwithstanding  all  the  com¬ 
binations  and  changes  which  it  had  undergone. 

C  O 

9.  That  the  ancient  originating  act  is  described  in  the  sen¬ 
tence  placed  at  the  opening  of  the  Bible,  appears  evident  from 
such  considerations  as  these :  First,  the  creative  acts  of  the 
second,  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  days,  begin  with  the  for¬ 
mula,  And  God  said ;  it  is  only  natural  to  conclude,  therefore, 
that  the  creative  act  of  the  first  day  begins  with  the  third 
verse,  where  the  same  formula  is  first  employed,  “  And  God  said , 
Let  there  be  light.”  But  if  so,  it  follows  that  the  act  described 
in  the  first  verse,  and  the  chaotic  state  of  the  earth  spoken  of 
in  the  second,  must  have  both  belonged  to  a  period  anterior  to 
the  first  day.  Secondly,  the  only  adequate  reason  assignable 
for  the  account  given  in  the  second  verse  is  to  prepare  the 
reader  for  the  description  which  follows  of  the  six  days’  work ; 
for  it  both  intimates  the  necessity  for  such  work  by  affirming 
the  chaotic  condition  of  the  earth,  and  describes  the  Spirit  of 
God  as  brooding  over  the  chaos,  preparatory  to  it.  Not  only 
the  originating  act  in  the  first  verse,  therefore,  but  also  the  com- 
mencement  of  the  energizing  process  in  the  second,  appears  to 
have  preceded  the  opening  fiat  of  creation  on  the  first  day,  and 
to  have  been  introductory  -to  it.  Thirdly,  if  it  be  admitted  that 
the  regular  unfolding  of  the  six  days’  work  begins  with  the 
utterance  of  the  first  fiat  in  the  third  verse,  it  follows  that  the 
origination  of  the  earth,  in  the  first  verse,  was  anterior  to  and 
independent  of  it ;  for  no  such  an  act  is  again  adverted  to  in 
tb^  subsequent  verses.*  In  other  words,  the  same  material, 


*  See  on  Gen.  i.  1  — 3.  “  Pre-Adamite  Earth,”  pp.  273  —  2S1. 


16 


MAN. 


originated  at  an  unknown  period  before,  and  which  had  been 
already  employed  in  successive  formations  of  the  earth,  was 
now  to  be  employed  anew  in  the  Adamic  earth. 

10.  At  the  eventful  moment  when,  according  to  the  Divine 
purpose,  the  Adamic  creation  was  to  commence,  “  the  earth 
was  without  form  and  void,  and  darkness  was  upon  the  face  of 
the  deep.”  How  much  of  the  entire  surface  of  the  planet  was 
in  this  chaotic  state,  is  not  ascertainable.  The  generality  of  the 
Mosaic  statement  is  quite  compatible  with  the  limited  extent  of 
the  chaos  described.*  The  just  inference  appears  to  be,  that 
the  desolation  and  ruin  were  universal  over  that  region  which 
was  about  to  be  prepared  for  the  reception  of  the  first  man  and 
his  antediluvian  posterity.  Now  that  the  desolation  was  not 
universal  over  the  globe,  geological  evidence  abundantly  attests.j 
Even  the  great  epochs  of  geology  do  not  exhibit  signs  of  uni¬ 
versal  disorder  and  ruin ;  much  less  do  the  tertiary  and  post- 
tertiary  changes  of  our  planet.  And  that  the  creation  which 
followed  the  chaos  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  was  local , 
seems  clear  from  Gen.  ii.  19,  20:  “And  out  of  the  ground  the 
Lord  God  formed  every  beast  of  the  field,  and  every  fowl  of 
the  air,  and  brought  them  unto  Adam  to  see  what  he  would 
call  them  ;  and  whatsoever  Adam  called  every  living  creature, 
that  was  the  name  thereof.  And  Adam  gave  names  to  all  cat- 


*  The  Hebrew  term,  pronounced  eretz,  whence,  ultimately,  our  earth ,  is 
by  no  means  restricted  to  the  single  meaning  of  the  entire  planet.  Some¬ 
times,  like  its  equivalent  in  other  languages,  it  is  employed  in  opposition 
to  the  heaven ,  Gen.  i.  1 ;  and  to  the  seas,  Gen.  i.  10.  Sometimes  it  stands 
for  a  particular  land  or  country ,  Gen.  ii.  11 ;  Ex.  iii.  8 ;  for  a  piece  of  land, 
a  Jield ,  Gen.  xxiii.  15  ;  for  the  ground,  xxxiii.  3  ;  for  earthy  matter,  Ps.  xii. 
7  ;  and,  at  others,  for  the  inhabitants  of  a  land,  and  of  the  world.  If,  now, 
it  should  be  insisted  on,  notwithstanding  these  instances  (a  few  among 
many)  of  the  varied  application  of  the  word  earth,  that  it  must  have  pre¬ 
cisely  the  same  extent  of  application  in  the  second  verse  of  Gen.  i.  which 
it  has  in  the  first  verse,  I  can  only  suppose  that  the  objector  has  some  par¬ 
ticular  theory  to  sustain  by  his  interpretation.  It  is  of  little  weight  for 
liim  to  allege  that  the  general  reader  would  infer  from  the  second  verse 
that  the  chaos  was  universal.  To  a  human  spectator  surveying  the  scene 
from  the  centre,  it  would  doubtless  have  appeared  universal :  and  the 
description,  we  repeat,  is  optical,  or  according  to  the  appearances  of  things. 
Bui  as,  even  in  this  opening  history,  the  term  earth  is  applied  to  the  entire 
planet,  to  the  dry  land  on  its  surface,  and  then  to  a  single  district,  we  are 
left  to  infer  the  extent  of  chaos  spoken  of  in  the  second  verse,  by  an  ex¬ 
amination  of  the  context,  if  it  contains  any  evidence  on  the  subject,  and 
by  an  investigation  of  the  earth  itself,  and  not  by  the  arbitrary  construc¬ 
tion  of  a  term. 

t  Lyell’s  Principles  of  Geology,  B.  I.  cc.  x..  xiii. ;  B.  HI.  c.  xi. 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


17 


fie,  and  to  the  fowl  of  the  air,  and  to  every  beast  of  the  field.” 
Here  it  is  affirmed  that  all  the  land-animals  which  were  then 
created  were  brought  to  the  father  of  mankind  to  be  distin¬ 
guished  and  named.  Now,  unless  it  be  assumed  that  animals 
alike  from  the  torrid  zone  and  from  the  arctic  circle  were  mira¬ 
culously  wafted  across  deserts  and  oceans  to  the  limits  of  Eden, 
or  else  that  they  were  created  in  Eden  to  be  subsequently 
transported  to  their  respective  regions,  (either  assumption  in¬ 
volving  a  cluster  of  extravagances  which  is  surely  too  enormous 
to  be  entertained,)  it  follows  that  the  animals  said  to  have  been 
brought  to  Adam  were  such  as  were  henceforth  to  inhabit  the 
Edenic  region,  probably  such  as  were  suited  for  domestication 
and  use,  and  that  such  only  were  at  that  time  created. 

11.  The  situation  of  this  important  region  can  only  be  spoken 
of  generally.  It  was  “  eastward”  *  or  an  eastern  country ; 
that  is,  it  lay  easterly  from  Palestine,  the  probable  station-point 
of  the  writer.  *  Of  the  river-system  f  which  is  described  as  char¬ 
acterizing  it  immediately  after  the  Adamic  creation,  the  Phrat 
and  the  Hiddekel  are  generally  agreed  to  be  the  Euphrates  and 
the  Tigris.  While  the  land  of  gold  and  of  precious  stones 
through  which  two  of  the  rivers  passed,  assists  us  further  in  at 
least  approximating  to  the  birth-place  of  man.  The  garden  of 
Eden  was  probably  situated  on  the  southern  slope  of  Armenia ; 
for  the  greater  part  of  this  country,  constituting  an  elevated 
table-land,  with  numerous  ranges  of  higher  mountains  rising 
above  it,  is  intersected  in  all  directions  by  rapid  streams ;  and 
here  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  have  their  rise,  not  far  from  each 
other.  But  Eden  itself  may  have  embraced  the  fairest  portion 
of  Asia  and  a  part  of  Africa.  The  probability  is,  however,  that 
it  was  limited  to  that  portion  of  Asia  which  is  bounded  by  the 
Indian  Sea,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  the  Arabian  Desert,  on  the 
south ;  by  the  Caucasian  Mountains,  the  Caspian  Sea,  and 
Tartary,  on  the  north ;  by  the  chains  of  Taurus  and  Amanus, 
on  the  west ;  and,  on  the  east,  by  the  high  land  which,  in  the 
steppe  of  the  Kirghis,  connects  the  western  ridges  of  the  Altai 
mountains  and  the  Himalaya  range,  about  the  sources  of  the 
Ganges;  comprehending  a  tract  lying  between  25°  and  40° 
N.  latitude,  and  between  30°  and  80°  E.  longitude. 

12.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  condition,  at  that  time,  of 


*  Gen.  ii.  8,  C'ljSE  (the  prep.  J2  often  makes  a  periphrasis  of  the  gen 
itive,)  of  the  eastern  country  —  i.  e.,  towards ,  or  at ,  the  east. 
t  Gen.  ii.  10  —  14. 


2* 


18 


MAN. 


other  parts  of  the  surface  of  our  planet,  here  was  a  region 
which  a  tremendous  cataclysm,  at  some  previous  period,  had 
superficially  convulsed  and  laid  utterly  waste.  To  a  human 
eye  surveying  the  desolation  from  the  centre,  the  anarchy 
would  appear  to  be  universal ;  and,  probably,  so  extensive  and 
ruinous  was  it,  that  the  equilibrium  of  nature  was  disturbed  in 
regions  far  beyond  the  centre  and  actual  scene  of  the  chaos. 
The  physical  cause  of  the  convulsion  may  have  been  the  sub¬ 
sidence,  owing  to  an  igneous  movement  below,  (one  of  a  series 
to  which  that  portion  of  the  earth  is  still  subject,  for  it  forms 
part  of  the  great  volcanic  range  extending  from  Central  Asia 
to  the  Azores,)  of  a  considerable  region ;  for  the  surface  is  de¬ 
scribed  as  being  covered  with  water.  One  of  the  consequences 
was  a  thick  darkness.  Even  an  ordinary  cloud  will  conceal 
the  sun.  A  dense  fog  will  render  artificial  light  necessary  at 
noon-day.  A  local  convulsion  of  the  earth  has  been  known  to 
envelope  a  district  of  many  miles  extent  in  midnight  gloom. 
What,  then,  may  we  suppose  to  have  been  the  turbid  and  opaque 
condition  of  the  atmosphere,  when  all  its  elements  over  a  wide 
region  were  in  a  state  of  conflicting  activity  and  revolution ! 

13.  On  the  face  of  this  troubled  deep  the  Spirit  of  God 
brooded ;  and  to  the  profound  gloom  of  the  atmosphere  the 
voice  of  Omnipotence  said,  Be  Light.  The  laws  of  gravity,  of 
molecular  attraction,  and  of  light,  were  forthwith  so  recalled 
into  operation,  that  the  surging  deep  began  to  be  tranquillized. 
The  restoration  of  light  was  the  chief  work  of  the  first  day ; 
or,  as  it  must  have  appeared  to  a  terrestrial  spectator,  had  there 
been  one,  its  'production .  But  that  this  light  was  at  first  only 
very  partially  reproduced,  is  evident  from  the  work  assigned  to 
the  second  day ;  for  the  atmosphere  was  still  laden  with  dense 
watery  vapor,  which  must  have  rendered  it  a  very  imperfect 
medium  for  the  light,  and  probably  unfit  for  organic  life.  This 
vapor,  therefore,  wms  next  collected  into  floating  masses,  or 
clouds,  and  become  “  the  waters  above  the  firmament,”  in  dis¬ 
tinction  from  “  the  waters  ”  which  still  overflowed  the  earth 
“  under  the  firmament.”  The  balanced  condition  of  the  atmos¬ 
phere  having  been  thus  comparatively  restored,  the  Divine 
Creator  proceeded,  on  the  third  day,  to  arrange  the  surface  of 
the  earth.  He  bade  the  waters  to  collect  and  confine  them¬ 
selves  within  certain  boundaries.  And  as  this  could  take  place 
only  by  the  upheaving  of  the  subjacent  land,  He  called  for 
“  the  dry  land  to  appear :  and  it  was  so.”  Everlasting  hills 
lifted  themselves  up,  and  awaited  his  further  command.  The 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


19 


fiat,  it  will  be  observed,  is  not  now  creative,  but  formative,  and 
is  represented  as  being  issued,  not  to  the  land,  but  to  the  water ; 
for,  owing  to  its  greater  mobility,  it  would  have  appeared  to  a 
spectator  to  be  hastening  away  and  voluntarily  giving  place  to 
the  land,  rather  than  as  being  actually  displaced  by  it.  Yet 
the  running  off  of  the  waters  was  doubtless  the  effect  of  the 
miraculous  elevation  of  the  land.  Vegetation  was  called  for, 
and  the  newly  raised  lands  were  forthwith  covered  with  grasses, 
herbs,  and  fruit  trees  —  terms  designating,  by  a  common  figure, 
the  whole  vegetable  kingdom.  The  morning  of  the  fourth  day 
dawned,  and  behold,  not  now  a  dubious  and  gloomy  twilight, 
but  the  sun  itself  enthroned,  and  “  rejoicing  as  a  strong  man 
to  run  a  race.”  Of  course,  by  a  spectator  then  standing  on  the 
earth  for  the  first  time,  the  appearance  of  the  sun,  and  perhaps 
of  the  moon  in  another  part  of  the  heavens  at  the  same  time, 
would  have  been  regarded  as  the  sudden  production  of  “  two 
great  lights.”  These  luminaries,  light-dispensers,  or  light- 
bearers,  the  Divine  Creator  now  “  made,”  in  the  common  sense 
of  appointed ,  to  serve  a  purpose  which  they  had  never  answered 
before,  (inasmuch  as  there  had  been  no  intelligent  beings  on  the 
earth  to  appropriate  them  to  the  use,)  to  “  be  for  signs  and  for 
seasons,  and  for  days  and  for  years,”  to  his  coming  creature  — 
man.  And  now  again  “  the  stars  ”  shone  forth.  The  fifth 
morning  of  creation  came :  and  the  waters  teemed  with  fish,  and 
birds  winged  their  way  through  the  air.  “  And  God  blessed 
them,  saying,  Be  fruitful,  and  multiply,  and  fill  the  waters  in 
the  seas,  and  let  the  fowl  multiply  in  the  earth,”  a  commission 
which  obviously  recognized  the  ordinance  of  animal  death,  and 
involved  its  necessity ;  as  the  grant  of  the  green  herb  for  food 
involved  the  condition  of  vegetable  death  :  for  continued  propa¬ 
gation  supposes  the  removal  of  some,  at  least,  of  the  preceding 
generations,  otherwise  room  and  food  would  soon  be  wanting. 
The  sixth  day  beheld  the  occupation  of  the  earth  by  land- 
animals  of  various  tribes :  and  the  Glorious  Creator  saw  that 
the  whole  “  was  good.”  Of  man’s  creation  —  the  last  and 
crowning  act  of  the  Divine  process  —  we  shall  speak  presently. 

14.  As  far,  then,  as  the  law  now  under  consideration  relates 
to  the  preparation  of  the  region  destined  for  man’s  immediate 
abode,  its  conditions  are  all  satisfied.  Often,  before,  we  are  to 
suppose,  the  same  tract  of  the  earth’s  surface  had  been  the 
scene  of  Creative  intervention.  Very  various  and  conclusive 
evidence  exists  that,  at  an  early  period  of  the  ancient  earth, 
the  northern  hemisphere  was  almost  entirely  submerged.  But 


20 


MAN. 


after  the  formation  of  the  carboniferous  strata,  land  was  suc¬ 
cessively  upheaved  from  the  deep  by  repeated  convulsions,  and 
the  physical  geography  of  those  regions  greatly  modified.  So 
recently  as  the  tertiary  period,  the  great  lowland  of  Siberia  — 
an  area  nearly  equal  to  all  Europe  —  appears,  from  the  char¬ 
acter  of  its  marine  strata,  to  have  emerged.  Shells  of  tertiary 
species  have  been  found  in  the  plains  of  Armenia.*  And  fossil 
remains  of  still  existing  species  inhabiting  valleys  and  plains 
have  been  found  lodged  in  the  peaks  of  the  Sewalik  range, f 
westward  of  the  river  Jumna,  indicating  the  comparatively  recent 
action  of  a  subterraneous  upheaving  force.  Indeed,  the  volcanic 
region  commencing  in  China  and  Tartary  extends  through  the 
Caspian  to  the  Caucasus,  the  countries  bordering  the  Black 
Sea,  and  through  part  of  Asia  Minor  to  Syria  ;  still  keeping  it, 
at  times  and  in  places,  in  violent  commotion.  But  as  often  as 
such  Pre-Adamite  disturbance  and  consequent  desolation  had 
occurred,  the  Divine  Creator  had  renewed  the  face  of  the  earth, 
and,  in  the  later  epochs,  had  successively  placed  on  its  surface 
new  forms  of  animal  life.  In  a  similar  manner,  on  the  present 
occasion,  the  face  of  the  ancient  earth  is  once  more  renewed. 
It  is  not  said  that,  on  the  third  day,  He  called  new  matter 
into  existence ;  but  that  He  gave  to  the  confused  and  conflict¬ 
ing  materials  already  existing,  a  new  arrangement.  All  the 
mechanical  and  chemical  laws  which  the  ancient  physical  crea¬ 
tion  had  known  were  again  reinstated  in  power,  and  resumed 
their  tranquil  operation.  The  laws  of  organic  life  wefe  sum¬ 
moned  anew  to  activity ;  and  sentient  existence  reappeared  in 
the  fulness  of  enjoyment.];  Or,  taking  the  order  of  the  Divine 
Perfections  winch  the  Pre-Adamite  Earth  displayed  —  Power 
had  first  stilled  the  conflict  of  chaos,  and  restored  the  reign  of 
pre-existing  physical  law  over  inorganic  nature  ;  and  hence,  in 
the  Ruach  JElohim,  or  Spirit  of  God,  of  Gen.  i.  2,  the  predom¬ 
inant  idea  is  that  of  'power.  Wisdom  employed  inorganic  mat¬ 
ter  as  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  organic  ends  —  clothing 
the  earth  with  vegetable  life  and  beauty.  And  Goodness  once 


*  Mr.  W.  J.  Hamilton’s  “  Tour  in  Asia  Minor,”  ii.  386. 
t  Falconer  and  Cautley,  in  Proceed.  Geol.  Soc.,  Nov.  15,  1843. 

t  In  the  second  edition  of  his  “  Scripture  and  Geology,”  the  Rev.  Dr. 
J.  P.  Smith  remarks  on  the  phrases,  Let  the  waters  breed,  and  the  earth 
brought  forth ,  that  “  the  kernel  of  truth  which  they  enclose  is,  that  animal 
and  vegetable  bodies  are  organized  out  of  the  very  materials  which  con¬ 
stitute  water  and  the  commonest  minerals.”  —  P.  279,  Note. 


THE  PAST  BE  OUGHT  FORWARD. 


21 


more  called  for  various  orders  of  animal  existence,  and  filled 
the  whole  with  enjoyment. 

15.  But  were  the  laws  of  nature  as  known  to  the  ancient 
earth,  and  now  recalled  into  operation  in  his  Edenie  region, 
introduced  and  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  the  new-made  man  ? 
This  is  the  condition  which  the  Law  now  under  consideration 
especially  requires. 

We  have  seen  the  preparations  made  for  the  presence  of  the 
coming  human  being.  The  mansion  is  ready,  but,  as  yet,  the 
inhabitant  is  not.  Here  is  the  temple  complete ;  the  worshipper 
is  now  to  be  created.  Eden  is  waiting  to  yield  its  fruits ;  but 
“there  is  not  a  man  to  till  the  ground.”  Was  not  His  absence 
felt  as  a  want,  a  state  of  unsatisfied  incompletion  ?  Did  not 
creation  await  His  coming  with  suspense  ?  Did  not  a  universal 
silence  reign  to  hear  the  mandate  for  His  creation  issued  ?  Let 
it  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  form  of  the  Creative  fiat  is 
now  changed.  He  who  hath  said,  Let  there  be  light ,  saith  not, 
Let  there  be  man.  The  Creator  himself,  as  if  to  mark  the 
importance  of  the  crisis,  is  described  as  having  paused.  To 
denote  the  new  style  and  superior  excellence  of  the  work  which 
is  now  to  be  performed,  the  Elohim  is  represented  as  proceed¬ 
ing  to  it  deliberately,  and  as  the  result  of  self-consultation.  To 
indicate  the  God-like  character  and  destiny  of  the  creature,  the 
“  Elohim  said,  Let  us  make  man  in  our  image,  after  our  like¬ 
ness,  and  let  them  have  dominion  over  all  the  earth.”  *  And  to 
represent  the  direct  and  peculiar  derivation  of  the  new  creature, 
he  is  described  as  formed  by  the  immediate  hand,  and  inspired 
bv  the  in-breathing  of  the  Godhead. 

16.  A  priori,  indeed,  it  might  have  been  said  with  a  feeling 
of  wondering  interest.  What  will,  what  can  be,  the  mysterious 
constitution  of  a  creature  whose  high  destiny  it  is  that  he  is  to 
read  the  creation  as  a  manifestation  of  the  Deity,  himself  being, 
by  that  very  act,  and  by  the  power  of  performing  it,  superior  to 
all  the  rest  of  creation !  What  a  vast  advance  will  he  present 
on  all  that  has  previously  existed !  However  far  the  mere 
animal  may  have  proceeded  along  the  brightening  upward  path 
which  man  is  meant  to  travel,  even  if  it  went  considerably 
beyond  its  present  stage,  the  interval  which  separates  it  from 
the  coming  human  being  would  yet  be  vast,  greater  than  any 
known  on  earth  before.  And  if  for  no  other  reason,  for  this, 
that  the  mere  animal,  by  its  destitution  of  those  properties 


*  Gen.  i.  26. 


22 


MAN. 


which  are  to  bring  man  into  a  moral  economy,  and  to  render 
him  capable  of  sympathizing  with  the  ultimate  end  of  that 
economy,  proves  that  its  relation  to  man  is  that  of  means  to  an 
end.  Surely  (it  might  on  these  grounds  have  been  said)  man 
will  have  little  or  nothing  in  common  with  the  material  nature 
of  the  preceding  creation  !  Contrary,  however,  to  such  an  ante¬ 
cedent  expectation,  it  follows,  if  our  theory  of  the  Divine  Pro¬ 
cedure  be  correct,  that,  vastly  superior  as  man  must  be  by  the 
nature  of  his  destiny,  to  all  the  past,  equally  certain  it  is  that 
he  will  take  up  into  his  constitution  the  essential  elements  of  all 
that  has  gone  before  him ;  and  that  thus  in  common  with 
them,  he  will  display  the  power,  and  wisdom,  and  goodness  of 
God. 

17.  (1.)  Then,  first,  as  part  of  a  material  universe,  he  may  be 
expected  to  be,  partly  at  least,  material  or  physical,  and  subject 
to  physical  laws.  Contrary  to  all  antecedent  views,  as  this  ex¬ 
pectation  might  have  appeared,  the  physiological  truth  is,  that 
the  human  body  is  composed  of  the  carbon,  oxygen,  hydrogen, 
and  nitrogen,  the  lime  and  sulphur,  iron,  phosphorus,  and  some 
other  substances,  of  the  mineral  kingdom.  And,  although  this 
fact  could  not  have  been  known  scientifically  until  modern 
chemistry  disclosed  it,  the  Mosaic  history  announced  with  unfal¬ 
tering!;  accent  —  “  And  the  Lord  God  formed  the  man  dust  from 
the  ground ;  ”  aphar  —  dust,  denoting  the  sand,  clay,  lime,  and 
common  constituents  of  the  general  soil.  And  the  same  fact 
is  commemorated  in  the  name  by  which  the  father  of  man¬ 
kind  is  known,  for  the  verse  just  quoted  is,  literally  rendered  — 
“  Jehovah  Elohim  formed  the  adam  (or  man)  dust  from  the 
adamah,  or  ground,”  the  name  being  derived  from  the  material 
of  which  the  body  was  composed.  And  hence  man  is  amenable 
to  the  laws  of  gravitation,  mechanical  force,  chemical  action, 
electricity,  and  light ;  and,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  much  of 
his  practical  wisdom  through  life  consists  in  conforming  to 
them. 

18.  (2.)  Besides  being  a  material  existence,  man  must,  for 
the  same  reason,  be  an  organized  being,  and  subject  to  organic 
laws.  Accordingly,  every  great  characteristic  by  which  vege¬ 
table  life  is  distinguished,  both  from  inorganic  matter  and  from 
animal  life,  is  to  be  found  in  man.  In  •distinction  from  the 
former,  he  is  nourished  and  grows  by  a  power  of  appropriation 
within,  vitalizing  that  which  he  appropriates,  and  imparting  to 
the  matter  vitalized  the  power  of  acting  in  the  same  way  on 
other  substances.  And  in  distinction  from  the  latter,  his  organic 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


23 


or  vegetative  life,  of  which  the  centre  is  the  heart,  acts  continu¬ 
ously,  unconsciously,  and  independently  of  the  will. 

19.  (3.)  For  the  same  reason  man  may  be  expected  to  be 
endowed  with  animal  life.  Accordingly,  it  is  said  in  anthro- 
popathic  language,  that  God  “breathed  into  his  nostrils  the 
breath  of  life,  and  man  became  a  living  or  animated  being.” 
As  such,  he  occupies  his  appropriate  place  at  the  head  of  the 
Vertebral  Division.  Physiologists  have  even  affirmed  that 
man’s  affinity  with  the  animal  kingdom  is  such  that,  during  the 
period  of  his  growth  before  birth,  he  assumes  in  succession 
many  of  the  characters  of  the  different  Classes  of  that  Division, 
and  assumes  them  in  the  same  order  in  which  they  are  said  to 
have  been  called  into  existence,*  and  in  which  also  Geology 
indicates  they  were  created  from  the  first.  This,  however,  is  to 
confound  resemblance  with  identity.f  For  it  is  also  admitted, 
at  the  same  time,  that  amidst  all  the  partial  analogies  and 
resemblances  of  the  Classes  in  question,  each,  at  the  very  same 
time,  exhibits  certain  specific  characteristics  of  its  own,  which 
form  an  impassable  partition  between  it  and  the  class  which  it 
may  most  nearly  resemble. 

20.  The  consideration  of  the  characteristic  and  superior 
organization  of  man,  we  reserve  for  Chapter  the  Fifth.  For  the 
present,  it  is  only  proper  to  speak  of  him  in  those  leading 
respects  in  which  he  agrees  with  the  class  to  which  he  belongs. 

First.  On  the  subject  of  nutrition ,  it  will  at  present  suffice  to 
remark  that,  while  to  the  rest  of  the  animal  kingdom,  a  grant 
was  made  by  the  Creator  of  the  gramineous  and  herbaceous 
substances,  to  man  was  given  the  use  of  all  grain-bearing  and 
leguminous  plants,  and  of  fruit  trees. 

21.  Second.  In  relation  to  the  propagation  of  the  species,  the 
same  analogy  was  observed.  For,  as  the  Creator  had  said  to  the 
inferior  animals,  “  Be  fruitful  and  multiply,”  so,  when  God  had 
“  created  man  in  his  own  image,”  it  is  added,  “  in  the  image  of 
God  created  He  him,  male  and  female  created  He  them.  And 
God  blessed  them,  and  God  said  unto  them,  Be  fruitful  and 
multiply,  and  replenish  the  earth,  and  subdue  it.” 

22.  In  the  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation  of  woman,  a  new 
and  striking  illustration  occurs  of  the  law  now  under  consider¬ 
ation.  In  the  creation  of  man,  we  have  just  seen  that  even  the 
miracle  did  not  deviate  from  this  law ;  that  the  Almighty  Maker 
did  not  originate  a  new  material  out  of  which  to  form  him,  but 


*  Gen.  i.  20  —  25. 


t  Pre- Adamite  Earth,  pp.  134 —  137. 


24 


MAN. 


simply  employed  a  new  combination  of  pre-existing  materials. 
And,  in  accordance  with  the  same  principle,  when  the  woman 
was  to  be  formed,  the  Divine  Creator,  instead  of  going  back 
even  so  far  as  to  the  dust  of  the  earth  for  the  material,  as  in  the 
case  of  man,  is  beautifully  and  significantly  represented  as 
employing  a  portion  of  the  new-made  man  himself;  thus,  in  a 
single  act,  assuming  and  embodying  all  the  prior  laws  of  the 
creation. 

23.  Here,  if  anywhere,  the  question  naturally  arises,  whether 
all  the  varieties  of  mankind  have  descended  from  a  single  pair. 
Whether  or  not  this  question  should  be  regarded  as  equivalent 
to  an  inquiry  respecting  the  unity  of  the  species,  depends 
entirely  on  our  definition  of  a  species.  If  we  regal'd  a  species 
as  an  assemblage  of  individuals  related  to  each  other  through 
descent  from  a  common  and  original  pair  or  stock  —  the  two 
questions  are  identical.  If,  however,  we  describe  a  species  to 
be  all  the  individuals  which,  having  some  organic  characteristic, 
transmit  it  to  them  successors,  together  with  the  same  power  of 
reproduction  —  or  say  that  fertile  offspring  constitutes  the  proof 
of  identity  of  species  —  we  are  stating  a  criterion  rather  than  a 
definition,  and  one  which  does  not  repose  on  absolutely  unex¬ 
ceptionable  facts.  Besides,  the  human  race  might,  according 
to  this  view,  have  formed  one  species,  and  yet  have  descended, 
hypothetically,  from  more  than  a  single  pair.  For  it  is  ante¬ 
cedently  conceivable  that  the  Divine  Creator  might  have  seen 
fit  to  create  more  than  one  parent  stock,  and  then  by  distin¬ 
guishing  them  with  this  characteristic  —  the  perpetuity  of  prop¬ 
agation  —  they  might  have  been  truly  described  as  “  of  one 
blood.”  Indeed,  the  identity  of  humanity  cannot  be  regarded 
as  dependent  on,  or  necessitated  by,  an  identity  in  the  means 
of  original  jwoduction  —  except  as  the  Creator  is  pleased  to 
establish  such  an  arrangement;  and  hence  each  of  the  first 
three  human  beings  was  produced  in  a  manner  circumstantially 
different.  The  unity  of  the  species  is  dependent  on  the#  fact 
that  God  has  willed  that,  notwithstanding  all  man’s  circumstan¬ 
tial  varieties,  our  moral  and  intelligent  natures  should  be  really 
and  truly  identical. 

24.  That  all  the  families  of  mankind  have  actually  descended 
from  a  single  pair,  appears,  however,  to  be  taught  in  the 
account  of  the  Adamic  creation,  and  God  appears  to  have 
designed  this  fact  to  be  both  the  means  and  the  exponent  of 
this  unity.  This  is  evident  from  the  first  employment  of  the 
word  Adam :  “  Let  us  make  man  [Adam]  in  our  own  image, 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


25 


after  our  own  likeness,  and  let  them  have  dominion ;  *  here  the 
plural  verb  shows  that  the  name  had  been  employed  collectively, 
as  equivalent  to  mankind.  “And  God  created  the  man  [the 
Adam]  in  his  own  image ;  in  the  image  of  God  created  He 
him ;  male  and  female  created  He  them.”  Here,  both  the 
application  of  “  male  and  female  ”  to  the  Adam,  and  the  plural 
pronoun  at  the  end  of  the  verse,  show  that  the  name  is  used 
generically,  and  that  it  is  equivalent  to  the  first'  ofi  mankind . 
The  word  Adam,  then,  was  not  at  first  a  proper  name,  but  an 
appellative  noun  for  the  human  species  ;  its  application  to  the 
first  man,  as  his  proper  name,  was  subsequent  and  secondary. 
Nor  did  it  ever  lose  its  primary  appellative  signification.  For, 
besides  that  it  has  no  plural  form,  it  is  very  often  employed  in 
the  Old  Testament  in  a  collective  sense,  to  denote  mankind  — 
the  human  race.  And  although  it  is  not  necessary,  as  we  have 
already  intimated,  that  the  “  one  blood  ”  f  of  the  human  species 
should  be  construed  to  signify  descent  from  a  common  ancestry, 
yet  the  probability  is  that  as  darn,  the  Hebrew  word  for  “  blood,” 
is  a  derivative  from  A-dam,  the  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  Apostle 
when  he  employed  the  phrase,  was,  that  from  one  Adam,  or 
man,  God  had  caused  to  spring  “  all  the  nations  of  the  earth.” 

25.  The  common  origin  of  mankind,  winch  is  thus  indicated, 
involves,  indeed,  a  problem,  or  rather  a  group  of  problems,  of 
difficult  solution.  And  this  might  have  been  antecedently 
expected;  considering  that  it  relates  to  an  order  of  beings 
capable,  from  its  original  constitution,  of  incomparably  greater 
deviations  from  a  normal  model,  or  standard,  than  any  other 
class  of  sentient  existences,  and  an  order  which  has  placed 
itself,  for  thousands  of  years,  under  the  influence  of  a  great 
variety  of  transforming  conditions,  without  preserving  a  record 
of  the  processes  through  which  it  has  passed.  But  to  enter  at 
any  length  into  the  investigation  here,  would  be  premature,  since 
it  belongs  properly  to  the  natural  history  of  man,  whereas  we 
have  now  to  do  with  his  origin  and  constitution.  For  the  present, 
it  is  sufficient  to  remark,  that  as  far  as  the  investigation  has  been 
pursued,  since  Blumenbach  began  his  extensive  researches  into 
the  comparative  anatomy  of  human  races,  and  Dr.  Prichard  J 


*  Gen.  i.  26. 

t  Actr.  xvii.  26,  6  Qeog  .  .  .  ereoirice  re  e%  evog  aljuarog  ttclv  e&vog  uvd-pu>- 

TUV. 

t  Sec  his  admirable  “  Besearehes  into  the  Physical  History  of  Man- 
kind  ”  Tnd  the  “  Natural  History  of  Man.” 

3 


26 


MAN. 


explored  their  comparative  physiology  and  psychology,  the 
difficulties  attending  the  theory  of  a  common  ancestry  have 
been  diminishing. 

26.  Blumenbach,  proceeding  on  Anatomical  grounds,  distri 
buted  mankind  into  five  groups  —  chiefly  according  to  the  con 
formation  of  the  skull  —  the  Caucasian,  Mongolian,  Ethiopian, 
American,  and  Malayan,  an  arrangement  which  Cuvier  adopted. 
According  to  Dr.  Prichard,  the  leading  types  of  cranial  config¬ 
uration  are  only  three  —  the  elliptical,  the  pyramidal,  and  the 
prognathous,  or  jaw-projecting.  It  is  observable,  however,  that 
the  retreating  forehead  of  the  latter  class  does  not  necessarily 
infer  that  the  capacity  of  the  cranial  cavity  is  less  than  that  of 
either  of  the  other  types  —  the  difference  being  one  of  form,  or 
of  greater  backward  elongation ;  that  the  prognathous  type  is 
neither  common  nor  peculiar  to  African  nations ;  while  there  is 
abundant  evidence  to  show  that  the  elliptical  form  of  the  Indo- 
Atlantic  group  passes  off,  by  insensible  degrees,  into  the  pyra¬ 
midal  type  of  the  Mongolian,  and  that  the  prognathous  form 
approaches,  and,  in  many  instances,  joins  on  to,  both  of  these. 
On  the  one  hand,  these  typical  characters  are  not  invariably 
transmitted  —  and  yet  such  permanence  appears  to  be  essential 
to  the  theory  of  an  original  diversity  of  stocks ;  and  on  the 
other,  as  we  pass  from  one  group  of  nations  to  another,  the 
widest  extremes  of  cranial  configuration  are  found  to  be  con- 
nected  by  forms  so  finely  graduated  as  to  defy  demarcation. 

27.  Physiology  demonstrates  the  identity  of  the  various  tribes 
of  mankind  in  all  the  great  laws  of  the  animal  economy.  Dr. 
Prichard  has  shown  that,  while  animal  races  specifically  dis¬ 
tinct,  but  very  nearly  resembling  each  other,  exhibit  the  most 
marked  differences  in  the  phenomena  of  reproduction,  in  the 
period  of  gestation,  in  liability  to  disease,  and  in  the  duration 
of  life,  the  various  branches  of  the  human  family  are,  in  all 
these  respects,  substantially  alike.  And  it  is  especially  perti¬ 
nent  to  the  subject  to  add  that,  while  it  is  almost  unexception- 
ably  true  that  distinct  species  of  animals  do  not  propagate 
so  as  to  perpetuate  hybrid  races,  the  mixed  offspring  of  men  of 
the  most  distinct  diversities  are  the  more  vigorous  and  prolific 
for  the  union  ;  involving  the  necessary  inference  that  such  diver¬ 
sities  are  only  variations  of  the  same  species. 

28.  The  most  dissimilar  races  are  found  also  to  be  Psycho¬ 
logically  identical.  Tribes  rashly  proscribed  as  on  a  level  with 
the  brute,  have  in  our  own  day  vindicated  their  claim  to  a  common 
humanity.  The  metropolis  of  civilization  is  not  without  its 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORAY ARD. 


27 


degraded  Bushmen,  while  the  aboriginal  Australian  is  not  inca¬ 
pable  of  European  cultivation.  As  far  as  we  know,  no  race  of 
men  stands  in  intellectual  or  moral  isolation.  All  are  amenable 
to  the  same  laws  of  motive  and  action.  Sympathies  and  emo¬ 
tions  in  common  proclaim  “  the  whole  world  kin.” 

29.  In  each  of  these  departments,  History,  in  connection 
with  Physical  Geography,  adduces  evidence  that  the  diversities 
of  mankind  are,  more  or  less,  resolvable'  into  the  prolonged 
action  of  external  and  other  agents  producing  or  perpetuating 
them.  Within  two  centuries,  the  population  of  a  district  in 
Ireland  has,  under  barbarizing  influences,  changed  the  elliptical 
form  of  skull  for  the  prognathous.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
pyramidal  type  of  the  Mongolian  group  of  nations  has,  in  the 
instance  of  the  Western  Turks,  for  example,  assumed  the  ellip¬ 
tical  conformation  of  skull.  The  color  of  the  eyes  and  of  the 
skin  is  found  to  be  so  dependent  on  external  conditions  as 
to  render  it  useless  as  a  characteristic  mark  of  some  races. 
The  Jew  of  Germany,  of  Portugal,  and  of  Cochin,  is  so  far 
assimilated  to  the  native  populations  of  these  countries  as  to 
be  light-complexioned  in  the  first,  dark-colored  in  the  second, 
and  black  in  the  third.  It  is  freely  admitted,  indeed,  that  cli¬ 
mate  does  not  account  for  all  the  varieties  of  color ;  but 
neither  will  diversity  of  original  stock  account  for  them.  Very 
marked  differences  of  color  exist  among  the  same  nation  ■ 
even  within  the  limits  of  a  small  island.  Peculiarities  of  com¬ 
plexion  often  appear  in  the  children  of  the  same  parents. 
Sometimes  all  the  offspring  of  five-fingered  parents  are  six¬ 
fingered;  and  circumstances  are  easily  conceivable  in  which 
this  distinction  might  be  perpetuated.  Thus  far,  then,  we  have 
met  with  no  race  exhibiting  a  single  distinctive  characteristic 
common  to  all  its  members  and  peculiar  to  them,  nor  one  so 
constant  as  not  to  be  susceptible  of  change  in  the  course  of 
time ;  leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  the  varieties  observable  are 
not  original,  but  within  the  limits  of  species. 

30.  It  may  be  objected  that  the  kinds  of  evidence  already 
adduced  only  make  it  probable  that  the  varieties  of  mankind 
may  have  descended  from  a  single  stock,  or  from  similar  stocks. 
This  is  true,  but  this  is  all  which  can  be  reasonably  looked 
for.  And  a  wise  philosophy  will  neither  reject  negative  evidence, 
where  positive  cannot  be  justly  expected,  nor  assume  a  plurality 
of  causes,  where  one  is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  phenomena. 
Comparative  Philology,  however,  —  or,  as  applied  to  the  science 
of  races,  “  Glottology,”  —  tends,  as  far  as  its  researches  have 


28 


MAN. 


hitherto  gone,  to  affirm  positively  the  unity  of  the  human  race. 
In  proportion  as  a  careful  inquiry  has  penetrated  into  the  past, 
the  streams  of  speech  have  been  traced  upwards  to  their  points 
of  divergence  from  their  parent  channels ;  and  many  of  these 
channels  themselves  have  been  found  to  converge  and  to  unite 
in  a  common  source.  Thus,  first,  the  languages  of  the  great 
Indo-European  family  of  nations  are  proved  to  have  been 
developed  from  a  common  Sanscritic  or  earlier  origin.  The 
second  or  Semitic  family,  called,  also,  the  Syro- Arabian,  com- 
prising  the  Hebrew,  the  Aramaic,  the  Arabic,  and  the  Ethiopie, 
are  traceable  to  a  common  origin  also.  But  these  two  families 
are  themselves  allied  by  the  most  unquestionable  analogies. 
The  Egyptian  language  was  long  supposed  to  stand  apart  from 
both  families.  Not  only,  however,  were  the  same  social,  polit¬ 
ical,  and  speculative  characteristics,  in  their  broad  outline, 
common  to  the  Egyptians  and  Indians,  but  the  language  of  each 
is  now  found  to  be  linked  together  by  mysterious  affinities. 
“  The  old  Egyptian  clearly  stands  between  the  Semitic  and 
Indo-European  ;  for  its  forms  and  roots  cannot  be  explained 
by  either  of  them  singly,  but  are  evidently  a  combination  of  the 
two.”  * * * §  The  third  family,  the  Turanian,  or  Ugro-Tartarian, 
comprises  the  languages  of  High  Asia  and  of  parts  of  Northern 
Europe.  To  this  branch  belongs,  also,  by  numerous  structural 
relations,  the  whole  American  family,  as  well  as  the  Papuan 
and  Polynesian  languages.  And  yet  so  striking  are  the  vestiges 
of  original  connection  between  the  Turanian  and  the  Inda- 

o 

European  families,  that  it  has  even  been  proposed  to  include 
them  both  under  the  wider  designation  of  the  Japhetic  ?  f  The 
monosyllabic  Chinese  and  Indo-Chinese  form  a  fourth  family 
of  languages.  But  even  this  strongly  marked  group  is  not 
isolated :  for  to  say  nothing  of  the  grammatical  affinities  between 
the  Chinese  and  Burmese  languages ;  t  the  Tibetan  language  is, 
“in  some  respects  intermediate  between  the  monosyllabic  lan¬ 
guages  in  general  and  the  Mongolian,”  which  is  one  of  the 
Turanian  group.  §  A  fifth  group,  the  languages  of  the  great 
region  of  Central  Negroland,  forms  the  last  Glottological  divis- 


*  The  Chevalier  Bunsen’s  “  Egypt’s  Place  in  Universal  History,”  p.  x. 

t  The  Chevalier  Bunsen’s  t;  Besults  of  the  recent  Egyptian  Researches,” 
&c.,  in  the  Report  of  Brit.  Assoc.,  1S47,  p.  297. 

X  Idem,  p.  264. 

§  Dr.  Prichard  “  On  the  various  Methods  of  Research,”  &c.,  in  the 
same  Report,  p.  247. 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


29 


ion ;  and  not  only  is  there  “ prima  facie  evidence  for  believing 
that  the  phenomenon  of  philological  isolation  is  not  to  be  found 
in  Africa,”  *  but  affinities  exist  which  place  this  family  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  Semitic  group. 

31.  Now  the  fact  that  formative  words  and  inflections  pervade 
the  entire  structure  of  some  of  these  great  families  of  languages, 
renders  almost  every  sentence  a  witness  to  the  common  origin 
of  the  nations  speaking  them.  But  when  it  is  remembered 
that,  according  to  the  laws  of  combination,  millions  of  chances 
lie  against  the  application  of  a  few  similar  unexceptionable 
words  in  different  languages  to  the  same  objects, t  we  may  be 
said  to  possess  mathematical  evidence  of  the  common  origin  of 
all  languages,  and  consequently  of  the  original  unity  of  man¬ 
kind.  And  thus  it  is  that  in  human  language  itself  there  is 
more  to  be  read  than  in  anything  that  has  been  written  in  it. 

32.  The  descent  of  mankind  from  a  single  stock  is  further 
supported  by  Analogy.  It  is  the  generally  received  doctrine  of 
naturalists  that  every  species  of  animals  had  only  one  beginning 
in  a  particular  spot ;  their  progeny  being  left  to  disperse  them¬ 
selves  as  far  from  that  spot  as  their  powers  of  locomotion, 
climatic  adaptations,  and  other  conditions  would  permit.  But 
if  this  hypothesis  be  accepted  respecting  the  brute  creation,  the 
improbability  that  there  was  a  plurality  of  ancestral  stocks 
created  for  man  is  as  much  greater  as  his  powers  of  locomotion, 
of  adaptation,  and  his  inventive  resources,  exceed  those  of  the 
brute  creation.  And,  further,  it  may  be  shown  that  there  are 
no  physical  diversities  of  color,  shape,  and  conformation,  found 
among  the  different  branches  of  the  human  family,  which  have 
not  their  parallel  in  the  varieties  of  many  an  animal  species ; 
leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  they  are  resolvable  into  deviations 
from  one  stock. 

33.  The  objection,  that  if  the  hypothesis  of  descent  from  a 
single  stock  be  accepted,  a  much  longer  time  is  necessary  in 
order  to  account  for  the  diversities  among  mankind  than  our 
received  chronology  would  allow,  inasmuch  as  some  of  them 
are  found  already  stereotyped  at  the  very  commencement  of 
historic  time,  belongs,  properly,  to  the  department  of  chronol¬ 
ogy.  We  may  remark,  however,  in  abatement  of  the  objection, 
first,  that  although  paintings  coeval  with  the  earliest  records 


*  Dr.  Latham,  “  On  Ethnographical  Philology,”  in  the  same  Report, 
pp.  223,  229. 

t  Dr.  Young,  in  Philosoph.  Trans.,  vol.  cix.  for  1819,  p.  70. 

3* 


ao 


MAN. 


exhibit  the  red  Egyptian  in  contrast  with  the  jet-black  Negro, 
tribes  are  to  be  found  on  the  borders  of  the  Red  Sea  constituting 
a  series  of  links  between  the  two,  and  therefore  pointing  to  a 
common  origin.  Secondly,  that  regarding  the  Negro,  for  exam¬ 
ple,  as  a  wide  departure  from  the  tjqDe  of  primitive  man,  it 
appears  to  be  a  law  of  human  nature  that  deterioration  should 
take  place  much  more  rapidly  than  restoration  or  improvement. 
And,  thirdly,  that  supposing  deterioration,  or  spontaneous  varia¬ 
tion  of  any  kind,  to  have  taken  place,  the  necessary  condition 
of  mankind  at  first  would  have  peculiarly  tended  to  its  perpetu¬ 
ation. 

34.  Besides,  if  the  hypothesis  of  a  common  origin  be  rejected, 
the  nature  of  the  only  alternative  should  be  distinctly  borne  in 
mind  —  an  unknown  number  of  separate  stocks.  Five  or  five 
hundred  will  not  suffice.  For  if  the  extreme  or  typical  forms 
of  mankind  are  to  be  each  assigned  a  distinct  origin,  why  is  not 
every  link  of  the  series  by  which  they  are  connected  together 
to  receive  a  similar  distinction  ?  They  can  be  placed  in  regular 
gradation  ;  and  if  any  one  in  the  line  be  merely  a  variation 
from  the  one  standing  next,  why  may  not  this  also  be  a  modifi¬ 
cation  from  the  next  in  the  series  ? 

35.  It  might  be  shown  also  that,  of  the  different  kinds  of  evi¬ 
dence  implying  unity  of  descent,  one  branch  is  strongest  where 
another  is  weakest.  Nations  most  linguistically  remote  have 
never  had  their  physical  relationship  questioned.  Others  are 
closely  bound  by  linguistic  ties,  though  widely  sundered  phy¬ 
sically  and  geographically.  All  the  branches  of  evidence  appro¬ 
priate  to  the  inquiry  support  each  other,  and  unite  in  authenti¬ 
cating  the  conclusion  that  the  human  species  is  one,  and  that  all 
the  differences  which  it  exhibits  are  to  be  regarded  merely  as 
varieties. 

36.  -Third.  Like  the  animal  kingdom  which  preceded  him, 
man  is  endowed  with  animal  instincts ;  and,  as  in  animals,  all 
these  instincts  determine  him  to  act  for  the  attainment  of  that 
end  which  is  relative,  but  only  relative,  to  the  great  End  —  his 
own  animal  Avell-being.  Whatever  higher  purposes  they  may 
be  applied  to  by  the  nobler  parts  of  man’s  nature,  the  direct 
objects  of  all  his  animal  instincts  are  life,  enjoyment,  and  con¬ 
tinuance  by  offspring.  The  existence  of  many  of  these  is 
recognized  in  the  terms  of  the  original  grant  of  the  earth  for 
man’s  use.  “  And  God  blessed  them,  and  God  said  unto  them, 
Be  fruitful,  and  multiply,  and  replenish  the  earth,  and  subdue 
it ;  and  have  dominion  over  the  fish  of  the  sea,  and  over  the 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


31 


fowl  of  the  air,  and  over  ever}'  living  thing  that  moveth  upon 
the  earth.”  Here  the  gregarious  instinct  becomes,  under  the 
influence  of  reason,  a  social  principle.  So  many  processes, 
and  so  great  a  variety  of  labor,  are  implied  in  the  accomplish¬ 
ment  of  this  destiny,  that  not  only  is  a  division  of  labor,  or  a 
community  of  effort,  desirable,  but  the  continuance  of  such  social 
compact  is  indispensable  through  a  long  period  of  time. 

37.  In  all  these  respects,  then,  the  laws  of  nature,  as  known 
to  the  ancient  earth,  were  now  introduced  and  embodied  in  the 
constitution  of  the  new-made  man.  So  completely  is  a  portion, 
at  least,  of  the  pre-existing  creation  taken  up  into  man’s  nature, 
that  any  change  in  external  nature,  unless  accompanied  by  a 
corresponding  change  in  his  constitution,  will  be  detrimental  to 
his  well-being.  And  any  essential  change  in  him  which  is  not 
accompanied  by  a  corresponding  alteration  in  the  laws  of  exter¬ 
nal  nature,  will,  by  throwing  him  out  of  his  constitutional  har¬ 
mony  with  nature,  be  equally  detrimental  to  his  physical, 
organic,  and  animal  well-being.  Had  man  been  the  first  object 
created,  and  had  he  been  held  miraculously  in  space  till  the 
earth  was  made,  God,  by  giving  him  his  present  constitution, 
would  have  given  a  pledge  that  the  material  globe  to  be  created 
as  his  habitation  should  harmonize  with  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
as  the  earth  was  created  first,  a  pledge  was  given  in  effect  that 
the  constitution  of  man  should  be  in  exact  correspondence  with 
all  its  laws.  And  the  closer  the  examination  into  this  coinci¬ 
dence.  which  we  may  hereafter  have  occasion  to  institute,  the 
more  shall  we  be  impressed  by  its  minuteness,  comprehensive¬ 
ness,  and  perfection.  And  thus  man’s  constitution,  regarded  in 
its  threefold  character,  as  physical,  organic,  and  sentient,  took 
up  the  strain  of  creation  which  had  preceded  his  coming,  in 
praise  of  the  power,  and  wisdom,  and  goodness  of  God. 

38.  Thus  far  we  have  only  verified  the  truth  of  the  Scriptural 
declaration  concerning  man,  that  his  foundation  is  in  the 
dusfc,”  for  we  have  merely  unearthed  and  looked  at  that  foun¬ 
dation.  The  towering  and  temple-like  superstructure  is  yet  to 
engage  our  attention.  But  could  we  have  looked  on  that  foun- 
dation,  even  before  it  began  to  be  built  on,  and  to  receive  its 
mysterious  additions,  and  could  we  have  taken  a  comprehen¬ 
sive  survey  of  the  preparations  and  purposes  which  it  implied, 
how  profound  the  emotions  which  must  have  filled  our  breasts ! 
To  receive  the  foundations  of  a  temple,  the  ground  has  often 
to  be  prepared  —  or,  as  it  is  technically  called,  to  be  made  —  at 
an  immense  expenditure  of  time  and  labor ;  but  here  is  a  basis 


82  ' 


MAN. 


laid,  for  which  “  the  foundations  of  the  earth  ”  themselves  had 
been  laid  —  for  which  the  earth  itself  had  been,  literally,  made. 
Nations  have  quarrelled  for  the  mere  sketches  and  outlines  of 
the  human  figure  by  some  of  the  masters  of  design :  the  very 
fragments  of  the  marble  block  from  which  one  of  the  master¬ 
pieces  of  ancient  sculpture  was  hewn,  would  be  deemed  a 
treasure  for  royalty ;  but  here  is  the  Divine  model  of  all  them 
copies  —  the  original  of  human  beauty  —  fresh  from  the  hand 
of  the  infinite  Designer.  “  The  dust  of  antiquity,”  when  it  does 
not  cover  what  ought  to  be  exposed,  imparts  sacredness  and 
value  to  the  objects  on  winch  it  rests ;  here  dust  of  dateless 
antiquity,  after  having  passed  through  numberless  combinations, 
is  taken  and  moulded  into  a  human  form.  Some  of  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  that  form  had  been  in  the  scheme  of  animal  organization 
unknown  ages  before  the  earth  was  prepared  for  man  or  suited 
to  his  constitution  ;  possibly,  the  earth  of  which  they  are  moulded 
has  been  already  in  all  their  animal  types  ;  but  in  Ins  form  they 
have  at  length  attained  a  development  which,  guided  by  reason, 
will  make  him  the  sovereign  of  the  animal  kingdom.  And  even 
earlier  still,  before  time  began,  there  was  “  a  book  ”  • —  an  eternal 
plan  —  in  which  “  all  his  members  were  sketched,  when  as  yet 
there  was  none  of  them.”  And  how  greatly  would  it  have 
added  to  the  interest  of  the  spectacle  could  we  have  imagined 
all  the  relations  of  that  new-made  organization  to  the  physical 
elements  which  encompassed  it;  or  have  foreseen  that  when 
that  Pharos,  prostrate  on  the  earth,  should  be  erected,  and 
lighted  up  with  an  intelligence  within,  it  would  stand,  the  centre 
of  the  material  universe,  with  lines  of  relationship  drawn  to  it 
from  every  part  of  the  vast  circumference.  What,  then,  must 
our  emotions  have  been,  could  we  have  looked  on  that  frame, 
so  “  fearfully  and  wonderfully  made,”  with  a  prophetic  eye,  and 
have  "caught  a  glimpse  of  its  subsequent  history ! 


39.  The  tenor  of  this  chapter  appears  to  assume,  first,  that, 
in  the  ascending  order  of  creation,  the  origination  of  matter 
preceded  that  of  mind,  and  mere  animal  life  that  of  angelic 
existence ;  and,  secondly,  that  man’s  creation  subsequent  to 
that  of  angels  implies  his  superiority  of  constitution  and  ulti¬ 
mate  destination.  Each  of  these  implications  I  believe  to  be 
clearly  deducible  from  the  word  of  God.  As,  however,  the  pro¬ 
cess  of  the  deduction  would  interfere  with  the  continuity  of 
our  remarks  respecting  man,  besides  anticipating  portions  of  the 


THE  PAST  BROUGHT  FORWARD. 


33 


later  revelations  of  God,  I  will  here  content  myself  with  two 
observations  —  first,  that  the  disproof  and  rejection  of  both 
these  propositions  respecting  angels  might  still  leave  the  truth 
of  our  theory  respecting  our  planetary  and  human  economy 
untouched.  For  aught  that  the  rejector  could  show  to  the  con¬ 
trary,  them  history  may  furnish  more  striking  illustrations  of 
our  theory  than  that  of  our  earthly  economy  does.  Unless  he 
were  in  a  condition  to  say  what  the  “  first  estate  ”  was  from 
which  some  of  the  angels  fell ;  where  they  passed  that  proba¬ 
tionary  state ;  and  in  what  respects  their  physiological  constitu¬ 
tion  differed  from  ours,  he  has  no  premises  from  which  to  draw 
a  single  conclusion  adverse  to  our  views.  Secondly,  he  is  not  at 
liberty  to  argue  from  their  condition  at  this  moment  to  our  pres¬ 
ent  condition.  This  (the  common  error)  is  a  gross  theological 
anachronism.  In  respect  of  mere  time,  they  are  a  stage  of 
existence  beyond  us.  They  are  already  in  their  future  state ; 
what  their  preliminary  or  probationary  history  was,  we  know 
not.  They  may  have  reached  their  present  condition  from  a 
part  of  the  Divine  dominions  in  which  Power  and  Wisdom  and 
Goodness  had  for  unknown  ages  been  conducting  a  process  of 
manifestation  parallel  to  that  of  earth,  and  in  which  everything 
was  in  strict  analogy  with,  and  preparatory  to,  the  subsequent 
arrival  of  their  own  economy  as  a  display  of  Holiness.  The 
angelic  and  terrestrial  economies  may  thus  have  proceeded  inde¬ 
pendently  and  separately  through  successive  stages,  and  for 
ages  of  duration,  and  yet  they  may  have  been  all  the  time  illus¬ 
trating  the  same  Divine  perfections,  till,  at  a  certain  point,  they 
touched  and  coincided.  All  that  an  objector  would  be  justified 
in  demanding  is,  that  when  they  do  meet  they  should  not  clash ; 
that  the  order  of  the  progress  of  each  should  be  the  order  of 
the  Divine  perfections ;  that,  like  two  streams,  which,  having 
run  for  leagues  separately  but  in  the  same  direction,  at  length 
unite  their  course,  and  cver  after  flow  on  together;  and  this 
condition  the  Scripture  itself  abundantly  satisfies. 


34 


MAN. 


CHAPTER  HI. 

PROGRESSION. 

Sect.  I.  —  Sensation  and  Perception. 

1.  In  our  last  chapter,  we  regarded  man  as  a  mere  link  in 
the  connected  chain  of  the  Divine  Manifestation.  The  same 
theory  which  led  us  to  look  for  the  reproduction  of  pre-existing 
laws  and  elements  in  his  constitution,  leads  us  to  inquire  next 
for  the  production  o  f  new  effects .  or  the  introduction  of  new  laws. 
This  itself  is,  hypothetically,  a  law  of  the  Divine  Procedure. 

2.  For  were  it  to  terminate  at  any  given  point,  the  proof  of 
all-sufficiency  for  unlimited  manifestation  would  terminate  with 
it.  Besides  which,  all-sufficiency,  which  is  the  perfection  to  be 
displayed,  requires,  from  its  very  nature,  infinity  and  eternity 
in  which  to  be  developed,  for  it  implies  sufficiency  for  nothing 
less  than  these.  But,  if  the  development  of  the  ultimate  Pur¬ 
pose,  or  the  attainment  of  the  great  End,  be  in  its  very  nature 
progressive ,  this  is  only  saying  that  the  process  must  ever  be 
kept  open  to  receive  the  addition  of  new  effects,  or  the  superin¬ 
duction  of  new  laws.  So  that  the  law  of  uniformity  itself  will 
always  be  subject  to,  or  bounded  by,  this  more  general  law  of 
Progression ;  just  as  this  more  general  law  itself  will  always  be 
subject  to  the  law  of  the  end,  to  which  all  particular  laws  owe 
their  existence.  That,  therefore,  winch  is  commonlv  regarded 
as  miraculous  interposition,  may  be  itself  a  law  of  the  Manifes¬ 
tation —  not  the  exception,  but  the  rule  —  or,  if  the  exception 
to  us  who  view  tilings  only  on  the  scale  of  a  few  days,  to  Him 
who  views  them  on  an  unlimited  scale  it  may  be  the  rule. 

3.  Xow,  in  harmony  with  the  law  of  progression,  we  have 
found  a  newly  created  man.  A  short  period  prior  to  the  point 
of  time  of  which  we  are  speaking,  he  was  not.  Animal  exist¬ 
ence  was  supreme.  A  higher  order  of  being  has  now  come. 
A  moment’s  consideration  will  show  that  we  have  now  reached 
a  new  and  vital  point  in  our  inquiries.  Hitherto,  we  have  con¬ 
templated  nature  as  a  manifestation  of  the  Deity ;  and,  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  we  regarded  man  merely  as  a  newly  added 
link  in  the  connected  chain  of  nature.  Xow,  we  have  to  view 
him  as  the  being  to  whom  the  manifestation  is  made ;  and  as 
such,  capable  of  turning  round  and  examining  the  chain,  link  by 


PROGRESSION. 


35 


link,  for  himself.  Hitherto,  but  two  objects  have  engaged  our 
attention  —  God,  and  the  created  nature  intended  to  manifest 
Him ;  but  now  a  third  party  comes  on  the  stage  —  the  Human 
being  to  whom  that  pre-existing  Nature  is  to  serve  as  a  mani¬ 
festation  of  God.  We  have  now  therefore  a  new,  and  in  some 
respects,  a  very  different  object,  with  which  to  deal.  Not, 
indeed,  that  this  new  being  himself  will  be  less  a  manifestation 
of  God,  because  he  is  the  first  to  be  occupied  in  the  new  work 
of  recognizing  God  in  creation.  On  the  contrary,  from  the 
moment  he  enters  on  his  new  task,  and  by  the  very  endow¬ 
ments  winch  enable  him  to  undertake  it,  he  himself  will  be  a 
nobler  exponent  of  the  perfections  of  his  Maker  than  any  part 
of  external  nature  winch  can  engage  his  attention.  But.  in  the 
order  of  nature,  this  part  of  the  subject,  or  man  regarded  as 
forming  a  part  of  the  Divine  manifestation,  must  be  deferred 
until  we  have  examined  into  the  nature  of  that  intellectual  and 
moral  constitution  by  which  he  is  made  capable  of  recognizing 
God  in  His  works.  In  other  words,  the  manifestation  of  God 
by  man,  requires  that  we  first  examine  how  the  manifestation 
of  God  to  man  is  made  possible.  Hitherto,  there  has  been  but 
one  free  mind  related  to  this  terrestrial  economy  • —  the  Infinite 
Mind  which  conceived  the  whole  as  a  limited  representation  of 
Himself ;  but  now  another  mind  has  come  expressly  in  order  to 
understand  and  admire  this  representation.  Here  are  now  two 
Subjectives  and  one  Objective  ;  the  Infinite  Subjective  proposing 
to  reveal  himself,  the  finite  subjective  prepared  to  receive  the 
revelation,  and  objective  nature  placed,  so  to  speak,  between  the 
two  as  the  occasion  or  medium  of  communication ;  and  with 
tills  peculiarity  of  arrangement,  that  the  finite  subjective  itself 
is  embodied,  or  is  constitutionally  ahied  to  external  nature. 

4.  Now  it  must  be  evident  that,  in  order  that  objective  nature 
may  answer  the  purpose  in  question,  the  two  subjective  minds 
must  have  many  things  in  common.  To  the  infinite  mind,  that 
objective  was  first  subjective,  existing  only  in  His  divine  pur¬ 
pose  ;  to  the  finite  mind  it  is  first  objective,  existing  apart,  and 
awaiting  his  arrival.  If,  then,  it  is  to  be  the  means  of  making 
the  same  truths  consciously  present  in  the  finite  mind  which 
were  once  entirely  subjective  in  the  mind  of  God,  it  is  clear 
that  the  two  minds  must  have  much  in  common  with  each 
other ;  that  man  must,  in  this  lofty  sense,  be  made  in  the  •image 
of  God  —  the  intellectual  finite  be  the  reflection  of  the  infinite 
—  otherwise  the  objective  universe  would  stand,  not  as  a  me¬ 
dium  of  communication,  but  as  a  barrier  of  obstruction,  between 


36 


MAX. 


the  teacher  and  the  taught.  If,  as  we  believe,  there  was  a 
point  in  past  duration  when  creation  had  yet  to  be,  when  all  the 
objects  in  nature  existed  in  the  Divine  mind  only  as  ideas ;  if 
everything  in  nature  exists  only  in  conformity  with  those  ideas, 
or  as  objective  expressions  of  their  laws ;  and  if  man,  though 
embodied  and  sentient,  is  to  know  them  as  such,  he  must  be 
made  capable  of  knowing  material  objects  as  the  occasion  of  his 
sensations,  of  understanding  the  laws  under  which  they  operate 
and  exist ;  and  of  being  conscious  of  the  ideas  which  these 
embodied  laws  symbolize  and  suggest. 

5.  First  of  all,  then,  it  seems  necessary  that,  if  the  physical, 
organic,  and  animal  world  be,  in  all  its  varieties,  a  manifestation 
of  God,  and  man,  though  partaking  of  a  material  nature,  is  to 
know  it  as  such,  he  should  be  placed  in  sensible  and  perceptible 
communication  with  it ;  or  be  endowed  with  means  of  sensation 
and  perception,  rendering  him  susceptible  of  a  sensible  change 
or  mental  impression,  consciously  and  uniformly  answering  to 
each,  or  else  capable  of  being  made  to  answer  to  each,  of  all 
the  phenomena  of  external  nature. 

6.  In  order  that  objective  nature  may  be  subjectively  felt,  it 
appears  necessary,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this  propo¬ 
sition,  («)  that  the  means  or  organs  of  sensation  be  susceptible 
of  a  change  of  state  corresponding  to  the  phenomena  presented 
to  them.*  ( b )  That  the  seat  of  the  sensation  be,  not  in  the 
material  organs,  but  in  the  mind,  and  the  mind  alone.  ( [c )  That 
the  sensation,  being  an  effect,  be  referable  by  the  mind  to  a 
cause  or  occasion,  (d)  That  the  sensation  be  attended  by  the 
belief  of  something  external  as  the  cause  or  occasion  of  it. 
(e)  That  this  reference  of  the  mind  to  an  external  agent  involve 
the  belief  of  distinction  or  difference  between  the  subjective 
and  the  objective,  (f )  That  the  sensation  be  referable,  not 
merely  to  some  occasion  extermd  as  its  origin,  but  to  the  right 
occasion. 

7.  (g)  That  the  perception  of  the  right  external  occasion  of 
sensation  be  phenomenal,  or  such  as  it  appears  when  known 
through  an  organic  medium.  Now  that  which  perception 
directly  assures  us  of  are  the  phenomena  which  we  term  attri¬ 
butes  and  qualities.  The  popular  notion  is,  indeed,  that  there 
is  something  in  the  external  agents  which  act  on  the  senses 


*  “Bell’s  Nervous  System  of  the  Human  Body,”  p.  114,  &c. ;  and 
“  Barlow’s  Connection  between  Physiology  and  Intellectual  Philosophy,” 

pp.  6  — 11. 


PROGRESSION. 


37 


similar  to  tlie  sensations  they  produce  ;  that  our  sensible  impres- 
110ns  are  exact  copies  of  objective  reahties;  that  the  quality 
j>f  sweetness  is  in  the  honey,  and  of  fragrance  in  the  rose.  But 
Savor,  fragrance,  and  color,  are  not  inherent  in  the  bodies 
which  excite  these  sensations,  any  more  than  pain  resides  in 
jhe  instrument  which  wounds  us.  That  there  are  aptitudes  or 
qualities  in  the  bodies  to  produce  these  sensations  is  unques¬ 
tionable,  otherwise  we  should  not  be  conscious  of  them.  But 
Ihese  qualities  themselves  are  known  to  us  only  as  the  external 
occasions  of  our  sensations.  Li  other  words,  they  have  no  ex¬ 
istence,  such  as  we  sensibly  apprehend,  apart  from,  and  inde¬ 
pendently  of,  the  sensations  which  they  occasion.  Now  this  is 
to  know  what  are  called  the  secondary  qualities  of  matter,  and 
answers  to  the  condition  which  I  have  just  named,  and  which  is 
to  be  regarded  as  a  necessary  means  of  knowledge.  For  if  the 
human  mind  itself  is  to  be  a  manifestation  of  the  Divine  mind, 
it  must  be  true  to  every  material  object.  The  subjective  mir¬ 
ror  must  not  distort,  any  more  than  the  objective  universe  must 
deceive. 

8.  But  is  this  the  limit  of  our  knowledge  of  matter  ?  To 

O 

speak  of  its  secondary  qualities  is  to  imply  the  existence,  real 
or  imaginary,  of  primary  qualities.  And  such  properties  there 
are,  (though  I  can  speak  of  them  here  only  by  anticipation,)  — 
properties  essential  to  matter,  and  without  which  the  mind  cannot 
conceive  it  to  exist.  Secondary  qualities  have  just  been 
described  as  those  which  have  no  existence  such  as  we  sensibly 
apprehend,  independently  of  the  sensations  which  they  occa¬ 
sion  ;  the  primary  qualities  of  matter  may  be  described  as  those 
which  would  have  existed,  even  if  no  sentient  being  had  ever 
been  created  —  such  as  form  and  extension.  Of  these  we  have 
notions  or  ideas,  not  sensations.  They  are  to  be  confounded 
neither  with  the  mind  which  conceives  of  them,  nor  with  the 
sensations  which  precede  them.  They  are  as  real  for  the 
reason  as  any  mere  sensible  phenomena  are  for  the  senses,  and 
much  more  objectively  distinct.  All  such  phenomena  pre-sup- 
pose  them,  and  are  dependent  on  them.  They  are  no  sooner 
experienced  to  exist,  than  their  existence  is  seen  by  the  mind 
to  be  necessary.  The  mind  neither  produces  them  nor  are  they 
merely  the  objects  of  its  sensational  perceptions;*  but  in  such 


*  As  perception  is  often  used  to  denote  the  reference  which  the  mind 
makes  to  its  own  phenomena,  through  the  medium  of  .consciousness,  I 
here  employ  the  phrase  sensational  perception  to  denote  the  same  faculty 

4 


38 


MAX. 


perceptions  it  intuitively  recognizes  their  independent  and 
necessary  existence  as  conditions  under  which  matter  existed 
before  we  came  into  being,  and,  indeed,  irrespective  of  all  cre¬ 
ated  minds. 

9.  These  remarks  on  the  primary  qualities  of  matter  are, 
however,  anticipatory.  But  as  some  notice  of  the  subject  at 
this  point  appeared  necessary,  in  order  to  prevent  misapprehen¬ 
sion,  I  might  here  state  the  result  as  another  condition  of  human 
knowledge  —  (h)  that  the  intellectual  apprehension  of  the  right 
object  in.  perception,  includes,  as  far  as  it  goes,  the  knowledge 
of  the  object' as  it  really  is  in  itself.  For  if  external  nature  is 
necessarily,  as  far  as  it  goes,  a  manifestation  of  God,  and  if  man 
is  made  in  order  to  apprehend  this  Divine  disclosure,  his  intel¬ 
lectual  apprehension  of  the  objective,  as  far  as  it  extends,  (for 
it  cannot  be  absolutely  unlimited,  and  therefore  I  employ  the 
term  apprehension,  not  comprehension,)  must  be  a  knowledge  of 
it  as  it  really  is,  or  as  it  would  have  been  had  he  never  existed 
to  apprehend  it ;  otherwise,  he  will  either  apprehend  a  fiction, 
or  an  objective  reality  will  exist  as  a  means  of  Divine  manifes¬ 
tation,  of  which  he  yet  knows  nothing. 

10.  Now,  if  these  views  are  accepted,  our  theory,  if  I  mistake 
not,  reveals  the  reason  of  the  distinction  in  question ;  for  it 
contemplates  man  in  a  twofold  light,  as  part  of  a  system  of 
Divine  revelation,  and  also  as  the  being  tc  whom  the  revelation 
is  to  be  made.  In  the  former  capacity,  his  mind  primarily,  like 
that  of  the  animal  below  him,  lias  to  do  only  with  the  secondary 
qualities  of  matter ;  in  the  latter,  as  standing  apart  from  the 
system,  and  viewing  it  as  a  disclosure  made  to  him,  his  mind, 
like  that  of  the  Divine  Discloser,  must  be  capable  of  appre¬ 
hending  primary  qualities.  As  a  part  of  nature,  he  has  to  do 
only  with  the  phenomena  of  nature  —  with  things  as  they  seem ; 
but  if,  as  a  reflective,  subjective  mind,  he  is  to  know  these  in 
their  highest  or  scientific  forms,  he  must  be  able  to  conceive  of 
them  in  their  primary  .conditions.  As  a  mere  epitome  of  cre¬ 
ated  nature  —  a  microcosm  —  he  must  know  nature  through  a 
sensible  medium,  so  that  his  knowledge  will  necessarily  be  rela¬ 
tive,  even  in  its  kind ;  but,  as  an  epitome,  or  reflection  of  the 
Divine  Mind,  his  mind  must  be  able  to  apprehend  nature  in  its 
primary  characters,  as  his  Maker  does,  so  that  its  knowledge 
may  be  relative  only  in  degree.  Relative  to  the  constitution  of 


in  its  reference  to  the  objects  of  external  nature,  through  the  medium  of 
the  senses. 


PROGRESSION. 


39 


his  mincl  it  must  be  ;  but  while,  in  the  former  case,  it  is  relative 
both  in  kind  and  in  degree,  in  the  latter  it  is  relative  in  degree 
only.  In  its  higher  capacity,  as  an  image  of  the  Divine  Mind, 
the  human  intellect  regards  the  primary  qualities  both  as  occa¬ 
sions  of  perceptions,  and  as  objects ,  or  as  purely  objective ;  in  its 
lower  capacity,  as  an  image  of  nature,  the  secondary  qualities 
are  related  to  it  only  as  occasions  of  perception.  The  primary 
qualities  of  matter  are  to  be  regarded  as  presupposed  even  by 
the  Divine  Creator  in  all  the  uses  for  which  he  may  be  pleased 
to  employ  it,  and  therefore  the  mind  of  man  is  constituted  to 
regard  them  as  objective  realities  ;  the  secondary  qualities  are 
not,  strictly  speaking,  objects  which  the  mind  perceives  as  they 
really  are,  but  only  the  external  agents  or  occasions  of  its  per¬ 
ceptions.  And  thus  our  theory  not  only  recognizes  an  im¬ 
portant  distinction  which  exists  in  almost  every  enlightened 
system  of  mental  philosophy  since  the  time  of  Locke,  but  even 
requires  it;  or,  at  least,  assigns  an  important  reason  for  its 
existence. 

11.  (i)  That,  in  sensational  perception,  our  knowledge  of 
external  things  be,  not  representational,  but  immediate  and 
direct ;  otherwise  we  should  be  shut  up  to  the  knowledge  of  our 
own  mental  states,  and  be  destitute  of  the  means  of  authenti¬ 
cating  our  conviction  of  a  material  universe. 

12.  Every  contrary  theory,  indeed  —  the  Peripatetic  doc¬ 
trine,  that  we  obtain  the  knowledge  of  material  things  by  shad¬ 
owy  films,  or  immaterial  species,  bearing  an  exact  resemblance 
to  the  external  object;  the  Epicurean  notion,  that  we  obtain 
such  knowledge  by  exquisitely  refined  but  yet  material  efflux¬ 
ions  from  them ;  the  Cartesian  idea  of  a  modification  of  the 
mind  itself  by  the  Deity  ;  the  intervening  idea  of  Malebranche  ; 
and  Hartley’s  vibrations,  —  all  proceed,  either  on  the  assumed 
axiom  that  nothing  can  act  where  it  is  not,  and  had  for  their 
aim,  therefore,  to  annihilate  the  distance  between  the  object  and 
the  percipient  mind ;  or  else,  on  the  unfounded  persuasion,  that 
things  which,  like  matter  and  mind,  are  not  homogeneous, 
cannot  act  on  each  other ;  and  therefore  they  essayed  to  devise 
a  subtle  sublimated  medium  between  them,  or  invoked  imme¬ 
diate  Divine  agency.  But  every  representational  theory,  besides 
utterly  failing  of  its  aim,  (for  if  the  intervening  representation 
be  after  all  material,  the  question  still  recurs  —  how  can  it  affect 
the  mind  ?  —  if  spiritual,  how  can  it  be  sensible  to  matter ) 
actually  involves  the  subject  in  a  difficulty  of  the  first  magni¬ 
tude.  F or  if  that  which  we  know  of  the  external  world  consist 


40 


MAN. 


only  of  images,  or  phantasmal  representations  of  it,  we  can 
have  no  certainty  that  an  external  world  exists,  inasmuch  as 
these  representations  of  it  are  not  the  reality  itself,  and,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  hypothesis,  we  are  cut  off  from  the  possibility  of  veri¬ 
fying  the  accuracy  of  the  image,  by  a  comparison  of  it  with  the 
reality. 

13.  The  same  result  follows  if  we  regard  consciousness  as  a 
distinct  faculty  of  the  mind,  co-ordinate  with  perception ;  for  if, 
in  addition  to  the  perception  of  an  object,  a  distinct  power  is 
necessary  to  make  me  conscious  of  the  perception,  I  am  only 
conscious  after  all  of  a  subjective  state ;  the  objective  reality  is 
beyond  the  reach  of  my  consciousness,  and  its  existence  inca¬ 
pable  of  proof.  Or  if,  with  Brown,  it  is  concluded  that  of  ex¬ 
ternal  objects,  the  mind  perceives  only  the  sensations,  or  the 
states  which  they  occasion,  it  still  follows  that  we  are  shut  out 
from  the  knowledge  and  proof  of  everything  extra-mental.  For 
even  if  it  be  affirmed  in  reply,  that  those  mental  states  of  which 
we  are  conscious  are  the  exact  counterparts  or  resemblances  of 
external  realities,  Fichte  and  the  idealists  are  justified  in  de¬ 
manding  proof  of  the  supposed  resemblance,  and  as  such  proof 
would  require  the  power  of  instituting  a  comparison  between 
the  subjective  copy  and  the  objective  original,  (the  very  power 
which  the  theory  abandons)  the  proof  is  impossible.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  it  was  from  such  representationalist  views  that  Berkeley 
inferred  the  non-existence  of  a  material  world,  alleging  the 
impossibility  of  our  proving  that  our  sensations  are  occasioned 
by  material  objects.  And  from  this  conclusion  again,  Hume 
proceeded  to  infer  that  as  sensations  and  ideas  are  the  only 
things  of  which  we  are  conscious,  we  are  no  more  justified  in 
affirming  the  existence  of  a  substance  called  mind,  than  we  are 
that  of  matter ;  that  all  we  can  say  is,  that  we  are  the  subjects 
of  impressions  and  ideas,  but  that  of  their  validity  we  know 
nothing.  And  such  appears  to  be  the  legitimate  deduction  of 
every  representationalist  theory  of  human  knowledge. 

14.  Now,  in  opposition  to  all  such  theories,  the  universal, 
ineradicable,  and  intuitive  conviction  of  mankind  is,  that  they 
perceive  the  object  itself  which  is  before  them,  and  not  a  more 
subjective  image  or  mental  representation  of  it.  In  perception 
there  exist  only  a  percipient  and  a  perceived  — •  of  any  connect¬ 
ing  medium  we  are  totally  unconscious  —  and  perception  itself 
is  the  relation  of  the  two,  or  the  mind’s  direct  cognition  of  the 
objectivB.  The  great  service  which  Reid  rendered  to  the  phi¬ 
losophy  of  mind,  consisted  in  his  calling  attention  to  this  fact, 


PROGRESSION. 


41 


in  appealing  to  the  ultimate  principles  on  which  it  rests,  and  in 
showing  the  utter  absurdity  of  calling  these  principles  in  ques¬ 
tion.  He  showed,  for  example,  that  in  a  sensational  percep¬ 
tion  there  is  present  not  merely  the  consciousness  of  a  phe¬ 
nomenon,  but  also  the  judgment  of  a  real  objective  existence, 
and  that  such  judgments  are  involved  in  the  very  constitution 
of  the  human  mind.  And  whether,  with  Reid,  we  call  them 
principles  of  common  sense ;  or,  with  Hutcheson,  metaphysical 
axioms  connate  with  the  mind ;  or,  with  Kant,  forms  of  the 
understanding ;  or,  with  Brown,  principles  of  intuitive  belief — 
we  shall  find  that  they  cannot  be  rejected  without  making  rea¬ 
soning  itself  impossible.  We  should  err  indeed  in  representing 
perception  as  a  simple  and  independent  judgment  or  act  of 
mind  in  making  itself  acquainted  with  external  phenomena  — 
independent,  that  is,  of  the  external  phenomena  as  the  exciting 
occasion  of  the  judgment ;  for  then  it  might  be  still  objected 
that,  for  aught  we  know,  the  mind  might,  by  a  previous  act, 
have  originated  the  phenomena  perceived,  and  we  should  con¬ 
sequently  be  cut  off  from  all  certain  communication  with  the 
objective.  We  have  seen,  however,  that  perception  contains 
an  objective  element;  that  it  is  a  sensational  reaction,  being 
called  into  exercise  from  ’without,  and  that  in  every  perception, 
the  objective  is  as  really  present  as  the  subjective.  A  sensa¬ 
tional  perception  is  not  the  object  of  my  knowledge  —  it  is  my 
knowledge  itself.  It  cannot  be  analyzed  into  an  act  and  the 
consciousness  of  that  act ;  the  act  itself  exists  only  as  we  are 
conscious  of  it.  I  do  not  know  the  external  world  through  the 
medium  of  such  perceptions  ;  they  themselves  are  my  knowl¬ 
edge.  Abstract  the  knowledge,  and  no  perceptions  are  left, 
I  am  conscious  of  self,  and  I  am  conscious  of  not-self ;  and  this 
consciousness  of  both,  in  perception,  is  my  knowledge,  direct 
and  immediate.  “  Consciousness  declares  our  knowledge  of 
material  qualities  to  be  intuitive.  Nor  is  the  fact,  as  given, 
denied  even  by  those  who  disallow  its  truth.”  *  And  if  such  be 
the  consciousness  of  mankind,  the  truth  of  the  view  cannot  be 
questioned  without  involving  every  other  fact  of  consciousness 
in  doubt,  and,  with  it,  the  validity  of  all  human  knowledge. 

15.  (jf)  That  these  conditions  of  sensational  perception,  or  of 
the  relation  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  be  charac- 


*  See,  on  the  “  Philosophy  of  Perception,”  an  article  in  the  Edin.  Rev., 
No.  103,  which,  for  acuteness,  comprehensiveness,  and  erudition,  is  a 
m  :del  of  philosophical  criticism. 

4* 


42 


MAX. 


terized  by  uniformity  and  constancy ;  for  otherwise  both  knowl¬ 
edge  and  its  communication  would  be  impossible.  Accordingly, 
the  senses  are  themselves  organic  parts  of  external  nature,  and, 
as  such,  partake  of  its  stability.  Our  “  confidence  in  the  stability 
of  nature  ”  is  unquestioned  and  universal.  The  uniformity  of 
the  subjective,  therefore,  is  implied  in  this  confidence  in  the 
stability  of  the  objective,  for  it  is  through  the  former  alone  that 
the  latter  is  verified. 

16.  Now,  if  external  nature  is  to  be  a  manifestation  of  God, 
and  if  man  is  to  know  it  as  such,  the  conditions  enumerated 
appear  to  be  essential  to  his  knowledge.  In  the  generation  of 
knowledge,  the  first  step  of  the  intellectual  process,  in  the  order 
of  time,  is,  undoubtedly,  sensation.  But  then  it  is  only  the  first 
step,  though  without  it  the  second  could  not  be  taken ;  for  in 
sensational  perception,  along  with  the  sensation  is  given  the 
instant  belief  of  an  external  reality,  and  in  this  inseparable 
union  of  self  and  nature  the  mind  finds  its  knowledge.  In 
speaking  of  perception,  however,  we  have  been  logically  pre¬ 
supposing  many  of  the  subjective  conditions  of  knowledge,  all 
of  which,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  are  necessarily  implied 
from  the  first  as  the  very  conditions  of  experience. 

17.  With  these  primary  means  of  knowledge,  then,  though 
not  with  these  alone,  the  first  man  awoke  to  life  in  Eden.  The 
fragrance  which  nature  presented  as  incense  to  her  new  sove¬ 
reign,  and  which  he  inhaled  with  his  first  breath,  the  melody 
which  welcomed  his  awakening  ear,  and  the  many-colored  glo¬ 
ries  which  courted  his  opening  eye,  were  probably  the  occa¬ 
sions  that  first  quickened  his  new-made  mind  into  a  state  of 
activity,  which  continue  still  and  will  never  cease.  The  sensa¬ 
tions  of  that  first  hour,  of  even  the  first  moment  —  the  sight,  the 
perfume,  the  touch  of  a  flower  —  might,  had  he  quitted  the  earth 
with  those  sensations  alone,  have  furnished  his  mind  with  an 
occasion  for  unending  thought.  As  effects,  did  they  not  say  to 
him  “there  is  a  cause,  a  First  cause,  a  self-existent  and  eternal 
Creator.”  As  a  complex  mental  change,  of  which  he  perceived 
the  cause  was  not  in  himself,  did  it  not  say  to  him  “  there  is  a 
world  without  —  a  world  from  which  you  are  distinct,  and  yet  to 
which  you  are  mysteriously  related.”  What  an  inexhaustible 
store  of  materials  for  thought,  then,  must  he  have  accumulated 
by  the  evening  of  the  first  day,  when  every  moment  was  crowd¬ 
ing  his  mind  with  new  sensations  !  Truly,  there  is  a  language 
earlier  than  that  of  words ;  and  in  that  language  nature  begins 
to  speak  to  man  from  the  first  moment  of  his  existence.  By 


PROGRESSION. 


43 


the  wise  and  wonderful  arrangement  of  light  and  colors,  of 
tastes  and  odors,  one  object  instructs  him  on  the  subject  of 
forms,  another  on  magnitude,  and  another  on  distances ;  one 
object  says  to  him,  “  I  am  to  be  chosen  ;  ”  and  another,  “  I  am 
to  be  avoided ;  I  am  related  to  you,  and  yet  different  and  dis¬ 
tinct  from  you  ;  I  am  destined  to  serve  you  as  long  as  you  ob¬ 
serve  a  certain  law ;  violate  that,  and  you  become  my  victim.” 
What  an  incalculable  sum  of  subjects  for  reflection,  then,  does 
every  man  take  away  with  him  when  he  quits  the  visible  wTorld 
for  the  invisible !  How  few  consider  that  among  these  are 
included  the  materials  of  inconceivable  regret  for  a  paradise 
lost,  or  of  eternal  joy  on  account  of  a  paradise  regained  ! 


Sect,  n .—Reflection  and  Understanding. 

1.  If  all  the  phenomena  of  the  external  world  are  variously 
related  in  and  among  themselves  —  if  they  sustained  these  rela¬ 
tions  prior  to  the  creation  of  man,  or  have  an  objective  reality 
—  and  if  these  relations  display  a  portion  of  that  Divine  Per¬ 
fection  which  man  is  to  appreciate,  he  must  be  able  to  trace 
and  to  apprehend  them. 

2.  In  the  last  section,  we  regarded  sensational  perception  as 
giving  us  the  knowdedge  of  separate  material  phenomena,  or 
individual  objective  facts,  though  we  remarked  that  even  these 
perceptions  of  material  objects  logically  presupposed  certain 
subjective  conditions,  such  as  the  ideas  of  self,  of  personal 
identity,  of  causation,  and  others,  as  essential  to  all  intelligent 
experience.  But,  in  addition  to  the  power  of  observing  insu¬ 
lated  objects,  and  which  alone  could  be  only,  at  best,  the  means 
of  very  limited  knowledge,  we  are  endowed  with  the  power  of 
observing  relations  among  phenomena,  which  enables  us  so  to 
classify  individual  facts  under  their  proper  conception,  still 
further  to  generalize  these  conceptions,  and  so  to  arrange  the 
whole,  as  indefinitely  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  retain  every  such  addition.  But 
where  do  these  relations  exist  ?  in  the  subjective,  in  the  ob¬ 
jective,  or  in  both  ?  What  are  the  forms  or  law's  of  the  mind 
in  thinking  ?  and  what  the  modes  of  its  pursuit  after  truth  ? 

3.  As  to  the  first  inquiry,  we  may  seek  for  the  lawrs  or  rela¬ 
tions  in  question  either  by  making  a  classification  of  all  sur¬ 
rounding  things  as  the  objects  of  our  feelings  and  thoughts ;  in 
wrhich  case  the  leading  characteristics  or  principles  of  the  clas- 


44 


MAN". 


sification  would  give  us  the  required  laws ;  or  else,  observing 
the  processes  of  our  own  minds ,  and  marking  the  general  laws 
which  regulate  them,  we  may  regard  these  as  giving  form  to  all 
the  variety  of  our  mental  phenomena.  Aristotle  pursued  the 
former  or  objective  method  —  classifying  things  as  understood; 
Kant  pursued  the  latter  or  subjective  method  —  analyzing  the 
mind  as  understanding.  Our  historical  or  chronological  method 
embraces  both ;  for,  regarding  time  as  an  independent  reality, 
it  views  everything  objective  as  having  a  place  in  it,  and  requir¬ 
ing  examination  —  both  the  phenomena  of  matter  and  the 
ohenomena  of  mind.  Accordingly,  some  of  the  laws  or  rela¬ 
tions  of  external  phenomena,  viewed  as  the  matter  of  our 
thoughts,  were  noticed  in  the  preceding  volume.  These  very 
relations,  however,  are  relations  of  which  the  mind  is  conscious. 
Our  investigation  of  these,  as  known  to  consciousness,  may 
bring  to  light  others  for  which  no  material  phenomena  will 
account.  Besides  which,  as  the  phenomena  of  the  mind  are 
open  to  inspection,  as  we  are  conscious  of  them,  that  is,  in 
such  a  manner  as  that  we  can  observe  them,  they  are  them¬ 
selves  objective,  and,  like  the  material  objective,  in  relation  to 
which  they  are  additional  and  distinct,  they  demand  distinct 
examination. 

Here,  then,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  new  region  of  inquiry,  and 
dealing  with  a  new  element  of  knowledge.  We  are  not  now 
exclusively  in  the  external  world,  examining  how  matter  ope¬ 
rates  on  matter.  Nor  are  we  merely,  as  in  the  last  section, 
standing  on  the  line  which  unites  matter  and  mind,  and  marking 
the  combined  result  of  the  laws  of  both.  W e  are  now,  in  addi¬ 
tion,  to  enter  within  the  mind,  and  to  mark  how  it  acts  by  and 
on  itself,  as  subject  and  object,  percipient  and  perceived ;  what 
becomes  of  its  sensations,  what  accompanies  or  follows  its  per¬ 
ceptions. 

4.  Our  second  inquiry  relates  to  the  forms  or  laws  of  the 
mind  in  thinking.  Locke  regarded  the  truth  of  our  notion 
respecting  anything  as  depending  on  the  conformity  of  our  idea 
of  it  with  the  outward  reality ;  Kant,  on  the  contrary,  made  it 
to  depend  on  the  validity  of  the  understanding  itself,  from  whose 
constructive  laws  the  outward  object  receives  its  form.  Now, 
we  believe,  in  harmony  with  the  former,  that  the  mind,  when  it 
classifies  external  objects  truly,  does  not  create  the  classifica¬ 
tion —  the  arrangement  existed  before  man  came,  —  he  only 
reads  and  understands  it.  But  then  the  power  of  reading  and 
interpreting  the  laws  of  the  classification  aright,  indicates  the 


PROGRESSION. 


45 


existence  of  independent  laws  in  his  own  mind.  And,  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  latter,  we  believe  that  the  operations  of  the  under¬ 
standing  ievelope  laws  which  external  nature  only  awakens ; 
but  then  the  very  office  of  awakening  them  implies  that  nature 
has  forms  of  its  own  corresponding  to  the  laws  —  meaning  by 
form,  that  part  of  an  object  through  which  it  ranks  under  a  law ; 
that  its  laws  are  not  created  or  imposed,  but  only  recognized 
by  the  mind.  “  Every  power  exerts  its  agency  under  some  laws 
—  that  is,  in  the  language  of  Kant,  by  certain  forms.”  The 
manifestations  of  Creative  power  are  expressed  in  the  laws  of 
nature ;  and,  for  the  same  reason,  it  might  have  been  antici¬ 
pated  of  the  human  mind,  that  the  power  of  God,  in  its  creation, 
would  be  regulated  by  laws  also.  But  we  are  now  speaking  of 
the  mind,  not  as  a  manifestation  of  Creative  power,  but  as  the 
intelligent  power  to  whom  the  manifestation  is  made.  As 
a  power,  therefore,  its  movements  and  manifestations  are  all 
according  to  law  —  thus  reflecting  the  legislative  power  of  its 
Maker.  What,  then,  are  the  laws  which  its  activity  evolves  ? 
In  speaking  of  these,  it  will  be  perceived  that  constant  refer¬ 
ence  is  made  to  those  primary  ideas  or  beliefs  of  the  reason,  the 
investigation  of  which  belongs  to  the  next  section.  As  being 
presupposed  by  the  understanding,  however,  and  as  regulating 
its  activity,  they  are  necessarily  introduced,  in  a  general  man¬ 
ner,  here.. 

5.  Treating  the  subject  in  the  order  of  nature  in  the  Divine 
manifestation  —  an  order  therefore  already  prescribed  to  us  — 
we  commence  with  body  and  motion.  We  cannot  think  of 
body  but  as  in  space.  Every  body  is  somewhere,  for  space  is 
its  place.  Every  body  has  extension,  and  occupies  space  ;  has 
figure,  and  measures  it;  has  parts,  and  co-exists  in  it.  Of 
space  without  body  we  can  conceive,  but  not  of  body  without 
space.  Again,  we  cannot  think  of  the  motion  of  body,  or  of 
events  or  changes  of  any  kind,  except  as  occurring  in  time. 
Every  event  is  -viewed  by  us  as  before  or  after;  as  a  first, 
or  second,  or  third,  and  so  on.  Were  it  not  for  this  law,  every 
event  would  be  to  us  a  first  event ;  it  would  want  even  the 
character  of  being  first,  because  for  us  there  would  be  no 
second.  The  relation  of  successiveness  in  the  world  without, 
has  its  correlate  within  in  the  memory.  “Men  derive  their 
ideas  of  duration,”  says  Locke,  “  from  their  reflection  on  the 
trains  of  the  ideas  they  observe  to  succeed  one  another  in  their 
own  understandings.”  But  when  our  consciousness  has  given 
us  this  apprehension  of  successiveness,  there  is  involved  in  it 


46 


MAN. 


the  judgment  that  this  succession  takes  place  in  a  determinate 
time.  We  can  conceive  of  the  non-existence  of  the  succession, 
but  not  of  the  time  in  which  it  has  taken  place.  Events,  then, 
inhabit  time,  as  bodies  occupy  space.  The  continuity  of  space 
renders  the  co-existence  of  bodies  possible ;  the  continuity  of 
time  renders  their  successive  existence  possible.  Both  the 
co-existence  and  the  successive  existence  are  contingent ;  but 
the  space  and  the  time  can  be  thought  of  only  as  necessary. 
And,  in  a  similar  manner,  any  instance  of  number  —  which  is 
an  element  of  succession,  and  which,  with  succession,  measures 
time  —  involves  the  idea  of  its  universal  applicability. 

Now  here  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  a  particular  body  and  a 
particular  succession  being  given,  both  of  which  we  regard  as 
variable  and  contingent,  the  mind  finds  itself  in  the  possession 
of  ideas  of  space  and  time,  which  it  can  think  of  only  as  un¬ 
changeable  and  absolutely  necessary ;  and  further,  that  wliile 
body  and  succession  imply  limitation,  the  ideas  of  space  and 
time  imply  the  absence  of  all  limitation,  indestructibility,  and 
immensity.  Leaving  now  the  particular  phenomena  of  body 
and  succession,  the  reason  takes  possession  of  pure  space  and 
time,  as  its  appropriate  and  rightful  domain.  Here  it  pro¬ 
ceeds  to  unfolchsciences  out  of  ideas  alone :  breadthless  lines, 
depthless  surfaces,  bodiless  figures,  and  abstract  numerical  rela¬ 
tions.  These  are  the  pure  and  the  exact  sciences  —  geometry, 
theoretical  arithmetic,  and  algebra  regarded  as  the  investigation 
of  the  relations  of  space  and  number  by  means  of  general 
symbols  — pure,  as  incapable  of  being  formed  out  of  material 
phenomena,  and  as  being  unmixed  with  them ;  and  exact,  as 
never  exceeding  and  never  falling  short  of  the  principles  on 
which  they  are  based.  And  when  the  mind,  having  discoursed 
with  the  truths  involved  in  the  ideas  of  space,  time,  and  num¬ 
ber,  returns  freighted  with  the  science  of  pure  mathematics  to 
the  region  of  material  phenomena,  it  finds  that  all  such  phenom¬ 
ena,  whether  objects  or  events,  sustain  relations  to  this  science, 
and  are  subject  to  its  conditions.  And  it  is  because  these 
truths  of  pure  mathematics  extend  to  all  external  phenomena, 
that  such  sciences  as  astronomy  and  mechanics  are  termed 
mixed  mathematics ;  involving  as  they  do  both  pure  mathemat¬ 
ical  truths,  and  the  special  laws  of  the  phenomena  collected  by 
observation.  Here,  then,  in  the  order  of  time,  we  have  first  a 
particular  sensation  occasioned  from  without,  and  involving  a 
cognition  or  perception  of  body  or  of  succession ;  involving, 
next,  the  intuition  that  the  body  is  in  space,  and  the  succession 


PROGRESSION. 


47 


in  time ;  and  this,  again,  developing  the  ideas  of  the  unlimited 
nature  of  both  space  and  time  —  ideas,  therefore,  evolved  from 
within,  and  not  created  by  any  material  influence.  Thus,  we 
find  ourselves  in  possession  of  the  two  important  laws  or  axioms, 
.Every  body  must  be  in  space ,  and,  Every  event  must  be  in  time. 
And  everything  is  viewed  by  the  understanding  in  the  relation 
of  co-existence,  or  of  successive  existence. 

6.  All  material  phenomena  are  regarded  by  us  as  sustaining 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  “  The  idea  of  cause,  modified 
into  the  conceptions  of  mechanical  cause,  or  force ;  and  resist¬ 
ance  to  force,  or  matter,  is  the  foundation  of  the  mechanical 
sciences ;  that  is,  Mechanics,  (including  Statics  and  Dynamics,) 
Hydrostatics,  and  Physical  Astronomy.  The  conception  of 
force  is  suggested  by  muscular  action  exerted ;  the  conception 
of  matter  arises  from  muscular  action  resisted.”  *  Our  obser¬ 
vation  of  material  phenomena,  indeed,  can  give  us  only  a  succes¬ 
sion  of  events.  And  hence,  Hume,  who  admitted  no  element  of 
thought  beyond  that  which  such  phenomena  supply,  concluded 
that  we  know  nothing  of  cause  and  effect  beyond  the  relation 
of  mere  sequence  —  that  in  saying  every  effect  has-  a  cause,  we 
are  only  affirming  that  an  effect  is  the  latter  of  two  given  events, 
or  merely  expressing  a  relation  of  antecedence  and  consequence. 
But  every  one  is  conscious  that  the  relation  of  succession  is 
one  thing,  and  that  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  another. 
And  the  ground  of  this  distinction  appears  as  soon  as  ever  we 
turn  our  attention  from  material  to  mental  phenomena.  In  the 
effects  which  we  ourselves  produce  we  are  conscious  of  more 
than  a  mere  sequence  —  we  are  conscious  of  volition  and  per¬ 
sonal  effort,  and  of  an  event  as  the  result  of  that  casual  effort. 
When,  therefore,  the  relations  of  succession  and  of  cause  and 
effect  coincide,  the  latter  is  the  principle,  the  former  the  conse¬ 
quence  of  the  principle.  Even  Locke  affirms  that  it  is  from 
the  internal,  and  not  from  the  external,  that  the  idea  of  power 
is  first  given.f  And,  having  gained  our  first  notion  of  causality 
from  the  consciousness  of  our  own  personal  effort,  we  transfer 
the  notion  to  the  changes  observable  in  the  material  world. 
The  objective  does  not  originate  the  idea  of  power,  we  derive 
it  from  our  own  consciousness  of  conjoined  effort  and  effect,  and 
apply  it  to  the  objective.  But  whence  the  felt  necessity  and 


*  Dr.  Whewefl’s  “Phil,  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,”  vol.  i.  pp.  xxir. 
t  B.  II.  c.  xxi.  §  4. 


48 


MAJST. 


universality  of  the  application?  Induction  cannot  have  sup¬ 
plied  it,  for  that  is  limited  both  in  kind  and  degree.  Besides, 
the  mind  does  not  wait  for  induction ;  the  production  of  one 
single  effect,  in  childhood,  is  sufficient  to  give  the  mind  the  con¬ 
viction  in  question.  And  hence  all  believe  that  no  phenomena 
can  begin  to  exist  in  space  or  in  time,  without  an  adequate 
cause.  Evidently,  the  idea  must  be  grounded  in  the  very  con¬ 
stitution  of  the  mind.  As  sensation  itself  implies  the  antece¬ 
dence  of  the  cause  which  occasions  it,  so  the  recognition  of  that 
causal  relation  implies  the  antecedence  of  the  idea  or  principle 
of  causality  in  the  human  mind ;  an  idea  which  admits  of  no 
limitation.  And  thus,  we  have,  in  addition  to  the  preceding 
axioms,  ihe  fundamental  truth,  Every  -phenomenon  must  have  a 
cause.  Everything  is  regarded  by  us  as  exhibiting  a  relation 
of  causal  dependence. 

7.  Another  relation  under  which  all  phenomena  are  viewed 
is  the  relation  of  properties  to  a  substance.  External  objects 
are  revealed  to  our  sensational  perceptions  as  qualities  and  pro¬ 
perties,  and  in  all  our  natural  investigations,  we  unavoidably 
assume  that  these  qualities  are  the  qualities  of  something ;  that 
besides  these  properties  there  is  a  substance  of  which  these  are 
the  properties ;  and  these  properties  are  conceived  of  as  insep¬ 
arable  from  the  substance.  Amd  hence  the  idea  of  substance :  — 
its  related  conceptions  of  polarity,  chemical  affinity,  and  sym¬ 
metry,  are  regarded  as  the  basis  of  mechanico-chemical  and 
chemical  sciences. 

As  we  can  define  matter  in  no  other  way  than  by  enumerat¬ 
ing  the  sensible  qualities,  so,  says  Stewart,  in  respect  of  mind, 
“  we  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  and  volition  —  opera¬ 
tions  which  imply  the  existence  of  something  which  feels, 
thinks,  and  'wills.  Every  man,  too,  is  impressed  with  an  irre¬ 
sistible  conviction  that  all  these  sensations,  thoughts,  and  voli¬ 
tions,  belong  to  one  and  the  same  thing  —  to  that  which  he 
calls  himself.”  The  personal  existence  —  the  self —  does  not 
come  under  the  eye  of  reflection,  only  its  manifestations  in  sen¬ 
sation  and  volition.  And  what  is  this  self  which  is  so  revealed 
but  the  subject  of  these  operations ;  the  unity  of  our  being,  as 
distinguished  from  the  plurality  of  consciousness ;  its  identity, 
as  distinguished  from  its  variable  manifestations ;  substance,  as 
distinguished  from  attributes.  In  a  similar  manner,  property 
substance  imply  each  other  in  the  external  world.  The 
perception  of  qualities  involves  the  idea  of  substance  in  which 
they  inhere,  and  of  which  they  are  the  manifestation.  But  this 


PROGRESSION. 


49 


idea  of  substance  is  not  obtained  by  an  analysis  of  these  mani¬ 
festations,  for  they  presuppose  it.  The  antecedence  of  this  idea 
is  necessary  in  order  to  make  our  apprehension  of  these  quali¬ 
ties  possible.  And  the  belief  of  this  distinction  between  sub¬ 
stance  and  properties  admits  of  no  limitation.  Here,  then,  we 
have  the  additional  principle,  Every  attribute  implies  a  sub¬ 
stance. 

8.-  Secondary  qualities  —  color,  sound,  heat,  odor,  flavor  — 
are  conceived  of  as  having  an  existence  exterior  to  us,  (though 
not  such  as  we  sensibly  apprehend  them,)  and  as  sustaining 
external  relations.  That  all  bodies  exist  in  space,  we  have 
seen  to  be  an  unavoidable  and  universal  axiom.  The  convic¬ 
tion  of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  however,  advances  a  step 
further,  and  implies  that  we  and  they  exist  in  one  common 
space.  The  idea  of  externality  is  essential  to  all  reasoning 
concerning  objective  existence :  even  Berkeley  assumed  it  in 
his  views  of  optics  and  acoustics.  And  further,  it  might  be 
shown  that  the  idea  of  an  objective  is  essential  to  all  reasoning: 
even  Fichte,  while  denying  a  real  objective,  found  it  necessary 
to  suppose  an  ideal  objective,  in  order  to  afford  the  means  of 
activity  to  the  subjective.  In  other  words,  if  God  had  not 
created  a  material  objective,  the  mind,  constituted  as  it  now  is, 
would  have  had  to  feign  one.  But  as  was  stated  in  the  preced¬ 
ing  section,  the  same  act  by  which  objects  are  perceived,  reveals 
also  their  externality.  Their  outness  is  not  merely  a  form  which 
the  mind  assumes,  but  a  fact  which  it  discerns.  But  our  pres¬ 
ent  proposition  affirms,  still  further,  that  even  the  secondary 
qualities  of  matter  exist,  and  are  related,  in  a  sphere  exterior 
to  the  sentient  faculty,  though  not  such  as  sense  apprehends 

them.  And  the  ultimate  aim  of  optics ,  acoustics  and  the  doctrine 
of  heat  is  to  determine  the  nature  and  laws  of  the  processes  by 
which  the  impression  of  any  given  secondary  quality  is  pro¬ 
duced.  All  measures,  of  sensible  qualities,  indeed,  must  ulti¬ 
mately  refer  to  the  appropriate  sense  —  must  be  supplied,  that 
is,  by  their  sensible  effects ;  but  the  effects  measured  are  such 
as  refer  us  to  number  and  space,  or  as  admit  of  being  estimated 
in  quantity.  Thus,  having  found  by  an'  appeal  to  sense  that 
expansion  increases  with  heat,  we  can  measure  heat  by  expan¬ 
sion  ;  and  only  in  such  manner  can  secondary  qualities  be¬ 
come  the  subjects  of  physical  science.  Secondary  qualities, 

then,  as  occasions  of  sensation,  are  conceived  of  as  objective, 
or  as  sustaining  relations  exterior  to  the  sentient  apprehen¬ 
sion. 


5 


50 


MAN. 


9.  External  phenomena  are  universally  regarded  as  sustain¬ 
ing  relations  of  resemblance ,  involving  ideas  of  identity  and 
difference.  It  is  only  in  this  way  that  they  can  either  proclaim 
their  origin  or  answer  their  end.  It  might  have  been  expected, 
therefore,  that  if  relations  of  magnitude,  position,  motion, 
number,  proportion,  and  affinity,  exist  in  the  world  without,  the 
knowledge  of  these  relations  would  be  found  in  the  human 
mind.  Accordingly,  the  sciences  we  have  enumerated  are  the 
mental  expressions  and  methodical  arrangements  of  these  rela¬ 
tions,  involving  the  idea  of  like  and  unlike ,  as  far  as  the  mind 
of  man  has  been  able  to  trace  them. 

If  relations  of  kind  or  natural  affinity  exist  among  objects,  it 
is  obviously  important  that  they  should  be  classed  accordingly. 
For  not  to  be  able  to  recognize  likeness  where  it  exists,  would 
be  to  reduce  nature  to  a  chaos  of  isolated  and  incongruous 
objects,  and  to  impose  on  the  memory  a  burden  under  which  it 
would  speedily  sink.  On  the  other  hand,  not  to  be  able  to 
recognize  differences  where  they  exist,  would  be  to  reduce  nature 
to  a  scene  of  uninstructive  sameness,  in  which  all  distinctions 
would  be  confounded.  Now,  by  certain  processes  of  abstraction 
and  generalization,  the  understanding  distributes  objects  ac¬ 
cording  to  these  distinctions ;  and,  hence,  in  the  “  classificatory 
ciences  ”  we  have  such  divisions  as  species  and  genus,  class  and 
order.  But  a  species  is  composed  of  individuals.  And  what  is 
the  condition  of  the  individuality  of  an  object  but  this,  that  its 
identification  shall  be  possible,  that  reasoning  concerning  it  shall 
be  possible.  This  supposes  that  the  object  has  inseparable  pro¬ 
perties,  or  an  essential  constitution.  And  hence  our  conception 
of  species,  leaving  behind  all  the  accidents  and  unessential  parts 
of  the  individual,  associates  all  such  individuals  as  have  the 
same  essential  properties  and  constitution,  and  indicates  them 
by  a  common  name.  A  genus ,  again,  is  a  collection  of  species, 
in  which,  leaving  out  of  view  what  may  be  peculiar  to  this  or 
that  species,  we  combine  the  characters  common  to  the  whole,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  reason  concerning  the  collection  as  a  whole,  and 
to  apply  to  it  a  common  name.  Thus,  every  individual  is  a 
representative  of  the  species  to  which  it  belongs ;  every  species 
is  a  representative  of  the  genus  to  which  it  belongs ;  every 
genus,  of  its  order ;  and  so  on  through  each  ascending  step  of 
classification.  In  contemplating  several  objects,  we  abstract  the 
points  in  which  they  agree,  disregarding  the  differences ;  we 
then  generalize ,  by  giving  to  these  objects  a  name  applicable  to 
them  in  respect  of  this  agreement.  By  this  generalization  we 


PROGRESSION. 


51 


obtain  a  conception  of  the  common  characteristic  of  many  ob¬ 
jects.  So  that  conception,  differing  alike  from  the  images  of 
Realism,  and  from  the  mere  terms  of  Nominalism,  identifies 
that  common  feature  of  resemblance  wherever  it  exists,  and 
retains  and  expresses  it  ever  after.  And  this  conception  of 
resemblance ,  based  on  the  ideas  of  identity  and  difference,  is 
another  form  or  law  under  which  we  feel  the  necessity  of  view¬ 
ing  whatever  receives  our  attention. 

10.  But  why  these  laws  of  the  understanding?  The  question 
reminds  us  of  another  conviction  under  which  the  mind  acts  — 
that  of  design  or  final  cause .  Means  and  ends  are  the  objects 
of  its  incessant  pursuit.  In  respect  to  organized  bodies,  in 
which  the  structure  of  every  part  points  to  a  purpose,  and 
where  we  unavoidably  speak  of  disease  as  failure  of  a  proper 
end,  the  conception  of  a  final  cause  is  so  obvious,  that  even 
they  who  reject  it  under  one  form,  will  be  found  to  be  directly 
affected  by  it  under  another  form.*  Thus,  also,  in  reply  to  the 
question  relating  to  the  ends  answered  by  the  laws  of  the 
understanding,  it  is  evident  that,  if  the  Divine  manifestation  be 
progressive,  the  succession  of  events  which  it  implies  must  be 
met  by  a  sense  of  successiveness ;  if  it  be  diversified,  the  con¬ 
ception  of  identity  and  difference  are  necessary,  alike  to  bind 
individuals  into  classes,  and  to  analyze  classes  into  individuals ; 
if  it  be  divinely  originated,  the  idea  of  causation  is  necessary  in 
order  to  trace  events  to  a  First  and  Efficient  Cause;  and  if  it 
have  a  purpose,  no  less  indispensable  is  the  idea  of  a  Final 
Cause  in  order  that  the  mind  may  be  ever  moving  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  the  end ;  and  so  of  the  other  laws  of  thought  which  we 
have  noticed.  Of  the  law  of  which  wre  are  now  speaking,  it  is 
only  necessary  to  add  that  it  is  the  idea  of  Design  which  puts 
the  guiding  clue  into  the  hand  of  scientific  research,  that  it 
evolves  system  from  phenomena  once  considered  chaotic,  and 
gives  us  the  assurance  of  its  presence  in  the  most  remote 
and  unexplored  regions  of  creation.  The  conception  of  a  Final 
Cause  is  inseparably  involved  in  the  operations  of  the  human 
mind. 

11.  Logic . —  These  remarks  prepare  us,  partly,  to  reply  to 
the  question  proposed  relative  to  the  modes  of  pursuing  and  in¬ 
vestigating  truth.  The  mind,  we  see,  has  laws  of  its  own, 
and  hence  the  possibility  of  Logic  as  a  science.  Besides  per¬ 
ceiving  the  phenomena  of  the  external  world,  it  can  reproduce 


See  “  The  Pre- Adamite  Earthy  p.  120. 


52 


MAX. 


the  phenomena  of  its  own  consciousness  which  these  perceptions 
had  occasioned,  and  can  observe  and  analyze  them,  and  thus 
deduce  the  laws  of  its  own  operations.  Its  thoughts,  indeed, 
are  primarily  occasioned  by  an  outward  influence ;  it  thinks 
about  something ;  but,  subsequently,  dispensing  with  that  some¬ 
thing  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  material  of  the  thoughts,  it 
can  bend  its  attention  to  the  thoughts  themselves.  In  inathe- 
matics,  for  example,  it  has  thoughts  about  quantity ;  but,  then, 
leaving  the  quantity  out  of  view,  it  can  make  the  thoughts 
themselves  the  objects  of  its  exclusive  contemplation.  And  to 
mark  the  forms  which  the  thoughts  assume  when  thus  detached 
from  their  matter  —  the  laws  which  the  process  of  thinking  and 
reasoning  evolves  —  and  the  order  which  they  observe,  is  the 
province  of  the  science  of  Logic.  Its  primary  office  is  not  to 
teach  the  mind  to  think  ;  but  to  expound  the  necessary  laws  of 
thought,  or  how  the  mind  must  think.  On  this  account  logic 
is  the  most  abstract  of  all  the  sciences ;  for,  while  every  other 
science  involves  a  code  of  principles  or  laws  respecting  the 
objects  of  which  it  treats,  logic  abstracts  these  very  laws  from 
their  material  objects,  expounding  the  laws  which  regulate 
them,  and  forming  them  into  a  code. 

12.  Induction.  —  But  if  the  mind  have  laws  of  its  own,  and 
if  the  world  without  have  laws  of  its  own  also,  may  not  the  for¬ 
mer  be  employed  in  the  discovery  of  the  latter  ?  The  laws  of 
the  mind,  indeed,  may  be  more  than  co-extensive  with  the  laws 
of  nature  ;  may  extend  to  higher  relations  and  to  other  worlds ; 
but  as  far  as  the  field  of  nature  extends,  may  it  not  appeal*  that 
“  deep  calleth  unto  deep  ”  —  the  logic  of  the  mind  to  the  logic 
of  nature  ?  It  is  true  that  the  mind  had  long  operated  sponta¬ 
neously  on  the  world  without  —  had  made  considerable  progress 
in  science,  and  art,  and  the  institutions  of  society,  before  ever 
its  logical  operations  were  made  to  assume  a  scientific  form. 
And  the  analysis  of  this  science,  and  art,  and  external  manifes¬ 
tation  of  itself,  greatly  facilitated  the  discovery  of  its  own  laws 
of  activity.  For  every  truth  which  the  mind  had  expressed  or 
embodied  in  the  world  without,  was  an  exponent  of  a  law 
within.  And,  now,  having  observed  its  operations  and  system¬ 
atized  these  laws  within,  it  can  emerge  again  to  employ  them 
in  the  regulation  of  its  movements,  and  in  testing  the  truth  of 
its  inferences,  relative  to  external  phenomena.  This  is  the 
Logic  of  Induction.  Beginning  with  the  observation,  it  may  be, 
of  a  single  fact,  the  mind  aims  to  ascend  from  this  point  to  the 
expression  of  the  general  law  of  which  that  fact,  and  innumer- 


PROGRESSION. 


53 


merable  others,  are  the  exponents.  The  process  by  which  it 
tracks  and  verifies  the  law  through  wide  and  various  ramifica¬ 
tions  is  that  of  induction ;  according  to  which,  observed  facts 
are  so  connected  as  to  yield  new  truths ;  and  these  truths, 
regarded  in  their  turn  as  facts,  are  so  associated  as  to  produce 
yet  higher  truths ;  and  so  onwards  through  a  succession  of 
higher  and  wider  generalizations.  And  the  province  of  induc¬ 
tive  Logic  is  to  test  the  truth  inferred  in  this  manner  from 
facts,  and  thus  silently  and  indirectly  to  discipline  the  mind  in 
its  spontaneous  movements  after  knowledge.  To  this  subject 
we  shall  advert  again  when  we  come  to  speak  of  the  Deductive 
method. 

13.  Art.  —  The  objects  of  nature  in  all  their  endless  beauty, 
and  variety,  and  elaborate  perfection,  are  works  of  Divine  art ; 
for  they  were  all  conceived  in  the  infinite  mind  of  the  Maker, 
and  embody  and  express  the  laws  of  the  Divine  Intelligence. 
In  works  of  human  art,  the  procedure  of  the  Infinite  Artist  and 
Mechanist  is  feebly  copied.  Taking  a  product  of  the  Divine 
Hand,  and  which  is  susceptible  of  other  forms  and  applications 
than  that  which  is  already  given  to  it,  the  human  artist  aspires 
to  impress  it  with  one  of  these  new  characters.  But  “  the  pro¬ 
phetic  eye  of  art  ”  is  “  the  mind’s  eye ;  ”  the  forecasting  con¬ 
ception  of  the  mind,  aiming  to  express  itself  outwardly  accord¬ 
ing  to  its  own  laws  of  proportion,  congruity,  harmony,  and 
grace,  but  in  obedience  to  the  pre-existing  laws  of  the  material 
objects  and  laws  with  which  it  works. 

14.  Here,  then,  is  a  second  means  of  knowledge.  The  last 
section  gave  us  objects,  but  unconnected ;  this  has  given  us 
their  mutual  relations.  By  perception,  the  impressions  of  sense 
are  given  as  facts ;  the  understanding  gives  the  relations  of 
these  facts,  disclosed  by  reflection,  as  science.  The  laws  of 
causation,  successiveness,  and  resemblance,  are  found,  in  opera¬ 
tion,  alike  in  the  world  within  and  the  world  without.  The 
relations  of  the  subjective  answer  to  those  of  the  objective,  and 
to  each  other ;  so  that  all  the  objects  and  the  ideas  which  come 
under  these  relations  are  found  to  be  capable  of  suggesting  one 
another.  But  if  such  be  the  correspondence  of  the  mind  to 
objective  nature,  how  subtle,  complicated,  and  immense  must 
be  the  web  of  its  associations !  Consequently,  how  vast  and 
varied  the  means  of  knowledge  thus  brought  within  its  reach ! 
Having  looked  abroad  over  creation,  man  can  then  look  within 
and  scan  the  wondrous  instrument  —  his  own  mind  —  by  which 
he  has  done  it :  can  place  its  past  operations  and  their  results 

5* 


54 


MAX. 


before  him  objectively,  and  view  them  as  if  they  formed  merely 
an  additional  phenomenon  in  the  aggregate  of  things  existing 
in  the  world  without.  As  the  visible  objects  of  creation  are 
facts  expressing  for  his  observation  Divine  thoughts,  so  his  own 
thoughts  are  additional  facts  submitted  to  his  notice  for  the  same 
end. 

15.  The  pre-existing  relations  of  the  material  system  into 
which  man  has  been  introduced,  were  arranged  with  a  pro¬ 
spective  regard  to  the  mind  which  is  to  trace  them.  They  are 
made  for  the  man,  and  not  the  man  for  them.  He  is  their 
proximate  or  medial  end.  So  that  while  it  may  be  proper  to 
say  that,  chronologically,  the  objective  determines  what  the 
subjective  shall  be,  it  is  right  to  say  that,  logically,  nature  was 
preconfigured  to  the  destined  constitution  of  the  human  mind. 
According  to  Kant,  indeed,  the  qualities  we  attribute  to  out¬ 
ward  objects  are  really  derived  from  our  own  minds,  so  that 
the  science  of  logic  must  exactly  correspond  with  the  science 
of  physics,  or  rather,  they  would  be  identical.  But  the  truth 
is,  so  nicely  are  the  objective  and  the  subjective  adjusted,  that 
they  expound  each  other.  A  lofty  intelligence,  on  surveying 
the  creation  before  man  was  made,  might  have  foretold  what 
the  characteristics  of  his  mental  and  bodily  constitution  would 
be ;  or  the  same  intelligence,  had  it  been  possible  for  him  to 
meet  with  man  in  some  distant  tract  of  the  universe,  and  with¬ 
out  previously  knowing  anything  of  the  planet  for  which  he 
was  destined,  might  have  accurately  conceived  its  all-related 
constitution.  So  exquisite  is  the  adjustment  of  which  we  speak, 
that,  were  it  to  be  deranged  in  a  single  principal  relation,  there 
is  ground  to  conclude,  that  not  only  might  it  make  all  future 
progress  in  knowledge  impossible,  but  perplex  and  render  una¬ 
vailing  all  that  we  now  possess  ;  but  that,  as  long  as  it  remains 
undisturbed,  every  new  and  well-directed  effort  of  the  mind 
ensures  some  new  discovery  of  truth,  and  every  such  discovery 
imparts  additional  power  for  making  further  progress  still. 


Sect.  HI.  —  Reason,  Speculative  and  Realized,  or  Ideal 

and  Applied 

1.  If  in  addition  to  the  sensible  phenomena  of  external 
nature,  and  to  their  objective  relations,  there  be  corresponding 

*  The  distinction  of  the  division  I  have  adopted  —  of  sensational  per¬ 
ception,  reflective  understanding,  and  rational  beliefs  —  from  that  of  Kant’s 


PROGRESSION. 


55 


objects  infinitely  greater  —  corresponding,  that  is,  as  time  to 
eternity,  or  as  the  finite  to  the  infinite  —  and  if  the  idea  or  belief 
of  their  existence  would  tend  to  exalt  onr  conceptions  of  God 
more  even  than  all  the  material,  and  the  relations  of  the  material 
indirectly  ascertained,  then  man  may  be  expected  either  to 
have  this  idea  or  a  native  susceptibility  to  have  it  awakened  in 
his  mind. 

2.  We  have  seen  that  the  mind  is  sensibly  related  to  every 
external  object,  and  that  if  external  objects  are  related  by  com¬ 
mon  laws,  so  also  the  mind  has  corresponding  laws  of  intelli¬ 
gence.  But  we  have  seen  also  that  all  these  objective  relations 
point  to  other  and  higher  objects  ;  they  awaken  ideas  of  certain 
principles  or  trutlis  metaphysically  necessary  in  order  to  account 
for  their  existence.  While  speaking  of  the  laws  of  the  under¬ 
standing,  we  were  constantly  and  unavoidably  presupposing 
these  principles.  What  are  these  ultimate  truths  or  beliefs  ? 
In  order  to  illustrate  their  nature,  we  may  refer  to  the  following. 
We  have  found  that  no  object  can  be  conceived  of  without  the 
accompanying  idea  of  space  —  no  succession  can  be  imagined 
without  the  accompanying  idea  of  duration  —  no  mental  opera¬ 
tion  be  recalled  without  involving  the  idea  of  time  in  which  the 
act  is  performed.  Every  change  necessarily  presupposes  a 
cause,  and  involves  the  principle  of  causality  of  which  the 
change  is  a  particular  manifestation ;  and  every  quality  or  phe¬ 
nomenon  involves  the  conviction  of  a  substratum  in  which 
it  inheres,  a  substance  of  which  the  quality  is  a  manifestation. 
Here  are  four  objects  of  thought  —  body,  succession,  change, 
quality ;  and  here  are  the  four  conditions  of  these  objects  re¬ 
spectively —  space,  time,  cause,  and  subject.  The  former  may 
vary ;  we  can  conceive  of  any  particular  instances  of  them  as 
even  non-existent ;  but  the  non-existence  of  the  latter  is  incon¬ 
ceivable.  Their  existence,  then,  is  antecedent  to  the  existence 
of  all  sensible  phenomena;  all  phenomena  presuppose  them, 
and  without  them  could  not  exist.  Then  they  exist  inde¬ 
pendently  of  all  phenomena:  our  ideas  of  them  are  not  the 
realities  themselves,  neither  do  we  create  the  ideas  in  the  act 
of  knowing  them.  And  without  limitation ;  for  even  to  think 
away  the  limited  and  the  finite,  is  to  leave  the  unlimited  and 
the  infinite ;  the  former  presupposes  the  latter,  and  is  logically 
present  in  one  and  the  same  act  of  thought.  Then,  further, 


sense,  understanding,  and  reason,  if  not  apparent  already,  will  become 
sufficiently  clear  as  we  advance. 


56 


MAX. 


the  ideas  of  them  must  have  existed  in  the  Divine  Mind  ante¬ 
cedent  to  the  means  employed  for  their  manifestation,  and  in 
order  to  it ;  and  the  mind  of  man  must  have  been  pre-consti- 
tuted  for  the  development  of  the  same  ideas,  otherwise  these 
means  would  be  undecipherable.  In  the  Mind  of  the  Infinite 
Creator,  indeed,  the  ideas  preceded  the  production  of  the  phe¬ 
nomena  or  laws  by  which  they  are  indicated ;  for  the  law  is  the 
idea  made  objective  ;  hence,  Lord  Bacon  “  describes  the  laws 
of  the  material  universe  as  ideas  in  nature.  Quod  in  natura 
naturata  Lex,  in  natura  naturante  Idea  dicitur.”  In  the  mind 
of  man,  on  the  contrary,  the  laws  or  phenomena  take  prece¬ 
dence,  in  the  order  of  succession,  of  the  ideas ;  for  as  the  ideas 
existed  out  of  the  relation  of  time,  and  independently  of  it,  it 
was  not  until  the  phenomena  were  given  that  the  conditions 
were  supplied  to  man,  a  being  of  sense  and  time,  by  which  he 
could  become  conscious  of  or  apprehend  the  ideas.  But  the 
ideas  themselves,  once  apprehended,  are  as  distinct  irom  the 
phenomena  for  the  human  mind,  according  to  its  nature,  as 
they  are  for  the  Mind  of  the  Divine  Original.  To  a  party 
speaking,  the  thought  is  first ;  to  the  party  listening,  the  speech ; 
for  each,  the  thought  is  equally  distinct  from  the  speech,  and,  it 
may  be,  though  hardly  half-uttered,  it  is  clearly  apprehended. 
In  a  similar  manner,  the  ideas  of  the  Divine  Mind  uttered,  or 
rather  hinted,  in  the  laws  of  nature,  are  seized.  and  responded 
to  by  a  mind  made  in  its  own  image,  and  having  them  implied 
in  its  very  constitution. 

3.  Now,  ideas  such  as  those  referred  to,  (and  of  which  we 
shall  have  to  notice  some  not  susceptible  of  expression  in 
material  phenomena.)  are  to  be  regarded  as  characteristic  of 
the  reason ,  the  highest  intellectual  prerogative  of  man.  (a)  That 
they  are  not  the  creatures  of  experience  is  evident,  for  they  are 
characterized  by  universality,  whereas  experience  can  testify 
only  to  particular  cases ;  they  are  characterized  by  necessity, 
whereas  experience  can  know  nothing  of  what  will  be  or  of 
what  must  be.  But  may  not  these  ideas  be  the  ultimate  expres¬ 
sions  of  that  generalizing  faculty  which  collects  all  the  individ¬ 
ual  results  of  experience,  and  forms  them  into  a  whole  ? 
Still  such  generalizations  can  only  give  us  experimental  truths, 
and  truths  therefore  destitute  of  the  properties  of  universality 
and  necessity  which  distinsruish  the  ideas  or  beliefs  of  the  rea- 
son.  Neither  can  the  imagination  be  supposed  to  originate 
them,  for  this  faculty  has  to  do,  not  with  the  necessary,  but 
with  the  possible.  Nor  can  any  strength  of  mere  association 


PROGRESSION. 


57 


account  for  their  felt  necessity ;  for  while  the  dissociation  of 
certain  things  which  we  have  never  seen  otherwise  than  to¬ 
gether,  would  not  greatly  surprise  us,  the  severance  or  contradic¬ 
tion  of  other  things  which  we  have  never  seen  illustrated,  it 
may  be,  more  than  once,  is  utterly  inconceivable.  And  the 
only  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  difference  is,  that  while  the 
former  would  only  contradict  our  experience,  the  latter  would 
offer  violence  to  our  reason.  The  one  is  merely  the  correction 
of  an  inference ;  the  other,  an  assault  on  our  mental  constitu¬ 
tion. 

4.  ( h )  Accordingly,  there  are  some  truths  which  exist  in  and 
for  the  mind  alone.  The  pure  mathematical  sciences  consist 
of  the  evolved  relations  of  some  of  these  truths.  Their  only 
principles  are  definitions  and  axioms  ;  their  only  method  of 
proof  that  of  deduction.  So  truly  are  they  fundamental,  that 
the  progress  of  the  principal  inductive  sciences  depends  on 
their  cultivation.  Their  truths  are  the  last  authority  of  all 
judgments  on  the  subjects  to  which  they  relate.  They  are  pure, 
as  being  incapable  of  perfect  realization  in  material  bodies. 
External  nature  knows  nothing  of  mere  abstract  truth.  All  its 
objects  are  concrete ;  the  abstract  is  only  given  in  them.  But 
though  the  truths  in  question  have  never  been,  never  can  be, 
objectively  realized,  their  subjective  reality  possesses  all  the 
certainty  of  our  intuitive  consciousness.  No  exception  can 
limit  their  universality.  No  conceivable  relation  or  power  can 
affect  their  necessity. 

5.  (c)  A  prior  idea  or  purpose  exists  in  the  mind,  and  is 
necessary  for  it,  in  every  inquiry  after  truth.  Every  experi¬ 
ment  is  a  question,  and  every  question  is  founded  on  some  idea 
of  the  answer.  In  every  such  effort,  the  mind  is  deductive 
before  it  is  inductive  ;  synthetic  before  it  is  analytic.  How, 
inquires  Plato,  can  you  expect  to  find,  unless  you  have  a  gen¬ 
eral  notion  of  what  you  seek?  Equally  does  Bacon  himself 
teach  that  the  mind  must  bring  to  every  experiment  a  precogi¬ 
tation,  or  antecedent  idea,  as  the  ground  of  tha i*prudens  qucestio, 
or  fore-casting  query,  which  he  pronounces  to  be  the  prior  half 
of  the  knowledge  sought.  “This  conception,”  says  Jouffroy, 
“  is  the  fundamental  axiom  in  all  the  sciences  of  facts,  the  torch 
which  guides  their  researches,  and  the  soul  which  animates 
their  method.”  To  supply  such  conceptions  the  mind  is  im¬ 
pelled  by  the  idea  that  all  phenomena  have  causes  and  laws, 
and  that  by  assigning  these  the  phenomena  will  be  accounted 
for.  And  as  the  reason  contains  in  itself  the  conditions  of  all 


58 


SIAN. 


science,  so  i  :s  irresistible  aim  is  to  trace  all  science  to  its  last 
results,  and  to  harmonize  it  in  one  system. 

6.  TTe  have  seen  that  the  Ideas  or  ultimate  facts  of  the  reason 
are  not  acquired  by  generalization  like  the  facts  of  the  under¬ 
standing.  Unlimited  space,  for  example,  is  not  a  general  idea 
derived  from  connecting  together  a  number  of  particular  spaces. 
To  conceive  of  it  as  otherwise  than  all-embracing  and  bound¬ 
less  is  impossible.  How,  *  then,  do  these  ideas  originate,  or 
what  is  their  relation  to  the  mind  ?  That  thev  are  not  innate. 

%/  J 

in  the  sense  of  being  already  present  to  the  consciousness  when 
its  activity  begins,  and  needing  nothing  from  without  to  quicken 
them,  is  obvious ;  for  they  never  arise  in  the  mind  at  first 
otherwise  than  as  the  concomitant  of  some  sensational  percep¬ 
tion.  Kant  opens  his  great  work  with  this  sentence,  “  That  all 
our  knowledge  begins  with  experience  does  not  admit  of  a 
doubt.”  Equally  clear  is  it,  on  the  other  hand,  that  they  are 
not  created  by  experience,  however  they  may  be  occasioned  by 
it,  or  begin  with  it ;  for  every  act  of  the  understanding  pre¬ 
supposes  them,  nor  would  experience  itself  be  possible  without 
them.  They  must  then  be  regarded  as  connate  to  the  mind, 
and  as  forming  the  necessary  products  of  the  reason  preconsti¬ 
tuted  to  their  formation.  So  that  although  requiring  for  their 
development  the  outward  solicitations  of  experience,  when 
called  into  activity  they  unfold  truths  which  interpret  that  ex¬ 
perience,  and  give  law  to  the  understanding. 

7.  In  their  development,  then,  there  are  two  orders  of  rela¬ 
tions  to  be  noticed  —  the  logical  and  the  chronological.  For 
example  :  “  the  idea  of  body  and  the  idea  of  space  being  given, 
which  supposes  the  other  ?  which  is  the  logical  condition,  or  that 

which  authorizes  the  admission  of  the  other  ?  Evidently,  the 

_  *  ' 

idea  of  space.  We  cannot  admit  the  idea  of  body  without  pre¬ 
supposing  the  idea  of  a  place  for  that  body ;  ”  *  and  this  illus¬ 
trates  our  meaning  in  saying  that  without  the  facts  or  truths  of 
the  reason,  experience  itself  would  be  impossible ;  for  without 
the  presupposition  of  space,  the  admission  of  a  body  would  be 
inconceivable.  But  there  is  also  a  chronological  order  to  be 
noticed.  For  it  by  no  means  follows  that  because  a  given 
idea  logically  authorizes  another,  therefore  it  must  historically 
precede  it.  If  we  had  not  first  the  notion  of  body,  we  should 
never  have  .the  idea  of  space.  No  perceptible  point  of  time 
intervenes,  but  yet  it  is  necessary  that,  in  the  order  of  succession, 


*  M.  Cousin’s  Examination  of  Locke’s  Essay,  c.  ii. 


PROGRESSION. 


59 


the  perception  of  body  should  precede,  in  order  that  the  idea  of 
space  which  contains  it  might  be  evolved  in  the  consciousness. 
Experience,  then,  is  the  chronological  condition  or  antecedent 
of  knowledge  ;  the  ultimate  facts  of  the  reason  are  the  logical 
conditions  or  antecedents  of  experience,  and  therefore  of  knowl¬ 
edge. 

8.  This  distinction  between  the  logical  and  chronological 
order  of  our  ideas,  introduces,  and  helps  to  illustrate,  an  im¬ 
portant  distinction  between  the  ideas  of  the  reason,  distributing 
them  into  two  classes.  Our  section  on  sensational  perception 
gave  us  the  phenomena  of  external  nature.  Our  section  on 
the  reflective  understanding  gave  us  the  fact  of  our  own  sub¬ 
jective  existence.  Chronologically,  the  objective  precedes  the 
subjective ;  sensation  occasioned  from  without  is  the  antecedent 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  ego.  Logically,  the  subjective  pre¬ 
cedes  the  objective  ;  for  it  is  the  condition  of  the  sensation.  In 
the  present  section,  we  have  to  do  with  the  ultimate  and  all- 
embracing  truths  which  contain  and  account  for  both  the  finite 
subjective  and  the  finite  objective.  We  have  now,  therefore, 
reached  a  point  in  which  both  these  finites,  percipient  and  per¬ 
ceived,  are  to  be  regarded  as  objective  to  the  Infinite  Mind  — 
the  point  (I  would  say  it  reverently)  occupied  by  the  Divine 
Creator  of  both,  before  either  was  called  into  existence.  There 
must  have  been  certain  truths  or  facts  logically  or  necessarily 
presupposed  by  the  Divine  Creator  himself,  in  order  to  creation 
and  Divine  manifestation.  And  to  these  necessary  truths,  the 
universe,  including  the  mind  itself,  must  be  related  as  to  the 
conditions  of  its  existence,  themselves  unconditioned;  so  that 
man,  if  he  is  to  apprehend  these  ultimate  relations,  must  be  able 
to  presuppose  these,truths  also. 

9.  Xow  it  will  be  found,  I  submit,  on  due  reflection,  that  among 
the  presuppositions  in  question  are  the  four  to  which  reference 
has  been  already  made.  The  Divine  purpose  to  create  neces¬ 
sarily  presupposed  that  Substance ,  or  infinite  Being,  of  which  all 
creation  should  be  the  manifestation ;  that  Activity,  which  was 
equal  to  the  causation  of  the  objective  universe ;  that  infinite 
space  in  which  all  created  things  should  be  placed ;  and  that 
infinite  time .  in  which  all  the  successions  of  events  should  occur. 
But,  next,  is  there  not  a  characteristic  common  to  the  former 
two  of  these  presuppositions  which  do  not  belong  to  the  latter  ? 
Time  and  space  are  necessary  only  as  conditions  of  creation  ; 
Being  and  Activity  are  necessary  as  conditions,  and  as  some- 
thing  more.  The  relation  of  the  former  to  a  creation  is  nega- 


60 


MAN. 


fcive,  consisting  in  tlie  absence  of  external  obstacles ;  while  that 
of  the  latter  is  positive,  and  constitutes  the  internal  ground  of  a 
creation,  is  both  the  efficient  cause,  and  the  sufficient  reason, 
of  it. 

10.  Further,  the  Infinite  Subjective  is  here  contemplated  in 
a  twofold  relation  —  as  Substance,  and  as  Activit  y  or  Cause. 
To  conceive  of  Substance  without  the  eternally  self-contained 
Activity,  which  in  its  objective  operation  we  call  Cause,  is  as 
impossible  as  to  conceive  of  Activity  without  Substance  —  for 
Mind  necessarily  involves  the  idea  of  activity.  But  on  coming 
forth  and  taking  possession  of  Space  and  Time  in  an  objective 
manifestation  of  properties  and  effects,  two  classes  of  truths 
appear  —  those  which  relate  to  the  possibility  of  a  creation,  and 
those  which  relate  to  its  actuality ;  or,  ideas  antecedently  and 
unconditionally  necessary,  and  the  truths  belonging  to  these 
ideas  as  now  caused  to  be  embodied  or  signified  objectively, 
and  only  conditionally  necessary  —  conditionally,  that  is,  on  the 
purpose  to  create.  Here,  then,  is  truth  unconditionally,  and 
truth  conditionally  necessary ;  the  latter  logically  reposing  on 
the  former.  And  this  difference  leads  to  a  corresponding  dis¬ 
tinction  in  the  Reason  itself,  revealed  in  the  different  mode  of 
its  action,  and  in  the  different  character  of  the  objects  to  which 
it  is  directed  —  a  distinction  which  may  be  designated  as  spec¬ 
ulative,  and  as  applied  or  practical.*  Reason  as  practical  has 
to  do  with  truth  conditionally  necessary  —  with  the  facts  of  ex¬ 
perience  supplied  by  the  understanding  —  to  an  induction  of 
which  it  impels  the  understanding  by  the  conviction  that  they 
involve  a  necessary  truth,  and  in  order  to  disengage  that  truth. 
As  the  speculative  reason,  it  has  to  do  with  truths  abstract  and 
unconditional,  and  which  have  their  evidence  in  themselves.  In 
the  former  case,  it  deals  with  truth  actualized  —  truth  in  the 
concrete ;  and  its  office  is  to  employ  and  direct  the  inductive 
understanding  so  as  to  elicit  from  its  concrete  materials  all  that 
relates  to  the  abstract  and  necessary,  and  of  which  it  has  already 
the  a  priori  idea ;  in  the  latter,  it  has  to  do  with  truths  not  real¬ 
ized,  nor  fully  realizable,  in  the  sensible  world  —  such  as  the 
pure  truths  of  Geometry.  As  speculative  reason,  it  is  consti¬ 
tutive,  determining  our  ideas  or  beliefs ;  as  practical,  it  is  direc¬ 
tive,  regulating  our  mental  activity. 

11.  Thus  reason  has  a  subjective  and  an  objective  aspect,  in 


*  Rot  employing  the  term  practical  in  the  Kantian  or  moral  sense,  but 
as  distinguished  from  speculative. 


PROGRESSION. 


61 


which  respect  it  harmonizes  with  those  operations  of  the  mind 
which  we  have  already  considered.  As  the  subjective  sensation 
points  objectively  in  perception,  and  as  the  subjective  reflection 
points  objectively  in  the  understanding,  so  the  reason  as  specu¬ 
lative  deals  with  truth  subjectively  necessary,  while  as  practical 
it  contemplates  so  much  of  that  truth  as  is  actualized  as  a  means 
to  an  end :  in  the  former  instance,  proclaiming  its  ultimate 
authority  by  applying  a  necessary  truth  to  a  particular  concep¬ 
tion,  and  superseding  the  necessity  of  experience  ever  after ; 
in  the  latter,  universalizing  a  particular  fact  as  true  for  all  space 
and  time.* 

12.  What  is  the  Form  in  which  the  facts  of  reason  exist  in 
the  mind  ?  It  appears  evident  that  the  only  notion  which  the 
understanding  can  have  of  the  unlimited  is  merely  the  negation 
of  the  limited.  Every  positive  notion  suggests  a  negative 
notion  —  suggests  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  by  what  it  is  not. 
Hence,  the  division  of  the  attributes  of  God  adopted  by  some 
theologians  into  Negative  and  Positive,  the  negative  attributes 
of  infinity,  eternity,  and  independence,  denoting  merely  the 
absence  of  the  limitation  and  dependence  belonging  to  our  own 
being.  But  though  the  infinite  cannot  be  construed  to  the  un- 
derstanding,  it  is  within  the  province  of  the  reason  to  affirm  its 
existence.  Though  not  comprehensible  as  an  object  of  perfect 
knowledge,  it  is  apprehensible  as  an  object  of  thought ;  though 
a  negative  truth  to  the  conceptive  understanding,  to  the  affirm¬ 
ing  reason  it  is  positive,  the  very  condition  of  its  own  possi¬ 
bility,  and  regulative  of  all  the  operations  of  the  understanding. 
And  as  the  possibility  of  our  intelligence  rests  ultimately  on 
facts  of  reason  which,  as  primitive,  can  be  explained  by  nothing 
more  simple,  nor  proved  by  anything  more  certain,  they  are  to 
be  regarded  not  so  much  in  the  forms  of  cognitions  as  of  beliefs. 
And  hence,  we  prefer  denominating  the  primary  affirmations  of 
reason  as  Beliefs. 

13.  I  am  aware  of  the  diverse  opinions  entertained  on  this 
subject  by  the  most  distinguished  metaphysicians,  and  would 
be  only  regarded  as  deferentially  indicating  my  own  convictions. 


*  For  example,  our  own  voluntary  effort  having  given  us  the  idea  of 
causation,  in  mechanical  science  we  apply  the  necessary  truths  of  causa¬ 
tion  to  force  and  motion,  on  the  ground  that  what  is  true  of  the  former  is 
true  of  the  latter ;  and  the  practical  reason  gives  universality  to  the  laws 
of  force  and  motion,  on  the  ground  that  what  is  true  of  them  in  one  place 
and  time,  is  true  always  and  everywhere,  or  that  time  and  space  are,  as 
we  have  seen,  only  conditional  not  causative. 

6 


62 


MAX. 


With  Kant,  I  believe  that  the  reason  has  the  notion  of  the  infi¬ 
nite  and  the  unconditioned,  and  has  it  as  a  regulative  prin¬ 
ciple  of  the  mind  itself;  but,  differing  from  him,  I  believe  this 
notion  to  be  more  than  a  mere  ens  rationis ,  existing  in  and  for 
the  mind  alone ;  that  it  has  an  objective  reality  with  which  it  is 
truly  conversant,  and  the  existence  of  which  it  is  entitled  to 
believe  on  the  same  ground  as  that  on  which  it  believes  the 
existence  of  the  limited  and  the  conditioned,  that  of  conscious¬ 
ness.  With  M.  Cousin,  I  regard  the  infinite  as  admitting  of 
“  apperception,”  or  as  apprehensible  by  thought,  but  must 
utterly  reject  the  proposition  that  it  is  also  comprehensible,  in 
the  sense  of  being  reducible  to  the  compass  of  our  conscious¬ 
ness,  or  exhaustible  within  it.  My  knowledge  constitutes  the 
ground  of  my  belief,  but  neither  prescribes  the  internal  nature 
of  its  objects,  nor  measures  the  extent  of  its  domain.  With 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  I  regard  the  notion  of  the  unconditioned 
and  the  infinite  as  necessary,  but  then  I  do  not  receive  it  as  such 
merely  on  mental  compulsion,  or  in  order  to  escape  a  contradic¬ 
tion,  but  as  a  fact  which  I  can  think  of  as  possible,  as  well  as 
feel  to  be  necessary. 

14.  If  I  am  required  argumentatively  to  prove  that  I  can 
think  of  the  infinite  as  positive  and  possible,  I  can  only  appeal 
to  the  consciousness  itself,  of  which  it  is  an  ultimate  fact ;  and 
as  such,  and  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is  such,  its  analysis  is 
impossible,  and  to  attempt  it  an  absurdity.  And  here,  it  ap¬ 
pears  to  me,  lies  the  secret  of  the  difference  between  those  who 
regard  the  notion  of  the  unconditioned  as  being  only  the  nega¬ 
tive  of  the  conditioned,  and  those  who  deem  it  apprehensible 
as  a  positive.  No  mere  argumentative  effort  to  bring  the  sub¬ 
ject  within  the  limit  of  the  understanding  —  no  ascent  from  the 
finite  and  the  conditioned  in  the  direction  of  the  unconditioned, 
can  ever  conduct  us  beyond  the  point  where,  feeling  that  we 
have  reached  the  end  of  that  which  we  know,  we  also  feel  that 
beyond  there  must  be  Something  more  which  we  do  not  know. 
“We  are  thus  taught  the  salutary  lesson,”  (says  Sir  W.  Hamil¬ 
ton,  very  admirably,)  “  that  the  capacity  of  thought  is  not  to  be 
constituted  into  the  measure  of  existence,  and  are  warned  from 
recognizing  the  domain  of  our  knowledge  as  necessarily  co¬ 
extensive  with  the  horizon  of  our  faith.  And,  by  a  wonderful 
revelation,  we  are  thus,  in  the  very  consciousness  of  our  ina¬ 
bility  to  conceive  aught  beyond  the  relative  and  finite,  inspired 
with  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  something  unconditioned  be¬ 
yond  the  sphere  of  all  comprehensible  reality.”  Now,  here  it 


PROGRESSION. 


63 


is  admitted  that  we  attain  to  “  a  revelation  ”  which  “  inspires  ns 
with  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  something  unconditioned.” 
But  the  question  is,  whether  this  revelation  and  inspired  belief 
of  an  unconditioned  something ,  and  therefore  of  a  positive ,  is  a 
mere  inference  of  the  understanding,  or  a  truth  of  the  reason, 
independent  of  all  argumentative  processes,  and  presupposed 
by  them.  That  it  cannot  be  the  former,  is  already  admitted  by 
both  parties.  If,  then,  it  be  the  latter,  its  very  nature  as  a 
primary  truth  of  reason  forbids  its  analysis.  It  is  a  belief  of 
something  —  of  a  positive  objective  reality.  It  is  a  revelation  in¬ 
spiring  belief  —  a  self-revealing  light.  It  admits  only  of  appeal, 
and  must  be  presumed.  To  think  either  of  decompounding  it, 
or  of  measuring  its  evidence,  is  as  absurd  as  to  think  of  carry¬ 
ing  a  line  around  the  unlimited  of  which  it  is  the  revelation, 
and  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is  its  revelation.  Every  demon¬ 
stration  is  unwound  from  something  indemonstrable  and  given, 
or  believed  as  actual.  To  require  a  reason  for  the  possibility 
of  the  belief,  beyond  the  fact  of  its  reality  as  given  in  the  con¬ 
sciousness,  is  to  attempt  to  ascertain  what  precedes  the  first,  or 
“  what  supports  the  foundation.” 

15.  I  would  suggest,  that  much  of  the  difficulty  attending 
this  subject  is  imposed  by  the  mind  itself,  and  arises  from  the 
attempt  to  conceive  of  infinity,  instead  of  an  infinite  Being. 
To  think  even  of  a  limited  abstraction  requires  an  effort ;  but 
to  think  of  an  abstraction  unlimited,  is  an  aggravation  of  the 
task,  from  which  the  mind  soon  recoils.  Nor  is  it  called  to 
make  the  attempt.  The  doctrine  of  infinity  comes  to  us  clothed 
in  the  attributes  of  a  personal  God.  “  The  ratio  formalis  of  In¬ 
finity  may  not  be  understood  by  us  clearly  and  distinctly,  but 
yet  the  Being  which  is  infinite  may  be.  Infinity  itself  cannot 
be  on  this  account,  because  we  conceive  it  by  denying  all  limita¬ 
tions  and  bounds  to  it ;  but  the  Being  which  is  infinite  we  ap¬ 
prehend  in  a  positive  manner,  although  not  adequately,  because 
we  cannot  comprehend  all  which  is  in  it.  As  we  may  clearly 
and  distinctly  see  the  sea,  though  we  cannot  discover  the  bounds 
of  it,  so  may  we  clearly  and  distinctly  apprehend  some  perfec¬ 
tions  of  God,  when  we  fix  our  minds  on  them,  although  we  are 
not  able  to  grasp  them  altogether  in  our  narrow  and  confined 
intellects,  because  they  are  infinite.”  * 

In  speaking  of  the  ultimate  facts  of  the  reason,  then,  as  be¬ 
liefs,  we  must  not  be  supposed  to  be  measuring  their  certainty, 


*  Stillingfleet’s  Origines  Sacrce,  B.  III.  <:c.  i.  y.  yi. 


64 


MAN. 


or  to  have  any  reference  whatever  to  their  logical  value.  We 
employ  the  term  as  serving  both  to  denote  their  primordial 
and  independent  character,  and  to  prevent  the  inference  to 
which  the  use  of  the  term  cognitions  might  lead,  that  we  deem 
it  possible  to  know,  in  the  sense  of  comprehending,  the  infinite. 
Know  it  in  the  true  logical  sense  of  knowledge,  we  do  —  if  by 
knowledge  is  meant  firm  belief  of  what  is  true,  on  sufficient 
grounds  *  —  for  consciousness  itself  attests  its  truth.  And  though, 
in  their  ultimate  character,  the  facts  of  reason  transcend  the 
understanding,  yet  as  beliefs  of  objective  realities,  as  positive 
facts,  they  are  generative  of  truths  to  which  the  understanding 
is  competent.  As  primary  positive  beliefs,  they  may  be  re¬ 
garded  as  standing  midway  between  the  Infinite  Objective  and 
the  inductive  understanding ;  affirming  the  existence  of  the  for¬ 
mer,  constituting  the  ground  for  the  operations  of  the  latter,  har¬ 
monizing  and  uniting  both.  The  understanding  is  met  in  its 
laboring  ascent  from  the  sensible,  by  the  reason  in  its  descent 
from  communion  with  the  invisible  and  the  unlimited ;  and  in 
the  coincidence  of  the  two  consists  our  intelligence. 

16.  As  to  the  Number  of  our  original  beliefs,  no  arbitrary 
catalogue  can  suffice.  The  true  classification  of  the  elements  of 
reason  must  be  founded  in  a  reason  which  shall  comprehend 
and  account. for  them  all.  “  Perhaps  a  practical  standard  of 
some  convenience  would  be,”  says  an  able  metaphysician,  u  that 
all  reasoners  should  be  required  to  admit  every  principle  of 
which  the  denial  renders  reasoning  impossible.!  This  is  only 
to  require  that  a  man  should  admit,  in  general  terms,  those  prin¬ 
ciples  which  he  must  assume  in  every  particular  argument,  and 
which  has  been  assumed  in  every  argument,  against  their  ex¬ 
istence.  It  is,  in  other  words,  to  require  that  a  disputant  should 
not  contradict  himself ;  for  every  argument  against  the  funda¬ 
mental  laws  of  thought  absolutely  assumes  their  existence  in  the 
premises,  while  it  totally  denies  it  in  the  conclusion.” 


*  Archbishop  Whateley’s,  Logic,  B.  IY.  c.  ii.  §  2,  Note. 

t  “  This  maxim,  (says  Sir  J.  Mackintosh,  in  his  Dissertation  on  Ethical 
Philosophy,  §  6,)  which  contains  a  sufficient  answer  to  all  universal  scep¬ 
ticism,  is  significantly  conveyed  in  the  quaint  title  of  an  old  and  rare  hook, 
entitled,  Scivi  sive  Sceptices  et  Scepticorum  a  Jure  Disputatioms  exclusio , 
bv  Thomas  White.  ‘  Fortunately ,’  says  the  illustrious  sceptic  himself, 
[Hume,]  ‘  since  Reason  is  incapable  of  dispelling  these  clouds ,  Nature  hei'sdj 
suffices  for  that  purpose ,  and  cures  me  of  this  philosophical  delirium  f  almost 
in  the  sublime  and  immortal  words  of  Pascal,  'La  Raison  confond les  Dog- 
mat  istes,  et  la  Nature  les  Sceptiquesi  ” 


PE  OGEE  SSI  OX. 


65 


17.  The  categories  of  Aristotle  were  not  intended  to  include 
the  infinite  ;  they  were  formed  on  the  principle  of  regarding  the 
basis  of  every  law  of  thought  as  a  property  inherent  in  the  out¬ 
ward  object ;  and  they  only  assumed  to  distribute  the  finite. 
The  categories  of  Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  were  formed  on  the 
principle  that  the  mind,  projecting  itself  on  the  object,  beholds 
in  the  properties  of  nature  nothing  but  the  reflection  of  itself, 
and  thus  obtains  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  or  conditions  of  its  own 
activity.  And  in  the  same  manner,  his  three  irreducible  ideas 
of  the  reason,  the  soul,  the  universe,  and  God,  are  purely  sub¬ 
jective,  and,  as  such,  cannot  be  allowed  to  authenticate  any 
objective  knowledge  whatever.  In  dealing  with  the  same  great 
problem,  M.  Cousin  reduces  the  whole  phenomena  of  reason  to 
three  inseparable  elements  —  the  infinite,  the  finite,  and  the  re¬ 
lation  between  them ;  or  substance,  causality,  and  the  relation 
between  them.  Now,  that  everything  may  be  viewed  under  this 
three-fold  aspect  is  unquestionably  true ;  but  so  also  may  they 
be  viewed  under  the  three-fold  aspect  of  identity,  difference, 
and  the  relation  between  them  ;  of  unity,  plurality,  and  the  re¬ 
lation  between  them  ;  and  of  many  others.  Indeed,  he  himself 
specifies  many  similar  three-fold  forms  of  classification.  But 
the  question  is,  whether  some  of  these  do  not  include  new  and 
distinct  ideas.  Admitting  that  identity,  unity,  eternity,  all  meet 
in  the  one  infinite  substance  —  the  glorious  and  incomprehen¬ 
sible  God  —  yet,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  idea  of  justice 
is  necessarily  included  in  them,  or  that  it  is  one  with  the  idea 
of  final  cause,  or  that  our  ideas  of  plurality,  imperfection,  and 
externality,  are  all  one,  the  catalogue  cannot  be  deemed  com¬ 
plete  as  an  enumeration  of  original  ideas,  however  great  its 
merit  may  be  as  a  classification  of  the  objects  to  which  the  ideas 
relate.  Doubtless,  there  is  a  point  from  which  each  of  these 
methods  —  the  objective,  the  subjective,  and  the  ontological  — 
appears  to  peculiar  advantage ;  and  a  still  higher  point  from 
which  the  just  results  of  all  would  be  seen  harmonized  and  com¬ 
pleted.  And  if  ever  that  point  be  attained  —  to  say  nothing  of 
the  ministry  of  theology  in  pointing  the  way  —  all  the  primor¬ 
dial  revelations  there  disclosed  will,  doubtless,  be  found  to  be  in 
perfect  coincidence  with  the  presuppositions  of  inspired  theology. 

18^  In  accordance  with  this  conviction,  I  have  already  stated 
that  if  there  were  facts  which  the  Divine  Creator  himself  had  to 
presuppose  in  order  to  creation  and  self-manifestation,  and  if 
man  is  the  being  to  whom  the  manifestation  is  to  be  made,  man 
must  be  able  to  presuppose  them  also ;  for  not  to  be  able  to  do 

6* 


66 


MAN. 


this,  would  be  not  to  recognize  its  relation  to  the  necessary  and 
the  unlimited,  and,  therefore,  not  to  the  Infinite  Creator  himself. 
And  if  the  right  specification  of  the  elements  of  reason  must  be 
itself  founded  in  a  reason  which  shall  embrace  and  account  for 
them  all,  I  believe  the  reason  now  hypothetically  stated  to  be 
the  true  one.  The  proposition  requires  that  there  should  be  a 
finite  subjective,  capable  of  receiving  the  manifestation,  and  a 
finite  objective  as  a  means  of  making  it;  and,  accordingly,  we 
have  seen  that  the  notion  of  self,  or  of  the  ego,  is  implied  in  our 
every  sensation,  thought,  word,  and  act,  and  is  necessarily  a 
primitive  and  universal  notion ;  we  have  seen  also  that  this  no¬ 
tion  supposes  the  idea  of  a  non-ego  to  which  it  stands  opposed, 
and  by  which  I  am  made  conscious  of  my  own  distinct  individu¬ 
ality  ;  and  that  all  the  ideas  we  have  named  of  space  and  time, 
substance  and  cause,  externality,  resemblance,  and  design  (ideas 
of  perfection  and  right  are  hereafter  to  be  considered)  are  evolv¬ 
ed  in  the  process.  Again,  the  proposition  supposes  that  there 
was  a  point  of  duration  when  both  these  finites  began  to  be,  and 
when,  with  a  view  to  it,  all  the  ideas  enumerated  must  have 
been  present  to  the  Infinite  Mind  as  so  many  possibilities ;  and, 
accordingly,  we  have  seen  that  our  ideas  of  self  and  nature  ne¬ 
cessarily  imply  correlative  ideas  of  the  infinite  and  unlimited, 
and  that  the  reason  authoritatively  proclaims  them. 

19.  What  ground  have  we  for  relying  on  the  Certainty  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  objective  ?  “A  strange  thing  this  !  exclaims 
Cousin.  A  being  perceives  or  knows  out  of  his  own  sphere. 
He  is  nothing  but  himself,  and  yet  he  knows  something  that  is 
not  himself.  His  own  existence  is,  for  himself,  nothing  but  his 
own  individuality ;  and  yet,  from  the  bosom  of  this  individual 
world  which  he  inhabits,  and  which  he  constitutes,  he  attains  to 
a  world  foreign  to  his  own.  That  the  mind  of  man  is  provided 
with  these  wonderful  powers,  no  one  can  doubt ;  but  are  their 
reach  and  application  legitimate  ?  and  does  that  which  they 
reveal  really  exist?  The  intellectual  principles  have  an  in¬ 
contestable  authority  in  the  internal  world  of  the  subject ;  but 
are  they  equally  valid  in  reference  to  their  external  objects  ?” 
This  is  the  most  profound  problem  of  speculative  philosophy ; 
for  it  involves  the  certainty  of  human  knowledge.  How  do  we 
know  that  things  are  what  they  appear  ?  How  do  we  ’cross 
from  psychology  to  ontology ;  or  effect  a  passage  from  the  con¬ 
scious  mind  to  the  existence  of  things  in  themselves?  The 
sceptic  affirms  that  the  mind  is  directly  conscious  only  of  its 
own  operations,  and  that  to  assume  the  existence  of  anything 
objective  and  independent,  is  an  assumption  without  proof. 


PROGRESSION. 


67 


20.  (a)  On  which  it  may  be  remarked,  first,  that,  hypothe¬ 
tically  admitting  the  existence  of  an  objective  universe,  it  is  im¬ 
possible  to  conceive  of  any  other  or  higher  ground  of  belief  in 
the  objective,  than  that  which  we  possess  in  our  own  conscious¬ 
ness.  Understanding  by  the  subjective  all  that  belongs  to  the 
thinking  subject,  and  by  the  objective  whatever  belongs  to  the 
object  of  thought,  we  ask,  how  could  we  believe  in  the  objective 
except  on  the  faith  of  the  subjective  ?  How  would  it  be  possi¬ 
ble  for  us  to  know  the  external,  but  by  an  internal  principle  ? 
It  is  I  who  know.  My  faculty  of  knowing  is  my  own.  To 
know  or  believe  an  existence,  then,  must  be  an  actual  state,  or 
fact,  of  my  own  consciousness. 

21.  (b)  Equally  inconceivable  are  any  reasons  to  account 
for  or  establish  the  veracity  of  consciousness.  The  capacity  of 
consciousness  necessarily  implies  a  structure  and  functions,  laws 
of  action,  and  whatever  is  essential  in  order  to  render  experi¬ 
ence  and  reasoning  possible.  These  laws  and  beliefs  of  the  in¬ 
tellectual  nature  must  plainly  be  ultimate.  And  if  ultimate, 
they  cannot  be  defined,  since  no  words  can  explain  them  to  him 
who  has  not  the  ideas  previously.  No  argument  can  corrobo¬ 
rate  them,  since  all  argument  rests  on  them.  No  evidence  can 
add  to  their  certainty,  for  they  are  already  facts  of  conscious¬ 
ness.  Did  their  veracity  admit  of  explanation  and  increase,  it 
could  only  be  owing  to  their  not  being  ultimate,  and  to  their  be¬ 
ing  reducible  to  facts  which  were  ultimate. 

22.  ( c )  A  universal  scepticism  then  cannot  be  otherwise  than 
self-contradictory ;  questioning  the  authority  of  the  very  princi¬ 
ple  on  which  it  must  rely  while  questioning  it.  “  It  is  an  at¬ 
tempt  of  the  mind  to  act  without  its  structure.”  Like  Hume, 
the  sceptic  may  go  the  length  of  saying  —  I  do  not  merely  affirm 
that  we  have  not  reached  the  truth,  but  that  we  never  can  :  that 
which  I  deny  is  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  The  very  struc¬ 
ture  of  the  mind  forbids  it.  But  how,  we  ask,  is  this  conclusion 
reached  ?  how,  but  by  admitting  the  truth  of  the  testimony  of 
consciousness  to  one  class  of  phenomena,  the  subjective ,  and  de¬ 
nying  it  to  another  class,  the  objective :  by  assuming  its  truth  at 
first  for  the  express  purpose  of  denying  it  afterwards.  To 
question  it  at  all,  is  to  render  it  inconsistent  for  the  questioner 
to  form  an  opinion  upon  any  subject,  to  inquire,  to  doubt,  or 
even  to  think.  “  At  this  point,  scepticism  itself  expires  ;  for, 
as  Descartes  says,  Let  a  man  doubt  of  everything  else,  he  can¬ 
not  doubt  that  he  doubts.” 

23.  (c?)  In  answer  to  the  great  question,  then,  What  is  the 


68 


MAN. 


relation  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective  ;  or,  What  is 
the  authority  of  our  belief  in  the  objective  ?  we  reply,  the 
identical  authority  on  which  we  believe  in  the  subjective;  or, 
the  only  authority  we  have  for  believing  at  all.  “In  perception, 
consciousness  gives  as  an  ultimate  fact  a  belief  of  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  the  existence  of  something  different  from  self.  We 
only  believe  that  this  something  exists,  because  we  believe  that 
we  hriow  (are  conscious  of)  this  something  as  existing;  and 
the  belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence ,  necessarily  involves 
the  belief  of  the  existence.  Both  are  original,  or  neither.  Does 
consciousness  deceive  us  in  the  former,  it  necessarily  deludes 
us  in  the  latter ;  and  if  the  latter,  though  a  fact  of  consciousness, 
be  false,  the  former,  because  a  fact  of  consciousness,  is  not  true?”* 
Consciousness,  then,  declares  that  our  knowledge  of  the  external 
world  is  direct  and  immediate  ;  and  it  is  because  this  knowledge 
is  intuitive  that  it  is  adequate  to  the  reality  itself.  The  mind, 
and  that  with  which  it  is  occupied,  being  both  included  in  the 
unity  of  consciousness,  give  an  ultimate  fact  which  cannot  be 
analyzed. 

24.  (e)  But  consciousness  gives  us  more  than  the  material 
world.  We  have  seen  that  in  giving  us  the  visible,  it  gives 
us,  at  the  same  time,  the  invisible  which  it  presupposes  and 
involves;  and  thus  it  launches  us  into  the  unlimited  and  the 
infinite.  Now,  on  the  grounds  already  stated,  we  must  either 
call  in  question  the  authority  of  consciousness  in  itself,  or  admit 
its  authority  without  reserve  for  all  the  facts  which  it  attests, 
and  therefore  for  the  facts  of  the  universal  and  the  invisible. 

F or  example,  every  event,  as  interpreted  by  reason,  supposes 
a  cause ;  reason  proclaims  the  universality  of  this  truth ;  attests 
that  in  no  conceivable  case  can  we  imagine  it  to  be  otherwise ; 
that  to  limit  the  fact  is  to  destroy  it.  Equally  conscious  are 
we  that,  in  sensation,  this  cause  is  not  self,  that  it  is  without 
me ;  and  thus  the  principle  of  causality  conducts  us  irresistibly 
to  an  external  cause.  Here,  then,  is*  an  existence  beyond  me  — 
a  being ;  for  my  notion  of  the  nature  of  cause  is  derived  from 
the  perceived  connection  between  my  own  voluntary  effort  and 
the  effect  which  followed.  I  cannot  now  think  of  the  aggregate 
of  phenomena  composing  the  universe,  without  admitting  the 
existence  of  a  Being  by  whom  all  the  power  is  exercised  which 
these  phenomena  display.  And  what  one  conscious  voluntary 
effort  is  to  the  Great  First  Cause,  that  a  single  act  of  memory 


*  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  Edin.  Rev.  Yol.  III.  p.  198,  Oct.  1830 


PROGRESSION. 


69 


apprehending  succession  is  to  unlimited  duration,  and  a  single 
intelligent  perception  of  objects  and  properties  to  the  Infinite 
substance  of  which  they  are  the  manifestation.  In  other  words, 
the  universal  is  presupposed  by  the  particular,  and,  in  that 
sense,  is  given  in  it ;  the  necessary  is  given  in  the  contingent ; 
the  reason  in  sensation ;  the  objective  in  the  subjective.  And 
they  are  given  directly,  intuitively,  and  spontaneously ;  thus 
proclaiming,  as  clearly  as  by  their  characteristics  of  universality 
and  necessity,  that  they  are  not  inferences  of  experience,  but 
are  actually  implied  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind.  And  is  not 
the  affirmation  of  the  infinite,  of  which  I  am  conscious  by  the 
intuition  of  reason,  as  valid  as  the  affirmation  of  the  finite,  of 
which  I  am  conscious  in  sensational  perception  ?  If  the  latter 
is  legitimate,  so  also  is  the  former ;  and  for  the  same  reason, 
that  it  is  attested  by  the  authority  of  consciousness.  “  If  a  state 
of  mind,”  says  Morell,  “termed  sensation ,  can  give  us  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  properties,  why  may  not  a  state  of  mind  termed  in¬ 
tuition  or  reason  give  us  the  knowledge  of  substance  ?  Reason 
has  as  much  right  to  take  us  out  of  ourselves  as  perception, 
and  if  the  one  cannot  assert  objective  validity,  neither  can  the 
other.”*  In  each  instance,  the  beliefs  of  which  we  are  conscious 
are  ultimate  facts ;  and  as  such  incapable  of  analysis,  and 
independent  of  argumentative  corroboration.  Our  primary 
experience  is  a  belief;  and  “our  intellectual  life  is  a  continued 
series  of  beliefs — of  acts  of  faith  in  the  invisible  revealed  by  the 
visible — acts,  which  extend  from  the  bosom  of  consciousness  to 
the  Infinite,  and  which  reach  even  to  the  Being  of  beings.” 

25.  Let  us  mark  and  admire  the  provision  which  is  thus 
made  in  the  very  structure  of  the  mind,  for  the  introduction  of 
new  truth  on  miraculous  evidence.  All  knowledge  rests  ulti¬ 
mately  on  beliefs — the  belief  of  necessary  and  universal  truths. 
Each  of  these  truths  comes  to  us  in  a  particular  concrete  form. 
Let  body  be  given,  and  the  notion  of  space  is  inevitable.  Let 
change  be  given,  and  the  idea  of  a  cause  adequate  to  the  change 
is  inevitably  involved.  Let  a  preternatural  or  superhuman 
change  or  event  be  given,  and  the  reason  inevitably  assumes  a 
preternatural  relation,  irresistibly  believes  a  superhuman  cause. 
In  so  doing,  the  mind  is  merely  acting  naturally ;  “  the  reason,” 
says  Locke,  “is  only  assenting  to  itself.” 

26.  Having  thus  illustrated  and  confirmed  the  truth  of  the 
general  proposition  placed  at  the  head  of  this  section,  I  may  be 


*  Modern  Philosophy,  Yol.  I.  328. 


70 


MAN. 


permitted  to  glance  at  the  antecedent  ground  for  expecting  such 
a  constitution  of  the  mind  as  it  hypothetically  describes.  "We 
had  seen  that  the  mind  is  sensibly  related  to  every  external 
object ;  and  that  all  objective  things  in  nature,  besides  being 
related  to  each  other,  have  corresponding  relations  in  the 
human  mind.  But,  in  addition,  there  must  be  a  sense  in  which 
both  perceived  and  percipient  must  be  related  to  whatever 
accounts  for,  or  is  presupposed  in,  the  fact  of  their  existence. 
And  the  apprehension  of  this  relation,  as  it  is  the  highest  and 
the  noblest,  must  be  more  desirable  and  important  than  that  of 
any  of  the  inferior  relations  to  which  reference  has  been  made  ; 
that  is,  must  tend  to  bring  us  mentally  nearer  to  the  Divine 
Being,  and  to  exalt  our  views  respecting  Him. 

But  whence  can  this  belief  or  apprehension  come  ?  Will  it 
be  the  result  of  experience,  the  self-completion  and  complement 
of  sensation  and  experience  merely  ?  Rather,  may  it  not  be 
expected  to  be  original,  connatural  with  the  infinite,  and  only 
awakened  into  activity  by  experience?  For  if  the  mind  derives 
its  sensations  from  external  objects ;  and  its  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  these  objects  through  reflection  ;  so,  if  there  be  a 
higher  order  of  relations,  it  seems  antecedently  probable  that 
an  acquaintance  with  these  will  be  traceable  more  directly  to 
the  constitution  of  the  mind  itself.  If  the  perceived  objective 
discloses  our  distinction  from,  yet  relation  to,  things  without ; 
and  if,  under  the  eye  of  reflection,  the  subjective  affirms  the 
relation  of  external  things  among  themselves,  surely  the  per¬ 
cipient  and  reflective  power  itself,  and  in  itself,  will  not  be 
barren  of  information.  If  the  mind,  regarded  simply  as  the 
subject  of  sensation,  and  as  capable  of  dealing  with  its  sensa¬ 
tions,  discloses  much,  considered  as  itself  an  objective  addition 
to  creation,  it  may  surely  be  expected  to  disclose  more.  The 
highest  being,  objectively  considered,  may  be  expected  con¬ 
stitutionally  to  imply  or  reveal  the  highest  relations.  If  the 
external  universe  be  a  wondrous  volume,  though  unconscious 
of  one  of  all  the  unnumbered  ideas  of  which  it  is  the  expression, 
surely  the  mind  which  views  every  object  as  a  letter,  every  fact 
resulting  from  a  combination  of  these  objects  as  a  word,  and 
every  natural  collocation  of  such  words  as  a  sentence  significant 
of  some  lofty  truth,  must  itself  be  more  wonderful  and  instruc¬ 
tive  still.  And  if  those  acts  of  the  mind  by  which  it  recognizes 
the  letters,  and  the  words,  and  the  relation  of  the  words  to  each 
other,  be  wonderful,  more  wonderful  must  that  power  of  the 
mind  be  which  interprets  the  sentence,  and  which  derives  from 


PROGRESSION. 


71 


Itself,  through  its  union  with  the  objective,  the  ideas  which  the 
Maker  of  both  intended  to  convey. 

27.  How  Divine  the  arrangement  by  which  the  counterpart 
of  every  idea  involved  or  implied  in  the  external  world  shall 
exist  potentially  in  the  human  mind.  Without  these,  the 
assumed  end  of  the  objective  would  fail ;  for  if  that  end  be  to 
reveal  the  infinite  and  eternal  in  God,  the  attainment  of  that 
end  depends  on  the  powers  or  susceptibilities  which  the  finite 
subjective  shall  bring  to  it.  If  the  ancient  Aristotelean  maxim 
—  “pregnant  with  systems” — be  admitted,  that  “there  is  no¬ 
thing  in  the  intellect  which  was  not  previously  in  the  sense,” 
how  important  the  addition  made  by  Leibnitz,  “except  the 
intellect  itself ;”  for  in  that  mental  constitution  must  be  poten¬ 
tially  involved  not  only  all  that  the  sense  is  capable  of  evolving, 
but  the  power  of  affirming  the  ultimate  relations  of  both  to 
God ;  otherwise  they  will  not  glorify  Him.  And  if  it  be  true 
that  the  mind  be  a  blank  apart  from  the  external  creation,  yet 
how  elaborately  must  that  apparent  blank  be  prepared,  when, 
by  simply  bringing  it  into  the  light  and  warmth  of  the  objective, 
it  "lows  with  colors  not  of  earth,  and  shows  that  from  the  first 
it  had  been  written  over  with  a  secret  writing  by  the  hand 
of  God.  So  that  if  a  being  of  another  race,  capable  of  inter¬ 
preting  creation,  were  to  make  creation,  mental  and  material, 
his  study,  after  ail  that  he  had  learned  from  material  objects, 
and  from  the  effects  of  these  objects  on  the  human  mind  in 
sensation,  he  would  expect  to  learn  more  from  the  study  of  the 
mind  itself — of  the  mind  primitive  and  potential — than  from  all 
creation  besides. 

28.  Antecedents ,  logical  and  chronological.  Among  the  truths 
to  be  evolved,  and  the  consequences  deducible,  from  the  pre¬ 
ceding  remarks,  some  are  so  important  as  to  merit  distinct 
attention.  We  have  seen  that,  as  a  means  of  knowledge,  the 
mind  is  the  logical  antecedent  to  external  nature  —  reason  to 
experience.  Nor  has  our  theory  failed  to  disclose  the  ground 
of  this  fact.  It  is  evident  that  the  very  design  of  an  external 
universe,  as  contemplated  from  eternity  by  the  Infinite  Mind, 
presupposed  certain  facts  as  already  existing,  —  such  as  the 
space  in  which  creation  should  appear,  and  the  Substance  or 
Nature  of  which  it  should  be  a  manifestation.  These  and 
certain  other  truths  were  the  logical  antecedents  of  a  creation 
in  the  Divine  Mind.  He  had  not  to  create  them ;  could  not 
Out  assume  them  ;  the  contrary  is  inconceivable.  But  if  the 
Infinite  Mind  necessarily  presupposed  them  in  designing  crea- 


72 


MAN. 


tion,  so  also  must  the  finite  mind  in  interpreting  creation.  It 
by  an  act  of  imagination,  we  conceive  of  creation  as  having  yet 
to  be  begun,  we  shall  find  that  our  every  conjecture  respecting 
the  great  process  would  unavoidably  involve  and  assume  them. 
Nor  can  the  assumption  of  these  truths  be  less  felt  to  be  neces¬ 
sary,  now  that  the  manifestation  is  in  progress,  than  it  was  prior 
to  its  origin.  As  necessary,  they  cannot  admit  of  argumentative 
proof ;  because  nothing  is  more  certain,  and  because  every 
argument  rests  upon  them.  As  primary,  they  must  be  assumed, 
for  there  was  nothing  before  them,  and  they  are  the  conditions 
of  the  existence  of  every  tiling  that  has  come  after.  They  could 
not  but  be  assumed  by  the  exalted  Creator  in  His  purpose  of 
Divine  manifestation ;  and  man,  made  in  the  intellectual  image 
of  God,  will  be  found,  in  all  his  constructions  of  external  nature, 
to  be  necessarily  assuming  them  also. 

But  we  have  seen  likewise  that,  as  a  means  of  knowledge, 
external  nature  is  the  chronological  antecedent  to  the  mind  — 
experience  to  reason.  And  for  this  our  theory  equally  accounts. 
If  the  Infinite  Mind  is  to  be  made  manifest  to  the  finite  mind, 
that  which  is  to  manifest  Him  must  precede  the  development 
of  the  idea  in  the  mind  —  the  means  must  precede  the  end. 
A  single  fact  may  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose ;  but  some  fact, 
some  external  object,  the  mind  must  have,  both  to  reveal  it  to 
itself,  and  to  awaken  in  it  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.  Hence, 
the  creation  of  the  material  universe  historically  preceded  the 
creation,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  mind  which  was  to 
interpret  it;  which  would  need  such  an  object  in  order  to 
acquire  an  idea  of  the  Intelligent  Cause  presupposed;  and 
which,  having  such  an  object,  would  awaken  to  the  idea  of  the 
Creator  in  and  by  the  very  act  of  interpretation. 

29.  The  arguments  a  'priori  and  a  posteriori.  The  preced¬ 
ing  paragraph  implies  the  folly  of  setting  up  an  exclusive  claim 
for  either  of  these  two  forms  of  argument.  They  involve  and 
support  each  other.  The  argument  d  pi'iori  supposes  an  d  pos¬ 
teriori  postulate  —  a  fact  of  experience  —  as  its  chronological 
antecedent ;  for  to  suppose  “  that  we  can  know  anything  pre¬ 
viously  to  experience  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms.”  The 
fact  or  postulate,  in  question,  indeed,  may  come  immediately 
from  within,  may  be  a  phenomenon  of  consciousness ;  but  that 
internal  phenomenon  supposes  an  external  occasion.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  an  examination  of  Clarke’s  celebrated  Demonstration  of 
the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  will  show,  that  although  the 
idea  of  God  is  given  by  reason,  and  not  by  experience,  it  is  not 


PROGRESSION. 


73 


given  without,  at  least,  a  fact  of  experience,  as  its  antecedent 
occasion  or  condition.*  In  a  similar  manner,  the  argument  d 
posteriori  supposes  an  element  strictly  d  priori,  as  its  logical 
antecedent.  For  the  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause  clearly  pre¬ 
supposes  the  idea  of  causality ;  without  which  all  the  phenom¬ 
ena  of  nature,  though  gazed  at  forever,  would  only  be  regarded 
by  us  as  phenomena  —  an  unmeaning  aggregate  of  effects,  and 
nothing  more.  The  reasoning  from  the  inconceivably  compli¬ 
cated  contrivances  disclosed  by  nature  to  the  skill  of  the  Creator, 
presupposes  the  idea  of  design,  without  which  all  the  illustra¬ 
tions  of  order,  harmony  and  skill,  as  proofs  of  a  final  cause, 
would  exist  in  vain.  But  these  ideas  of  causality  and  purpose 
are  primary  —  presupposed  in  the  things  created  ;  and,  as  such, 
necessarily  presumed  by  the*  mind  that  interprets  creation  by 
arguing  from  nature  to  its  Maker.  These  two  modes  of  proof 
then,  “  are  so  little  exclusive  of  each  other,  that  each  contains 
something  of  the  other.”  And  all  evidence,  whatever  its  form 
or  kind  may  be,  —  whether  that  of  testimony  ;  example  or  fact ; 
experience  ;  resemblance  and  analogy ;  or  of  axioms  and  defini¬ 
tions,  or  demonstrative  reasoning,  —  is  reducible  to  the  d  prion 
and  the  d  posteriori  proof,  or  forms  different  kinds  of  it. 

30.  Necessary  and  contingent  truth.  For  the  reasons  just 
stated,  necessary  truth  relates  to  whatever  facts  are  presupposed 
by  creation  ;  facts,  therefore,  which  existed  before  creation,  and 
which  still  exist  independently  of  it ;  and  facts  which  the  In¬ 
finite  Creator  himself  presupposed,  for  they  are  involved  in  the 
all-comprehending  fact  of  His  own  Nature.  Contingent  truth 
relates  to  whatever  facts  exist  on  account  of  the  former,  and 
which  could  not  exist  without  it.  In  contradistinction  from  the 
truth  which  is  necessary,  universal,  and  primary,  this  is  con¬ 
ditional.  limited,  and  chronologically  subsequent ;  it  is  condi¬ 
tional  as  to  being  at  all,  as  to  being  what  it  is,  and  when  it 
is  on  the  will  of  Him  who  is  the  sole  reason  why  it  is.  There 
is,  however,  a  third  aspect  of  truth  which  it  is  important  to 
notice,  —  namely,  the  conditionally  necessary;  combining  the 
characteristics  of  the  two  preceding  classes.  For  example,  in 
the  proposition  that  every  body  supposes  space,  we  have  the 


*  Accordingly,  the  eighth  proposition  of  the  argument  which  affirms 
that  the  First  Cause  must  be  11  intelligent,”  —  in  which,  as  he  truly  states, 
“  lies  the  main  question  between  us  and  the  atheists  ”  —  is  admirably  sus¬ 
tained  by  an  a.  posteriori  argument :  he  himself  admitting  that  the  prop¬ 
osition  cannot  be  demonstrated  a,  priori. 

7 


74 


MAN. 


necessary  idea  of  space,  as  that  which  com  l  not  but  be ;  the 
conditional  idea  of  body,  as  that  which  might  not  have  been  ; 
and  the  conditionally  necessary  idea  of  the  relation  of  the  body 
to  space  —  a  relation  necessary  on  the  condition  of  the  body 
existing. 

31.  Synthesis  and  analysis.  Then  every  necessary  truth  is 
synthetic,  for  it  contains  potentially  all  the  contingent  which 
rests  on  it,  by  which  it  can  be  made  manifest,  and  of  which  the 
external  universe  is  the  development.  Hence  every  abstract 
and  necessary  truth  comes  to  us  in  a  concrete  state,  or  is  given 
in  a  particular  fact.  On  the  other  hand,  contingent  truth  is 
analytic ;  for,  resting  as  it  does  on  truths  beyond  itself,  and  ad¬ 
mitting  as  it  does  of  combination  with  other  contingent  truths, 
it  allows  of  analysis  and  generalization  —  analysis,  in  order  to 
a  generalization  which  shall  reach  as  far  as  to  the  ultimate 
truths  on  which  it  rests.  So  that,  while  synthesis  prevails  in 
the  objects  of  nature,  the  study  of  these  objects  must  be  conduct¬ 
ed  analytically. 

32.  Co-existence  and  successive  existence.  Every  necessary 
truth,  we  have  seen,  is  synthetic  ;  and  every  object  in  nature,  as 
a  symbolic  expression  of  necessary  truth,  is  synthetic  also.  Now 
in  the  Eternal  Mind,  as  the  seat  of  all  necessary  truth,  the  en¬ 
tire  objective  universe  may  be  regarded  as  contemplated  syn¬ 
thetically  as  a  whole,  and  therefore  as  co-existent  in  space.  In 
all  which  He  has  been  pleased  to  create,  He  has  only  descend¬ 
ed  from  the  general  to  the  particular,  from  the  great  synthetic 
Whole  to  its  parts ;  which  Whole  is  ever  present  to  His  all- 
comprehending  purpose.  But  nature,  synthetic,  and  co-existent 
as  it  is  in  the  Divine  Purpose,  is,  for  an  adequate  reason,  un¬ 
folded  progressively.  That  which  as  an  expression  of  necessary 
truth  is  potentially  co-existent  —  is,  as  a  means  of  human  know¬ 
ledge,  successively  existent.  In  the  former  respect,  it  may  be 
regarded  in  its  relation  to  space ;  in  the  latter,  to  time ;  in  that, 
as  consisting  of  objects ;  in  this,  of  events. 

33.  Deduction.  External  nature  is  to  be  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  sublime  argument,  in  which  the  Creator  is  reasoning 
syllogistically,  or  deductively,  from  the  necessary  to  the  contin¬ 
gent,  from  principles  to  facts,  from  generals  to  particulars.  With 
the  great  synthetic  whole  ever  present  to  His  mind,  He  is  seen 
unfolding  the  parts  of  which  it  consists.  He,  the  First  Cause, 
is  beheld  descending  through  a  prolonged  and  complicated  se¬ 
ries  of  dependent  causes  and  their  effects. 

Now,  in  order  that  man  may  feel  the  force  of  this  syllogistic 


PROGRESSION. 


75 


"easoning,  lie  must  be  prepared  to  admit  tlie  truth  of  the  pri¬ 
mary  proposition.  Equally  with  the  Divine  Mind,  the  human 
mind  must  presuppose  the  primary  principle  on  which  all  its 
subsequent  reasoning  depends.  “  If  you  will  be  at  the  pains, 
(says  Dr.  Whately*)  carefully  to  analyze  the  simplest  descrip¬ 
tion  you  hear  of  any  transaction  or  state  of  things,  you  will 
find  that  the  process  which ‘almost  invariably  takes  place  is*  in 
logical  language,  this :  that  each  individual  has  in  his  mind  cer- 
tain  major  premises  or  principles  relative  to  the  subject  m  ques¬ 
tion  ;  that  observation  of  what  actually  presents  itself  to  the 
senses,  supplies  minor  premises  ;  —  and  that  the  statement  given 
(and  which  is  reported  as  a  thing  experienced)  consists,  in  fact, 
of  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  combinations  of  these  pre¬ 
mises.”  In  the  great  argument  of  which  we  are  treating,  the 
major  premises  consists  of  primary  truths,  and  of  the  proposi¬ 
tions  which  they  evidently  involve,  and  to  which  they  necessa¬ 
rily  lead.  And  these,  I  repeat,  as  they  necessarily  exist  in  the 
mind  of  the  Infinite  Reason,  must  exist  also  in  the  minds  of  the 
beings  with  whom  He  is  reasoning. 

For  example ;  the  creation,  we  have  seen,  is  a  sublime  argu¬ 
ment  on  the  Power,  and  Wisdom,  and  Goodness  of  God.  Let 
us  imagine  that  ihe  first,  on  Power  or  Causation,  is  about  to  be 
commenced.  The  theatre  is  boundless  space.  The  instruments 
of  proof  are  symbols.  The  first  effect  is,  by  supposition,  yet 
to  be  produced ;  and  the  design  of  its  production  is  to  convince 
a  coming  race  of  intelligent  beings  that  as  there  is  no  effect 
without  a  cause,  the  impending  production  will  imply  a  Great 
First  Cause.  Accordingly,  He  calls  for  a  universe  of  matter, 
distributes  it  into  systems,  and  puts  them  into  motion.  But 
here  the  major  proposition,  that  every  phenomenon  supposes  a 
cause,  is  assumed  by  the  Great  Reasoner  himself ;  it  could  not 
be  otherwise.  Unless  the  intelligent  creature,  then,  assume  the 
major  premiss  also,  what  will  the  production  of  a  universe 
of  effects  avail  ?  —  he  will  want  the  link  essential  to  connect 
the  creation  with  the  Creator.  But  suppose  the  human  mind 
to  assume  this  principle  in  common  with  the  Divine  Mind,  and 
the  syllogism  may  be  made  complete  — •  the  argument  irrefrag¬ 
able.  For,  if  every  phenomenon  supposes  a  cause,  and  if  the 
world  be  a  phenomenon,  the  existence  of  the  world  demon¬ 
strates  the  existence  of  an  adequate  and  independent  cause. 
And  thus  we  see  the  nature  and  necessity  of  the  deductive 


*  Polit.  Econ.,  p.  76. 


76 


MAN. 


process  —  from  the  universal  to  the  particular,  included  un¬ 
der  it. 

34.  Induction.  But  besides  the  necessary  truth  which  crea¬ 
tion  presupposes,  and  which  truth  is  assumed  alike  by  the  Infi¬ 
nite  Mind  and  the  finite  mind,  the  great  argument  implies  (as 
in  every  instance  of  ordinary  reasoning,)  that  there  are  certain 
ideas  in  the  Mind  of  the  former,  which  are  not  as  yet  in  the 
mind  of  the  latter,  and  which  it  is  the  design  of  the  argument 
to  convey.  An  analysis  of  the  following  syllogism  will  illustrate 
our  meaning,  and  show  the  distinctive  nature  and  necessity  of 
the  Inductive  process.  —  Whatever  exhibits  marks  of  design 
must  have  had  an  intelligent  author;  the  world  exhibits  marks 
of  design;  therefore,  the  world  must  have  had  an  intelligent 
author.  Here,  the  major  is  a  primary  fact,  assumed  alike  by 
God  and  man ;  while  the  Conclusion,  —  that  the  world  must 
have  had  an  intelligent  author,  together  with  all  the  various 
and  important  truths  which  it  involves  —  constitutes  that  which 
God  and  man  have  not  at  first  in  common ;  that  which  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  primarily  in  the  mind  of  God  alone  ;  and  which  it 
is  the  chief  design  of  the  Great  Argument  to  convey  into  the 
mind  of  man  also.  But  it  must  be  obvious  that  the  truth  of  the 
Conclusion,  and  the  attainment  of  the  knowledge  contained  in 
it,  depend  on  the  truth  and  validity  of  the  minor  —  namely,  that 
the  world  does  exhibit  marks  of  design.  How  is  this  proposi¬ 
tion  arrived  at  ?  —  How,  but  by  Induction  ?  It  is  a  generalized 
conclusion  drawn  from  the  observation  and  comparison  of  a 
number  of  particular  facts.  And,  then,  with  this  conclusion  so 
arrived  at,  we  are  further  warranted  to  infer,  by  virtue  of  the 
major  already  assumed,  that  the  world  must  have  had  an  intel 
ligent  author. 

35.  This  representation  of  the  distinctive  difference  between 
the  deductive  and  the  inductive  processes,  is  only  coincident 
with  the  other  distinctions  of  truth  which  we  have  indicated. 
As  a  fact  is  Necessary,  it  is,  and  must  be  seen  by  intuition ,  or 
it  could  not  be  seen  at  all.  Demonstration  is  only  a  series  of 
intuitions,  or  the  development  of  a  primary  intuition  ;  so  that 
demonstration  is  based  on  intuition,  and  always  presupposes 
it.*  But  as  far  as  facts  are  contingent,  they  admit  of  an 
indefinite  variety  of  modification  and  combination,  so  that  any 
one  principle  which  they  involve  can  be  drawn  out  and  substan¬ 
tiated  only  from  an  induction  of  many  facts.  As  the  Necessary 


*  See  Locke’s  Essays,  B.  IV.  c.  ii.  §  7. 


PROGRESSION. 


77 


is  synthetic ,  it  requires  to  be  analyzed  into  particulars ;  as  the 
Contingent  is  particular ,  its  parts  require  to  be  collected  or  syn¬ 
thetically  generalized.  As  the  Necessary  is  the  logical  antecedent 
to  the  contingent,  it  places  the  human  mind,  in  effect,  in  the  po¬ 
sition  of  regarding  creation  as  yet  to  come — looking  down  from 
principles  to  the  exemplification  of  those  principles  in  appropri¬ 
ate  objects  and  events.  As  the  Contingent  is  the  chronological 
antecedent  of  the  necessary  —  i.  e.,  that  in  which  the  necessary 
is  given  to  the  human  mind,  it  places  the  mind  in  the  reverse 
position,  that  of  looking  up  from  facts  to  principles. 

36.  So  that,  in  this  respect,  the  process  of  Nature,  taken  as 
a  whole,  and  the  inductive  process  of  man  are  inverse.  Nature 
reasons  deductively,  from  principles  to  facts.  Man  meets  her 
by  reasoning  inductively,  from  facts  to  principles.  Hence  the 
aphorism  of  lord  Bacon,  “  What  is  first  to  nature  is  not  first 
to  man.”  Nature  begins  with  causes  which  produce  effects ; 
the  senses  open  upon  the  effects,  and  from  them  ascend  to  the 
causes.  In  this  respect,  too  —  as  applied  to  the  great  historic 
fact  of  creation  —  the  position  of  the  Peripatetic,  though  often 
questioned,  may  be  maintained,  that  “  syllogism  is  naturally 
prior  in  order  to  induction.”  For,  as  Nature — i.  e.  the  God  of 
Nature  descends  from  the  universal  to  the  particular ;  and  as  it 
is  not  until  this  is  done,  that  man  can  ascend  from  the  particular 
to  the  general,  and  from  the  general  to  the  universal,  it  follows 
that  nature  and  man  proceed  inversely  —  that  induction  is  first 
to  man,  syllogism  first  to  nature  :  or,  where  less  than  induction 
from  many  facts  is  necessary  —  where,  as  in  pure  mathematical 
reasoning,  a  single  fact  is  sufficient,  still  that  single  fact  is  the 
chronological  antecedent  to  man,  while  the  primary  principle 
which  it  presupposes  is  first  to  nature. 

37.  The  different  hinds  of  evidence  have  been  named  already. 
The  remarks  immediately  preceding  may  have  suggested  the 
important  fact  that  evidence  admits  of  degrees.  This  graduation 
may  be  described  as  ranging  from  evidence  of  the  barely  pos¬ 
sible,  through  the  doubtful,  the  probable,  the  morally  certain,  the 
physically  certain,  to  the  metaphysically  certain.  As  the  last 
alone  possesses  the  characteristics  of  universality  and  necessity, 
and,  as  such,  is  fixed,  the  others  belong  to  the  domain  of  the 
inductive  understanding,  and  rise  in  value  in  proportion  as  they 
approach  an  idea  or  belief  of  the  reason,  and  derive  authority 
from  it. 

38.  Among  the  consequences  inferable,  especially  from  our 
remai  ks  under  the  head  of  deduction  and  induction,  one  is, 

7* 


78 


MAX. 


that  man  in  retracing  the  steps  of  material  nature,  will  come 
nearer,  at  every  ascending  stage  of  his  inquiries,  to  the  region 
of  mathematical  truth.  A  fact  which  illustrates  Bacon’s  pro¬ 
position,*  that  “  all  natural  inquiries  succeed  best,  when  a  phy¬ 
sical  principle  is  made  to  terminate  in  a  mathematical  opera¬ 
tion.”  For,  in  proportion  as  man  returns  to  the  inorganic 
forms,  and  forces,  and  elementary  principles,  which  character¬ 
ized  the  first  stage  of  the  Divine  Manifestation,  he  is  approach¬ 
ing  the  region  of  purely  intellectual  truth. 

39.  It  follows,  also,  that  in  proportion  as  man  reascends,  he 
will  find  nature  becoming  more  and  more  simple,  and  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  nature  fewer  and  more  general.  Accordingly,  “  as 
philosophy  advances,  the  properties  of  matter  are  found  to  be 
fewer  and  simpler ;  which  the  Creative  Wisdom  so  combines 
and  directs  as  to  produce  the  most  diversified,  and,  at  first  sight, 
opposite  results.”  And  this  fact  admirably  harmonizes  with 
the  progressive  character  of  Creation ;  in  which  we  have  seen 
"Wisdom  combining  the  productions  of  power,  and  Goodness 
taking  the  results  of  both,  and  further  complicating  them  for 
her  own  advanced  purposes.  In  the  light  of  this  truth,  we  can 
interpret  and  qualify  that  remark  of  Laplace,  in  which  a  fatal 
heresy  has  been  supposed,  and  perhaps  justly  supposed,  to  lurk 
—  that,  as  science  advances  from  point  to  point,  final  causes 
recede  before  it,  and  disappear  one  after  the  other.  If  we  re¬ 
gard  Creation  as  the  progressive  development  of  a  Divine 
Manifestation,  the  fact  is  explained  ;  man  is  receding  from  final 
causes ;  for,  in  returning  towards  the  first  stage  of  that  process, 
we  are  necessarily  leaving  a  final  cause  behind  us  at  every 
step.  The  progress  of  science  is  retrogressive  to  nature.  If 
we  read  Euclid  backwards,  and  leave  a  problem  behind  us  at 
every  page,  we  shall  at  length  reach  the  postulates  and  axioms 
of  the  first  page,  on  which  all  the  book  depends.  But  who 
would,  on  this  account,  withhold  his  admiration  from  the  intel¬ 
lect  and  design  displayed  in  the  subsequent  development  of 
those  axioms  ?  And  who  that  glances  at  the  subtle,  complica¬ 
ted,  endless  application,  of  even  mathematical  laws  to  the  great 
system  of  external  nature,  but  must  feel  Iris  amazement  aug¬ 
mented  in  exact  proportion  as  he  contrasts  the  generality  of 
these  laws  with  the  inexhaustible  particularity  of  their  applica¬ 
tion,  and  the  variety  of  their  results. 

40.  It  may  be  expected,  also,  that  in  proportion  as  man 


*  Nov  "‘rg.  lib.  iii. 


PROGRESSION. 


,9 


ascends  nearer  to  the  region  of  necessary  truth,  he  will  find 
himself  drawing  nearer  to  the  Great  Reason  and  Principle  of 
the  Whole.  “  Every  true  step  in  this  philosophy,”  says  New¬ 
ton,*  “brings  us  not  immediately  to  the  knowledge  of  the  First 
Cause,  yet  it  brings  us  nearer  to  it,  and  is  on  that  account  to  be 
highly  valued.”  And  because  the  course  of  human  inquiry 
thus  leads  from  the  particular  to  the  universal,  the  science  of 
universals  obtained  the  name  of  metaphysics. 

41.  It  may  be  further  expected  that  the  higher  we  ascend 
towards  the  Great  Source,  and  the  more  general  the  law  on 
which  we  obtain  a  footing,  the  greater  will  become  our  power 
of  deductive  reasoning  and  prophetic  anticipation.  “In  particu¬ 
lars  our  knowledge  begins,  and  so  spreads  itself  by  degrees  to 
generals ;  though  afterwards  the  mind  takes  the  quite  contrary 
course,  and  having  drawn  its  knowledge  into  as  general  propo¬ 
sitions  as  it  can,  makes  those  familiar  to  its  thoughts,  and  accus¬ 
toms  itself  to  have  recourse  to  them,  as  to  the  standards  of  truth 
and  falsehood.”  f  And  all  reasoning  in  natural  philosophy, 
says  Bacon. 1  “  is  ascendant  and  descendant,  from  experiments 
to  axioms,  and  from  axioms  to  new  discoveries.”  Accordingly, 
science  is  now  regarded  as  having  reached  that  height  from 
which  the  Deductive  method  is  henceforth  to  predominate. 
Without  becoming  less  inductive,  only  less  experimental,  the 
tendency  of  all  sciences  is  to  acquire  an  ever-enlarging  deductive 
power.  “  A  revolution  is  peaceably  and  progressively  effecting 
itself  in  philosophy,  the  reverse  of  that  to  which  Bacon  has 
attached  his  name ;  ”  (and,  it  might  be  added,  in  consequence 
of  that,)  “  that  great  man  changed  the  method  of  the  sciences 
from  deductive  to  experimental,  and  it  is  now  rapidly  reverting 
from  experimental  to  deductive.”  § 

42.  In  these  sections  on  man  considered  as  an  intellectual 
being,  or  as  constituted  to  know  creation  as  a  manifestation  of 
the  Deity,  we  have  regarded  him  as  endowed  with  the  three¬ 
fold  power  of  sensational  perception,  of  reflective  understanding, 
and  of  rational  ideas  or  primary  beliefs.  By  the  first,  we  have 
found  him  made  cognizant  of  the  separate  objects  and  events  of 
external  nature ;  by  the  second,  capable  of  tracing  the  relations 
of  these  objects  and  events  to  each  other  and  to  himself ;  and 
by  the  third,  of  referring  both  himself  and  nature  to  that  all- 


*  Optics,  Query  28.  p.  34.  I  Locke’s  Essays,  B.  iv.  c.  7,  §  2. 

t  Nov.  Org.  lib.  i.  aph.  104,  and  De  Augm.  Scient.,  lib.  iii.  cap.  3. 

§  Mill's  System  of  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  579. 


80 


MAX. 


comprehending  Personal  Reason  in  whom  Truth  and  Being  arc 
one  and  infinitely  perfect  —  the  Eternal  God.  The  first  dis¬ 
closes  to  him  an  external  and  material  universe ;  but  in  doing 
so,  reveals  and  presupposes  the  second,  or  that  reflective  power 
which,  as  directly  subservient  to  the  will,  distinguishes  the  finite 
mind ;  while  both  presuppose  and  point  to  their  Infinite  Author, 
God :  thus  indicating  the  three  great  elements  of  human  know¬ 
ledge  —  nature,  man,  and  God.  The  first  we  have  spoken  of 
as  conversant  with  facts  which  are  merely  conditional  or  contin¬ 
gent  ;  the  second,  or  the  eonceptive  understanding,  receives 
these,  and  brings  them  under  laws  which  are  eonditionallv  ne-* 
cessary,  its  occupation  consisting  in  discovering  and  generaliz¬ 
ing  the  relations  of  the  conditional  to  the  necessary ;  and  the 
third,  as  the  utterer  of  necessary  truths,  guiding  the  operations 
of  the  understanding,  and  authenticating  its  legitimate  conclu¬ 
sions.  Reason,  therefore,  is  to  be  regarded  strictly  as  giving  us 
Philosophy,  being  simply  conversant  with  principles ;  the  un¬ 
derstanding  gives  us  Science,  but  only  as  it  succeeds  in  reducing 
phenomena  under  the  principles  of  reason ;  the  phenomena  or 
materials  of  the  science  being  supplied  primarily  by  the  senses. 
As  to  their  respective  methods,  reason  gives  us  the  Deductive, 
by  which  we  proceed  from  the  universal  to  the  particular ;  the 
understanding  is  inductive,  proceeding  from  the  particular  to  the 
general ;  while  sense  gives  the  experimental  particular  itself, 
proceeding  only  by  single  and  separate  steps.  When  viewed  in 
relation  to  Evidence,  then,  reason  alone  is  conversant  with  the 
metaphysically  certain  ;  while  the  understanding  supplies  the 
physically  and  conditionally  certain,  and  all  that  lies  "between  it 
and  the  single  notices  of  sensational  perception.  Regarded  in 
this  light,  sensational  perception  may  be  described  as  related  to 
that  which  is,  or  the  material  existent ;  the  eonceptive  under¬ 
standing,  presupposing  that  which  is,  starts  in  its  inquiries  from 
that  which  may  be,  or  the  probable,  and  ever  aims  at  the  goal 
of  certainty ;  while  the  peculiar  province  of  the  reason  is  that 
which  must  be,  or  the  necessary. 

43.  And  as  we  have  advanced  in  our  investigation  of  man’s 
intellectual  constitution,  we  have  found  it  answering  to  and  ful¬ 
filling  the  various  conditions  necessary  to  his  knowledge  of  cre¬ 
ation  as  a  manifestation  of  Deity.  From  the  whole  of  which, 
it  may  be  concluded  that,  to  God  the  entire  process  of  Divine 
disclosure  is,  in  effect,  a  sublime  syllogism ;  of  which,  the  least 
object,  and  the  remotest  event,  are  already  included  in  the  ma¬ 
jor  premiss ;  and  the  unfolding  of  which  is  destined  to  occupy 


PROGRESSION. 


81 


tlie  coming  eternity.  While  man,  appointed  to  find  the  sphere 
of  his  activity  in  the  vast  intermediate  space  between  the  Neces¬ 
sary  and  the  purely  Conditional,  and  unable  to  find  intellectual 
rest  but  in  the  felt  junction  of  the  two,  will  derive  perpetual 
accessions  of  enjoyment  as  he  ascends  from  the  particular  to  the 
Infinite,  with  whom  it  originated,  and  in  whom  it  is  contained : 
and  will  be  furnished,  as  the  great  process  of  the  manifestation 
advances  from  stage  to  stage,  with  ever  fresh  occasion  for  the 
adoring  exclamation,  “  Of  Him,  and  to  Him,  and  through  Him, 
are  all  things  ;  to  whom  be  glory  for  ever  and  ever.  Amen.” 


Sect.  IV.  —  Imagination. 

1.  If  the  actual  creation,  as  known  to  man  through  perception, 
understanding,  and  reason,  have  not  exhausted  the  Divine  re¬ 
sources,  and  if  it  would  both  exalt  his  nature  and  enhance  his 
conceptions  of  those  resources,  to  be  able  to  imagine  phenomena 
harmonizing  with,  but  superior  to,  all  belonging  to  the  present 
and  the  actual,  he  may  be  expected  to  be  endowed  with  a  power 
distinct  from  any  we  have  yet  described,  in  order  to  enable  him 
to  realize  such  impossibilities. 

2.  Now  that  the  universe,  as  apprehended  at  any  one  time,  is 
not  the  measure,  but  only  a  specimen,  of  the  creative  resources 
of  the  Deity,  is  evident,  both  from  his  infinity,  which  cannot  be 
exhausted,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  actual  creation  itself  is 
perpetually  assuming  new  forms,  and  repeating  its  demands  on 
those  resources.  Besides  which,  if  parts,  at  least,  of  this  crea¬ 
tion  are  destined  for  other  worlds,  and  for  unending  duration, 
that  which  is  known  of  the  Divine  Resources  at  any  one  point 
of  duration  can  bear  no  proportion  to  that  which  remains  to  be 
known,  and  which  only  awaits  the  enlargement  of  our  capacity 
in  order  to  be  revealed.  It  is,  therefore,  unnecessary  for  us 
now  to  inquire  whether,  when  the  actual  universe  was  called 
into  being,  there  were  not  also  present  to  the  Divine  mind  the 
archetypes  or  ideas  of  other  worlds  • — ■  possible  creations,  and 
possible  varieties  of  actual  existence.  It  is  enough  for  us  to 
know  that  there  was  present  to  the  Creator,  because  dependent 
on  His  purpose,  all  the  philosophy,  science,  and  art,  which  the 
actual  universe  embodies  and  illustrates.  To  Him  wrere  pres¬ 
ent  —  for  He  actually  designed  them  —  all  the  artistic  applica¬ 
tions,  the*aesthetic  combinations,  and  the  kindling  suggestive 
power  of  which  the  natural  would  be  found  capable,  when  sub- 


82 


MAN. 


mitted  to  the  action  of  the  human  mind,  as  He  proposed  to 
endow  it,  as  well  as  all  the  ideal  phenomena  of  that  mind 
itself. 

3.  What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  that  mysterious  endowment 
by  which  man  is  thus  admitted  to  hold  intellectual  fellowship 
with  his  Maker  respecting  the  possible  ?  It  is  allied  indirectly 
to  the  sensational  part  of  our  nature ;  deriving  its  name  from 
the  organ  of  sight  through  which  its  principal,  though  by  no 
means  its  only,  materials,  are  supplied;  and,  if  it  expresses 
itself  in  art,  taking  pre-existing  materials  as  the  means  by 
which  to  attain  its  ends.  In  various  respects  it  is  identical 
with  the  understanding.  As  an  artist,  it  can  work  only  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  constitution  of  the  material  with,  and  on  which, 
it  works.  That  material  itself  is  the  production  of  the  Great 
Artist,  and  has  laws  and  properties  of  its  own ;  and  it  is  only 
as  the  imagination  complies  with  them  that  they  become  its 
servant ;  and,  like  the  understanding,  it  abstracts  only  that  it 
may  generalize,  and  generalizes  only  that  it  may  abstract  again. 
In  conformity  with  the  reason ,  also,  imagination  has  its  primor¬ 
dial  truth  ;  its  idea  is  perfection  —  the  loftiest  attributes  appro¬ 
priate  to  the  nature  of  the  object  which  it  contemplates. 

4.  But  from  each  of  these  characteristics  of  the  mind,  imagi¬ 
nation  is  easily  distinguished.  It  looks  on  material  forms  only 
to  transform  them  —  to  imprint  on  them  images,  and  to  apply 
them  to  purposes,  unknown  before.  To  the  eye  of  imagination, 
nature  is  a  great  system  of  symbols,  each  containing  and  con¬ 
cealing  a  hidden  truth  yearning  for  sympathetic  interpretation. 
Inorganic  nature  lives  and  breathes,  and  becomes  oracular,  in 
fable,  emblem,  or  hieroglyph.  Free  of  all  time  and  space, 
imagination  brings  together  beings  the  most  widely  separated, 
and  has  unities  of  its  own.  But  its  highest  prerogative  is,  in  a 
secondary  sense,  to  create.  The  real  creations  by  which  it 
finds  itself  surrounded  in  nature,  appeal,  as  divine  provocatives, 
to  its  own  ideas  of  order,  beauty,  and  sublimity.  Under  its 
plastic  hand,  the  shapeless  marble  takes  a  godlike  form,  and 
comes  forth  a  Venus  di  Medici,  or  an  Apollo  Belvedere.  To 
its  pencil,  ordinary  colors  become  “  colors  dipt  in  heaven/’  and 
a  corresponding  Transfiguration  forthwith  glows,  and  inspires 
devotion.  Out  of  the  common  air,  it  modulates  strains  to 
“  raise  a  mortal  to  the  skies,”  or  to  “  draw  an  angel  down.”  If 
it  beautifies  the  earth,  it  aims  at  new  Edens,  and  gardens  of  the 
Hesperides,  Castalian  springs,  and  golden  fruits,  and  amaranth¬ 
ine  flowers.  If  it  governs,  its  domains  lie  far  away  —  the  City 


PROGRESSION. 


•  83 

oi  die  Sun.  or  Utopia,  or  Oceana,  or  the  New  Atlantis — and 
are  exempt  from  all  the  defects  of  the  world’s  known  statesman¬ 
ship.  To  its  lofty  sense,  the  created  universe  is  one  Poem  — 
God’s  grand  Epic  —  and  as  the  solemn  recital  proceeds,  imagi¬ 
nation  essays,  with  trembling  hand,  to  write  down,  if  but  an 
episode,  a  line,  that  all  time  may  read.  Not  that  it  is  ever  satis¬ 
fied  with  its  own  productions.  The  finest  materials  with  which  it 
works  are  too  coarse  and  intractable.  Even  after  its  most  suc¬ 
cessful  efforts,  its  cherished  vision  remains  unrevealed ;  it  car¬ 
ries  about  with  it  an  unrealized  idea. 

5.  We  have  said  that  the  imagination,  like  the  understanding, 
abstracts  and  generalizes.  But,  unlike  that  faculty,  it  modifies 
our  conceptions,  recombines  them  on  principles  of  its  own,  or, 
abstracting  a  single  element,  dispenses  with  the  rest  as  irrele¬ 
vant  to  its  creative  purpose.  It  aims  not,  like  the  understand¬ 
ing,  at  the  conviction  which  results  from  evidence,  but  at  the 
emotion  which  flows  from  sympathy.  And,  beyond  this,  it  is, 
in  the  highest  sense,  synthetic.  Its  productions  are  brought 
forth  before  the  theory  which  accounts  for  and  explains  them. 
Homer,  and  the  great  classic  dramatists,  precede  Aristotle. 
The  highest  criticism  is  but  an  exposition  of  laws  already  syn¬ 
thesized  in  the  great  works  of  genius.  Like  the  sciences  them¬ 
selves,  the  productions  of  genius  are  found  to  be  based  on  fun¬ 
damental  principles.  But  the  imagination  does  not  wait  for  the 
theory  of  these  principles.  It  silently  and  unconsciously  em¬ 
bodies  them.  And  when,  subsequently,  its  productions  are  ana- 
lvzed,  the  logic  of  genius  and  of  nature  are  found  to  be  the  same. 
Sublimity  and  truth  are  one. 

6.  This  latent  amenableness  of  the  imagination  to  the 
majesty  of  law,  distinguishes  it  from  the  mere  play  of  fancy 
with  which  it  is  often  confounded.  The  former  is  the  great 
tidal  wave  obeying  a  planetary  impulse,  wdiile  the  latter  is  only 
the  ripple  and  wave  of  the  surface  occasioned  by  the  action  of 
the  air.  And  the  ground  of  this  difference  appears  to  be,  that 
it  is  the  province  of  imagination  to  realize  the  ideal,  while 
fancv  onlv  adorns  and  idealizes  the  real :  the  former  symbol- 
izes  the  essences  of  things,  while  the  latter  only  beautifies  the 
actual. 

7.  We  have  seen  that,  like  the  reason,  and  rooted  in  it,  im¬ 
agination  is  synthetic.  But  while  the  reason  finds  its  necessary 
truths  affirmed  and  expounded  by  the  objects  and  events  of  the 
existing  universe,  it  is  the  high  prerogative  of  the  imagination 
to  illustrate  the  same  truths  by  additional  ideal  creations.  If 


MAN. 


84  • 

the  reason  points  in  the  direction  of  that  which  must  be,  the 
imagination  points  in  addition,  and  for  the  same  end,  to  that 
which  might  be.  In  feeble,  but  yet  loyal  imitation  of  Him 
whose  universe  is  but  a  varied  utterance  of  the  beautiful  and 
the  sublime,  symbolical  of  the  true,  the  imagination  comes  after 
and  essays  to  take  possession  of  every  unoccupied  spot  with 
new  and  congenial  varieties  of  its  own.  And  thus  it  may  be 
regarded  as  the  mediating  power  between  the  necessary  and  the 
already  existent,  adding  its  own  little  copy  of  a  creation-week 
to  the  six  days  work  of  the  Divine  Creator,  and  showing,  that 
if  He  chose  to  pause  at  a  given  point  of  the  great  process,  it 
was  not  because  the  archetypes  of  things  were  all  embodied  and 
exhausted,  but,  as  one  reason,  because  He  willed  not  to  commit 
to  unconscious  matter  the  representation  of  all  imaginable  ideas, 
but  to  reserve  for  a  creature  made,  in  this  respect,  in  His  own 
image ,  the  conscious  representation  of  certain  archetypes  left 
unembodied,  and  thus  to  be  ever  carrying  onwards  the  process 
of  the  Divine  manifestation. 

8.  But  the  province  of  the  imagination  is  far  from  being 
restricted  to  the  possible  in  nature  and  in  the  intellectual  world. 
Its  influence  variously  affects  the  emotions,  the  will,  and  the 
conscience.  What  Bacon  hath  finely  said  of  poetry  *  as  a 
daughter  of  imagination,  may  be  justly  affirmed  of  the  imagina¬ 
tion  itself.  “  There  is,  agreeable  to  the  spirit  of  man,  a  more 
ample  greatness,  a  more  exact  goodness,  and  a  more  absolute 
variety,  than  can  be  found  in  the  nature  of  things.  Therefore, 
because  the  acts  or  events  of  true  history  have  not  that  magni¬ 
tude  which  satisfieth  the  mind  of  man,  Poesy  feigneth  acts  and 
events  greater  and  more  heroical ;  because  true  history  pro¬ 
pounded  successes  and  issues  of  action  not  so  agreeable  to  the 
merits  of  virtue  and  vice,  therefore  Poesy  feigns  them  more  just 
in  retribution,  and  more  according  to  revealed  Providence. 
And  therefore  it  was  even  thought  to  have  some  participation  of 
divineness,  because  it  doth  raise  and  erect  the  mind,  by  sub¬ 
mitting  the  shows  of  things  to  the  desires  of  the  mind.”  In  the 
light  of  these  views,  we  see  the  truth  of  the  affirmation,  that 
“  poetry  is  more  philosophical  than  history.”  f  Clearing  the 
bounds  of  the  particular  and  the  actual,  imagination  beholds 
things  already  in  their  unity  and  completeness.  It  is  a  power¬ 
ful  auxiliary  to  every  motive  drawn  from  the  remote  and  the 
invisible,  antedating  the  final  day,  and  placing  even  now  the 


*  De  Augm.  Scient.,  lib.  ii.  cap.  13. 


t  Aristot.  de  Poet.  cap.  9. 


PROGRESSION. 


85 


whip  of  scorpions  in  the  hands  of  remorse,  and  the  aureola 
around  the  head  of  suffering  virtue.  However  strong  the 
Christian’s  conviction,  on  independent  grounds,  of  a  heavenly 
state,  vet  it  is  on  the  wings  of  imagination  that  he  ascends  and 
foretastes  its  blessedness.  However  bright  and  expanded  the 
prospect  of  human  improvement  in  the  present  state  may  be,  it 
is  as  nothing  compared  with  the  interminable  career  of  glory 
which  stretches  before  the  eye  of  imagination  in  worlds  beyond. 
Rich,  then,  as  we  should  have  regarded  the  newly-created  man, 
could  we  have  looked  on  him  when  first  he  stood  forth  as  heir 
of  the  world,  how  incomparably  more  opulent  was  he  as  the 
heir  of  things  which  he  could  then,  at  best,  only  imagine :  the 
one,  measurable,  passing  ;  the  other,  it  hath  not  yet  entered  even 
into  his  mind  fully  to  conceive.  By  the  former,  God  manifested 
himself  to  man  indirectly,  and  from  without ;  by  the  latter,  God 
directly  mirrored  himself,  however  partially  and  faintly,  in  the 
mind  itself,  and  man  beholds  his  Maker  in  the  image. 


Sect.  —  Man  Emotional. 

1.  In  the  view  which  we  have  taken  of  man’s  mental  consti¬ 
tution,  we  have  found  him  endowed  with  the  means  of  intellect- . 
ually  interpreting  the  Divine  manifestation  ;  but  how  are  these 
means  to  be  put  and  kept  in  activity  so  as  to  secure  their  end  ? 
Polished  and  capacious  as  the  mirror  of  his  mind  may  be,  and 
capable  of  reflecting  every  object  and  hue  that  passes  before  it, 
is  it,  like  a  mirror,  to  be  stationary  and  passive  while  the  uni¬ 
verse  revolves  around  it,  and  to  reflect  every  object  alike  with 
cold  and  mirror-like  indifference?  For,  if  he  is  actively  to  em¬ 
ploy  his  knowing  faculties  as  means  of  knowledge,  and  if,  as  ex¬ 
ternal  and  internal  phenomena  differ  in  their  character  and  im¬ 
portance,  he  is  to  estimate  them  accordingly,  he  must  be  en¬ 
dowed  with  a  corresponding  variety  of  susceptibilities.  In  other 
words  — 

2.  If  the  various  and  complicated  phenomena  of  matter  and 
mind  with  the  existence  of  which  man  has  the  means  of  becom¬ 
ing  acquainted,  be  to  be  studied  and  appreciated,  as  means  of 
Divine  manifestation,  he  must  possess  the  susceptibility  of  being 
moved  and  affected  by  them,  in  a  manner  answering  both  to 
their  positive  character  and  importance,  and  to  the  relation  in 
which  he  stands  to  them. 

3.  This  is  the  susceptibility  of  emotion  ;  a  term  originally  de- 

8 


86 


MAN. 


noting,  perhaps,  a  movement  from  within,  or  the  power  of  the 
mind  to  affect  the  body  externally.  Not  that  this  is  the  neces¬ 
sary  effect  of  emotion,  for  the  mental  affection  may  be  too  placid 
to  produce  any  external  sign,  or  be  so  powerful  and  deep  as  to 
leave  the  material  surface,  like  the  centre  circle  of  a  whirlpool, 
unruffled.  As  an  original  and  underived  part  of  our  nature,  it 
admits  not  of  description  to  him  who  is  not  already  conscious  of 
it.  All  that  we  can  do  is  to  point  out  what  it  is  not,  or  wherein 
it  differs  from  those  parts  of  our  nature  with  which  we  are  most 
liable  to  confound  it,  and  to  indicate  the  circumstances  in  which 
it  arises,  and  thus  to  clear  and  authenticate  our  conception  of 
what  it  truly  is. 

4.  In  contradistinction  from  the  appetites ,  such  as  hunger  and 
thirst,  which  are  bodily,  and  which  have  their  immediate  origin 
in  the  body,  an  emotion  is  an  affection  of  the  mind.  The  for¬ 
mer  relate  directly  and  entirely  to  external  and  material  objects ; 
the  latter  relates  immediately  to  internal  states,  for  even  when 
traceable  to  external  objects,  its  relation  to  them  is  only  indirect, 
or  through  the  medium  of  perception. 

Sensation  depends  on  organs  of  sense,  and  is  directly  related 
to  external  objects,  for  it  is  occasioned  by  their  presence ;  emo¬ 
tion  depends  not  directly  on  such  organs,  but  on  the  sensations 
themselves,  and  on  the  intellectual  states  which  follow. 

An  intellectual  act  or  state  has  none  of  the  vivid  feeling  which 
belongs  to  an  emotion  ;  and  differs  from  it  as  remembering  an 
object  differs  from  the  love  or  hatred  of  an  object  remembered. 
The  former  is  the  antecedent  of.  the  latter ;  and  we  can  con¬ 
ceive  of  a  being  so  constituted  as  that  the  intellectual  act  might 
have  existed  without  the  emotion. 

We  may  further  remark  that  Affection  for  an  object  denotes 
the  tendency  of  the  mind  to  have  emotions  of  a  certain  class 
awakened  by  it,  the  actual  repetition  of  such  emotions,  and  also 
the  state  or  habit  of  the  mind  resulting  from  such  repetition. 
Sensibility  implies  a  highly  emotional  tendency,  or  a  great  sus¬ 
ceptibility  to  emotional  appeals.  By  Taste  is  meant  disciplined 
sensibility,  or  sensibility  rendered  discriminating  by  emotional 
experience,  and  therefore  as  prompt  in  its  decisions  as  the  emo¬ 
tions  themselves.  Properly  speaking,  perhaps,  the  objects  of 
taste  are  inanimate,  Avhile  affection  embraces  sentient  being. 
Passion  expresses  the  violence  of  an  emotion,  or  an  affection ; 
and  hence  it  is  not  unfrequently  employed  as  a  synonyme  for 
anger,  that  brevis  furor,  and  most  raging  of  the  passions.  Tem¬ 
perament  denotes,  not  emotion  itself,  but  a  characteristic  mental 


PROGRESSION. 


87 


susceptibility,  predisposing  the  mind  to  certain  classes  of  emo¬ 
tion.  Thus,  a  mind  constitutionally  grave  or  gay,  melancholy 
or  cheerful,  is  peculiarly  susceptible  to  corresponding  emotions 
of  gloom  or  joy. 

5.  As  man  exists  for  an  end,  and  his  constitution  is  the  ap¬ 
pointment  of  means  to  that  end,  it  may  be  expected,  first,  that 
he  will  be  the  subject  of  different  kinds  of  emotion  in  harmony 
with  the  attainment  of  that  end.  Now  this  requirement  appears 
to  involve  the  following  facts,  each  of  which  may  be  regarded 
as  a.  classifying  law  of  the  emotions. 

(1.)  The  appropriate.  That  everything  conducive  to  the 
end  of  his  being,  and  capable  of  being  obtained  by  him,  should 
be  regarded  by  him  as  an  object  of  desire.  Thus,  as  the  very 
end  for  which  life  is  bestowed  on  him  at  all  supposes  the  con¬ 
tinuance  of  life,  at  least,  for  a  time,  he  is  the  subject  of  an  in¬ 
stinctive  desire  for  its  continued  existence.  And  innumerable 
external  objects  are  ever  appealing  to  the  desire  and  keeping  it 
in  play. 

6.  The  continuance  of  life,  as  well  as  its  design,  imply  that 
he  is  meant  for  activity.  He  desires  it  —  desires  it  even  for  its 
own  sake  as  well  as  for  its  practical  results ;  for  it  is  attended 
with  feelings  of  pleasure  which  may  easily  be  kindled  to  cheer¬ 
fulness  and  delight.  And  external  nature,  even  in  Eden,  was 
calculated  to  call  forth  his  activity ;  for  he  had  “  to  dress  it  and 
to  keep  it.” 

7.  Do  the  constitution  of  man,  as  far  as  we  have  studied  it, 
and  the  design  of  that  constitution,  suppose  a  thirst  for  know¬ 
ledge  ?  This  desire  is  evinced  by  the  infant  even  before  he  pos¬ 
sesses  the  power  of  uttering  it ;  nor  is  there  any  emotion  whose 
influence  is  later  felt.  It  observes  an  order  of  development  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  order  of  our  wants.  Besinnina;  in  childish  curi- 
osity,  it  passes  through  all  the  intermediate  stages  of  inquiry,  to 
a  profound  and  far-sighted  philosophy ;  and  when  stopped  by 
any  objects  short  of  ultimate  facts,  it  feels  as  if  it  had  a  right  to 
know  them,  and  evinces  increasing  restlessness  and  resentment 
at  the  obstacles,  till  it  is  gratified.  So  ardent  and  instinctive  is 
our  desire  for  knowledge,  that  the  pursuit  is  commenced  for  its 
own  sake  alone,  and  respecting  objects  which  may  never  come 
into  our  possession.  The  only  reason  we  can  assign  for  insti¬ 
tuting  most  of  our  inquiries,  is  because  the  subjects  to  which 
they  relate  are  new  and  unknown  to  us.  And,  as  we  advance, 
the  desire  which  impels  us  onwards,  the  pleasure  which  attends 
the  perception  of  progress,  and  the  delight  resulting  from  sue- 


88 


MAN. 


cess,  and  from  the  direct  contemplation  of  the  truth  sought,  — 
all  show  tha;  the  mind  was  made  for  knowledge.  Besides 
which,  it  will  be  found  that  the  mind  is  ever  systematizing  the 
knowledge  acquired,  and  reducing  it  to  unity,  so  as  to  make  it 
more  securely  its  own. 

8.  The  creation  of  a  second  human  mind,  endowed  with  the 
power  of  expressing  itself  through  the  medium  of  speech,  greatly 
increased  the  means  of  knowledge.  By  this  arrangement,  the 
horizon  of  external  nature  was  indefinitely  extended  and  en¬ 
riched,  for,  in  addition  to  the  wide  range  of  the  material  crea¬ 
tion,  the  individual  mind  is  now  supposed  to  enjoy  access  to  the 
wider  region  and  the  richer  phenomena  of  another  mind.  The 
desire  of  man  for  knowledge,  then,  if  no  other  reason,  prepares 
us  to  expect  that  he  will  be  found  desirous  of  communion  with 
other  minds.  Accordingly,  society  is  desired,  as  soon  as  ever 
the  mind  can  form  a  conception  of  it ;  desired,  as  if  it  were  es¬ 
sential  to  the  diversity,  enlargement,  and  completion  of  one’s 
own  being.  The  Creator  himself  pronounced  solitude  to  be  un¬ 
desirable,  gave  a  companion  to  man,  and  promised  the  indefinite 
multiplication  of  the  species. 

9.  But  will  not  a  certain  amount  of  power  furnish  the  means 
of  gratifying  all  the  other  desires,  and  of  thus  answering  the  end 
of  existence  ?  Accordingly,  man  is  made  capable  of  enjoying 
power  for  its  own  sake,  and  of  desiring  all  that  contributes 
to  it.  Dominion  over  animate  and  inanimate  nature  is  his  birth¬ 
right,  and  he  finds  and  imparts  a  measure  of  happiness  and 
improvement  in  the  exercise  of  it.  The  desire  of  property , 
associated  with  the  feeling  of  right  in  it,  and  over  it,  is  an 
inherent  and  essential  part  of  our  nature.  Equally  inherent 
and  indestructible  is  the  desire  of  superiority ,  for,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  whether  he  who  attains  the  object  of  his  desire 
intentionally  exercises  it  as  an  instrument  of  power  or  not,  it 
invests  him  with  a  transforming  influence,  over  all  those  by 
whom  it  is  recognized. 

10.  Still  further  would  the  end  of  his  being  appear  to  be 
answered,  if  he  act  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  esteem  and  appro¬ 
bation  of  others.  Creation .  is  made  to  be  appreciated ;  the 
human  mind  forms  the  most  important  part  of  creation ;  but  he 
can  understand  and  appreciate  the  mind  of  another,  only  in 
proportion  as  he  communes  and  sympathizes  with  it.  To  dis¬ 
regard  it,  or  to  be  insensible  to  it,  would  be,  in  effect,  to  lose  a 
world  of  knowledge,  influence,  and  enjoyment :  to  appreciate  it, 
and  to  act  consistently  with  that  appreciation,  is  to  make  that 


PROGRESSION. 


89 


world,  to  a  great  extent,  his  own.  Hence,  man  is  found  sus¬ 
ceptible  of  the  desire  of  approbation,  even  before  he  is  capable 
of  understanding,  and  when  he  is  not  considering,  its  practical 
effects.  Many  of  the  deeds  by  which  he  diffuses  happiness 
around  him,  are  traceable  to  this  source.  The  hour  which  saw 
the  “woman  take  of  the  fruit  of  the-  tree  of  the  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil,  and  give  also  to  her  husband  with  her  and  he  did 
eat,”  beheld  an  illustration  of  this  desire,  and  perhaps,  indeed, 
of  all  the  desires  we  have  specified ;  reminding  us,  that  the 
desires  in  themselves  are  destitute  of  a  moral  character ;  for,  in 
order  to  their  morality  they  must  be  placed  in  alliance  with 
a  principle  which  we  have  not  as  yet  considered ;  so  that 
much  which  passes  for  morality  is  merely  the  result  of  instinc¬ 
tive  emotion. 

11.  (2.)  Impartative.  That  besides  being  susceptible  of 
desires  relative  to  everything  apparently  conducive  to  his  own 
well-being,  he  will  be  found  capable  of  being  moved  by,  or 
affected  towards  other  objects  in  a  manner  conducive  to  their 
well-being.  This  is  implied  in  the  general  proposition ;  for,  if 
other  beings  are  susceptible  of  desires  as  well  as  himself,  and  if 
everything  has  ends  of  its  own,  subordinate  to  the  great  End, 
as  well  as  himself,  these  desires  and  ends  form  a  part  of  the 
phenomena  by  which  he  is  to  be  suitably  affected.  The  same 
is  implied  in  his  being  capable  of  desiring  the  good  will  of 
others ;  for  this  supposes  an  identity  of  nature,  or,  at  least,  so 
great  a  measure  of  identity,  as  that  he  knows  what  will  secure 
their  good  will ;  and  therefore,  that  he  will  respect  their  desires 
in  order  to  it.  It  is  implied  also  in  his  desire  of  personal  well¬ 
being  ;  for  the  continuance  and  well-being  of  other  things  are 
essential  to  it.  And  the  same  is  presupposed  by  the  great  End 
which  everytking  is  designed  to  promote  ;  for  how  could  that  be, 
attained,  except  by  the  continuance  in  well-being,  or  by  the  con¬ 
ditional  restoration,  of  all  the  means  necessary  to  it?  We  are 
only  saying,  then,  that  the  being  who  is  to  appreciate  the  means 
of  Divine  manifestation,  may  be  expected  to  be  affected  towards 
them,  in  a  manner  tending,  not  to  their  destruction,  but  to  their 
continuance  and  employment ;  and  consistently  with  the  fact 
that  he  himself  is  a  part,  and  only  a  part,  of  the  great  system 
of  means. 

12.  Xow  as  the  individual  man  is  instinctively  desirous  of 
continued,  existence ,  he  carries  about  with  him  a  memorial  that 
other  beings  have  the  same  instinctive  desire ;  and  as  the 
implantation  of  the  desire  in  his  own  breast  presupposes  that 

8* 


90 


MAX. 


every  object  without  him  will  be  found  to  respect  and  corres 
pond  with  that  desire,  the  existence  of  the  same  desire  in  others 
equally  presupposes  that  everything  which  is  external  to  them, 
and  therefore  including  himself,  will  also  respect,  and  be  moved 
in  a  manner  corresponding  with  their  desires.  Now  this  is  the 
basis  of  the  sentiment  of  Justice.  And  this  feeling  of  respect 
for  the  desires  of  others  relating  to  whatever  may  be  essential 
to  their  existence,  is  found  to  be  an  original  part  of  human 
nature.  With  the  question  of  the  derangement  or  perversion 
of  this  or  of  any  other  part  of  our  nature,  by  sin,  we  have  not 
as  yet  to  do.  It  is  sufficient  for  us,  at  present,  to  find  that  there 
is  implanted  in  man  a  sentiment  which  prompts  him,  without 
reference  to  anything  except  the  impulsive  emotion  itself,  con¬ 
ditionally  to  respect  the  desires  of  others. 

13.  As  his  own  desire  of  activity  implies  scope  and  freedom, 
as  far  as  others  are  concerned,  for  its  exercise,  the  same  desire 
in  them  implies,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned,  similar  scope  and 
Uoerty.  Accordingly,  he  is  originally  predisposed  to  concede 
' and  to  derive  pleasure  from  the  contemplation  of  it. 

14.  The  correlate  to  the  desire  of  obtaining  knowledge  is  a 
disposition  to  impart  it.  The  desire,  without  the  correspond¬ 
ing  disposition,  would  be  a  contradiction,  and  a  source  of 
misery.  But  the  constitution  of  things  is  open  to  no  such  an 
impeachment.  The  communicative  disposition  is  found  to  be 
quite  as  strong  as  the  appropriating  ,desire.  And  even  he  who 
might  appear  to  be  acquiring  knowledge  under  the  influence  of 
no  such  an  incentive,  will  be  commonly  found  to  be  already 
enjoying,  by  anticipation,  the  moment  wffien  he  shall  be  impart¬ 
ing  it,  and  holding  converse  with  other  minds. 

15.  The  correlate  to  the  desire  of  society  is  a  disposition  to 
seek  associates.  By  the  former,  man  would  have  others  come 
to  him ;  by  the  latter,  he  is  equally  prompted  to  go  to  them. 
The  former  alone,  not  meeting  with  any  response  from  without, 
would  leave  mankind  in  a  state  of  individual  isolation,  each 
desiring  that  which  there  was  no  disposition  in  the  others  to 
grant.  The  latter  alone  would,  as  by  a  centripetal  force,  blend 
all  the  race  into  a  single  mass,  and  thus  make  the  existence  of 
distinct  communities  impossible.  Now  the  disposition  to  asso¬ 
ciate  is  evinced  by  man  in  every  stage  of  life,  and  thus  he  is 
constitutionally  prepared  to  meet  and  gratify  the  corresponding 
desire  of  society  existing  in  others.  The  various  modifications 
of  this  disposition  account  partly  for  the  various  hinds  of  attach¬ 
ments  or  affection  existing  in  society. 


PROGRESSION. 


91 


16.  The  desire  of  power  co-exists  with  a  disposition  to  con¬ 
ditional  concession  and  subordination.  Indeed  the  presence 
of  such  a  disposition  in  the  individual  is  presupposed  in  the  bare 
existence  of  society.  Even  the  co-existence  of  matter  implies 
a  law  of  physical  subordination.  And,  that  society  could  not 
exist  without  an  analogous  law  is  evident ;  for  if  every  member 
were  unconditionally  independent  of  every  other,  each  would  be 
separate,  as  well  as  distinct,  from  all.  Mutual  improvement 
would  in  that  case  be  impossible ;  for  where  there  is  no  suscep¬ 
tibility  of  being  moved  by  a  superior  power,  there  can  be  no 
change.  But  man  possesses  this  susceptibility  ;  evinces  a  pre¬ 
disposition  to  fall  into  an  order  with  others ;  instinctively  aims 
to  augment  his  own  individual  power  by  conditionally  surren¬ 
dering  a  portion  of  it  to  be  combined  with  a  higher  power,  and 
thus  to  find  a  unity  in  plurality,  to  combine  individual  distinct¬ 
ness  with  social  identity. 

17.  The  desire  of  esteem  co-exists  with  a  disposition  to  ap¬ 
prove  whatever  appears  to  be  estimable  in  others.  Beautifully 
is  the  correspondence  of  these  susceptibilities  displayed  in  the 
fact  that  the  emotion  itself  is,  in  each  instance,  the  special  ob¬ 
ject  contemplated,  and  is  all  that  is  sought  after.  Let  one  party 
evince  a  desire  for  the  esteem  of  another,  though  it  be  ex¬ 
pressed  only  by  a  look,  unaccompanied  by  a  single  act,  and  let 
the  other  only  look  approval  in  return,  and  the  object  of  each 
is  gained.  The  desire  of  esteem  on  the  one  side  may  be  ex¬ 
pressed  by  an  act  which,  apart  from  that  evident  desire,  would 
have  excited  displeasure ;  and  the  approving  emotion,  on  the 
other,  may  be  similarly  expressed ;  but,  in  each  case,  the  motive 
is  felt  to  be  everything.  The  communion  which  has  taken 
place  between  the  parties  is  a  communion  of  emotions,  and 
these  have  a  language,  and  a  precious  value,  peculiar  to  them¬ 
selves. 

18.  (3.)  Arrestive.  As  man  is  introduced  into  a  system 
indefinitely  vast,  and  as  his  knowledge  will  consequently  ever 
fall  far  within  the  circle  of  its  objects,  he  will  be  frequently 
meeting,  both  as  an  individual  and  as  a  race,  with  what  is  new 
and  unexpected.  It  may  be  anticipated,  then,  that  he  will  be 
endowed  with  cautionary  and  arresting  susceptibilities  answer¬ 
ing  to  such  situations.  Accordingly,  he  is  found  capable  of  the 
emotions  of  surprise,  astonishment,  wonder,  admiration,  awe. 
Many  of  the  objects,  indeed,  which  awaken  these  emotions, 
when  they  come  to  be  known,  excite  the  additional  emotions  of 
desir  q  gratitude,  and  fear.  And  hence  the  wisdom  of  that  Di- 


92 


MAN. 


vine  arrangement  by  which,  in  the  presence  of  strange  objects, 
or  in  novel  circumstances,  we  are  led  to  pause  and  to  examine, 
when  heedlessly  to  have  advanced  might  have  been  fatal.  The 
appearance  of  anything  new,  may  be  regarded  as  exciting  sur¬ 
prise.  When  not  only  the  object  or  occurrence  itself  is  novel, 
but  also  the  circumstances  which  have  led  to  it  are  unexpected, 
the  mind  is  astonished.  When  both  the  object  or  event  and  the 
circumstances  admit  of  no  explanation,  the  mind  is  left  in  a 
state  of  wonder.  The  beautiful  awakens  admiration  ;  and  the 
sublime  inspires  aioe.  The  consideration  of  the  latter  two  emo¬ 
tions  properly  belongs  to  another  class,  to  which  reference  will 
presently  be  made.  They  are  adverted  to  here,  on  account  of 
their  tendency  to  arrest  the  attention,  and  to  awaken  reflection. 
The  same  objects,  indeed,  may  not  uniformly  excite  the  emo¬ 
tions  of  admiration  and  awe ;  but  as  often  as  these  emotions 
are  excited,  even  by  the  same  objects,  one  of  their  characteris¬ 
tics  is  the  arresting  nature  of  the  feeling  which  they  include. 
Now,  by  the  emotions  specified,  the  mind  is  engaged  to  a  fur¬ 
ther  consideration  of  the  objects  exciting  them ;  and  thus  the 
intellect  purveys  for  the  emotions,  and  the  emotions  react  and 
provide  subjects  of  study  for  the  intellect ;  the  mind  and  the 
feelings  influence  each  other. 

19.  (4.)  Perfective.  The  system  to  which  man  belongs  is 
not  only  indefinitely  vast,  it  is  progressive,  and  he  himself  is  an 
intelligent  part  of  it.  Accordingly,  the  mere  susceptibility  of 
improvement  and  progress,  when  perceived,  has  a  tendency  to 
awaken  in  his  breast  an  emotion  of  complacency  involving  a 
disposition  to  encourage  and  promote  it.  Still  more  is  the  per¬ 
ception  of  supposed  excellence  and  happiness  calculated  to  ex¬ 
cite  the  feeling.  In  the  absence  of  every  disturbing  cause,  the 
mere  look  of  gladness  in  another,  falls  like  sunshine  on  his  own 
breast.  His  heart  is  an  instrument  containing  a  chord  for 
every  note  which  happiness  knows.  And  its  jsvery  true  re¬ 
sponse  to  the  touch  of  things  without,  falls  in  with  the  music  of 
the  spheres  —  is  either  a  note  of  grief  over  something  other¬ 
wise  than  it  should  be,  or  of  pleasure  in  instinctive  anticipation 
of  the  final  chorus. 

20.  Akin  to  this  class,  and  tending  to  the  same  refining  and 
ennobling  results,  are  the  emotions  of  beauty  and  sublimity ; 
emotions  which  both  presuppose  the  perfect  and  the  infinite, 
and  tend  to  prepare  the  mind  for  them.  But  is  the  beautiful 
objective  or  subjective ;  is  it  a  quality  inhering  in  the  object 
we  admire,  or  w  it  the  reflection  of  the  admiring  mind,  the 


PROGRESSION. 


93 


result  of  its  own  associations  ?  My  own  conviction  is,  that  the 
writers  on  this  subject  have  erred  in  taking  it  for  granted  that 
it  must  be  the  one  or  the  other  exclusively.  Granted,  that 
where  one  man  sees  beauty  in  a  given  object,  another  sees 
none  :  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  therefore  all  objects  are 
equally  and  entirely  destitute  of  instrinsic  beaut)" ;  for  what  part 
of  man’s  constitution  is  not  liable  to  perversion  ?  Granted,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  there  are  certain  objects  or  qualities  which 
seldom  if  ever  fail  to  awaken  in  the  mind  the  emotion  of  beau¬ 
ty  ;  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  all  beauty  is  therefore 
entirely  objective,  and  that  the  mind  does  not  often  embellish 
external  objects  with  charms  of  its  own.  Admitting,  however, 
that  beauty  is,  in  some  sense,  subjective,  the  question  arises 
whether  the  emotion  is  original  and  simple,  or  whether  it  is 
resolvable  into  association.  And  here  again  it  appears  to  me 
that  the  proved  existence  of  a  compound  emotion  by  no  means 
necessitates  the  exclusion  of  an  emotion  simple  and  underived. 

A  little  analysis  may  be  sufficient  to  show  that  much  of  the 
beauty  of  which  the  mind  is  conscious,  is  of  an  acquired  or 
complex  origin.  But  this  appears  to  be  additional  to  the  opera 
tion  of  the  primitive  emotion  of  beauty,  and  partly  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  it.  The  very  fact  that  the  mind  is  found  suscepti¬ 
ble  of  what  may  be  called  associated  or  suggested  beauty,  pre¬ 
supposes,  it  appears  to  me,  the  existence  of  an  original  emo¬ 
tion,  as  the  only  condition  of  its  possibility.  If  objects  are 
deemed  beautiful  only  as  they  come  to  be  associated  in  the 
mind  with  certain  agreeable  feelings,  it  would  follow  that  all 
external  objects  are  beautiful  with  which  agreeable  associations 
have  been  formed.  Now  there  are  two  considerations  which 
seem  fatal  to  this  conclusion;  first,  that  although  there  are 
many  things  which  have  had  the  same  opportunity,  so  to  speak, 
of  having  interesting  associations  formed  with  them,  as  other 
tilings  deemed  beautiful  have  had,  yet,  by  an  inherent  repulsive¬ 
ness,  they  resist  the  association  ;  and,  also,  that  many  of  those 
things  with  which  agreeable  associations  have  been  formed  are 
yet  never  employed  as  images  of  the  beautiful.  The  mind  thus 
intuitively  distinguishes  between  accidental  and  inherent  beauty. 
It  seems  impossible  to  conceive  of  the  first  man,  as  created 
without  an  original  emotional  susceptibility  for  the  beautiful; 
to  suppose  that  he  who  was  made  “  in  the  image  of  God,”  the 
objective  expression,  however  faint,  of  Him,  who  is  the  “  First 
Fair,”  should  himself  be  destitute  of  an  original  emotion  of 
beauty ;  that  he  should  have  had  to  discover  that  he  was  sur- 


94 


MAN. 


rounded  by  elements  of  beauty,  even  in  Eden,  only  by  the  slow 
growth  of  agreeable  associations.  Surely,  the  first  hour  revealed 
to  him  the  fact ;  emotion  followed  emotion  originally  and  in¬ 
herently  agreeable ;  the  first  vision  of  that  new-created  loveli¬ 
ness  which  appeared  in  her  — 4  fairer  than  all  her  daughters, 
Eve’  —  the  mother  and  model  of  human  beauty,  could  not  have 
failed  instantly  to  awaken  an  admiring  and  attracting  emotion 
independently  of  all  previous  agreeable  associations,  or  even  if 
no  such  associations  had  yet  been  formed. 

These  remarks  imply  that  there  is,  as  has  been  already  inti¬ 
mated,  objective  beauty.  We  do  not  suppose,  indeed,  that  there 
is  anything  in  the  object  of  the  same  nature  as  the  emotion, 
any  more  than  we  believe  that  a  property  identical  with  our 
sensation  of  fragrance  resides  in  the  rose.  But,  as  our  sensa¬ 
tion  of  fragrance  would  not  exist  unless  there  were  an  exciting 
property  in  the  flower,  so  the  emotion  of  beauty  presupposes  a 
peculiar  element  in  every  object  which  excites  it.  It  appears 
to  me  impossible  to  conceive  of  the  Divine  Creator  as  evolving 
the  vast  variety  of  forms  and  objects  in  nature,  without  any  ref¬ 
erence  whatever  to  an  ideal  standard  of  beauty.  We  cannot 
but  think  of  beauty  as  one  of  the  principles  on  which  the  world 
is  made.  The  principle  of  utility,  though  often  found  in  combi¬ 
nation  with  it,  is  yet  distinct  from  it.  And  hence  there  are  ob¬ 
jects,  in  which,  after  we  have  spoken  of  them  as  useful,  and 
even  as  agreeable,  we  feel  that  there  is  another  element  which 
we  can  denote  only  by  saying  that  they  are  beautiful.  The 
same  remarks  are  applicable  to  the  distinct  emotion  of  sublimity, 
which  springs  from  the  idea  of  power,  and  which  points  to  the 
indefinitely  vast,  and  infinite.  Both  of  these  emotions,  by 
detaining  the  mind  in  communion  with  ideal  loveliness  and 
grandeur,  tend  to  the  indefinite  improvement  and  progress  of 
the  mind. 

21.  (5.)  Remedial.  Our  theory  supposes  not  only  the  pro¬ 
gress  of  man,  but  his  possible  deterioration.  If  he  is  capable 
of  being  affected  towards  other  objects  in  a  manner  conducive 
to  their  well-being,  it  may  be  expected  that  he  will  evince  ap¬ 
propriate  emotion  at  the  perception  of  any  object  which  ap¬ 
pears  to  have  fallen  out  of  the  ranks  in  the  onward  march 
of  creation,  and  a  disposition  to  restore  it  to  its  lost  place  and 
capabilities.  Accordingly,  the  spectacle,  or  even  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  an  object  in  a  state  less  happy  or  less  perfect  than  it 
has  been,  or  than  he  expected  to  find  it,  or  than  he  conceives 
it  was  meant  to  be,  affects  him  with  compassion  for  it,  involving 


PROGRESSION. 


95 


a  disposition  to  relieve  or  to  ameliorate  its  condition.  And  the 
emotion  is  found  susceptible  of  the  various  modifications  of  con¬ 
cern,  sorrow,  distress,  and  anguish,  answering  +o  the  states  of 
deprivation,  affliction,  pain  or  danger  of  the  objects  contem¬ 
plated.  Gratitude  is  the  emotion  consequent  on  the  perception 
of  a  disposition  in  others  to  sympathize  with,  and  to  aid  an  ob¬ 
ject  of  compassion,  or  to  render  to  another  more  than  strict  jus¬ 
tice  demands,  in  order  to  his  happiness. 

22.  (6.)  Relational.  The  different  classes  of  emotion  which 
have  been  already.enumerated  give  rise  to  a  subsequent  and 
distinct  class,  dependent  on  the  activity  and  gratification  of 
these  primary  emotions.  For  if  man  may  sustain  to  the  ob¬ 
jects  of  these  emotions,  the  different  relations  of  anticipation,  of 
possession,  or  of  loss,  it  may  be  expected,  secondly,  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  our  general  proposition,  that  he  will  evince  a  vary¬ 
ing  susceptibility  of  feeling,  corresponding  with  such  change  of 
relation. 

If,  for  example,  two  objects  equally  desirable  are  present  to 
his  mind,  but  only  one  of  which  is  attainable,  it  may  be  ex¬ 
pected  that  he  will  be  impelled  towards  that  object  by  an  emo¬ 
tion  of  which  he  is  unconscious  in  respect  to  the  other.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  the  perception  of  his  relation  to  it  awakens  the  hope, 
the  trust,  or  the  confidence  of  obtaining  it.  By  this  benevolent 
provision  he  is  both  saved  from  spending  himself  in  the  vain 
pursuit  of  an  unattainable  end,  and  of  thus  defeating  the  design 
of  his  existence ;  and  is  left  to  put  forth  his  strength  in  the  di¬ 
rection  in  which  it  is  likely  to  be  crowned  with  success.  The 
prospect  of  failure  fills  the  mind  with  apprehension,  anxiety,  and 
the  various  modifications  of  fear.  In  the  attainment  and  pos¬ 
session  of  the  good  desired,  he  is  conscious  of  joy,  and  of  all  its 
modifications,  contentment,  satisfaction,  gladness  and  delight. 
The  loss  of  the  object  occasions  him  sorrow .  If  he  lose  it  by 
his  own  folly,  he  is  the  subject  of  mortification  or  remorse.  If 
he  is  deprived  of  it  by  the  unjust  act  of  another,  or  if,  by  such 
an  act,  even  his  retention  of  it  be  endangered,  he  evinces  an¬ 
ger,  jealousy,  indignation,  and  resentment. 

23.  Now,  it  might,  I  think,  be  shown  that  each  of  these  six 
classes  is  distinctive,  and  that  there  is  not  a  single  simple  emo¬ 
tion  which  might  not  find  an  appropriate  place  under  one  or 
other  of  these  heads,  and,  therefore,  no  compound  emotion,  the 
elements  of  which  might  not  be  similarly  distributed.  But  if 
this  classification  be  accepted,  we  shall  find  that  the  emotions 
admit  of  a  further  generalization  into  those  arising  from  the  na- 


96 


MAN. 


ture  of  the  mental  objects  which  excite  them,  and  those  arising 
from  a  perception  of  our  relation  to  the  objects.  The  former 
division  includes  the  first  five  groups  we  have  specified  — 
namely,  the  appropriative,  the  impartative,  the  arrestive,  the 
progressive  or  perfective,  and  the  restorative  or  remedial.  The 
latter  division  includes  the  emotions  of  the  sixth  class  — 
namely,  those  attending  the  attainableness,  the  possession,  and 
the  loss  of  the  objects  belonging  to  the  preceding  classes. 
This  latter  division  necessarily  presupposes  the  former,  on 
which  account  the  two  divisions  may  be  designated  respectively 
the  primary  and  the  secondary ;  not,  be  it  observed,  as  measur¬ 
ing  or  comparing  their  importance,  but  as  simply  indicating  the 
order  of  their  mutual  relation.  Further:  all  the  objects  and 
emotions  of  the  first  division  are  to  be  regarded  as  immediate, 
or  as  existing  without  any  reference  to  time.  This  is  true  even 
of  the  desires.  To  class  desire  with  the  prospective  emotions 
is  to  confound  it  with  hope,  an  emotion  of  the  second  division, 
and  relating  to  the  attainableness  of  an  object ;  whereas,  desire, 
like  surprise  or  admiration,  knows  no  future  any  more  than  it 
does  a  past.  “  It  arises  from  good  considered  simply,”  and  re¬ 
spects  only  the  quality  of  objects.  On  the  other  hand,  those  of 
the  secondary  division  are  related  to  time,  for,  as  attainable  or 
unattainable,  they  respect  the  future  ;  as  possessed,  the  present ; 
as  lost,  the  past.  Each  division  alike  may  be  characterized  as 
agreeable  or  disagreeable ;  but  with  this  important  distinction, 
that  while  the  primary  and  immediate  emotions  are  essentially 
agreeable  or  the  reverse,  the  secondary  are  such  only  in  a  rela¬ 
tive  sense.  The  character  of  the  former  is  carried  over  to  the 
latter,  and  determines  whether  the  perception  of  our  relation  to 
their  objects  shall  occasion  hope  or  fear,  joy  or  sorrow. 

24.  And,  further,  it  is  important  to  remark,  as  harmonizing 
with  our  distinction  between  man  as  the  being  to  whom,  and 
the  being  to  and  by  whom,  the  Divine  manifestation  is  made, 
that  the  division  which  we  have  denominated  as  primary,  im¬ 
mediate,  and  essentially  agreeable,  belongs  to  man  as  viewed 
in  the  former  light,  and  that  the  secondary  division  is  affirm- 
able  of  him  as  viewed  in  the  latter  respect.  It  is  easy  to  con¬ 
ceive  of  a  human  being  as  successively  experiencing  each  class 
of  emotions  belonging  to  the  former  division,  and  yet  remain¬ 
ing  a  stranger  to  hope  or  fear,  to  joy  or  sorrow,  in  relation  to 
any  of  the  specific  objects  of  those  classes.  As  an  emotional 
intelligence  to  whom  the  creative  revelation  is  made,  he  con¬ 
templates  objects ;  his  emotions  pronouncing  one  class  of  these 


PROGRESSION. 


97 


objects,  good  for  himself ;  another  class,  good  for  others ;  a 
third,  surprising  for  their  novelty  ;  a  fourth,  to  be  admired  and 
loved  for  the  presence  of  certain  excellences ;  and  a  fifth,  pitia¬ 
ble  on  account  of  the  absence  of  certain  qualities  or  conditions ; 
As  an  emotional  intelligence  by  whom,  partly,  as  well  as  to 
whom,  the  creative  revelation  is  to  be  made,  he  is  called  on  not 
merely  to  appreciate  the  objective.  He  himself,  the  subject 
of  such  appreciating  acts,  is  placed  in  organic  relation  to  the 
great  scheme,  and,  in  this  relation,  is  to  have  his  own  nature 
evolved,  in  order  that  it  also  may  be  appreciated.  Accordingly, 
the  perception  of  his  relation,  not  merely  to  the  general  system, 
but  to  every  fraction  of  it,  touches  an  emotional  spring  of  his 
nature  harmonizing  with  his  conception  of  it  as  attainable,  pos¬ 
sessed,  or  lost.  And  thus,  while  each  of  these  emotional  divis¬ 
ions  alike  presupposes  an  intellectual  act  as  its  immediate  ante¬ 
cedent,  the  former,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  our  general 
proposition,  respects  our  appreciation  of  things,  in  themselves 
considered ;  the  latter,  our  relation  to  them. 

25.  The  general  proposition  implies,  thirdly ,  that  man’s  sus¬ 
ceptibility  of  emotion  will  be  found  co-extensive  with  his  means 
of  knowledge,  just  as  these  have  been  found  commensurate 
with  the  means  of  Divine  manifestation.  Could  we  point  to 
any  part,  or  lay  our  finger  on  any  object,  or  name  any  subject, 
in  our  world,  which  never  has  excited,  nor  can  excite,  a  human 
emotion,  or  to  which  man  has  no  chord  of  feeling  in  his  nature 
capable  of  responding,  it  would  be  evident  that  a  defect  in  the 
system  of  things  had  at  length  come  to  light.  Either  man’s 
nature  was  relatively  incomplete,  or  else  the  anomalous  object 
which  found  in  him  no  emotive  vibration  was  not  of  Divine 
origin  —  must  have  proceeded  from  some  discordant  mind,  or 
have  come  wandering  hither  from  some  unknown  world.  But 
such  an  inconsistency  is  unknown.  Man  has  the  susceptibility 
of  being  moved  by  everything  within  the  circle  of  that  creation 
which  he  has  been  sent  to  inhabit,  and  for  the  very  reason  that 
he  has  been  sent  to  inhabit  it  expressly  to  interpret  and  to 
estimate  it  aright.  In  vain  should  we  attempt  to  enumerate 
the  various  objects  of  knowledge  which  the  world  contained 
when  he  first  came  to  be  its  inhabitant ;  but  though  the  task 
would  soon  set  our  poor  arithmetic  at  defiance,  man  brought 
with  him  the  power  of  responding  to  the  call  of  each.  In  vain 
should  we  try  to  imagine  the  diversified  groupings,  and  the 
physical  combinations  of  which  these  separate  objects  have 
since  then  admitted,  yet  each  of  these  was  meant  to  move. 

9 


b8 


MAN. 


How  impossible  to  think  of  all  the  events  to  which  they  have 
hourly  given  rise  !  yet  each  of  these  was  calculated  to  exercise 
a  motive-power  in  man.  We  are  to  remember,  also,  that  not 
merely  the  clear  perception  of  each  of  these,  but  every  degree 
of  perception,  every  point  of  the  long  line  between  entire  igno¬ 
rance  of,  and  an  intimate  acquaintance  with,  each  of  all  these 
objects  and  events,  and  their  inconceivably  numerous  combina¬ 
tions,  was  calculated  to  affect  the  emotive  part  of  man’s  nature. 
And  not  only  is  that  nature  equal  and  open  to  the  manifold  and 
myriad-voiced  appeal,  had  the  whole  been  brought  to  bear  on  a 
single  individual,  hidden  susceptibilities  would  still  have  re¬ 
mained  within  him,  and  sources  of  feeling  in  reserve  for  other 
disclosures,  and  for  future  periods  of  his  being. 

26.  But  if  such  be  man’s  emotional  relation  to  external  na¬ 
ture,  how  defective  must  that  piety  be  which  makes  it  a  boast 
that  it  can  see  little  in  the  entire  circle  to  engage  its  attention, 
or  to  yield  it  delight :  how  great  its  loss  of  enjoyment :  how 
sacred  the  duty  of  training  the  mind  to  an  acquaintance  with 
the  objects  appointed  by  God  to  excite  our  emotions ;  how  im¬ 
portant  that  the  heart  be  kept  open  and  susceptible  to  all  the 
influences  designed  to  act  on  it ! 

27.  Fourthly ,  it  is  further  implied  in  the  general  proposition, 
that  the  degree  in  which  man  will  be  found  susceptible  of  being 
moved  by  objects  and  events,  will  be  regulated  by  his  views  of 
their  importance,  as  this,  again,  depends  on  the  degree  of  their 
subserviency  to  the  great  end.  Endowed  with  this  discrimi¬ 
nating  power,  every  object  possesses,  in  the  eye  of  man’s 
emotional  nature,  a  different  value.  To  a  superficial  observer, 
indeed,  the  objects  of  external  nature  may  appear  to  be  thrown 
together  like  the  stars  of  the  midnight  sky,  in  inextricable  con¬ 
fusion.  But  as  among  the  celestial  bodies  the  astronomer  dis¬ 
tinguishes  masses  of  different  magnitudes,  and  constellations 
of  different  brightness,  so  in  all  our  thoughts  and  reasonings 
on  things,  no  true  distinction  can  exist,  no  difference  of  value 
be  imagined,  which  the  emotions  are  not  calculated  to  appre- 
iiate  and  confirm.  While  every  object  of  thought  exercises 
&n  influence,  the  mind  is  supposed  to  be  affected  by  each  in  a 
manner  proportioned  to  its  subserviency  as  a  means  of  Divine 
manifestation.  This  is  the  standard  of  their  value  in  the 
Divine  estimation,  for  this  is  the  very  reason  of  their  existence. 
God  himself  is  perpetually  energizing  every  part  and  particle 
of  the  entire  system,  and  imprinting  on  it  some  property  of 
His  nature,  as  a  means  of  self-revelation.  It  is  only,  there* 


PROGRESSION. 


99 


fore,  as  every  object  included  in  the  system,  succeeds  in  im¬ 
parting  or  imprinting  itself,  that  it  answers  the  design  of  its 
being.  According  to  the  laws  of  gravitation,  the  feather  acts 
on  the  globe,  as  well  as  the  globe  on  the  feather ;  so,  in  the 
intellectual  world,  there  is  nothing  so  insignificant  as  not  to 
possess  some  property  which  represents  a  Divine  perfection, 
and  whose  office  it  is  not  therefore  to  move  the  mind  according 
to  the  value  of  that  property  in  the  general  scale  of  things. 
Hence  the  least  objects  are  ever  tending  to  imprint  on  the 
greatest  their  reality  and  their  signature,  as  well  as  the  greatest 
on  the  least.  But  while  in  this  system  of  mutual  dependence 
and  influence  the  least  do  not  fail  to  affect  the  greatest,  it  is  to 
be  expected  that  the  reason  of  the  existence  of  each  will  be 
the  principle  of  its  operation,  and  that  that  which  is  more  per¬ 
fect  will  ever  be  tending  to  conform  that  which  is  less  perfect  to 
itself.  In  so  doing,  it  is  only  evolving  its  own  nature,  acting  in 
harmony  with  the  will  of  Him  who,  having  endowed  it  with  a 
superior  power  of  Divine  manifestation,  values  it  in  proportion 
as  it  answers  the  end  of  its  existence. 

23.  Here,  then,  is  a  scale  of  valuation  for  all  the  objects  in 
the  universe.  How  important  that  we  should  acquire  the  habit 
of  correctly  arranging  and  valuing  things  accordingly  !  How 
many  of  the  fatal  errors  which  occur  in  the  education  of  the 
young,  arise  from  the  oblivion  of  this  rule ;  in  consequence  of 
which  means  are  mistaken  for  ends,  shadows  for  realities,  and 
the  body  preferred  to  the  mind ! 

How  high  a  place  in  this  scale  of  valuation  would  a  human 
being  be  found  to  occupy !  while  every  other  object  would 
find  a  place,  he,  as  the  mediate  end  of  all,  would  stand  at  their 
head,  charged  with  the  collective  influences  of  the  whole,  the 
great  blessing  of  every  circle  into  which  he  came.  How 
high  a  place  above  all  other  communications  should  a  volume 
of  Divine  revelations  occupy !  If  the  mutual  impartation  of 
human  thoughts  be  the  great  ordinary  instrument  for  moving 
the  mind,  what  emotions  may  be  expected  to  follow  the  utterance 
of  Divine  thoughts  !  Hence  “  the  truth  ”  is  the  means  of  human 
renovation.  Besides  the  world  of  natural  objects  employed  to 
move  the  mind,  God  has  inserted  or  superadded  a  more  direct 
communication  from  Himself,  has  afforded  views  of  a  higher 
and  a  more  spiritual  economy  of  things ;  and  when  the  heart 
has  been  prepared  and  adjusted  to  receive  the  influence  which 
the  view  of  this  new  economy  is  calculated  to  exercise,  this 
finite  subjective  is  gradually  brought  into  harmony  with  that 


100 


MAN. 


infinite  objective.  Hence,  too,  the  transforming  influence  of 
prayer,  in  which  the  finite  subjective  is  brought  into  direct 
communication  with  the  Great,  the  Infinite  objective ;  and 
what  can  the  effect  of  that  be  but  to  touch  every  spring  in 
human  nature,  and  to  put  it  into  activity  in  harmony  with  the 
Divine  movements  ! 

29.  Now  this  view  of  the  manner  in  which  the  heart  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  moved  by  objects  according  to  their  rank  or  value 
in  the  scale  of  Divine  manifestation  will  serve  to  show  the  rea¬ 
sonableness  of  loving  God  with  all  the  heart,  and  soul,  and  mind, 
and  strength ;  and  how  it  is  that  the  belief  of  the  truth  is  essen¬ 
tial  to  the  understanding  of  the  truth — the  love  of  God  to  the 
knowledge  of  God.  For  the  very  design  of  my  susceptibility  to 
be  moved  by  an  object  is  that  I  may  be  led  to  attend  to  it,  and 
then  to  deal  with  it  according  to  its  value.  My  means  of  doing 
this,  however,  would  be  inconceivably  augmented,  if  the  emo¬ 
tions  were  subject  to  laws  such  as  the  following — that  I  should 
have  the  power  of  recalling  and  willing  the  presence  of  certain 
objects  before  the  eye  of  the  mind,  in  order  that  they  might 
give  rise  to  certain  emotions  ;  that  I  should  have  the  power  of 
attending  to  these  objects :  that  my  attention  to  them  should 
have  the  effect  of  rendering  my  perception  of  them  more  quick 
and  vivid  than  they  would  otherwise  be  ;  that  while  one  impres¬ 
sion  lasts,  in  proportion  to  its  intensity,  my  mind  should  be 
incapable  of  receiving  impressions  from  other  objects ;  that  the 
longer  it  is  under  the  influence  of  an  object,  the  deeper  should 
be  its  impression  (hence  the  importance  of  attention)  :  that  as 
all  objects  are  related,  so  all  emotions  should  be  also.  Now 
these  and  other  laws  exist ;  but  as  they  presuppose  the  activity 
of  the  power  next  to  be  considered  —  the  will — our  considera¬ 
tion  of  them  must  be  reserved  for  the  next  section. 


Sect.  VI.  —  Man  Voluntary. 

1.  We  have  found  man  capable  of  being  moved  by  every 
object  in  creation.  And  as  different  classes  of  phenomena  are 
of  different  degrees  of  importance  in  the  great  scheme  of  the 
Divine  procedure,  we  found  him  susceptible  of  corresponding 
differences  of  emotion.  But  in  all  these  movements  of  the 
mind  by  different  classes  of  objects,  we  have,  so  far,  been  re¬ 
garding  it  as  passive.  For  aught  that  has  yet  appeared  to  the 
contrary,  the  man  is  lying  in  this  respect  at  the  mercy  of  phe- 


PROGRESSION. 


101 


nomena  over  which  he  has  no  control.  Everything  .is  acting 
upon  him,  but  without  any  power  on  his  part  either  to  resist  or 
voluntarily  to  submit,  because  without  any  choice.  He,  too, 
may  be  reacting  on  every  object  within  a  given  circle,  but  only 
as  they  are  acting  on  him,  unconsciously,  and  by  a  preordained 
necessity. 

2.  The  reason  and  the  reasonableness  of  his  being  actually 
influenced  by  the  objective  universe  in  a  certain  manner  and  in 
a  certain  degree,  are  obvious.  How,  otherwise,  is  man  to 
sympathize  with  his  Maker  in  his  appreciation  of  all  that  God 
has  done  for  His  own  manifestation  ?  When  the  universe  was 
made,  it  only  presented  to  the  Divine  Mind  the  objective  dis¬ 
play  of  that  which,  subjectively,  He  had  contemplated  from 
eternity.  If  man,  then,  is  to  sympathize  with  his  Maker,  in 
this  respect,  lie  can  do  so  only  by  having  the  objective  universe 
as  true  in  its  relations  and  influences  to  his  mental  constitution 
as  if  it  were  within  him.  As  the  idea  of  the  external  universe 
was  in  the  mind  of  God  before  it  was  embodied  without ;  for 
man  that  universe  is  first  without,  in  order  that  it  might  pro¬ 
duce  the  appropriate  effect  within  him.  And  hence  we  have 
seen  that  he  is,  in  some  sense,  open  to  all  its  influences ;  that 
everything  is  calculated  to  act  upon  him,  directly  or  indirectly, 
with  a  motive-power.  But  this  view  of  external  objects  acting 
through  his  sensitive  nature,  must,  we  repeat,  admit  of  some 
qualification.  In  our  last  chapter,  in  which  we  saw  the  inor¬ 
ganic,  organic,  and  animal  dispensations  re-appear  in  his  con¬ 
stitution,  we  found  him  to  be  a  link — the  last  and  the  noblest, 
it  is  true,  but  still  only  a  continuous  link — in  the  unbroken 
chain  and  iron  mechanism  of  nature,  and  formed  as  necessarily 
out  of  antecedent  materials,  and  as  subject  to  the  antecedent 
laws  of  cause  and  effect,  as  the  link  which  preceded  him.  And 
for  aught  that  has  yet  appeared  to  the  contrary,  the  manifesta¬ 
tions  of  his  intellectual  and  of  his  sensitive  nature,  are  all 
necessary  also. 

3.  It  seems  obvious,  then,  that  if  man’s  appreciation  of  the 
Divine  manifestation,  and  his  subserviency  to  it,  are  not  to  be 
necessitated  but  free,  he  must  be  endowed  with  such  a  power 
of  directly  or  indirectly  reacting  on  or  regulating  the  emotive 
part  of  his  constitution,  as  shall  render  that  appreciation  and 
subserviency  the  expression  of  his  unconstrained  choice.  On 
no  other  condition  can  his  appreciation  of  the  Divine  mani¬ 
festation  be  morally  pleasing  to  God,  or  acceptable  even  to 
himself. 


9* 


102 


MAN. 


4.  In  accordance  with  this  general  proposition  it  may  he 
expected,  first,  that  man  will  be  endowed  with  the  power  of 
acting  according  to  his  will.  Here,  it  may  be  proper  to 
premise  that  by  the  Will  is  meant  the  power  of  volition  ;  and 
that  a  Volition ,  or  particular  act  of  the  will,  immediately  pre¬ 
cedes  and  determines  action.  By  Motive  is  intended  that  which 
immediately  precedes  and  influences  volition. 

5.  Now  that  man  has  the  power  of  acting  as  he  will  is  a  fact 
conceded  by  all  parties.  It  is  a  statement  susceptible  of  an 
explanation  to  which  even  an  ultra-fatalist  would  readily  sub¬ 
scribe.  If  this  were  a  full  exposition  of  human  freedom,  we 
might  accept  Hobbes’s  definition  of  liberty — “the  absence  of 
all  impediments  to  action  that  are  not  contained  in  the  nature 
and  intrinsical  quality  of  the  agent with  which  the  definitions 
of  liberty  by  Leibnitz,  by  Collins,*  by  Bonnet,  and  by  Schel- 
ling,  substantially  agree.  “  That  is  free,”  says  the  last,  “  which 
only  acts  conformably  to  the  laws  of  its  own  being.”  But  this 
is  language  which  serves  to  conceal  the  difficulty  ;  for  the  ques¬ 
tion  still  recurs,  What  are  those  laws  of  our  being  ?  If  they  only 
amount  to  “the  power  of  acting  as  we  are  acted  on” — if  this 
is  all  that  is  meant  by  freedom ,  it  becomes  a  question  whether 
there  be,  whether  there  can  be,  such  a  thing  as  necessity  ;  for  if 
there  be,  and  if  there  are  any  phenomena  naturally  constituted 
to  be  determined  by  it,  still,  according  to  the  foregoing  defini¬ 
tions,  they  must  be  said  to  be  free,  since  they  act  conformably 
to  the  laws  of  their  being.  The  line  of  the  poet:  “the  River 
windeth  at  his  own  sweet  will,”  must  be  received  as  a  meta¬ 
physical  truth.  Indeed,  Hobbes  actually  selected  the  descent 
of  water,  or,. its  “liberty  to  descend  by  the  channel  of  a  river,” 
as  an  example  of  freedom.  But  if  this  be  not  an  image,  not  an 
analogy,  but  an  example  of  human  liberty,  there  is  no  such  a 
thing  as  necessity.  Fate  itself,  if  there  were  such  a  being, 
would,  owing  to  the  very  iron  rigidity  of  its  nature,  be  the  most 
perfect  instance  of  liberty.  The  falling  stone,  and  the  mind  which 
excogitated  the  Principia,  are  alike  free ;  the  only  difference 
being  that  the  former  is  part  of  a  material,  and  the  latter  part 
of  a  spiritual,  machine ;  but  the  movements  of  each  are  alike 
mechanical.  Further,  if  all  our  actions  are  thus  mechanical, 
or  necessitated  from  without,  it  seems  to  follow  that  our  charac- 

*  In  opposition  to  this  view  of  free  agency,  see  Dr.  S.  Clarke’s  “  Re¬ 
marks  on  a  Book  entitled,  A  Philosophical  Inquiry  concerning  Human 
Liberty,”  and,  of  Dr.  Reid’s  Essays,  that  on  the  Liberty  of  Moral  Agents, 

e.  1. 


PROGRESSION. 


103 


ters  ar  the  inevitable  result  of  an  unremitting  constraint; 
that  Diderot  was  not  illogical  in  concluding  that  there  is 
“ neither  vice  nor  virtue,”  that  “the  doer  of  good  is  lucky, 
not  virtuous,”  that  “we  should  reproach  others  for  nothing,  and 
repent  of  nothing;”  nor  Bonnet,  in  affirming  that  “the  same 
chain  embraces  the  physical  and  the  moral  worlds,”  and  that 
“the  wisdom  which  has  ordained  the  existence  of  this  chain, 
has  doubtless  willed  that  of  every  link  of  which  it  is  composed.” 
On  the  supposition  that  all  our  volitions,  and  therefore  all  our 
actions,  have  an  objective  cause,  there  is  but  one  Being  in  the 
universe  to  whom  human  conduct  can  be  traced  ;  and  Spinoza 
was  only  consistent  in  concluding  that  even  He  acts  involunta- 
rily,  and  that  in  all  He  has  done  He  had  not  the  power  to  act 
otherwise.* 

6.  If  the  bare  freedom  of  acting  as  we  will  may  thus  consist 
with  fatalism,  we  may  expect  to  find,  secondly,  as  our  general 
proposition  implies,  that  the  motives  acting  on  the  will  do,  in 
some  respects,  admit  of  selection,  regulation,  or  resistance.  If 
they  do  not,  if  man  acts  only  and  immediately  as  he  is  acted  on, 
if  he  differs  in  no  respect  from  that  external  world  in  which 
nothing  determines,  but  everything  is  determined,  then  are  we 
still  in  the  resistless  current  of  necessity ;  and  to  speak  of  free¬ 
dom  as  in  relation  to  the  will,  is  to  confound  fiction  and  truth, 
and  to  utter  a  contradiction  in  terms.  But  the  enlightened 
necessarian  admits,  as  freely  as  the  libertarian,  the  conditional 
resistibleness  of  motives.  It  is  a  fact  of  consciousness;  of  daily, 
hourly  experience.  A  motive  of  one  kind,  for  example,  is  made 
to  give  place  to  a  motive  of  another  kind.  Wherever  opposing 
motives  are  present  to  the  mind,  one  of  them,  at  least,  is  over¬ 
ruled.  Among  different  motives  to  an  action,  we  are  conscious 
of  answerableness  for  acting  from  the  right  motive.  And  this 
single  fact  admonishes  us  that,  in  entering  on  the  consideration 
of  the  human  will,  we  have  reached  a  province  of  observation 
essentially  differing  from  every  preceding  province  ;  that,  hence¬ 
forth,  a  fact  unknown  to  all  the  antecedent  creation  (as  far  at 
least  as  this  world  is  concerned)  is  to  be  admitted  as  a  distin¬ 
guishing  element  in  our  views  of  man ;  that  the  very  fact  of  our 
having  to  do  with  that  unique  thing  in  creation,  a  will — there 
having  been,  by  hypothesis,  but  One  Will,  in,  at  least,  this  part 
of  the  universe,  previously,  and  of  which  the  human  will  is  to 


*  Res  nullo  alio  moclo.  neque  alio  online  a  Deo  produci  potuerunt, 
quam  productae  sunt. — Ethic.  Pars  I.  Prop.  33. 


104 


MAN. 


be  the  representative  —  should  be  sufficient  to  remind  us  that 
we  must  move  from  the  position  from  which  we  have  hither¬ 
to  looked  at  creation,  and  even  at  the  phenomena  of  our  own 
minds,  and  must  seek  to  occupy  a  point  from  which  we  can 
mark  the  coincidence  between  the  phenomena  of  nature  which 
is  necessitated,  and  this  new  phenomenon,  which,  in  the  same 
sense,  is  not  necessitated. 

7.  Here  is  a  faculty  investing  man  with  the  high  prerogative 
of  subordinating  the  laws  of  nature  to  his  own  purposes ;  surely, 
that  cannot  be  the  right  state  of  mind  for  doing  it  justice  which 
treats  it  as  if  it  were  itself  nothing  more  than,  or  nothing  dif- 
ferent  from,  one  of  these  same  external  and  mechanical  pow¬ 
ers.  Here  is  a  new  power,  by  which  man  himself  is  lifted  out 
of  the  category  of  mere  things  and  becomes  a  person ;  surely, 
it  augurs  ill  for  a  correct  result,  if  we  begin  by  viewing  this 
power  itself  as  a  mere  thing,  an  additional  link  in  the  iron  chain 
of  things.  That  the  mind  cannot  originate  a  special  method 
of  reasoning  for  the  phenomena  of  the  will  is  freely  admitted ; 
but  neither  can  it  employ  the  ordinary  method,  without  invol¬ 
ving  itself  in  error  respecting  them,  if  it  be  unconscious  of 
having  made  a  vast  transition  in  its  subject,  of  having  passed 
from  the  natural  to  the  super-natural.  And  the  danger  advert¬ 
ed  to  is  that  of  treating  the  phenomena  of  a  faculty  which  is 
sui  generis ,  as  ordinary  phenomena ;  of  forgetting  that  in  speak¬ 
ing  of  the  will  we  have  entered  a  sphere  in  which  that  which 
man  is  conscious  of  respecting  it,  is  to  be,  not  merely  one  of 
the  elements  admitted  into  the  discussion,  but  is  to  supply  the 
primary  data.  The  mind  has  not  to  reason  to  the  facts  of  con¬ 
sciousness  on  this  subject,  but  from  them ;  and  therefore  until 
they  are  present,  and  have  made  themselves  to  be  heard,  rea¬ 
son  itself  prescribes  silence.  On  the  ordinary  laws  of  causation 
the  mind  can  reason  securely,  as  on  a  topic  which  is  before  it, 
and  below  it ;  but,  psychologically,  the  will  presupposes  the  in¬ 
tellect,  comes  after  it,  and,  as  the  great  executive  power  of  the 
mind,  ranks  above  it.  At  this  point,  therefore,  reason  has  to 
wait  for,  and  to  accept  of,  facts  of  consciousness,  which  are  them¬ 
selves  —  ultimate  facts. 

8.  The  fact  that  some  motives  are  resistible,  is  admitted. 
But  this  proves  nothing  conclusive,  either  for  the  libertarian,  or 
against  the  necessarian.  For,  first,  if  the  latter  remarks  that 
the  view  of  the  libertarian  gains  nothing  by  the  admission,  since 
the  overcoming  power  itself  is  a  motive ;  it  is  rejoined  that  this 
is  the  point  to  be  proved,  not  assumed ;  and  that  to  say,  that  it 


PROGRESSION. 


105 


is  the  strongest  motive  which  prevails,  because  it  prevails,  is  to 
argue  in  a  circle.  To  which  the  libertarian  adds,  secondly, 
that  even  granting  it  to  be  a  law  of  the  will  that  it  shall  act 
only  under  the  influence  of  the  strongest  motive,  to  conclude 
that  therefore  the  act  is  caused  by  the  motive,  would  be  to  beg 
the  question  at  issue ;  and  that,  in  his  eyes,  it  would  be  to 
confound  law  and  cause,  uniformity  of  condition  and  efficiency 
of  operation.  And,  thirdly,  that  the  fact  that  no  motive  is  uni¬ 
formly  strong  for  the  mind,  shows  that  all  the  apparent  strength 
of  the  motive  is  not  inherent,  or  independent  of  the  mind 
which  entertains  it ;  that  its  power  is  more  subjective  than  ob¬ 
jective  ;  and  that  such  subjective  strength  may  therefore  be 
the  result  of  a  prior  exercise  of  the  will.  As  the  sensation  of 
fragrance  is  not  in  the  flower  which  occasions  it,  but  in  the 
sentient  mind  itself ;  and  as  the  emotion  of  desire  is  not  in  the 
intellectual  act  which  precedes  and  occasions  it,  but  in  the 
emotional  mind  itself* ;  so,  by  analogy,  the  strength  exhibited  in 
volition  may  not  lie  in  the  motive  which  precedes  and  occasions 
it,  but  in  the  faculty  of  volition,  the  will,  itself.  The  flower, 
the  thought,  the  motive,  being  nothing  more  than  occasions  of 
the  sensation,  the  emotion,  and  the  volition,  respectively ; 
necessary  occasions,  it  is  true,  but  still  occasions  or  conditions 

only- 

9.  Now  the  necessarian  himself  coincides  in  this  representa¬ 
tion  to  this  extent,  that  he  never  thinks  of  confounding  motives 
with  mere  external  objects.  That  which  moves  the  will,  he 
teaches,  is  “that  motive,  which,  as  it  stands  in  the  view  of  the 
mind ,  is  the  strongest ;  ”  in  other  words,  that  the  motive  will 
always  be,  as  is  the  character  of  the  man  viewing,  and  of  the 
object  viewed,  taken  conjointly,  and  that,  consequently,  it  will 
be  different  in  different  men,  and  even  different  in  the  same 
man  at  different  times.  All  that  yet  appears  evident,  then,  is, 
that  motives  are  conditionally  resistible.  Whether  the  resisting 
power  consists  of  counter-motives,  or  of  the  will  itself,  remains 
to  be  considered. 

10.  Accordingly,  our  third  remark,  harmonizing  with  our 
general  proposition,  is,  that  the  force  of  these  motives  which 
are  yielded  to  is  not  the  force  of  efficient  causation,  necessarily 
producing  volitions  as  effects  in  the  same  sense  in  which  phy¬ 
sical  causes  produce  effects.  Here,  as  in  the  last  particular, 
we  are  removed  back  from  the  connection  between  volitions  and 
their  sequents  to  the  connection  between  volitions  and  their 
antecedents  —  motives.  And,  without  saying  anything  at  pres- 


106 


MAN. 


ent  on  the  certainty  of  this  connection,  we  merely  affirm  that,  in 
its  nature ,  it  differs  essentially  from  that  of  physical  causes  and 
effects.  For  example,  we  may  have  decided  on  the  performance 
of  a  certain  act,  for  several  reasons,  but  when  just  on  the  point 
of  performing  it,  we  hesitate ;  during  our  hesitation,  all  the 
reasons  but  one  cease  to  exist,  and  that  one  becomes  consider¬ 
ably  weakened ;  and  yet,  after  all,  we  decide  on  and  perform 
the  act.  Now,  this  phenomenon,  of  a  thing  which  is  to  be 
acted  on  resisting  or  suspending  the  influence  of  that  which 
acts  on  it  when  at  its  strongest,  and  yet  yielding  to  the  same 
thing  when  at  its  weakest,  has  no  strict  analogy  in  material 
nature. 

11.  Now,  the  libertarian  affirms  that  the  will  itself  is  a  cause ; 
not  a  lawless,  chance-like,  or  unlimited  cause,  but  a  cause  in¬ 
variably  conditioned  by  motives ;  and  that,  provided  these  con¬ 
ditions  are  present,  it  is  capable  of  originating  particular  vo¬ 
litions,  and  of  acting  or  determining  itself  in  a  special  direc¬ 
tion.  And  this  view  he  regards  as  arming  him  with  an  ade- 
quate  reply  to  the  famous  objection,  that  if  motives  are  not 
the  cause  of  any  given  volition,  some  previous  volition  must  be, 
that  volition  again  being  preceded  by  another  volition,  and  so 
on,  ad  infinitum.  For,  he  argues,  that  if  the  will  itself  be  a 
conditional  cause  of  volition,  no  other  cause  need  be  invoked  ; 
and,  indeed,  that  the  so-called  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  an  in¬ 
finite  retrogressive  series  of  causative  acts,  supposed  to  be 
chargeable,  in  one  form,  on  the  advocates  of  an  unconstrained 
will,  belongs  properly  and  exclusively,  in  another  form,  to  the 
necessarian  scheme,  which  appears  to  exhibit  the  unwinding  of 
a  system  of  causes  and  effects  in  one  long  line  of  inseparable 
dependencies. 

12.  The  objection  thus  combated  had  been  made  to  assume 
a  very  formidable  aspect  by  some  necessarian  philosophers  and 
divines,  who  represented  it  as  endangering  the  argument  for  a 
First  Cause.  Collins  pretended  a  concern  for  the  argument 
when  he  wrote,  “  Man  is  a  necessary  agent,  because  all  his 
actions  have  a  beginning.  For  whatever  has  a  beginning  must 
have  a  cause ;  and  every  cause  is  a  necessary  cause.  If  any¬ 
thing  can  have  a  beginning,  which  has  no  cause,  then  nothing 
can  produce  something!”*  “As  to  all  things  that  begin  tc 
be,”  says  Edwards,  “  they  are  not  self-existent,  and,  therefore, 


*  Colli'  ’s  Philosophical  Inquiry  concerning  Human  Liberty,  pp.  57— 
82. 


PROGRESSION. 


107 


must  have  some  foundation  of  their  existence  without  them¬ 
selves.”*  Edwards,  though  employing  almost  the  same  lan¬ 
guage  as  that  of  Collins,  was  actuated  by  a  very  different  mo¬ 
tive  ;  by  a  holy  jealousy  lest  “  the  scheme  of  free  will  (by  afford¬ 
ing  an  exception  to  that  dictate  of  common  sense  which  refers 
every  event  to  a  cause)  should  destroy  the  proof  a  posteriori  for 
the  being  of  God.”  The  libertarian,  however,  points  to  the  log¬ 
ical  consequences  of  the  necessarian’s  own  argument  on  the  sub¬ 
ject,  according  to  Collins,  “that  every  cause  is  a  necessary 
cause ;  ”  in  other  words,  that  even  the  First  Cause  is  only  an¬ 
other  name  for  Fate.  Or,  waiving  this  consideration,  the  liber¬ 
tarian  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  as,  in  his  view,  the  will  it¬ 
self  is  a  cause  of  which  every  volition  is  an  effect,  the  danger 
apprehended  is  not  of  his  creation ;  and,  further,  that  he  be¬ 
lieves  as  fully  as  the  necessarian  that  all  things  that  begin  to  be, 
and  therefore  every  will  of  which  volitions  are  the  manifesta¬ 
tion,  are  of  Divine  creation  ;  and  that  every  created  will  is  con¬ 
stantly  sustained  in  the  causative  activity  which  it  exercises  by 
the  pervading  agency  of  its  Maker. 

13.  Another  objection  alleged  against  the  self-determining 
power  of  the  will  is  derived  from  the  doctrine  of  the  Divine 

x  _ 

foreknowledge.  Either  man  is  free,  it  is  said,  and  then  it  is  im¬ 
possible  to  foresee  his  volitions  ;  or  else  his  volitions  can  be  fore< 
seen,  and  then  he  is  not  free.  To  this  the  advocates  of  the  free¬ 
dom  of  the  will  reply,  first,  The  objection  is  not  relevant.  If 
the  objector  will  only  inform  us  of  the  mode  of  the  Divine  fore¬ 
knowledge  —  in  which  foreknowledge  we  believe  as  unwaver¬ 
ingly  as  he  does  —  probably  no  difficulty  will  remain.  But  till 
then,  his  objection  owes  its  strength,  not  to  his  knowledge,  but 
to  his  ignorance.  He  is  arguing  from  the  darkness  of  the  un- 
known,  against  the  light  of  the  known  and  the  felt ;  from  a  sub¬ 
ject  of  which  he  is  entirely  ignorant,  against  a  fact  of  his  own 
consciousness.  So  that  in  order  to  be  employed  at  all,  the  ob¬ 
jection  must  be  based  on  an  assumption.  It  supposes,  without 
any  authority,  that  man’s  mode  of  acquiring  foreknowledge  and 
God’s,  are  identical.  We  foresee  the  future  only  by  induction 
from  the  past ;  this  foresight  never  attains  to  certainty  except  in 
the  calculation  of  mechanical  laws  —  of  causes  and  effects  con 
,  nected  by  necessary  dependence;  when  the  effects  of  free 
agents  are  to  be  anticipated,  our  foresight  is,  at  best,  mere  con 
jecture.  Now  the  design  of  the  objection  is  evidently  to  re 
lieve  the  infinite  mind  from  the  supposed  difficulty  and  uncer 


*  Inquiry  on  the  Will,  P.  II.,  §  3. 


108 


MAN. 


tainty  of  having  to  foresee  in  any  other  way  than  by  induction. 
The  objector,  indeed,  does  not  know  that  such  is  the  mode  of 
the  Divine  foreknowledge ;  but  his  objection  supposes  that  he 
does  know.  He  says,  in  effect,  that  he  himself  could  not  fore¬ 
see  all  things,  unless  the  whole  were  capable  of  arithmetical  cal¬ 
culation  ;  and  he  assumes  the  same  for  Him  whose  u  thoughts 
are  not  as  our  thoughts.”  Perhaps,  however,  he  would  revolt 
from  forming  such  an  idea  of  the  Divine  prescience ;  yet  this 
appears  to  be  the  legitimate  application  of  his  objection.  At  all 
events,  while  he  may  be  sincere  in  the  homage  which  he  pays 
to  the  Divine  foreknowledge  in  sacrificing  to  it  the  fact  of  hu¬ 
man  liberty,  we  trust  we  are  not  less  sincere  in  abstaining 
from  the  imposition  on  the  Infinite  Mind  of  that  limitation  and 
feebleness  of  our  own  minds,  which  alone  render  such  a  sac¬ 
rifice  necessary.  We  do  not  avail  ourselves  of  the  view  which 

V 

regards  before  and  after  as  terms  relative  only  to  our  mode  of 
acquiring  knowledge ;  which  denies  that  infinite  knowledge  has 
a  past  and  a  future  any  more  than  infinite  space  has  an  above 
and  a  below  ;  and  which  represents  duration  as  an  ever-present, 
and  the  Deity  as  hnoiving  all  the  events  of  that  'present.  We 
content  ourselves  with  saying,  that  until  the  objector  can  dis¬ 
close  to  us  the  mode  of  the  Divine  knowledge,  he  can  derive- 
no  argument  from  that  quarter  without  assuming  that  his  dark¬ 
ness  is  as  good  as  light. 

And,  secondly,  they  argue,  If  the  foreknowledge  of  actions 
necessitate  them,  every  action,  according  to  the  scheme  of  the 
necessarian,  must  be  the  effect  of  two  distinct  causes  —  of  the 
Divine  prescience,  and  also  of  the  force  of  motives.  He  can¬ 
not  regard  both  these  as  identical ;  for  Divine  prescience,  is  not 
human  motives,  nor  are  human  motives  Divine  prescience.  Nor 
can  we  regard  the  one  as  the  consequence  of  the  other;  for  then 
the  sense  in  which  the  one  necessitates  actions  must  differ  es¬ 
sentially  from  the  sense  in  which  the  other  necessitates  them. 
Thus,  if  the  actions  are  necessitated  by  the  Divine  prescience, 
then  the  motives  cannot  cause  them,  for  the  actions  would  ne¬ 
cessarily  follow  even  without  the  motives ;  if  again  the  Divine 
prescience  of  human  actions  is  the  consequence  of  the  neces¬ 
sary  operation  of  motives,  then  those  motives  would  have  op¬ 
erated  necessarily,  whether  forseen  or  not.  The  true  and  only 
explanation  of  the  difficulty  appears  to  be  this,  that  the  term 
necessity  is  here  employed  by  the  necessarian  in  two  distinct 
senses.  As  applied  to  motives  producing  actions,  it  is  the  me¬ 
chanical  necessity  of  cause  and  effect.  But  as  applied  to  Di- 


PROGRESSION. 


109 


vine  prescience,  it  is  simply  tlie  certainty  of  the  effect.  If  it 
meant  more  than  certainty  —  if  foreknowledge  exercises  a  ne¬ 
cessitating  force,  the  Infinite  Agent  himself  is  not  free ;  for 
“He  seeth  the  end  from  the  beginning.”  But  are  the  events 
of  His  providence  necessitated  by  His  foreknowledge  of  them  ? 
In  other  words,  are  they  caused  by  His  prescience  or  by  His 
will  ?  On  this  point,  His  own  declaration  is  definitive,  “  He 
doeth  all  things  according  to  the  counsel  of  His  own  will.”  So 
that  his  foreknowledge,  leaving  his  will  unconstrained,  has  sim¬ 
ply  to  do  with  the  certainty  of  the  events  which  He  has  willed 
taking  place.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  Divine  foreknow- 
lege  of  human  volitions. 

14.  Thus  far,  we  have  seen  that  man  has  the  power  of  act¬ 
ing  according  to  the  dictates  of  his  will ;  that  when  different 
motives  are  present  to  his  mind,  some  of  them  are  resistible ; 
and  that  the  force  of  those  yielded  to,  is  not  that  of  efficient 
causation  in  the  same  sense  in  which  physical  causes  produce 
effects.  I  Ye  have  now  to  remark,  fourthly,  in  agreement  with 
our  general  proposition,  that  the  mind  is  conscious  of  an  un¬ 
constrained  power  of  volition.  However  certain  or  necessary, 
then,  the  connection  between  motives  and  volitions,  either  that 
necessary  relation  is  not  necessitating,  or  else  these  necessity 
ting  motives  must  themselves  have  had  an  element  of  freedom, 
operative  in  some  stage  of  their  formation  ;  or  else  this  con¬ 
sciousness  of  unconstrained  power  must  be  an  illusion.  The 
choice  of  the  religious  necessarian  must  lie  between  the  first 
and  second  of  these  alternatives.  Ultimately,  perhaps,  they  are 
one.  But  to  deny  that  an  element  of  freedom  comes  into  oper¬ 
ation  at  one  or  other  of  the  two  points  specified,  is  to  deny  the 
veracity  of  consciousness,  and  to  shut  himself  up  to  the  third 
alternative. 

15.  YYe  have  not  attempted  to  define  the  YYill,  for,  as  an  ul¬ 
timate  power  of  the  human  mind,  we  do  not  believe  that  it  ad¬ 
mits  of  formal  definition.  Nor  have  we  attempted  to  define  the 
F reedom  of  the  will,  for  we  regard  it  as  a  simple  idea.  All  the 
definitions  of  it,  hitherto  given,  are  nothing  more  than  synony¬ 
mous  expressions  or  identical  propositions.  The  meaning  ’or 
idea  of  freedom  must  spontaneously  arise  in  the  mind,  and  free¬ 
dom  itself  be  consciously  realized  and  felt,  or  no  definition  or 
description  can  ever  originate  the  idea.  It  is  open  for  consid¬ 
eration,  however,  at  what  point  the  element  of  freedom,  of  which 
the  mind  is  conscious,  comes  into  play  as  one  of  the  antecedents 
of  volition.  For,  from  the  moment  that  man  received  a  moral 

10 


110 


MAN. 


constitution,  reason  required  that  such  an  antecedent  there  should 
be,  and  consciousness  attested  its  existence.  To  affirm  that 
every  action,  like  the  will  itself,  is  originated  from  without,  and 
that  the  influence  originating  it,  encounters  no  such  element 
within  as  that  of  which  we  speak,  blit  passes  into  a  volition  as  a 
cause  producing  its  unmodified  effect,  is  fatalism.  To  affirm,  in 
effect,  that  the  Creator  could  not  give  me  a  choosing  power, 
without  Himself  causing  every  act  of  that  power  as  really  as  He 
caused  the  power  itself,  or  choosing  for  me  —  that  He  could  not 
endow  me,  that  is,  with  the  function  of  choice  without  retaining 
and  exercising  that  function  Himself —  is  a  self-contradiction. 
To  imply  that  nothing  but  necessity  is  possible,  that  it  is  not 
in  the  compass  of  Omnipotence  to  create  a  will  not  necessitated 
in  its  volitions,  as  it  respects  both  the  operation,  and  the  compo¬ 
sition,  of  the  motives  producing  them,  would  be  to  beg  the  point 
at  issue,  and  to  do  this  in  the  face  of  a  protesting  consciousness. 

16.  The  analogy  ordinarily  invoked  to  sustain  such  views 
from  the  laws  of  causation  in  the  material  world,  fails  in  the 
only  point  in  which  it  would  be  relevant,  for  the  physical  cause 
or  moving  power  is  external  to  the  thing  affected ;  in  the  in¬ 
stance  of  voluntary  agents,  the  motive  is  not  external.  Emo¬ 
tions  are  my  emotions,  states  of  my  mind,  expressions  o£  my 
character.  Granted,  that  inducements  to  action  come  from 
without,  the  very  fact  that  they  come  to  be  accepted  or  rejected, 
shows  that  the  mind  is  free  in  a  sense  which  takes  its  phenom¬ 
ena  out  of  all  strict  analogy  with  the  phenomena  of  mechanical 
causation.  Granted,  also,  that  some  of  these  inducements  are 
acted  on,  it  is  not  as  mere  objective  realities  that  they  move  me. 
They  do  not  adopt  me,  but  I,  a  person,  accept  them,  and  accept 
them  as  having  become  subjective  states  of  my  own  mind.  And 
does  not  Edwards  (it  will,  perhaps,  be  asked)  take,  substantially, 
the  same  view  of  the  motives  ?  distinctly  affirming  that  the  vo¬ 
lition  depends  not  only  upon  “  what  appears  in  the  object  view¬ 
ed,  but  also  in  the  manner  of  the  view,  and  the  state  and  circum¬ 
stances  of  the  mind  that  views in  other  words,  on  subjective 
as  well  as  on  objective  conditions?  Admitted.  This,  indeed, 
is  the  great  principle  of  his  system.  So,  also,  Mill,  in  insisting 
on  the  universality  of  the  law  of  causation,  affirms  that  “  by  say¬ 
ing  that  a  man’s  actions  necessarily  follow  from  his  character, 
all  that  is  really  meant  is,  that  he  invariably  does  act  in  con¬ 
formity  to  his  character.”*  But  the  question  is,  what  faculties 


*  System  of  Logic,  1.  419. 


PROGRESSION. 


Ill 


or  processes  are  concealed  or  included  in  this  state  of  mind ,  and 
in  this  character  ?  Do  they  really  involve  an  unconstrained 
power  ?  or  have  they  been  all  made  what  they  are  by  con¬ 
straint  ?  He  who  adopts  the  latter  alternative  ought,  in  fair¬ 
ness,  to  omit  the  subjective  element  in  his  account  of  the  condi¬ 
tions  on  which  volition  depends ;  or  else,  to  add  that,  ultimate¬ 
ly,  it  is  traceable  entirely  to  objective  causes,  and,  as  such,  is 
independent  of  the  man,  and  irresistibly  formative  of  him. 

17.  The  sense,  then,  in  which  we  speak  of  emotions  as  our 
emotions,  states  of  our  minds,  supposes  that  they  involve  the 
presence  of  an  element  of  freedom.  Coleridge,  indeed,  has  af¬ 
firmed  that  “  the  man  makes  the  motive,  and  not  the  motive  the 
man.”  Taken  without  explanation,  each  member  of  this  sen¬ 
tence  may  be  regarded  as  containing  only  a  half-truth.  From 
the  first  moment  of  conscious  volition,  the  man  and  the  motive 
begin  to  make  each  other ;  but  they  operate  in  a  certain  order. 
In  that  first  moment,  and  in  all  the  successive  acts  of  man’s 
voluntary  agency,  the  motive  chronologically  precedes  the  voli¬ 
tion,  the  will  psychologically  precedes  the  motive.  Even  though 
it  should  appear,  therefore,  that  the  motive  determines  the  voli¬ 
tion,  it  could  have  acquired  the  power  only  from  the  prior  con¬ 
sent  of  the  unconstrained  will  itself.  Motives  are  ever  modify¬ 
ing  character,  but,  primarily,  character  is  to  be  viewed  as  modi¬ 
fying  motives,  and,  therefore,  as  being  ultimately  the  sum  and 
result  of  its  own  acts. 

18.  In  corroboration  of  this  view,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind 
that  we  are  actually  indebted  for  the  idea  of  causation  to  the 
conscious  exertion  of  our  own  will.  I  make  an  effort  to  move 
my  arm,  and  I  move  it.  The  relation  between  the  effort  and 
the  movement  is  a  relation  of  succession  ;  but  it  is  more.  If  my 
consciousness  is  to  be  relied  on,  it  is  also  mediately  or  immedi¬ 
ately  a  relation  of  efficiency.  The  effort  supposed  is  in  the 
will ;  in  making  it  I  feel  that  I  really  produce  an  effect,  of  which 
the  organic  movement  is  the  manifestation  ;  and  it  is  in  the  con¬ 
sciousness  of  this  that  I  find  the  idea  of  cause.  And,  further, 
in  the  very  act  of  making  the  effort,  I  am  conscious  of  a  control¬ 
ling  power  in  reserve,  which  leaves  me  free  to  make  it  or  to  de¬ 
sist  from  it. 

19.  “  But  may  not  this  consciousness  be  an  illusion  arising 
from  our  ignorance  of  the  antecedent  causes  ?”  This  sentiment 
may  be  either  boldly  asserted,  or  tacitly  implied,  and  taken  for 
granted.  In  his  endeavor  to  reconcile  the  feeling  of  liberty 
with  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  Lord  Karnes,  in  his  Essays  and 


112 


MAN. 


Sketches ,  explicitly  adopted  and  advocated  it.  According  to 
him,  at  the  moment  when  man  imagines  that  he  is  performing 
his  own  act,  he  is  only  an  instrument  developing  a  concealed 
necessity.  He  is,  in  effect,  a  machine,  fancying  itself  an  agent. 
The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  his  nature  is  a  he,  and  he  is 
constituted  to  act  through  life  on  the  firm  faith  of  its  being  a 
truth.  Startling  as  this  consequence  may  be,  the  reasoning  of 
those  who  argue  the  doctrine  of  necessity  as  if  the  will  were 
subject  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  is  chargeable  with  involving  the  same  re¬ 
sults.  But,  in  proportion  to  the  revolting  nature  of  the  view 
adverted  to,  is  its  value  as  a  proof  of  our  consciousness  of  free¬ 
dom  ;  for  it  is  the  confession  of  an  ultra-necessarian  or  fatalist, 
of  the  utter  uselessness  of  questioning  the  fact  of  such  conscious¬ 
ness.  The  Stoics  themselves,  the  champions  of  fate,  strenuous¬ 
ly  asserted  the  liberty  of  the  will.*  Descartes,  in  the  same 
passage  in  which  he  asserts  that  God  is  the  cause  of  all  our  ac¬ 
tions,  appeals  to  the  evidence  of  consciousness  for  the  freedom 
of  the  will.t  Nothing  but  a  truth  deep-seated  in  the  conscious¬ 
ness,  could  thus  maintain  its  ground  amidst  hostile  views,  and 
cause  its  voice  to  be  heard  by  unwilling  ears.  It  is  recognized 
in  the  common  forms  of  speech  in  all  civilized  languages ;  in  the 
universal  faith,  in  the  judicial  administrations,  and  in  the  estab¬ 
lished  practices,  of  mankind ;  nor  does  any  rational  being  ever 
lose  the  consciousness  of  it. 

20.  Were  it  not  for  this  conscious  freedom,  man  would  be 
incapable  of  government  or  obligation.  Some,  indeed,  would 
object  that  the  possession  of  such  a  power  would  render  him  in¬ 
capable  of  government.  Superior  to  the  government  of  com¬ 
pulsion  and  necessity,  such  as  that  to  which  matter  is  subject,  it 
certainly  does  render  him.  But  not  incapable  of  rational  and 
moral  government ;  for  it  leaves  him  open  to  the  influence  of 
motives.  And  it  is  the  consciousness  of  his  power  to  deal  with 
this  influence  freely,  as  opposed  to  its  necessitating  force,  that 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  his  sense  of  responsibility.  To  say  that 
any  moral  obligation  could  rest  on  a  creature  whose  actions  are 
determined  by  necessity,  would  be  a  self-contradiction.  If  my 
volitions  are  truly  and  in  every  sense,  necessitated,  the  Divine 
jurisdiction  in  my  breast  cannot  commence  till  after  I  have 
willed.  If  my  power  has  no  reference  to  my  motives,  I  cannot 


*  Enchiridion  of  Epictetus ;  the  opening  sentences, 
t  Cartesii  Epistolce  Till.  IX.,  Pars  1. 


PROGRESSION. 


113 


be  held  responsible  for  acting  from  one  motive  ratlier  than  from 
another.  If  my  freedom  lies  exclusively  in  the  connection  be¬ 
tween  my  volitions  and  their  sequents,  why  yet  am  I  so  consti¬ 
tuted.  that  even  when  that  freedom  is  denied  me,  I  feel  con¬ 
scious  of  m  obligation  to  will,  purpose,  or  intend  a  certain  act, 
despite  my  want  of  opportunity  to  perform  it  ?  Of  power  with¬ 
out  responsibility  we  can  conceive ;  but  responsibility  without 
power  is  a  nullity.  An  unconstrained  will,  in  some  sense,  is 
essential  to  make  morality  even  possible.  And  if  the  authority 
of  consciousness  is,  as  we  saw,  ultimate  and  infallible  in  the  in¬ 
tellectual  department,  it  must  be  received  as  decisive  on  moral 
questions  also. 

21.  Fifthly,  an  important  element  of  this  great  subject  yet 
remains  to  be  considered,  and  one  which  is  vitally  involved  in 
our  general  proposition,  namely,  that  although  motives  are  not 
necessitating  causes  of  volitions,  they  stand  in  necessary  and 
harmonious  relation  to  them  as,  at  least,  conditions.  Many  of 
the  advocates  of  human  liberty  have  erred  in  not  assigning  to 
this  part  of  the  subject  its  due  importance.  In  their  anxiety 
to  protect  the  precious  interests  involved  in  the  conscious  fact 
of  an  unconstrained  will,  they  have  not  sufficiently  borne  in 
mind  that  this  freedom  itself  contemplates  the  attainment  of  an 
end ;  that  every  individual  will  is  placed  in  the  midst  of  a  great 
system,  of  which  every  part  has  a  tendency  in  the  same  direc¬ 
tion  as  that  in  which  the  will  finds  its  highest  liberty. 

22.  It  is  at  this  point  of  the  subject  —  if  anywhere  —  that  the 
necessarian  and  the  libertarian,  by  aiming  to  combine,  in  one 
view,  the  claims  of  the  individual  will  and  the  claims  of  the 
great  encircling  system  in  which  it  moves,  may  hope  to  approx¬ 
imate,  though  they  may  never  entirely  coalesce.  Each  errs, 
perhaps,  not  so  much  in  what  he  affirms,  as  in  what  he  denies. 
Each  approaches  and  contemplates  the  subject  from  a  different 
point,  and  seldom  sees  to  advantage  more  than  one  side  of  it. 
The  most  eminent  of  each  party  are  the  readiest  to  admit  that 
neither  view  alone  is  adequate  to  all  the  exigencies  of  the  sub¬ 
ject  ;  that  there  is  essential  truth  lying  on  each  side  of  the 
line  which  separates  them,  and  truth  which  is  separately  de¬ 
monstrable  ;  and  that  the  great  difficulty  lies  in  mutually  ac¬ 
cepting  each  other’s  mode  of  exhibiting  that  truth,  and  in  the 
reconciliation  of  their  respective  views.  To  conclude,  however, 
that  because  we  find  it  difficult  to  harmonize  two  propositions, 
therefore  they  are  irreconcilable,  or  else  one  of  them  must  be 
false,  is  to  erect  our  minds  into  the  standard  of  truth,  and  our 

10* 


114 


MAN. 


present  knowledge  into  the  measure  of  all  possible  attainments. 
Surely,  nothing  is  wanting  on  the  part  of  the  religious  dispu¬ 
tants  on  this  subjec.  but  a  little  Christian  magnanimity,  in  order 
to  dissipate  their  mutual  misunderstandings,  and  so  to  narrow 
the  debateable  ground  which  separates  them  as  to  make  them 
practically  one. 

23.  If  now  it  be  true,  as  stated,  that  man  is  made  for  an  end 
—  whatever  that  end  may  be  —  the  libertarian  must  concede 
that  the  liberty  of  the  will  cannot  be  such  as  to  leave  man  in¬ 
different  to  that  end.  Suppose  man  made  for  happiness,  it  can¬ 
not  be  a  condition  of  freedom  that  he  should  be  equally  biassed 
in  favor  of  misery.  Suppose  him,  again,  introduced  into  a  sys¬ 
tem  in  which  some  things  tend  to  his  misery,  and  others  flow  in 
the  direction  of  his  happiness,  it  cannot  be  required  in  order  to 
his  freedom  that  he  should  be  affected  by  both  classes  alike. 
But  if  he  be  not,  the  so-called  liberty  of  indifference  has  no  ex¬ 
istence.  And  it  was  against  that  theory  of  the  will  which 
invests  it  with  a  self-determining  power  irrespective  of  motives, 
that  Edwards  especially  directed  his  powerful  logic.  The  utter 
untenableness  of  such  a  theory  is  further  evident  from  the  fact 
that  it  makes  a  habit  of  virtue  or  of  vice  impossible  ;  for  in  pro¬ 
portion  as  a  course  of  conduct  became  habitual,  the  very  force 
of  the  habit  would  destroy  its  moral  character,  so  that  it  would 
be  only  necessary  for  a  man  to  persist  in  a  vice  until  it  became 
inveterate,  in  order  to  neutralize  his  guilt.  In  the  same  man¬ 
ner,  virtue  would  be  diminished  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  the  force 
of  the  motives  to  practise  it.  Accordingly,  AVhitby  and  others 
actually  taught  that  the  actions  of  the  holy  and  of  evil  angels 
are  alike  destitute  of  a  moral  character,  and  therefore  alike  un¬ 
susceptible  of  reward  and  punishment.  Now,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  revolting  difficulties  in  which  a  libertarian  entertaining 
such  views  would  be  involved  were  they  to  be  applied  to  the 
Divine  volitions,  we  may  safely  refer  them  for  a  reply  to  the 
consciousness  of  every  individual,  and  to  the  fearful  moral  con¬ 
sequences  to  which  they  directly  tend. 

24.  That  men  act  without  motives  is  a  doctrine  as  alien  from 
enlightened  views  of  an  unconstrained  will,  as  from  those  of 
moral  necessity.  Even  Dr.  S.  Clarke,  in  his  remarks  on  Col¬ 
lins,  affirms,  that  the  dictate  of  the  understanding  is  substantially 
the  same  as.the  determination  of  the  will,  and  cannot  be  distin¬ 
guished  from  it.  But  though  men  never  act  without  motives,  it 
is  contended  that  it  by  no  means  follows  that  their  actions  are 
caused  by  motives.  The  motives  are  the  necessary  occasion 


PROGRESSION. 


115 


and  condition  of  the  will’s  activity,  while  the  will  itself,  as  the 
principle  and  caase  of  its  own  volitions,  determines  the  particu¬ 
lar  volition,  in  the  view  of  these  motives,  to  be  what  it  is,  and 
not  otherwise.  “  What  determines  the  man  to  a  good  and  wor¬ 
thy  act,  we  will  say,  or  a  virtuous  course  of  conduct?  The 
intelligent  will,  or  the  self-determining  power  ?  True,  in  part , 
it  is  ;  and  therefore  the  will  is  pre-eminently  the  spiritual  con¬ 
stituent  in  our  being.  But  will  any  reflecting  man  admit  that 
liis  own  will  is  the  only  and  sufficient  determinant  of  all  he  is, 
and  all  he  does  ?  Is  nothing  to  be  attributed  to  the  harmony 
of  the  system  to  which  he  belongs,  and  to  the  pre-established 
fitness  of  the  objects  and  agents,  known  and  unknown,  that  sur¬ 
round  him,  as  acting  on  the  will,  though,  doubtless,  with  it  like¬ 
wise  ?  a  process  which  the  co-instantaneous,  yet  reciprocal  ac¬ 
tion  of  the  air,  and  the  vital  energy  of  the  lungs  in  breathing, 
may  help  to  render  intelligible.”  *  More  strikingly  still  may 
this  illustration  be  made  to  serve  its  purpose,  if  we  think  of  the 
moment  in  which  the  air  and  the  lungs  first  come  into  contact 
at  the  birth  of  the  infant.  What  nice  arrangement  and  exqui¬ 
site  adaptation  are  necessary  in  order  to  bring  about  the  coinci¬ 
dence  of  the  two  in  that  eventful  moment !  Without  the  sur¬ 
rounding  air  there  would  be  no  motion  of  the  lungs,  no  life  ;  but 
the  air  is  only  a  condition  of  life.  Were  it  the  cause,  the  lungs 
would  never  cease  to  play  as  long  as  they  continued  to  be  sup¬ 
plied  with  air. 

In  a  manner  somewhat  analogous,  motives,  as  conditions, 
influential  conditions,  are  necessarily  co-present  with  our  voli¬ 
tions.  For  man  to  act  without  motives,  even  if  it  were  optional, 
would  only  serve  to  convict  him  of  irrationality.  To  affirm 
that  he  is  naturally  constituted  to  act  and  will  without  reasons, 
would  be  to  lower  him  to  a  level  with  animal  instinct.  That 
he  is  really  influenced  by  motives  is  a  fact  of  which  he  is  as 
conscious  as  that  he  is  not  irresistibly  determined  by  them. 
So  that  while  motives  are  not  physically  the  causa  causans , 
equally  clear  is  it  that  they  are  the  sine  qua  non  of  our  voli¬ 
tions.  If  a  will  necessarily  constrained  by  motives  is  a  contra¬ 
diction,  it  is  equally  evident  that  a  will  separate  from,  and  unin¬ 
fluenced  by  them,  is  a  nonentity. 

25.  But  how  is  this  view  of  the  necessity  of  acting  from  a 
motive  compatible  with  the  doctrine  of  an  unconstrained  will  ? 
We  think  it  may  be  shown,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  neither  in 


.  *  Coleridge’s  Aids,  &c.,  p.  67. 


116 


MAN. 


the  being  of  God,  nor  in  the  laws  of  nature,  (and  these  are  the 
only  sources  whence  opposition  could  come,)  is  there  any¬ 
thing  incompatible  with  the  co-existence  and  perfect  harmony 
of  the  two. 

The  first  part  of  the  problem  is  this :  —  Can  a  particular  will 
exist  at  the  same  time  with  a  universal  will  ?  Can  the  freedom 
of  the  finite  being  exist  without  being  overborne  by  the  infinite 
power  of  God  ?  and  His  power  escape  invasion  from  the  un¬ 
compelled  activity  of  the  human  will  ?  That  all  beings  are 
necessarily  dependent  on  God  —  that  their  dependence  is  not 
an  arbitrary  arrangement,  but  the  inevitable  condition  of  their 
continued  existence,  is  a  fundamental  truth ;  and  the  question 
is,  —  can  man’s  personal  freedom  co-exist  with  this  state  of 
dependency  ?  Now,  that  freedom  and  law  can  co-exist  is 
evident ;  for  the  highest  freedom  and  the  highest  law  actually 
exist  in  perfect  combination  in  the  Creator  himself.  We  behold 
it  in  that  co-existence  of  voluntariness  and  appointment  which 
constitutes  the  basis  of  the  whole  scheme  of  Divine  manifesta¬ 
tion.  It  is  recognizable  even  prior  to  that,  in  the  order  of 
thought,  in  the  still  more  simple  form  of  that  Primary  purpose 
by  which  the  Self-sufficient  bound  himself  to  appear  as  the 
All-sufficient,  and  thus,  certainly ,  for  an  infinite  Reason,  yet 
voluntarily ,  brought  himself  under  obligation  to  do  that  which 
He  will  certainly,  yet  voluntarily,  be  ever  doing. 

26.  But  if  such  co-existence  be  realized  in  God,  we  can 
show  next  that  a  similar  co-existence  in  man  is  not  merely 
probable,  but  is  even  made  necessary,  by  the  great  end  of  the 
Divine  manifestation.  Even  if  no  such  end  existed  —  if  the 
design  of  God  in  creation  were  simply  to  be  known ,  the  co¬ 
incidence  of  law  and  will  in  man  was  necessary  ;  for  if  this 
coincidence  exist  in  the  Divine  Being,  the  only  condition  on 
which  it  would  be  possible  for  us  to  know  it  would  be,  that  He 
will  the  existence  of  the  same  in  us.  If  His  design  were  only 
to  be  loved ,  this  coincidence  was  still  necessary ;  for  none  but 
personal  beings  —  beings  influenced  by  motives,  and  determined 
by  will  —  possess  the  capability  of  loving,  as  none  but  such  are 
the  proper  objects  of  love.  But  the  great  and  ultimate  design 
of  creation  is  the  manifestation  of  the  Divine  All-sufficiency. 
The  greater  the  Divine  Perfection,  the  more  certainly  will  that 
perfection  be  exhibited  in  the  most  exalted  of  His  creatures. 
Now  the  co-existence  of  law  with  freedom  in  His  own  nature 
is  the  highest  perfection  of  which  a  creature  can  conceive.  It 
is  that  alone  which  makes  a  holy  and  a  happy  creation  pos- 


PROGRESSION. 


117 


sible.  Not  to  impart  this  perfection  to  a  creature,  is  to  leave 
His  highest  glory  as  a  Creator  unrevealed.  Destitute  of  this 
characteristic,  man,  so  far  from  being  in  His  image,  would  be 
most  unlike  Him;  for  he  would  want  the  very  perfection  which 
distinguishes  an  intelligent  and  a  personal  God  from  a  blind, 
impersonal,  and  resistless  fate.  And  creation,  as  it  would  only 
exhibit  a  power  working  mechanically  with  blind  impulsion, 
would,  instead  of  displaying  His  glory,  only  serve  to  detract 
from  it.  Man,  then,  may  be  expected  to  resemble  God  in  this 
important  respect.  But  this  is  saying,  in  effect,  that  his  par¬ 
ticular  will  can  co-exist  with  the  Universal  will.  For  the  co¬ 
incidence  of  law  and  freedom  —  of  motive  and  volition — in  God 
is  the  very  thing  to  be  manifested.  And  the  coincidence  of 
man’s  own  individual  will  with  the  Divine  will  is  essential  to 
make  the  manifestation  possible. 

27.  But,  it  may  be  asked  whether  it  is  permissible  to  reason 
from  the  law  which  regulates  the  Divine  activity  to  the  law  of 
man’s  dependence  ?  Are  they  sufficiently  analogous,  that  is,  to 
justify  the  conclusion  that  if  the  former  co-exists  with  Divine 
freedom,  the  latter  is  equally  compatible  with  human  liberty  ? 
We  cannot  hesitate  to  reply  in  the  affirmative.  For  the  nature 
of  the  difficulty  to  be  solved  is  the  same  in  each  instance.  True, 
in  the  former  case,  the  law  is  freely  Self-imposed ;  while,  in  the 
latter,  it  is  an  unavoidable  necessary  condition.  But  the  point 
in  question  is,  not  the  origin  of  the  law,  nor  the  reason  of  the 
law,  but  the  reconcilement  of  its  actual  existence  with  real  free¬ 
dom — for  law  is  limitation.  Now,  in  the  manifested  God  we 
actually  behold  self-limitation ;  a  limitation  of  power  which, 
having  been  originated,  not  only  permits  the  existence  of  other 
powers,  but  even  them  wanderings,  'without  crushing  them ;  a 
limitation  of  activity  which,  so  far  from  doing  all  things  at  once, 
admits  of  unending  progression ;  a  limitation  freely  Self-imposed 
for  the  highest  purpose,  and  of  which  the  highest  perfection 
alone  is  capable.  Not  merely,  therefore,  is  freedom  compatible 
with  the  limitation  of  law,  we  have,  here,  the  archetype  of  this 
grand  truth  for  all  orders  of  free  intelligences,  and  the  ground 
of  its  existence  and  manifestation  in  them.  He  “hides  His 
power,”  that  man’s  power  might  not  be  overborne.  He  veils 
His  effulgence,  and  circumscribes  His  activity,  that  man  might 
be  able  to  look  abroad,  and  might  find  ample  scope  for  his  free 
agency. 

28.  And,  by  the  same  arrangement,  the  Divine  agency 
escapes  the  infringement  of  the  free  activity  of  the  human  will. 


118 


MAST. 


The  possibility  of  man’s  sinning,  indeed,  only  demonstrates  tne 
reality  of  his  freedom.  And  the  fact  that  his  sinning  was  cnly 
possible,  and  not  necessary,  proves  that  the  limitation  arising 
from  his  dependence  left  that  reality  untouched.  We  are  not 
now,  however,  treating  of  man  actual  and  historical,  but  of  man 
potential.  And,  we  repeat,  that  the  fact  that  the  infinitely  free 
God  was  pleased  to  will  the  limitation  of  His  own  agency,  is 
the  very  ground  which  makes  the  freedom  of  man  possible, 
though  he  is  dependent ;  and  which  provides  for  his  obedience, 
though  he  is  free.  While  his  necessary  finiteness  and  depend¬ 
ence  surround  him  with  a  circle  beyond  which  he  has  no  power 
to  move,  the  Supreme  Will  assigns  that,  within  that  circle,  his 
will  shall  be  free  from  the  centre  to  the  circumference.  And 
what  higher  guarantee  can  be  given  that  his  unconstrained 
movements  will  be  all  in  harmony  with  the  free  activity  of 
the  Supreme  Agent,  than  the  fact,  that  his  freedom  is  an  en¬ 
dowment  designed  expressly  to  manifest  and  represent  the 
Divine  freedom  ? 

29.  This  coincidence  of  the  free  human  will  with  the  Divine 
is  essential,  therefore,  in  order  to  its  perfection.  For  if  the 
operation  of  the  Divine  will  is  according  to  infinite  reason,  and 
is  therefore  perfect,  the  “freedom  of  a  finite  will  is  possible 
under  this  condition  only,  that  it  becomes  one  with  the  will  of 
God.”  Where  this  harmony  has  either  never  been  disturbed, 
or  is  entirely  restored,  holy  influences  from  without  may  be 
supposed  to  act  on  and  through  the  emotions  most  directly. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  mind  to  divert  their  course,  or  to  di¬ 
minish  their  intensity.  “The  pure  in  heart  shall  see  God;” 
and  the  light  which  streams  from  his  presence  reaches  their 
will  without  decomposition  or  refraction.  Voluntarily  they  place 
themselves  in  a  fine  with  its  rays,  and  spontaneously  move  only 
in  the  direction  of  its  beams ;  and  as  they  go  on  consciously 
brightening  under  its  radiance,  the  continuous  act  of  uncon- 
strained  choice  which  retains  them  in  it,  reflects  it  back  again 
in  homage  with  added  splendor.  And  thus  the  state  in  which 
they  appear,  from  their  spontaneous  and  perfect  conformity  to 
the  Divine  law,  to  be  the  least  free,  or  to  be  most  completely 
surrendered  to  the  "will  of  God,  is  the  state  in  which  each  is 
most  vividly  conscious  of  individuality,  and  in  which  all  feel 
themselves  most  exultingly  free. 

30.  This  view  suggests  the  reply  appropriate  to  the  second 
part  of  the  inquiry — How  can  the  freedom  of  the  human  will 
consist  with  the  necessary  laws  to  which  nature  is  subjected  ? 


PROGRESSION. 


119 


Nature  itself  owes  its  origin  to  the  same  source?  and  exists  for 
the  same  end,  as  the  human  mind,  however  different  its  consti¬ 
tution.  Had  the  free  human  being  come  into  a  world  not  jet 
subjected  to  law  (admitting  for  a  moment  the  possibility  of  such 
a  world),  he  would  have  found  that  until  it  was  brought  under 
law,  it  was  no  world  for  him  either  to  know  or  to  employ.  Its 
pre-existing  laws  were  the  very  conditions  of  its  habitableness. 
All  of  them,  however,  are  but  the  appointments  and  inferior 
expressions  of  the  same  Divine  will  which  has  endowed  him 
with  freedom.  It  is  not  possible,  therefore,  to  conceive,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  nature  as  standing  in  contradiction  to  freedom  ; 
and  if,  on  the  other,  the  human  will  is  in  coincidence  with  the 
Divine  will,  it  follows  that  it  is  in  coincidence  with  everything 
that  expresses  that  will,  and  therefore  with  nature.  Besides, 
nature  itself  is  mechanical  only  as  viewed  apart  from  its  Maker; 
and  as  having  no  will  of  its  own,  or  in  itself.  Regarded  as  the 
production  of  the  Infinite  will,  and  the  expression  of  Divine 
attributes,  it  supposes  that  the  finite  will  which  already  agrees 
with  the  Infinite  will,  is  one  with  nature  also.  “  The  finite 
will,”  as  Coleridge  expresses  it,*  “  gives  a  beginning  only  by 
coincidence  with  the  absolute  will,  which  is  at  the  same  time, 
infinite  power.  Such  is  the  language  of  religion,  and  of  phi¬ 
losophy  too,  in  the  last  instance.  But  I  express  the  same  truth 
in  ordinary  lano:ua°;e  when  I  say  that  a  finite  will,  or  a  finite 
free-agent,  acts  outwardly  by  confluence  with  the  laws  of 
nature.”  Primarily,  the  only  freedom  he  needs,  is  that  of  being 
able  to  act  on  his  own  nature,  to  assert  his  exemption  from  the 
iron  chain  of  physical  laws.  And  this  liberty  he  consciously 
asserts,  partly  in  the  high  ends  to  which  he  applies  these  laws. 
Availing  himself  of  these,  or  acting  in  harmony  with  them,  his 
power  over  nature  is  of  a  degree  unknown  —  a  power,  indeed, 
which,  as  comprehended  in  his  own  will,  corresponds  with  the 
Supreme  will.  Nature  thus  treated,  so  far  from  being  hostile  to 
his  freedom,  aspires  to  share  it ;  and  he,  the  finite  artist,  aspires 
to  call  into  existence  forms  unknown  to  nature  —  a  second 
nature — in  humble  imitation  of  the  productive  energy  of  the 
Creator. 

31.  And  thus  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion,  that  though  motives 
are  not  the  compelling  cause  of  volitions,  they  yet  stand  har¬ 
moniously  related  to  them  as  essential  conditions.  This  is  at 
once  a  fact  of  observation,  and  a  truth  of  consciousness.  It  is 


*  Ads  to  Reflection,  p.  261. 


120 


MAN. 


this  which  makes  both  sin  and  holiness  possible.  And  it  is 
this  wondrous  arrangement  by  which  man,  the  inferior  part  of 
whose  constitution  is  itself  mechanical  and  necessary,  possesses 
the  means  of  bringing  that  part  of  his  nature  into  the  Divine 
presence,  and  of  offering  it  up  as  a  free-will  offering  to  God. 
Thus  resembling  his  Maker  in  another  respect  ;  for  as  all 
material  nature  is  the  product  of  the  Divine  will,  and  is  made 
subservient  to  the  Divine  glory,  so  man,  made  in  the  image  of 
God,  possesses  the  means  of  subjecting  that  condensed  world, 
his  own  nature,  to  the  Divine  will,  as  the  free  act  of  his  own 
individual  will. 

32.  We  have  now  to  attempt,  as  proposed,  a  brief  exposition 
of  the  laws  of  the  will  in  relation  to  motives.  If  the  view  which 
we  have  taken  be  correct,  it  may  be  expected  (1.)  that  the  will 
is  capable  of  availing  itself,  in  some  manner,  of  the  different 
motives  or  classes  of  motives,  to  an  act  or  a  course  of  conduct, 
before  it  decides  what  that  course  shall  be.  Motives  are  of 
different  orders,  answering  to  man’s  different  relations,  internal 
and  external ;  motives  arising  from  his  appetites,  his  self-love, 
his  affections,  and  his  regal'd  for  the  will  of  God.  (Of  that 
sense  of  duty,  or  consciousness  of  obligation,  which  may 
underlie  the  entire  field  of  motives,  and  which,  when  present, 
adds  to  them  a  sacred  and  ultimate  character,  we  have  not  now 
to  speak.)  These  motives  lie  around  the  will,  and  enclose  it. 
The  more  a  man  observes,  converses,  and  reflects,  the  more  the 
motives  of  each  class  are  multiplied.  No  motive  of  one  class 
can  influence  him  to  put  forth  a  volition,  to  which  volition  mo¬ 
tives  belonging  to  the  other  classes  do  not  also  bear  a  more  or 
less  intimate  relation.  Are  these  other  classes  of  motives  to 
exist  in  vain  ?  At  one  time  or  other,  they  have  been  present 
to  his  mind;  can  they  in  no  way  be  recovered  when  it  is  most 
important  that  they  should  be  felt  ?  and,  if  they  are  recoverable, 
what  is  the  state  of  the  mind  in  the  interval  which  passes 
between  the  first  motive  to  an  act,  and  the  action  ?  Now,  that 
the  will  is  not  necessarily  impelled  by  the  first  motive  which 
acts  on  it,  in  any  given  instance,  we  have  seen  already.  And  if, 
naving  decided  not  to  yield  to  it,  at  least,  till  other  motives 
appear;  if,  during  this  pause,  the  mind  re-produces  prior  con¬ 
victions,  or  presents  new  considerations,  and  if  the  will  is  then 
decided  by  these  latter  reasons,  it  has  in  so  far  resisted  the 
first  motive,  and  has  adopted  another,  which  presented  itself  as 
the  indirect  consequence  of  that  resistance.  This  is  a  mental 
process  of  familiar  occurrence  If  the  plurality  of  motives 


PROGRESSION 


121 


between  which  the  will  decides  be  not  a  plurality  of  co¬ 
existence,  but  of  successive  existence,  the  process  begins  in  the 
act  of  the  will  negativing  the  first  motive,  and  thus  affoiding 
scope  and  opportunity  for  the  introduction  of  others ;  this  is 
followed  by  the  power  of  recollection,  or  suggestion,  or  both, 
producing  them ;  and  of  attention  in  regarding  them ;  though 
after  all,  perhaps,  the  first  motive  may  prevail.  This  power 
of  the  will  it  is  which  constitutes  the  chief  difference  between 
the  mere  creature  of  impulse  or  of  circumstances,  and  the  man 
who  acts  from  wise  deliberation. 

33.  (2.)  It  would  further  augment  the  power  of  the  will  if, 
besides  being  able  to  call  for  objects  of  thought  as  motives  to 
action,  each  of  these  objects  should  suggest  to  the  mind  a  train 
of  other  and  associated  objects,  accompanied  by  their  appropri¬ 
ate  emotions.  Now,  such  proves  to  be  the  fact.  An  object 
may  solicit  the  will  to  move  in  a  particular  direction,  but  before 
the  movement  is  made,  other  objects  of  thought  are  summoned 
to  reinforce  the  prior  motive,  or  else  to  counteract  it.  They 
come  not  singly,  but  in  linked  association ;  and  it  depends  on 
which  of  these  the  attention  fixes,  and  on  its  character,  as  to 
whether  the  will  moves  in  the  direction  at  first  indicated,  or  in 
an  opposite  course.  Not  only  will  that  act  of  attention  magnify 
the  importance  of  the  object,  and  invest  it  with  a  light  which 
will  cast  the  others  into  shade ;  if  that  act  of  attention  be  con¬ 
tinued,  the  effect  will  be  to  bring  all  those  other  thoughts  as 
auxiliaries,  and  to  range  them  around  that  central  motive,  to 
strengthen  and  to  serve  it.  Everything  will  seem  to  join  as 
minor  motives,  in  urging  the  will  in  the  direction  of  that  selected 
and  principal  motive. 

How  vital  the  connection  which  exists  between  the  subjective 
and  the  objective,  when  the  world  without  is  thus  able  to  call 
up  trains  of  thought  in  the  world  within ;  and  the  world  within 
to  be  ever  drawing  in  fresh  materials  of  thought  from  the  world 
without !  How  vital  the  connection  between  these  movements 
within,  when,  to  call  for  a  single  thought  is  to  tend ,  at  least,  to 
move  the  whole  ;  and  when,  of  all  which  do  appear,  there  is  not 
one  which  might  not  prove  an  incentive  to  action  !  And  how 
lofty  that  power  of  the  mind  which,  when  surrounded  by  these 
motives,  and  influenced  by  them,  can  yet  decide  to  which  it 
will  yield ! 

34.  (3.)  The  power  of  the  will  would  be  still  greater  if,  be¬ 
sides  indirectly  calling  for  motives  to  action,  it  could  select  and 
attend  to  any  one  of  these  motives  at  pleasure.  We  say  m- 

11 


122 


MAN. 


directly  call  for  them,  for,  as  we  have  shown  above,  the  will 
cannot,  on  the  instant,  bid  any  or  every  train  of  thought  into  its 
presence  which  the  nature  of  the  impending  volition  might  ren¬ 
der  seasonable  and  important.  But,  having  delayed  the  volition, 
having  resisted  a  present  motive  that  it  might  delay,  and  having 
thus  placed  itself  in  a  condition  to  receive  the  influence-.of  other 
motives,  the  mind  does  possess  the  important  power  of  selecting 
either  of  these,  and  of  concentrating  upon  it  the  whole  of  its 
regards.  This  is  the  faculty  of  attention;  and  an  act  of  attention 
is  a  voluntary  act,  an  exercise  or  manifestation  of  the  will. 

According  to  a  preceding  head,  I  can,  by  a  volition,  transport 
myself  to  a  new  scene  of  observation ;  and,  in  so  far,  I  must 
be  regarded  as  voluntarily  exposing  myself  to  the  action  or 
influence  of  whatever  objects  that  scene  may  exhibit.  But, 
when  surrounded  by  these  objects,  I  can,  according  to  the 
present  head,  determine,  by  another  volition,  on  which,  or 
whether  on  any,  of  all  these  objects  I  will  fix  my  regards.  Be¬ 
sides  the  muscular  power  which  my  will  employed  to  take  me 
to  the  spot,  I  can,  when  there,  employ  the  same  muscular  power 
to  remove  me  from  it;  or  to  close  my  eyes  and  to  shut  out  the 
entire  scene ;  or  to  keep  my  gaze  steadily  fixed  on  only  one  of 
all  the  objects  which  it  contains.  So  also,  by  voluntarily  calling 
for  certain  objects  of  thought,  and  by  bringing  them  from  the 
past,  the  distant,  or  the  future,  I  am,  in  effect,  willing  the  emo¬ 
tions  which  they  are  calculated  to  excite.  The  particular  ob¬ 
ject  I  wish  to  think  of,  indeed,  may  be  forgotten  ;  but  something 
relating  to  it  may  be  remembered,  and  by  dwelling  upon  that, 
I  am  voluntarily  giving  it  the  opportunity  of  recalling  all  the 
objects  of  thought  with  which  it  is  associated  ;  and,  among  them, 
the  particular  idea  I  desire  to  recover.  Not  only  therefore  is 
the  emotional  influence  of  that  particular  idea  when  recovered 
to  be  traced  back  to  that  act  of  the  will  which  first  called  for  it, 
but  whatever  influence  has  been  shed  on  me  by  the  train  of 
ideas  which  at  length  brought  me  to  it,  I  must  be  regarded  as 
having  voluntarily  submitted  to  likewise.  And,  in  like  manner, 
if  I  desire  to  avoid  a  certain  object  of  thought,  I  can  call  for  one 
of  a  contrary  nature ;  in  which  case,  I  voluntarily  withdraw  my 
mind  from  one  class  of  emotions  and  subject  it  to  another. 

35.  (4.)  Further,  the  power  of  the  will  would  be  shown  if, 
besides  being  able  to  summon  objects  as  occasions  of  motives 
into  its  presence,  and  to  select  any  one  of  these  as  an  object  of 
attention,  the  effect  of  that  attention  should  be  to  render  our 
perception  of  that  object  more  vivid  than  it  ivould  otherwise  be. 


PROGRESSION. 


123 


«  The  first  effect  of  our  attention,”  says  Dr.  Chalmers,*  “  is  the 
brightening  of  that  object  to  which  it  is  directed,  or  rather,  the 
clearer  view  which  we  ourselves  acquire  of  it.  There  is  not  a 
greater  quantity  of  light  upon  that  which  we  are  looking  to,  but 
the  look  itself  makes  the  same  quantity  of  light  serve  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  a  more  distinct  and  luminous  perception.”  The  differ¬ 
ence  of  effect  between  a  vague  reverie  in  which  a  whole  train 
of  mental  objects  glides  along  indistinctly,  and  a  vigorous  effort 
of  attention  in  which  the  mind  is  concentrated  on  one  ot  these 
objects,  is  just  that  which  follows  from  glancing  carelessly  at  a 
landscape  when  deepening  in  the  shades  of  evening,  and  that 
which  arises  from  singling  out  one  of  the  figures  of  the  land¬ 
scape,  approaching  it,  and  making  it  for  a  while  the  exclusive 
object  of  regard  —  that  is,  it  gradually  detaches  itself  from  the 
surrounding  objects  with  which  it  had  appeared  confounded,  and 
assumes  and  reveals  its  own  definite  outline.  And  then,  not 
merely  is  the  emotion  excited  by  an  object,  a  summons  to  at¬ 
tend  to  it,  but  the  effect  of  our  attending  to  it  is,  very  generally, 
and  up  to  a  certain  point,  an  increase  of  emotion.  And  thus 
the  will,  besides  exercising  an  influence  anterior  to  the  emotion 
by  calling  for  objects  of  thought  likely  to  excite  it,  can  then  ex¬ 
ert  its  power  in  the  presence  of  these  objects  by  selecting  any 
one  of  them,  and  confining  its  attention  to  that,  and  then  show 
its  power  over  that  selected  object  by  so  holding  it  before  the 
mind  as  to  render  it  the  occasion  of  deep  interest  and  emotion. 

36.  Now  these  laws  of  the  will  in  respect  to  the  emotions, 
disclose  the  secret  of  the  error  of  those  who  affirm  that  belief  is 
an  involuntary,  and  therefore  an  irresponsible  act,  as  well  as  the 
ground  on  which  it  may  be  boldly  met  with  the  counter-affirma¬ 
tion,  that  man  is  accountable  for  his  belief.  “  The  state  of  mind 
which  constitutes  belief  is,  indeed,  one  over  which  the  will  has 
no  direct  power.  But  belief  depends  upon  evidence  ;  the  result 
of  even  the  best  evidence  is  entirely  dependent  on  attention  ; 
and  attention  is  a  voluntary  intellectual  state  over  which  we 
have  a  direct  and  absolute  control.  As  it  is,  therefore,  by  pro¬ 
longed  and  continued  attention  that  evidence  produces  belief,  a 
man  may  incur  the  deepest  guilt  by  his  disbelief  of  truths  which 
he  has  failed  to  examine  with  the  care  which  is  due  to  them.”t 


*  Moral  Philosophy,  chap.  v.  p.  195.  The  whole  of  this  chapter,  “  Os 
the  Morality  of  the  Emotions,”  and  of  the  preceding  one,  “  On  the  Com 
mand  which  the  Will  has  over  the  Emotions,”  are  of  great  value, 
t  Abercrombie’s  Moral  Peelings,  p.  18*2. 


124 


MAN. 


While  man  is  by  no  means  responsible  for  the  evidence  of  the 
tiling  to  be  believed  or  disbelieved,  for  the  attention  which  he 
gives  to  it  he  is  responsible ;  for  this  is  under  the  control  of  his 
will,  and  on  this  depends  the  presence  or  the  absence  of  convic¬ 
tion. 

37.  And  here,  also,  we  see  the  sense  in  which  the  apparently 
paradoxical  proposition  is  strictly  true,  that  belief  precedes  and 
prepares  the  way  for  the  understanding.  The  evidence  of  the 
truth  of  a  proposition  is  one  thing,  the  meaning  of  the  proposi¬ 
tion  so  evidenced  is  another ;  the  reception  of  the  former  may 
be  indispensable  to  the  comprehension  of  the  latter.  .  This  is 
true  in  relation  even  to  many  of  the  phenomena  of  physical  sci¬ 
ence.  The  fact  of  there  being  antipodes,  is  only  one  of  the 
many  truths  which  philosophy  itself  once  pronounced  to  be  “  ut¬ 
terly  inconceivable.”  And  it  was  not  until  attention  to  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  the  fact  had  commanded  belief,  that  the  mind  was 
enabled  to  conceive  of  the  fact  itself.  The  belief  of  the  evidence 
of  the  fact,  prepared  the  way  for  the  apprehension  and  admis¬ 
sion  of  the  fact  itself.  Still  more  generally  does  the  same  order 
obtain  in  the  department  of  moral  truth.  The  evidence  of  the 
fact  of  a  Divine  revelation,  for  example,  is  one  thing ;  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  its  contents  is  another.  Now,  he  who  erroneously  denies 
that  he  is  responsible  for  his  belief,  will  surely  admit  that  he  is 
responsible  for  a  sincere  desire  to  know  the  truth.  But  this 
desire  cannot  be  sincere  if  he  do  not  accord  to  the  evidences  of 
revelation  the  attention  which  its  importance  deserves.  This  at¬ 
tention  is  a  voluntary  exercise,  and  this  voluntary  exercise,  issuing 
in  belief,  provides,  in  the  meaning  of  the  revelation  whose  claims 
are  admitted,  a  new  object  of  attention  of  transcendent  interest, 
which  attention,  again,  is,  at  least,  one  of  the  conditions  of  rightly 
understanding  it.  And  thus  it  is  that  a  man’s  moral  state  influences 
his  intellectual  conclusions  ;  and  that  there  may  be  guilt  attached 
to  his  ignorance,  his  judgments,  and  his  beliefs,  because  his  atten¬ 
tion  never  took  the  initial  step  for  arriving  at  the  truth,  or  because 
he  voluntarily  took  that  step  in  a  state  of  mind  for  which  he 
was  responsible,  and  which  could  ensure  only  a  wrong  result. 

38.  (5.)  Still  further  is  the  importance  of  the  will  in  the  won¬ 
derful  economy  of  the  mind  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  while 
one  emotion  continues,  and  in  proportion  to  its  intensity,  the 
mind  is  incapable  of  receiving  impressions  from  extraneous  ob¬ 
jects.  The  attention,  in  the  very  act  of  fastening  its  eye  on  a 
single  object  withdraws  the  mind  from  the  objects  which  lie 
around  it;  and,  then,  in  proportion  to  the  light  with  which  that 


PROGRESSION. 


125 


attention  invests  that  object,  all  the  surrounding  objects  are 
eclipsed  and  disappear.  Hence  it  is  that  the  attention  of  two 
persons  may  be  fixed  on  apparently  the  same  object,  and  yet 
they  may  be  affected  in  a  manner  diametrically  opposite.  Let 
the  object  be  supposed  to  present  the  twofold  aspect  of  suffer¬ 
ing  and  unsightliness,  and  the  explanation  is,  that  the  attention 
of  one  was  so  riveted  on  the  suffering  that  he  heeded  not  the 
unsightliness,  and  that  the  attention  of  the  other  was  so  en¬ 
grossed  by  the  unsightliness  that  he  was  blind  to  the  suffering. 

39.  The  great  advantage,  and,  as  we  believe,  the  Divine 
design  of  this  arrangement  is,  that  the  man  might  persevere  in 
the  comparatively  undistracted  study  cf  one  subject  till  it  be 
understood,  or  rightly  appreciated,  before  he  passes  on  to 
another;  and  that,  as  objects  rank  very  variously  in  importance, 
he  might  be  able  to  award  the  right  amount  of  regard  to  the 
superior  without  being  diverted  by  the  inferior,  and  to  the  infe¬ 
rior,  when  necessary,  without  being  entirely  engrossed  by  the 
superior.  To  the  same  law  it  is  owing,  that  the  exhibition  to 
the  mind  of  a  new  class  of  truths  or  facts  may  become  the 
means  of  entirely  displacing  objects  which  had  previously 
engrossed  the  attention.  This  makes  a  gradual  change  of  the 
character  possible.  Surrounded  by  a  new  objective  let  down 
from  Heaven,  the  mind  which  had  looked  only  at  the  sensible 
and  the  passing,  may  come  to  “  look,  not  at  the  things  which 
are  seen,  but  at  the  things  which  are  not  seen  ”  and  “  eternal.” 

40.  (6.)  The  power  of  the  will  would  be  considerably  in¬ 
creased  if  it  were  the  tendency  both  of  emotion  to  become 
weaker  by  repetition,  and  of  voluntary  acts  to  become  easier 
and  more  frequent  by  repetition.  Now,  this  is  found  to  be 
actually  the  case.  The  frequent  repetition  of  any  mechanical 
act,  at  stated  periods,  renders  it  more  and  more  facile,  till  at 
length  it  comes  to  be  accomplished  almost  unconsciously,  and 
leaves  the  performer  at  liberty  to  attend  to  other  things  while 
he  is  doing  it.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  more  frequently  the 
thoughts  are  voluntarily  turned  into  a  given  channel,  and  a  vir¬ 
tuous  act  is  consequently  performed,  the  less  vividly  is  the 
emotion  felt  which  first  attracted  the  thoughts  in  that  direction, 
and  prompted  to  that  action  ;  and  the  less  necessary  is  it  foi 
the  will  to  put  forth  an  effort  to  induce  us  to  perform  it.  This 
is  the  law  of  the  momentous  power  of  Habit.  And  the  end 
gained  by  it  is  obvious.  The  design  of  external  objects  is, 
through  the  medium  of  thought,  to  produce  emotions,  and  the 
object  of  these  is  under  the  determining  power  of  the  will,  to 

11* 


126 


MAN. 


lead  to  outward  action.  But  when  the  action  has  become  easy 
and  familiar,  the  emotion  is  no  longer,  to  the  same  degree, 
necessary.  When  the  scene  of  wretchedness  to  which  we  were 
at  first  attracted  by  deep  and  even  painful  commiseration,  -has 
been  frequented  so  often  that  our  visits  have  become  habitual, 
where  would  be  the  advantage  or  necessity  of  the  painful  emo¬ 
tion  ?  The  intensity  of  the  feeling  gradually  diminishes,  and 
is  exchanged  for  the  habit  of  active  benevolence. 

41 .  The  advantages  of  this  wise  arrangement  are  numerous. 

o  o 

It  leaves  the  emotional  part  of  our  nature  free  to  be  attracted  in 
a  new  direction,  and  to  be  excited  by  fresh  objects  of  interest ; 
and  as  we  are  capable  of  only  a  limited  measure  of  excitement, 
this  economizing  of  our  sensibility  is  of  great  importance  to  our 
progress  in  knowledge  and  virtue.  It  tends  to  prepare  us  to 
look  beyond  the  visible  and  the  present  for  objects  commensu¬ 
rate  with  our  capacity  of  enjoyment.  As  mere  sublunary  ob 
jects  of  interest  are  necessarily  limited,  and  the  interest  which 
they  excite  of  comparatively  brief  duration,  the  mind  is  left  at 
liberty  to  look  on  into  other  worlds  for  objects  of  imperishable 
interest.  It  warns  us  not  to  rest  in  the  barren  luxury  of  emo¬ 
tion,  but  to  advance  at  once  to  the  action  which  is  the  appro¬ 
priate  end  of  that  emotion ;  since  emotions  not  only  begin  to 
subside  from  the  moment  they  reach  a  certain  point  (so  that  it 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  acquire  the  habit  of  performing 
that  action  before  the  languor  commences),  but,  if  neglected  to 
be  carried  on  into  the  appropriate  action,  that  languor  proceeds 
all  the  more  rapidly  till  it  terminates  in  insensibility.  Hence, 
the  fearful  consequence  of  indulging  in  that  species  of  reading 
which  excites  a  sympathy  never  to  be  carried  out  into  benevo¬ 
lent  conduct ;  and  of  being  often  excited  by  the  preaching  of 
the  gospel  without  taking  a  step  towards  genuine  repentance ; 
and  of  habitually  witnessing  dramatic  exhibitions  for  the  mere 
sake  of  emotional  excitement  —  the  excitement  terminating  only 
in  sentimental  tears,  and  in  cheap  verbal  lamentations  over 
imaginary  woes,  while  the  suffering  race,  the  world  of  real  woe, 
for  which  those  tears  were  designed,  is  forgotten  and  passed  by 
with  callous  indifference.  It  renders  our  perseverance  in  a 
right  course  of  action,  the  longer  we  continue  in  it,  more  and 
more  certain.  Virtue  becomes  increasingly  subjective.  Each 
act  of  goodness  imparts  new  strength  to  the  will,  and  renders  it 
more  certain  that  the  act  will  be  repeated.  Another  conse¬ 
quence  of  this  arrangement  is  that  we  come  to  possess  “  greater 
moral  pow6-~,  while  the  given  action  itself  requires  less  moral 


PROGRESSION. 


127 


effort.  There  hence  arises  a  surplus  of  moral  power  which 
may  be  applied  ”  *  to  higher  courses  and  nobler  acts  of  virtue. 
Not  only  is  the  power  by  which  it  gave  impulse  to  an  inferior 
course  of  action  set  at  liberty,  there  is  also  the  power  acquired 
by  that  effort  to  be  added  to  it.  And  thus  is  it  ever  presenting 
us  with  the  strongest  incentives  to  a  right  course  of  action. 
For,  if  every  act  tends  to  the  formation  of  habit,  and  if  every 
habit  goes  to  form  character  and  to  render  it  unalterable,  who 
can  calculate  the  interminable  consequences  attached  to  every 
moral  voluntary  act. 

42.  But  the  same  arrangement  which  is  so  advantageous  for 
the  virtuous,  becomes,  in  the  experience  of  the  vicious,  a  means 
of  fearful  punishment.  Every  act  of  sin  tends  to  repeat  itself, 
and  to  render  the  whole  man  more  vicious.  Each  sinful  indul¬ 
gence  yields  an  ever-diminishing  amount  of  gratification,  though 
the  passions  which  demand  it  are  ever  growing  in  tyrannic 
strength.  Thus  their  evil  character  is  gradually  approaching  a 
state  of  unchangeableness.  And  often  it  happens,  that  a  voice 
from  within  has  pronounced  it  unalterable,  long  before  the  voice 
without  authoritatively  confirms  the  sentence  in  the  fearful 
words,  “  He  that  is  unholy,  let  him  be  unholy  still.” 

43.  (7.)  If  such  be  the  power  of  the  will  in  relation  to  the 
emotions,  it  may  be  expected  (as,  indeed,  we  have  taken  for 
granted)  that  it  will  possess  the  means  of  exemplifying  its  in¬ 
ternal  activity  by  corresponding  external  movements  of  the 
body.  To  will,  indeed,  is  to  act ;  for  to  act,  is  to  put  forth  a 
power ;  and  this  the  will  does  in  every  volition.  Hence,  if  a 
man  will  to  move  his  arm,  and  the  arm  be  paralytic  and  inca¬ 
pable  of  motion,  still  the  will,  the  moving  power,  has  acted ;  all 
that  is  wanting  in  such  a  case  is  an  external  physical  movement 
in  obedience  to  the  internal  act  of  the  will.  “  If  there  were  no 
external  world,”  remarks  Cousin,  f  “  there  would  be  no  com¬ 
pleted  action  ;  and  not  only  is  it  necessary  that  there  should 
be  an  external  world,  but  also  that  the  power  of  willing  should 
be  connected  with  another  power,  a  physical  power,  which 
serves  as  an  instrument,  and  by  which  it  can  attain  the  external 
world.  Suppose  that  the  will  were  not  united  with  an  organi¬ 
zation,  there  would  no  longer  be  any  bridge  between  the  will 
and  the  external  world ;  and  no  external  action  would  be 


*  Elements  of  Moral  Science,  by  E.  TVayland,  D.D.,  President  of 
Brown  University,  &c.  —  c.  iii.  §  2,  an  excellent  treatise. 

+  Elements  of  Psychology,  c.  x. 


128 


MAN. 


possible.”  Now,  the  muscular  system  has  been  placed  entirely 
at  the  service  of  the  will.  As  the  will  is  the  executive  power 
of  the  mind,  the  muscular  system  is  its  appointed  and  obedient 
instrument ;  and  hence  the  loss  of  command  over  any  part  of  it 
by  disease,  is  the  loss  of  so  much  lfieans  of  carrying  our  voli¬ 
tions  into  external  effect. 

44.  One  fact  there  is  connected  with  this  mysterious  arrange¬ 
ment  worthy  of  our  attention  —  that,  in  obedience  to  the  will, 
this  muscular  organization  should  equally  express  what  we  will 
to  do  and  to  have  done,  and  what  we  will  not  to  do  and  not  to 
have  done.  Pre-eminently  is  this  the  fact  in  relation  to  one 
part  of  this  organization  —  the  tongue.  Not  only  is  it  capable 
of  expressing,  at  the  bidding  of  the  will,  what  we  would  and 
what  we  would  not  have,  but  of  conveying  to  others  the  know¬ 
ledge  alike  of  the  propensities  of  the  inferior  part  of  our  nature, 
of  the  perceptions,  judgments,  and  ideas  of  the  intellect,  of  the 
varying  play  of  the  emotions,  and  of  all  the  movements  of  the 
internal  world,  with  which  the  will  perhaps  has  had  nothing  to 
do  but  to  keep  them  in  check,  and  to  cause  them  to  be  described 
and  imparted  through  the  medium  of  speech.  But  this  the  will 
has  to  do  with  them.  And  it  is  because  the  tongue  has  so  wide 
a  range  in  relation  to  the  movements  of  the  world  within,  and 
forms  so  ample  and  efficient  a  medium  of  communication  with 
the  world  without,  that  its  government,  whether  in  a  personal, 
social,  or  religious  point  of  view,  is  of  such  vast  importance. 
And  as  that  government  is  given  into  our  own  power,  being 
placed  under  the  control  of  the  willy  we  can  account  for  the  em¬ 
phatic  declaration  of  an  apostle,  “  that  he  who  offends  not  with 
his  tongue,  the  same  is  a  perfect  man.” 

45.  (8.)  Lastly,  the  power  of  the  will  in  the  individual 
would  be  indefinitely  augmented  by  acting  in  harmony  with 
other  wills.  The  man  in  whom  the  will  so  far  exerts  its  au¬ 
thority  as  to  permit  no  explosions  of  passion,  and  no  yielding 
to  temptation,  but  who  controls  the  forces  within  him,  and 
“  governs  his  own  spirit,”  is  pointed  at  by  the  finger  of  Inspira¬ 
tion  itself  as  a  model  of  power.  By  placing  himself  in  har¬ 
mony  with  the  laws  of  nature,  which  are  themselves  expres¬ 
sions  of  the  Divine  will,  he  can  greatly  increase  his  power. 
By  resisting  them,  he  would  only  diminish  his  own  proper 
power,  and  lose  the  use  perhaps  of  some  of  those  muscular  or¬ 
gans  and  instruments  which  are  already  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  his  own  personal  will ;  but  by  falling  in  with  them,  and  avail- 
‘ng  himself  of  them,  he  can,  in  effect,  multiply  these  organs 


PROGRESSION. 


129 


and  instruments ;  can  appropriate  and  arm  himself  with  many 
of  the  forces  of  nature,  and  become  the  will,  the  moving  power, 
of  many  of  its  laws,  as  to  when  they  shall  act,  and  when  they 
shall  not.  Beyond  this,  he  can  add  to  his  own  the  muscular 
forces  of  other  men,  by  uniting  his  will  with  theirs  in  a  com¬ 
munity  of  purpose.  He  and  they  can  freely  will  to  do  this. 
Influenced  by  the  same  motives,  they  can  determine  on  the 
same  end,  and  move  together  like  one  man  towards  it.  How 
important  that  others  should  thus  feel  and  will  with  us,  in  order 
that  the  injustice  which  one  man  could  not  restrain  single- 
handed,  might  be  successfully  repelled  by  the  union  of  many ! 
How  important  is  this  union  in  order  that  the  good  which  we 
are  unable  to  accomplish  separately,  others  may  help  us  to 
perform !  Hence,  it  was  contemplated  in  the  primal  benedic¬ 
tion,  as  the  means  by  which  the  earth  should  be  replenished 
and  subdued  to  man’s  dominion.  And  wherever  it  has  existed 
for  anv  length  of  time,  nothing  has  been  able  to  stand  before  it. 

46.  But  only  let  us  imagine  this  community  of  wills  to  exist 
in  relation,  not  merely  to  some  particular  objects,  however  good, 
but  to  some  central  object,  around  which  all  those  particular 
objects  revolve,  and  to  which  they  are  subservient.  Let  us 
conceive  these  wills  to  be  moving  harmoniously  together,  not 
merely  towards  an  end,  however  good,  but  towards  the  end  for 
which  all  other  ends  exist,  and  exist  only  as  means.  Let  us 
suppose  this  community  of  created  wills  to  be  ever  moving  in 
harmony  with  the  Central  and  Supreme  Will  of  the  Creator ; 
to  regard  each  indication  of  His  will  as  the  loftiest  motive  for 
,  their  wills ;  each  movement  of  His  as  the  broad  and  open  path 
of  freedom  for  theirs ;  let  us  suppose  even  their  desires  to  be 
so  accordant  with  their  wills  that  in  uttering  the  language  ol 
the  one  they  should  be  giving  expression  to  the  other,  and  that 
the  language  most  expressive  of  their  united  and  highest  en 
ergy  should  be  —  Thy  will  he  done  —  Thy  will,  as  the  only 
means  of  satisfying  our  wills ;  and,  in  order  that  our  wills  —  our 
whole  nature  —  may  find  perfection  !  What  a  sublime  spectacle 
would  such  a  scene  present !  —  a  race  of  free  creatures  finding 
the  very  perfection  of  happiness  and  freedom  in  the  perfection 
of  obedience  !  finding,  and  exulting  to  find,  that  the  act  in  which 
they  put  forth  their  highest  energy  and  their  noblest  assertion 
of  liberty,  was,  at  the  same  time,  the  act  most  perfectly  in  har¬ 
mony  with  the  Divine  will,  and  with  all  the  laws  of  created 
nature !  God,  nature,  and  man,  in  universal  activity,  but  ex¬ 
hibiting  the  harmony  of  a  single  Force  ! 


130 


MAN. 


47.  But  even  suppose  that  only  a  single  human  will  were  in 
strict  accordance  with  that  supreme  will,  who  does  not  see  that, 
by  moving  in  a  line  with  it,  everything  else  in  accordance  with 
it  would  be  one  with  that  finite  will  ? — all  the  mechanical  laws 
of  nature  would  be  one  with  it.  Hence,  “the  beasts  of  the  field” 
are  said  to  be  “in  covenant  with  him;”  “the  stars  in  their 
courses  fight  for  him ;”  and  “  even  his  enemies  are,”  under  cer¬ 
tain  circumstances,  “  at  peace  with  him.”  He  takes  all  nature 
with  him ;  because  nature,  like  himself,  is  moving  in  harmony 
with  the  will  of  God ;  and  he  takes,  if  not  the  wills,  the  con¬ 
sciences  of  “  his  enemies”  with  him  also.  And  the  longer  he 
continues  to  identify  his  will  with  the  Divine  will,  the  more  un¬ 
alterable  becomes  his  habit  of  obedience,  until  his  moral  charac¬ 
ter,  like  that  of  God,  assumes  the  regularity  and  constancy  of 
moral  necessity.  While  the  prayer  of  Scriptural  faith  is  repre¬ 
sented  as  actually  giving  him  “power  with  God,”  the  Supreme 
will  unites  with  his  will,  and  becomes  a  new  antecedent  to  new 
and  unexpected  consequents. 

48.  Having  already,  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  indulged  in 
remarks  somewhat  in  advance  of  what  the  subject  requires,  I 
may  be  permitted,  in  the  same  strain,  to  call  attention  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  Scriptures  assume  all  these  laws  of  the 
will,  or  take  their  existence  for  granted.  For  example:  can 
the  will  either  indirectly  repel,  or  call  for,  objects  of  thought, 
which  are  sure  to  excite  corresponding  emotions  ?  we  are  ex¬ 
horted  to  stand  aloof  from  certain  things,  lest  they  should  inju¬ 
riously  affect  us,  and  we  are  to  set  our  affections  on  objects  of  a 
different  order.  Can  we  select  one  object  out  of  many,  and , 
mentally  dwell  on  it  ?  we  are  exhorted  to  “  distinguish  between 
things  that  differ,”  to  make  the  right  selection  of  things  on  which 
the  mind  is  to  dwell ;  to  “  keep  our  hearts,”  in  this  respect, 

“  with  all  diligence,”  remembering  that  every  object  admitted 
into  them  will  leave  its  print  there.  Do  objects  affect  us  in 
proportion  as  we  attend  to  them?  we  are  to  “take  heed  how  we 
hear,”  and  are  held  responsible,  on  the  pain  of  perdition,  for  not 
believing  the  Gospel.  Are  emotions  to  be  carried  out  into 
action,  and  to  lead  to  the  formation  of  habits  ?  we  are  reminded 
that  “pure  religion  is  this,”  not  merely  to  talk  of  the  suffering, 
not  to  shed  fruitless  tears  over  unseen  woes,  nor  even  to  give 
money  for  their  relief  (for  that  may  not  be  in  our  power,  or 
may  be  done  without  sympathy),  but  “to  visit  the  fatherless  and 
the  widow” — to  cultivate  active  benevolence.  Is  the  muscular 
system  placed  at  the  service  of  the  will?  we  are  to  “bow  our 


PROGRESSION. 


131 


ear”  to  receive  instruction;  and  to  “yield  our  members  as  in¬ 
struments  of  righteousness  unto  God.”  Can  our  wills  mutually 
harmonize  ?  the  church  is  the  community  instituted  expressly 
to  exhibit  the  sublime  spectacle  we  have  described;  and  the 
glory  of  God  is  the  great  end  which  is  to  harmonize  and  unite 
them.  In  a  word,  can  the  finite  will  accord  with  the  Infinite  ? 
It  must  live  in  the  contemplation,  and  move  daily  in  the  presence 
of  that  ethereal  purity  and  unclouded  glory,  which  transforms 
the  beholder  into  its  own  image. 


Sect.  VII.  —  Conscience. 

1.  In  the  preceding  section,  we  behold  the  introduction  of  that 
novelty  in  the  created  universe, —  at  least  in  this  part  of  the 
Divine  dominions, —  an  intelligent  will.  In  our  previous  survey 
of  the  progressive  unfolding  of  the  Divine  scheme,  we  started 
from  the  Infinite  and  Only  Will,  in  which  the  whole  had  origi¬ 
nated,  and,  descending  regularly  from  link  to  link  in  a  pro¬ 
longed  chain  of  causes  and  effects,  we  had  encountered  nothing 
capable  of  being  anything  else  than  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  pot¬ 
ter.  Now,  however,  we  have  come  to  another  will :  to  a  being 
who  is  not  only  capable  of  intelligently  examining  that  chain, 
though  he  himself,  as  far  as  all  but  his  will  is  concerned,  forms 
a  part  of  it,  but  capable,  also,  by  means  of  his  will,  of  disturbing 
and  putting  himself  out  of  harmony  with  it, — of  putting  even 
the  inferior  part  of  his  own  nature  in  opposition  to  it.  Here, 
then,  in  the  bare  possibility  of  this  opposition  is  a  hypothetical 
effect,  of  which  nothing  in  the  antecedent  chain  can  be  regarded 
as  the  cause.  There,  in  truth,  is,  in  some  sense,  a  cause,  or  a 
power  hypothetically  opposing  itself  to  the  First  Cause.  For, 
if  the  production  of  the  natural  universe  be  traceable  to  a  cause 
— the  Will  of  God — the  possibility  of  disturbing  it,  or  of  con¬ 
sciously  taking  anything  out  of  harmony  with  it,  must  obviously 
originate  in  a  cause  also  ;  certainly,  it  could  not  originate  in  one 
of  the  mechanical  links  of  the  pre-existing  chain. 

2.  Owing  to  this  new  power  .alone  it  is  that  man  can  form  the 
idea  of  a  First  Cause.  The  fact  that  he  himself  possesses  a  will, 
is  revealed  to  him  exclusively  by  its  own  acts  ;  and  this  gives  to 
him  the  idea  of  a  cause,  of  a  power  capable  of  originating  an  act 
or  state.  He  is  conscious  that  in  willing,  he,  though  influenced 
and  conditioned  by  motives,  originates  and  constitutes  an  actual 
beginning,  and  as  there  is  no  example  of  this  in  the  phenomena 


132 


MAN. 


of  Nature,  he  can  only  refer  their  origination  to  a  Supreme 
Will. 

3.  But  while  these  phenomena  are  consecutive,  and  exist  in 
linked  continuity,  his  will,  for  the  reason  assigned,  claims  imme¬ 
diate  descent  from  the  Divine  Will,  and  direct  alliance  with  it. 
The  Divine  Will  originated  them  all ;  man’s  Will  is  above  them 
all.  But  for  the  Infinite  Will,  creation  could  not  have  taken 
place ;  but  for  the  Finite  Will,  the  existence  of  that  Infinite 
Will,  as  the  originating  power  of  creation,  would  have  been 
unknown  ;  so  that  no  manifestation  would  have  been  possible. 
Wanting  in  the  human  will,  therefore,  creation  would  have  been 
defective  in  the  principal  respect;  for  the  very  image  and  know¬ 
ledge  of  the  Will  in  which  the  whole  had  originated,  would  have 
been  wanting.  In  the  human  will  alone  does  God  behold  and 
manifest  the  reflection  of  His  own  will. 

4.  But  by  the  possession  of  a  will  representative  of  the  Divine 
Will,  man  ceases  to  be  a  thing,  and  becomes  a  person.  Destitute 
of  this  attribute,  he  might  be  used  or  employed  as  a  means  to 
an  end  ;  but,  possessed  of  it,  he  could  not  be  so  employed,  with¬ 
out  doing  violence  to  this  distinctive  part  of  his  nature,  for  it 
would  be  against  his  will.  He  is  now  a  being  who  has,  con¬ 
sciously,  an  end  and  object  of  his  own,  and,  as  such,  a  person. 
For,  as  God  is  his  own  end  in  that  scheme  of  manifestation 
which  originated  in  his  Divine  Will,  so,  by  right  of  his  finite 
representative  will,  man  is  not  merely  a  means  for  the  attain¬ 
ment  of  this  end :  lie  is  capable  of  seeking  his  own  end,  and  of 
subordinating  everything  created  and  inferior  to  it,  though  he  is 
made  to  find  the  true  end  of  his  own  existence  only  by  seeking 
it  in  perfect  coincidence  with  the  great  end. 

5.  And,  for  doing  this,  he  is  to  be  held  accountable.  In  giv¬ 
ing  him  a  will,  a  foundation  was  laid  for  his  responsibility.  Up 
to  that  point  he  was  irresponsible,  because  mechanical  and 
powerless.  But  the  bestowment  of  a  will — grave  and  awful 
privilege! — gave  the  other  parts  of  his  nature  into  his  own 
keeping,  placed  the  most  sacred  trust  in  creation — his  character 
— in  his  own  hands.  Still,  though  man  is  a  voluntary  being, 
and  though  this  element  of  his  nature  is  indestructible  and  ina¬ 
lienable,  free  agency  alone  does  not  constitute  and  complete  his 
accountableness.  This  is  only  the  executive  power  of  the  mind. 
If  there  be  a  right  and  a  wrong,  and  if  every  voluntary  act  be 
the  one  or  the  other,  it  is  essential,  in  order  to  responsibility, 
that  the  free  agent  should  know  what  he  ought  and  what  he 
ought  not  to  do.  In  other  words,  if  man  is  to  be  a  manifestation 


PROGRESSION. 


133 


of  the  Divine  character  as  well  as  of  the  Divine  will,  and  is  to 
be  held  accountable  for  voluntarily  harmonizing  with  the  Di¬ 
vine  manifestation,  it  may  be  expected  that  he  will  be  capable 
of  a  consciousness  of  obligation  in  every  instance  in  which  he 
has  the  means  of  subserving  the  great  end. 

6.  The  phraseology  here  employed  indicates  that  we  are  now 
entering  on  a  new  region  of  truth- — that  we  have  left  the  quid 
est,  and  have  reached  the  quid  oportet,  the  province  of  ethics  or 
moral  science.  “  The  purpose  of  the  physical  sciences  through¬ 
out  all  their  provinces,  is  to  answer  the  question,  What  is  ? 
The  purpose  of  the  moral  sciences  is  to  answer  the  question, 
What  ought  to  he  It  is  of  the  first  importance,  however,  to 
the  correct  view  of  our  subject,  to  bear  in  mind  that  moral 
science  itself  branches  off  into  two  similar  divisions.  In  this 
department,  the  question,  What  is  ?  relates  to  the  eternal  and 
immutable  distinction  of  right  and  wrong  —  to  the  foundation 
and  principle  of  moral  obligation,  a  foundation  and  a  principle 
which  existed  anterior  to  creation,  and  which  would  continue 
to  exist  were  the  universe  of  creatures  to  sink  into  annihilation ; 
while  the  question,  What  ought  to  he  ?  relates  to  the  moral  con¬ 
stitution  and  conduct  of  the  creature.  No  one  has  insisted 
more  cogently  on  the  necessity  of  steadily  abiding  by  this  dis¬ 
tinction  than  the  writer  himself  just  quoted.  When  once  it  is 
recognized,  indeed,  it  seems  to  be  so  obvious,  as  to  render  illus¬ 
tration  unnecessary.  And  yet  such  men  as  Paley  and  Hume, 
Bentham  and  A.  Smith,  have  either  failed  uniformly  to  make 
the  discrimination,  or  else  have  entirely  confounded  the  two 
branches  of  the  subject  together. 

7.  That  branch  of  the  subject  with  which  we  have  at  present 
to  do,  relates  to  the  latter  of  the  two  questions  stated  —  not  to 
the  nature  and  foundation  of  rectitude,  but  to  the  process  or 
faculty  by  which  we  are  made  capable  of  recognizing  and  re¬ 
sponding  to  it.  The  question,  What  constitutes  virtue  ?  is  quite 
distinct  from  our  present  inquiry  • — How  does  man  derive  the 
notion  of  virtue  ?  Virtue  has  an  objective  existence  independent 
of  the  subjective  mind  which  takes  cognizance  of  it.  Rectitude 
is  not  a  creature.  From  eternity  it  lias  resided  in  Him  in 
whom  fact  and  right  are  one.  Man  is  a  creation  of  God,  and 
his  mind  is  made  to  appreciate  that  rectitude.  The  constitution 
of  his  mind,  then,  is  a  subject  of  inquiry  as  distinct  from  the 
foundation  and  principle  of  the  rectitude  for  which  it  is  made, 


*  Sir  J.  Mackintosh’s  “Dissertation on  Ethical  Philosophy,”  Introduction. 

12 


134 


MAN. 


as  his  faculty  of  reasoning  is  from  the  figures  and  truths  of  geome¬ 
try,  which  he  feels  to  be  independently  and  eternally  neces¬ 
sary.* 

8.  In  accordance  with  this  important  distinction,  and  with  the 
terms  of  our  general  proposition,  it  may  be  shown,  first,  that 
man  universally  recognizes  a  moral  quality  in  actions.  The 
same  action  may  be  viewed  in  different  lights  —  as  clever  or 
foolish,  seasonable  or  unseasonable,  polite  or  uncourteous.  But 
besides  this,  the  mind  is  capable  of  recognizing  in  it  a  quality 
which  no  terms  can  express  but  those  of  right  or  wrong.  And 
this  distinction  is  universal.  When  once  the  idea  is  developed 
in  the  mind,  it  is  never  entirely  lost.  The  same  mind  cannot 
regard  the  same  quality  of  an  action  as  right  and  wrong,  just 
and  unjust,  at  the  same  time.  The  two  ideas  resist  every  at¬ 
tempt  at  such  commutation.  Their  objects  may  change  with 
circumstances,  but  their  nature  never.  Even  the  professional 
infanticide  of  a  barbarous  clime  pursues  his  horrid  calling,  not 
as  wrong,  but  right  —  not  merely  as  a  right  (the  noun  instead 
of  the  adjective,  with  which  it  is  often  confounded)  acquired  by 
custom  or  law ;  but  as  being,  for  certain  supposed  reasons,  ad- 
jectively  right.  And  the  criminal  whose  life  may  appear  to 
have  been  spent  in  a  laborious  endeavor  to  confound  the  dis¬ 
tinction  between  right  and  wrong,  confidently  calculates,  when 
called  to  trial,  on  justice  ;  he  assumes,  that  is,  that  the  sentiment 
of  right  and  wrong  is  common  to  man,  and  that  which  he  de¬ 
mands  is  right.  If  he  is  to  be  punished,  he  assumes  that  jus¬ 
tice  is  something  anterior  to  punishment,  and  he  demands  to 
be  punished  according  to  justice.  Indeed,  the  ideas  of  reward 
and  punishment  invariably  presuppose  the  ideas  of  merit  and 
demerit,  and  these  again  presuppose  the  ideas  of  right  and 
wrong,  terms  designating  a  quality  or  distinction  in  actions 
which  man  universally  recognizes. 

9.  This  view  of  conscience  answers,  by  anticipation,  the  sup¬ 
posed  objection  to  the  universality  of  conscience,  that  the  moral 
judgments  of  men  widely  differ  respecting  the  same  actions. 
Had  we  represented  conscience  as  a  faculty  divinely  empowered 
to  divide  all  external  actions  into  two  classes,  and  to  pronounce 
infallibly  that  every  action  of  the  one  class  was  right,  and  every 
action  of  the  other  class  wrong,  our  statement  would  have  been 
liable  to  the  objection  But  regarded  as  the  faculty  which  re¬ 
cognizes  a  moral  quality  in  actions,  we  know  of  no  exception  to 


*  Dr.  Chalmers’s  Bridgewater  Treatise,  Vol  I.  p.  72. 


PROGRESSION. 


135 


its  universality.  Many  of  the  very  practices  erroneously  ad¬ 
duced  to  prove  the  non-existence  of  conscience  in  certain  par¬ 
ties,  are  the  expedients  ignorantly  resorted  to  in  the  hope  of 
appeasing  its  remorse.  The  Thugs  of  India  did  not  strangle 
their  human  victims,  because  they  believed  murder  to  be  an -in¬ 
nocent  act ;  but  under  the  notion  that  they  were  offering  an  ac¬ 
ceptable  sacrifice  to  Kalee,  the  goddess  of  destruction,  and  that 
the  strangled  victim  went  directly  to  Paradise.  The  most  de- 
graded  of  mankind  are  found  to  recognize  a  moral  quality  in 
actions,  however  mistaken  they  may  be,  owing  to  their  perverted 
judgments,  in  its  specific  selection. 

10.  Granting  the  universality  of  conscience,  the  want  of  uni¬ 
formity  in  its  decisions  may  be  objected  to,  as  greatly  detracting 
from  its  value.  To  which  we  reply,  first,  that  perfect  objective 
unifonnitv,  amidst  an  endless  variety  of  disturbing  influences 
could  only  be  secured  by  investing  conscience  with  a  dictatorial 
power  destructive  of  all  responsibility.  Secondly,  the  moral 
differences  which  actually  obtain  among  men,  relate,  not  so 
much  to  whether  a  certain  action  shall  be  regarded  as  virtuous 
or  vicious,  as  to  whether  one  of  two  qualities,  of  which  both  are 
admitted  to  be  right,  may  not  be  sacrificed  to  the  other.  Thus, 
when  theft  was  publicly  taught  and  rewarded  in  Sparta,  it  was 
not  because  honesty  was  not  deemed  a  virtue,  but  because  patri¬ 
otism  was  deemed  a  greater  virtue,  and  therefore  the  dexterous 
robbery  of  an  enemy  was  honored  at  the  price  of  honesty,  as  a 
service  rendered  to  the  state.*  Nor,  thirdly,  is  the  extinction 
of  conscience  to  be  inferred,  from  the  spectacle  of  a  multitude  of 
men  madly  rushing  into  the  same  crime,  any  more  than  the  non¬ 
existence  of  the  passions  is  to  be  inferred  from  their  subjection 
to  control.  Their  moral  judgment  respecting  it  may  be  one 
with  our  own,  when  the  judgment  shall  be  allowed  to  speak ; 
even  if  their  present  impetuosity  of  conduct  is  not  to  be  inter¬ 
preted  as  an  attempt  to  silence  the  present  uneasiness  of  their 
conscience.  Nor,  fourthly,  is  anything  other  than  the  temporary 
perversion  of  conscience  to  be  inferred  from  the  deliberate  and 
continued  practice  of  certain  crimes,  a  perversion  produced  only 
as  the  result  of  example  and  instruction.  The  patient  training 
of  the  Indian  Thug  did  not  permit  the  apprentice  to  the  trade  of 
murder  to  witness  the  horrid  rites  till  the  third  vear  of  service ; 
implying  that  it  required  all  that  time  to  murder  conscience,  or 


*  Sir  J.  Mackintosh’s  Dissertation,  §  i.  See  also  Dr.  T.  Brown’s  74th 
and  75th  Lectures. 


136 


MAN. 


rather  to  bribe  it  to  silence.  And,  fifthly,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind 
that  even  where  conscience  is  thus  temporarily  drugged  to 
silence  on  some  one  point  of  morality  —  drugged  by  an  opiate 
administered  in  the  name  of  morality  or  religion  —  it  is  always 
liable  to  awake,  or  waiting  to  respond  to  a  monitory  call ;  while, 
apart  from  such  temporary  and  local  exceptions,  the  same  vir¬ 
tues  are  honored,  and  the  same  vices  execrated,  with  remarka¬ 
ble  uniformity,  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

11.  “The  principles  upon  which  men  reason  in  morals  (says 
Ilume)  are  always  the  same,  though  their  conclusions  are  often 
very  different.”  The  uniformity  which  obtains  even  among  the 
laws  of  nations  can  be  accounted  for  only  by  supposing  a  com¬ 
mon  moral  nature.  “  Whatever  variety  may  be  discovered,” 
says  Michelet,  in  his  origin  of  French  Law,  “  unity  predomi¬ 
nates.  It  is  an  imposing  spectacle  to  find  the  principal  legal 
svmbols  common  to  all  countries,  throughout  all  ages.  In  truth, 
to  one  who  considers  not  the  human  race  as  the  great  family  of 
God,  there  is  in  those  multitudinous  voices,  out  of  hearing  of 
each  other,  and  which,  nevertheless,  respond  each  to  each  from 
the  Indus  to  the  Thames  in  reciprocating  sounds,  wherewithal 
to  dismay  the  intelligence,  to  strike  the  heart  and  spirit  of  man 
with  consternation.  Transporting  was  the  emotion  which  I  my¬ 
self  experienced,  when,  for  the  first  time,  I  heard  this  universal 
acclaim.  Unlike  the  sceptic  Montaigne,  who  so  carefully  fer¬ 
reted  out  the  customs  of  different  nations  to  detect  their  moral 
discordances,  I  have  found  a  consentaneous  harmony  among 
them  all.  A  sensible  miracle  has  risen  before  me.  My  little 
existence  of  the  moment  has  seen  and  touched  the  eternal  com¬ 
munion  of  the  human  race.”  Even  if  morality  were  a  question 
to  be  decided  by  vote,  it  would  be  much  more  rational  to  con¬ 
clude  that,  since  a  thousand  to  one  agree  concerning  a  given 
action  that  it  is  wrong,  therefore  the  action  has  a  recognizable 
moral  character,  than  that  it  has  not  because  one  in  a  thousand 
differs.  And  such  subjective  uniformity  actually  exists  amidst 
all  the  objective  varieties  of  its  manifestation  which  the  world 
presents. 

12.  The  inquiry,  What  are  the  means  by  which  man  recog¬ 
nizes  and  responds  to  the  moral  quality  of  actions  ?  is,  as  ob¬ 
served  already,  entirely  distinct  from  the  question,  What  is  that 
moral  quality  itself,  or,  what  is  virtue  ?  Yet  so  generally,  in 
ethical  discussions,  has  the  former  been  involved  in,  and  con¬ 
founded  with,  the  latter,  that,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  opinions 
which  have  been  entertained  on  the  subject,  we  shall  not  be  able 


PROGRESSION. 


137 


to  avoid  a  glance  in  passing  at  some  of  the  theories  of  virtue  in 
which  thsse  opinions  are  implied. 

13.  Is  our  notion  of  morality  derived  from  our  acquaintance 
with  human  law  ?  According  to  Hobbes,  virtue  is  only  a  syno- 
nyme  for  political  law ;  actions  have  no  moral  character  prior 
to  human  legislation.  But  this  is  to  confound  a  right  acquired 
by  law,  with  right  independent  of  law. 

"  14.  According  to  another  theory,  morality  is  founded,  not  on 
the  will  of  man,  but  on  the  will  of  God.  But,  in  the  language 
of  Aquinas,  “though  God  always  wills  what  is  just,  nothing  is 
just  solely  because  he  wills  it.”  TVe  believe,  indeed,  not  only 
that  every  command  of  God  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  recti¬ 
tude,  but  that  the  rectitude  is  the  reason  of  the  command.  Now, 
both  these  theories  of  the  nature  of  virtue  —  the  first  creating  it 
by  human  law,  and  the  second  by  Divine  law,  though  materially 
differing  from  each  other,  may  be  regarded  as  basing  morality 
on  arbitrary  appointment;  and  as  consequently  reducing  the 
means  necessary  to  recognize  morality  to  a  mere  acquaintance 
with  such  appointment.  But  as  man  recognizes  moral  distinc¬ 
tions  independently  of  such  external  knowledge,  the  true  solu¬ 
tion  of  the  problem  must  be  sought  further. 

15.  Is  our  notion  of  a  moral  quality  in  actions  derived  from 
the  arbitrary  constitution  of  our  minds,  independently  of  any 
such  quality  in  the  actions  themselves  ?  This  is  a  consequence 
which  has  been  charged  on  Hutcheson’s  theory  of  a  moral 
sense ;  for  if  a  thing  be  right  only  as  it  gives  rise  to  a  constitu¬ 
tional  feeling  of  approbation,  it  follows  that  a  change  in  our 
moral  constitution  would  originate  a  corresponding  change  in 
the  nature  of  rectitude.  According  to  Adam  Smith,  we  judge 
of  the  actions  of  others  by  a  direct,  and  of  our  own,  by  a  reflex, 
sympathy ;  those  with  which  we  fully  sympathize  are  right. 
But  this  again  is  to  make  virtue  depend  on  the  constitution  of 
the  mind,  and  renders  all  morality  relative.  In  a  similar  man¬ 
ner,  virtue,  according  to  Dr.  T.  Brown,  is  a  mere  abstraction, 
expressive  only  of  the  relation  between  a  certain  action  and  a 
certain  emotion.  From  which  it  would  follow  that  virtue  ha$ 
ao  objective  reality ;  and  the  relations  of  right  and  wrong  might 
dave  been  reversed  by  the  mere  reversal  of  our  personal  feeling 
ff  approbation. 

16.  These  three  theories  are,  in  effect,  only  modifications  of 
ihe  last  of  the  preceding  two,  which  makes  virtue  a  creature 
of  arbitrary  legislation.  The  principal  difference  appears  to  be 
that  whereas  in  that  theory  the  Divine  command  is  objective  and 

12* 


138 


MAN. 


is  imposed  upon  the  creature  ;  according  to  this,  it  is  subjective , 
or  expressed  inherently  in  the  original  constitution  of  the  mind ; 
each,  however,  agreeing  in  this,  that  an  action  whether-externally 
enjoined  or  internally  approved,  might  have  been  the  very 
opposite  of  what  it  is,  and  yet  have  been  virtuous.  With  the 
objectionableness  of  this  theory,  however,  as  a  theory  of  virtue, 
we  have  nothing  at  present  to  do,  except  as  it  bears  on  the  an¬ 
swer  to  our  inquiry  —  Is  our  notion  of  a  moral  quality  in  actions 
owing  entirely  to  the  arbitrary  constitution  of  our  minds  ?  Ad¬ 
hering,  as  our  consciousness  compels  us,  to  the  conviction  that 
we  recognize  in  actions  cm  inherent  moral  quality  which  is  quite 
independent  of  such  recognition,  we  could  not  admit  the  affirm¬ 
ative  of  the  question  without  implying  that  our  moral  nature  * * * § 
consists  of  a  moral  deception.  Our  moral  faculty  protests 
against  the  possibility  of  such  an  imposition.  Having  recog¬ 
nized  the  rectitude  of  an  action,  we  feel,  in  the  depths  of  our 
consciousness,  that  it  wmuld  and  must  be  right,  even  though  we 
had  been  denied  the  power  of  perceiving  it.  We  feel  that  it  is 
right,  anterior  to,  and  independently  of,  our  perception  of  it ; 
and  that  our  perception  of  it  is  simply  owing  to  a  certain  faculty 
wfith  which  we  are  endowed  for  that  purpose. 

17.  Is  our  nation  of  morality  the  result  of  intellectual  intuition  ? 
According  to  Cumberland,*  the  professed  antagonist  of  Hobbism, 
certain  propositions  of  unchangeable  truth,  or  laws  of  nature , 
prompt  us  to  social  morality ;  obedience  to  these  principles  is 
virtue ;  and  these  are  “  necessarily  suggested  to  the  minds  of 
men  ;  ”  or  are  the  direct  product  of  “  right  reason.”  Cudworth  f 
resolves  virtue  into  an  agreement  with  the  ideas  which  have 
existed  eternally  and  immutably  in  the  infinite  mind.  Dr.  S. 
Clarke  j  regarded  it  as  an  agreement  with  the  eternal  relations 
fitnesses  of  things.  According  to  Wollaston,  §  virtue  consists 
in  conformity  to  truth ,  or  to  the  truth  of  things.  Now  all  these 
writers  differ  from  the  class  preceding,  in  regarding  right  and 
wrrong  as  words  representing  real  characters  of  actions,  and  not 
mere  qualities  of  our  minds  —  what  actions  are  in  themselves, 
and  not  the  feelings  or  sensations  attending  them.  And  they 
agree  with  each  other,  not  merely  in  thus  regarding  virtue  as 


*  See  his  “  Philosophical  Inquiry  into  the  Laws  of  Nature.” 

t  “  Treatise  concerning  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality.” 

t  “  Being  and  Attributes  of  God ;  and  Evidence  of  Natural  and  Revealed 
Religion.” 

§  Author  of  “  The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 


PROGRESSION. 


189 


an  objective  reality  —  as  eternal  and  immutable  in  the  objects 
to  which  the  word  is  applied  —  but  also  in  regarding  our  per¬ 
ception  of  it  as  intellectually  direct  and  necessary.  Whether 
represented  as  necessarily  suggested  to  the  mind,  or  as  contem¬ 
plated  in  the  mind  of  God,  or  as  perceived  immediately  like  a 
mathematical  truth,  they  unite  in  making  the  recognition  of  it  a 
purely  intellectual  operation.* 

We  have  therefore  to  allege  against  them,  in  common, 
that  they  overlook  the  voluntary  and  emotive  part  of  our  nature. 
That  virtue  does  coincide  with  nature,  reason,  truth,  order,  and 
the  fitness  of  things,  we  confidently  believe,  but  it  coincides 
with  something  more.  To  say  that  our  idea  of  virtue  is  given 
us  in  a  purely  intellectual  act  or  intuition,  by  no  means  satisfies 
the  requirements  of  the  case.  It  leaves  us  to  a  state  of  passive 
contemplation.  Our  consciousness  of  moral  obligation  and  ap¬ 
probation  remains  unexplained.  In  our  recognition  of  moral 
qualities  we  are  conscious  of  more  than  an  intellectual  percep¬ 
tion. 

18.  Is  our  idea  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions  derived  from 
the  exercise  of  the  judgment  ?  According  to  Dr.  Wardlaw,  the 
faculty  which  decides  on  the  right  and  wrong  in  actions  is  the 
judgment.f  Dr.  Payne  applies  the  term  conscience  to  “the 
susceptibility  of  experiencing  those  emotions  of  approbation  and 
disapprobation  j  which  are  consequent  on  the  prior  decision  of 
the  judgment.  My  own  conviction  is,  on  grounds  to  be  here¬ 
after  stated,  that  the  function  of  moral  discrimination,  and  the 
susceptibility  of  consequent  emotions,  both  belong  to  the  province 
of  conscience  —  a  view  to  which  Dr.  Wardlaw  expresses  himself 
as  by  no  means  averse.  More  than  mere  judgment  appears  to  be 
necessary,  in  the  case  supposed,  if  the  term  be  taken  in  its 
strict  and  logical  acceptation.  Thus,  if  judgment  be  that  act  of 
the  mind  which  affirms  a  relation  between  two  notions  previ¬ 
ously  existing  in  the  mind,  no  one  can  affirm  that  the  sky  is 
blue  unless  the  notion  of  the  sky  and  of  the  color  which  he 
predicates  of  it,  be  first  in  his  mind.  And  no  man  who  had  no 
previous  idea  of  right  and  wrong,  could  ever  affirm  either  of 
these  qualities  of  an  action ;  “  much  less  could  he  by  this  faculty, 


*  Malebranche’s  “  Love  of  Order,”  and  Jonathan  Edwards’s  “  Love  of 
Being,”  might  have  placed  them  in  the  same  category  as  far  as  their  ob¬ 
jective  abstractions,  o~ier  and  being,  are  concerned ;  but  by  employing  the 
term  love ,  their  theory  of  -virtue  ceased  to  be  merely  intellectual. 

t  Christian  Ethics,  Lect.  Y.  f  Mental  and  Moral  Science,  p.  404. 


140 


MAN. 


acquire  the  original  idea.”  Butler,  indeed,  is  supposed  by  some 
to  have  regarded  conscience  merely  as  the  exercise  of  judgment 
in  the  department  of  morals.  “  There  is  (says  the  Bishop)  a 
principle  of  reflection  in  men  by  which  they  distinguish  between, 
approve,  and  disapprove,  their  own  actions.”  *  But  the  very 
fact  that  he  here  and  elsewhere  speaks  of  conscience  as  a  dis¬ 
tinct  principle  in  man,  seems  to  negative  such  a  supposition. 
And  the  office  which  he  assigns  to  conscience,  of  not  merelv  dis- 
tinguishing  between  actions,  but  of  also  approving  and  disap- 
proving  —  or  else  of  distinguishing  by  approving  and  disappro¬ 
ving  them  —  implies  that  if  the  act  is  intellectual  it  is  emotional 
also.  The  commanding  power  likewise  with  which  he  regards 
conscience  as  invested,  intimates  that,  in  his  view,  its  province 
is  not  merely  discriminating  and  intellectual,  but  also  imper¬ 
ative. 

19.  Is  our  idea  of  morality  derived  from  a  principle  of  asso¬ 
ciation  ?  According  to  Hartley,  the  formation  of  our  passions 
and  affections,  and  even  of  our  sentiments  of  virtue  and  duty, 
takes  place  by  means  of  “  the  association  of  ideas.”  "With  cer¬ 
tain  modifications,  Sir  J.  Mackintosh  adopts  this  view.  But 
though  conscience  is  thus  “  acquired.”  he  represents  it  as  “  uni¬ 
versally  and  necessarily  acquired ;  ”  and  though  not  simple  but 
compounded,  the  language  of  all  mankind  (says  he)  implies 
that  the  moral  faculty,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  from  what 
origin  soever  it  may  spring,  is  intelligibly  and  properly  spoken 
of  as  one.”  But  on  this  theory  we  may  remark  that  the  idea 
of  right  and  wrong  is,  in  the  case  supposed,  a  part  of  the  com¬ 
pound.  In  the  first  moral  association  of  which  we  are  con 
scious,  its  existence  is  presupposed.  Besides,  by  affirming  that 
the  moral  faculty  is  universally  and  necessarily  acquired,  it 
must  be  meant  that  the  acquisition  takes  place  in  consequence 
of  an  original  law  of  our  nature,  which  universally  and  neces¬ 
sarily  operates.  u  He  supposes  association.”  says  Dr.  TThewell, 
in  his  preface  to  the  Dissertation,  “  to  be  employed  in  the  edu¬ 
cation  rather  than  in  the  creation  of  our  moral  sentiments."  If 
this  be,  as  it  appears,  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  theory  — 
if  there  be  an  original  law  of  the  mind  which  onlv  needs  edu- 
cation,  and  which,  as  the  result  of  a  necessary  process,  exhibits 
a  growing  power  of  recognizing  the  moral  quality  of  actions, 
the  most  questionable  part  of  the  theory  disappears.  That  the 
moral  faculty  was  designed  to  enlarge  its  domain  as  we  advance 


*  Sermon  I. 


PROGRESSION. 


141 


from  infancy  to  mature  age,  till  we  come  to  “  make  conscience 
of  everything,”  there  can  be  no  doubt.  One  could  wish,  how- 
ever,  to  have  been  more  particularly  informed  concerning  the 
nature  of  that  original  law,  which  is  supposed  to  become  con¬ 
science  only  as  it  is  developed  by  association. 

20.  Is  our  idea  of  virtue  derived  from  a  calculation  of  conse¬ 
quences  ?  Opinions  on  this  subject  are  divisible  into  the  follow¬ 
ing  clauses:  —  First,  the  theory  of  Hobbes*  — ■  properly  desig¬ 
nated  the  selfish  system  —  according  to  which,  whatever  pro¬ 
motes  our  own  selfish  interest  is  for  that  very  reason  right ;  and 
whatever  opposes  it,  wrong.  To  this  it  is  sufficient  to  reply,  in 
passing,  with  Butler,  that  there  are  the  same  kind  of  indications 
in  human  nature,  that  we  were  made  to  promote  the  happiness 
of  others,  as  that  we  were  made  to  promote  our  own.  Indeed, 
the  impeachment  of  this  revolting  view  of  morality  is  implied 
in  each  of  the  theories  which  follows. 

21.  Secondly,  the  Utilitarian  theory  of  Hume  makes  virtue 
coincident  with  whatever  is  agreeable  and  useful  to  ourselves 
without  injury  to  others,  and  to  others  without  injury  to  our¬ 
selves.  This  is  an  obvious  improvement  on  the  selfish  system, 
for  it  contemplates  the  advantage  of  others.  Besides,  Hume 
adds  the  term  agreeable  to  that  of  useful ;  which  amounts  to  a 
virtual  abandonment  of  the  utilitarian  character  of  the  theory. 
For  by  leading  us  back  to  the  question,  On  what  is  this  feeling 
of  agreeableness  or  approbation  founded  ?  we  find  ourselves  re¬ 
ferred  to  a  principle  distinct  from  that  of  utility.  Indeed,  to  the 
existence  of  such  a  principle  repeated  reference  is  found  in  his 
writings  ;*  as  if  its  admission  were  involved  in  the  very  act  of 
denying  it.  Bentham,  too,  the  great  advocate,  in  recent  times, 
of  utilitarianism  under  the  name  of  the  greatest-happiness  prin¬ 
ciple,  exhibits,  by  a  happy  inconsistency,  the  impossibility  of 
dispensing  with  'the  word  ought  in  ethical  discussions.  For, 
though  repeatedly  angry  with  the  word,  his  work  is  denominated 
Deontology-  —  meaning,  the  Science  of  Duty,  or  of  what  men 
ought  to  do. 

22.  According  to  Paley  in  his  theory  of  expediency,  or  of 
general  consequences,  “  Virtue  is  the  doing  good  to  mankind,  in 
obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting: 

'  O 


*  Thus,  one  of  the  sections  in  the  third  book  of  his  “  Treatise  of  Human 
Nature.''  is  headed,  “  Moral  Distinctions  derived  from  a  Moral  Sense.” 
See  also  the  first  section  of  u  An  Inquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of 
Morals .” 


142 


MAN. 


happiness.”*  This  proposition  appears  to  place  virtue  on  high¬ 
er  and  nobler  ground  than  that  occupied  by  either  of  the  pre¬ 
ceding  theories ;  for  it  recognizes  the  will  of  God  and  an  eter¬ 
nal  future.  In  reality,  however,  it  is  chargeable  with  a  gross 
selfishness,  which  the  doctrine  of  Hume  condemns.  It  implies 
that  every  act  is  vicious  which  is  not  performed  for  the  sake  of 
the  agent’s  own  happiness ;  and  consequently,  that  the  impulses 
of  generosity  and  compassion  should  be  repressed  as  being  wor¬ 
thy  of  reprobation.  In  effect,  too,  it  makes  the  “  tendency  to 
produce  happiness  ”  both  the  rule  of  virtue  and  its  foundation  ; 
for  while  professing  to  regard  the  will  of  God  as  the  rule,  it 
finds  the  test  and  standard  of  that  rule  in  the  “  tendency  to  pro¬ 
duce  happiness,”  because  “  God  Almighty  wills  and  wishes  the 
happiness  of  his  creatures.”! 

23.  The  distinguished  American  divine,  Dr.  Dwight,  places 
his  theory  of  utility  on  still  loftier  ground.  Disclaiming  utility 
as  the  ride  of  virtue  to  us,  he  affirms  that  “  virtue  is  founded  in 
utility  ”  J —  meaning,  by  utility,  a  tendency  to  produce  happi¬ 
ness.  For,  while  contending  that  “the  foundation  of  virtue  is 
not  in  the  will  of  God,  but  in  the  nature  of  things,”  and  that 
“  the  foundation  of  virtue  is  that  which  constitutes  its  value  and 
excellence,”  he  finds  this  nature  and  excellence  in  virtue  only 
as  it  is  productive  of  happiness.  This,  however,  is  not  to  find 
the  foundation  of  virtue  in  the  nature  of  things,  but  in  their  ten¬ 
dency,  and  is  to  confound  the  intrinsic  excellence  of  rectitude 
with  its  effects.  As  Dr.  Wardlaw  has  well  expressed  it,§  “the 
principles  of  moral  rectitude  are  not  right  because  they  produce 
happiness,  they  produce  happiness  because  they  are  right ;  theii 
nature  not  arising  from  their  tendency,  but  their  tendency  from 
their  nature.” 

24.  In  my  remarks  on  this  important  subject,  I  would  by  no 
means  imply  that  virtue  may  not  ultimately  coincide  with  utility 
—  the  great  moral  law  with  the  greatest  happiness.  It  must 
be  admitted  that,  even  now,  the  expedient  often  proves  to  be 
right ;  and  that  in  regard  to  things  morally  indifferent,  utility 
and  expediency  may  allowably  guide  our  determination.  But 
this  is  widely  different  from  saying  that  expediency  is  the  crite¬ 
rion  of  rectitude,  and  utility  to  us  the  rule  of  morality.  That 
our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions,  and  of  their  conse¬ 
quent  obligatoriness,  are  not,  and  cannot  be  derived  from  a  con- 


*  Moral  and  Polit.  Phil.,  Book  I.,  c.  vii.  f  B.  II.,  c.  iv. 

$  Theology,  Serin.  XCIX.  §  Christian  Ethics,  Lect.  VI. 


PROGRESSION. 


143 


sideration  ol  their  consequences,  may  be  made  evident  from  the 
following  considerations :  — 

25.  First,  it  assumes  that  the  production  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness  is  the  controlling  principle  of  the  Divine 
government ;  and  that,  if  it  be  not,  we  are  under  no  obligation 
to  obey  God.  Perhaps  (says  Bishop  Butler)*  Divine  good¬ 
ness,  with  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we  make  very  free  in  our 
speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to  produce 
happiness,  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the 
honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely  perfect  mind  may  be 
pleased  with  seeing  his  creatures  behave  suitably  with  the  na¬ 
ture  which  he  has  given  them,  to  the  relations  in  which  he  has 
placed  them  to  each  other,  and  to  that  in  which  they  stand  to 
Himself ;  that  relation  to  Himself,  which  during  their  existence 
is  ever  necessary,  and  which  is  the  most  important  one  of  all. 
I  say  an  infinitely  perfect  mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral 
piety  of  moral  agents  in  and  for  itself  as  to  ell  as  upon  account 
of  its  being  essentially  conducive  to  the  happiness  of  his  crea¬ 
tion.”  Hot  only  does  the  idea  we  are  opposing  assume  the 
reverse  of  all  this  independently  of  proof,  but,  further,  if  the 
happiness  on  which  virtue  is  made  to  depend  be  the  happiness  of 
the  universe,  including  the  infinite  God,  it  would  follow  that 
even  His  own  holiness  depends  on  his  happiness,  not  that  his 
happiness  springs  from  his  holiness.  Nor  even  then  could  we 
be  certain  that  an  action  would  be  right  for  us  in  proportion  to 
its  productiveness  of  happiness,  except  by  taking  it  for  granted, 
further,  that  our  happiness  is  coincident  with  His.  While  the 
discovery  that  either  of  these  assumptions  was  false  would  dis¬ 
charge  us  from  all  obligation  to  virtue,  or  else  would  show  that 
we  had  mistaken  its  ver y  foundation. 

26.  Secondly,  the  theory  of  utility  —  even  in  its  least  excep¬ 
tionable  form — -confounds  together  motive  and  obligation,  the 
subjective  and  the  objective,  the  intention  of  the  agent  and  the 
intrinsic  nature  of  the  act.  For  if  it  be  affirmed  of  an  act  that 
it  is  good  because  of  its  tendency  to  promote  the  general  happi¬ 
ness,  it  follows  that  it  is  subjectively  good  or  virtuous,  owing  to 
the  motive  of  the  agent  to  promote  that  end.  In  other  words, 
virtue  as  an  objective  independent  reality  is  annihilated,  as  well 
as  the  obligation  which  belongs  to  it,  and  the  motive  of  the  agent 
usurps  their  place. 

27.  Thirdly,  the  theory  of  utility,  or  of  happiness,  as  the  rule 


*  Analogy,  Part  i.,  c.  2 


144 


MAN. 


of  virtue,  is  incapable  of  general  application  in  our  hand. 
“  TThatever  is  expedient,  (says  Paley,)*  is  right.  But  then  it 
must  be  expedient  upon  the  whole,  at  the  long  run,  in  all  its 
effects,  collateral  and  remote,  as  well  as  in  those  which  are 
immediate  and  direct ;  as  it  is  obvious,  that,  in  computing  con¬ 
sequences,  it  makes  no  difference  in  what  way,  or  at  what  distance 
they  ensue.”  This  might  be  almost  regarded  as  a  grave  satire 
on  the  entire  theory.  It  presumes  on  the  presence  and  equal 
activity  of  qualities  in  which  men  are  commonly  most  varied 
and  deficient  —  those  of  foresight  and  intelligent  comprehension. 
It  overlooks  the  fact  that  man  is,  at  present,  in  a  state  of  things 
in  which  multiplied  disturbing  forces  are  in  operation.  “  The 
individual  is  to  imagine  what  the  general  consequences  would 
be,  all  other  things  remaining  the  same,  if  all  men  were  about 
to  act  as  he  is  about  to  act.  I  scarcely  need  remind  the  reader, 
what  a  source  of  self-delusion  and  sophistry  is  here  opened  to  a 
mind  in  a  state  of  temptation  ?”f  Or  if  it  relies  on  the  com¬ 
bined  and  generalized  results  of  human  experience,  these  are 
inaccessible  to  the  majority  of  mankind  in  almost  every  situa¬ 
tion  in  which  they  would  be  of  any  value ;  and  to  the  still  greater 
majority  of  individual  actions  they  are  not  applicable  at  all. 
And  the  theory  in  question  everlooks  the  fact  that,  as  every 
action  embraces  an  inffnitv  of  relations,  the  Infinite  mind  alone 
can  apply  it.  Taking  advantage  of  this  doctrine,  infidel  attempts 
have  not  been  wanting  to  subvert  the  foundations  of  morality. 
Beausobre,  for  example,  remarks,  “  the  goodness  of  actions  de¬ 
pends  upon  their  consequences,  which  man  cannot  foresee,  nor 
accurately  ascertain.” 

28.  Fourthly,  in  its  grosser  form,  the  utilitarian  theory  is 
chargeable  with  disparaging  even  the  great  doctrine  of  motives. 
By  placing  virtue  in  the  outward  act,  it  confounds  the  morality 
of  the  agent  with  the  law.  It  calls  away  the  attention  from  that 
which  we  are,  to  that  which  we  do  ;  and  thus  tends  to  patronize 
hypocrisy.  It  robs  the  benevolent  of  the  virtue  belonging  to 
their  good  intentions ;  simply  because  their  poverty  or  want 
of  means  may  prevent  them  from  carrying  their  intentions  into 
effect. 

29.  Fifthly,  the  theory  under  consideration  overlooks  the  ef¬ 
fect  of  actions  upon  the  moral  state  and  habit  of  the  mind.  It 
implies,  for  example,  in  opposition  to  the  general  verdict  of  man- 


*  Moral  and  Polit.  Phil.  Bk.  H.  c.  viii. 
t  Coleridge’s  Friend.  Yol.  II.  Essay  xl. 


PROGRESSION. 


145 


kind,  that  happiness  does  not  depend  in  the  highest  degree  on 
the  state  of  the  mind ;  that  there  are  certain  outward  things  on 
which  happiness  depends  more  than  on  the  exercise  of  virtuous 
affections  and  principles  ;  for  otherwise,  the  cultivation  of  such 
principles  must  be  regarded  as  an  important  independent  object. 
And  it  implies  also  that  outward  actions  do  not  flow  from  the 
affections  and  states  of  the  mind ;  otherwise  the  regulation  and 
right  state  of  the  affections  must  be  a  distinct  object  of  primary 
importance.  Indeed,  it  is  now  generally  admitted  by  utilitarian 
moralists,  that  in  estimating  the  utility  of  an  action,  “  its  influ¬ 
ence  on  the  agent’s  own  mind,”  and  “  on  the  characters  of  other 
persons  besides  the  agent,”  is  to  be  taken  into  the  account.  But 
tins  concession,  besides  prescribing  for  the  judgment  a  condition 
of  very  limited  and  precarious  application,  virtually  abandons 
the  theory  which  it  is  meant  to  modify ;  for  if  the  utility  of  an 
action  consists  partly  in  its  promoting  morality  and  confirming 
virtuous  habits,  it  follows  that  virtue  is  a  distinct  good,  worthy 
of  being  valued,  and  capable  of  being  cultivated,  for  its  own 
sake  alone. 

30.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  evident,  sixthly,  that  the 
doctrine  in  question  is  open  to  the  charge  of  logical  inconsistency. 
What  is  the  design  of  Paley  in  teaching  that  expediency  is  right, 
or  of  Bentham  in  affirming  that  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  human  action, 
but  to  show  that  men  ought  to  act  on  these  views  ?  But  why 
ought  they  to  do  so  ?  The  answer  may  be,  either,  because  it  is 
their  interest  to  promote  their  interest  —  which  is  a  truism 
explaining  nothing ;  or  else,  because  they  are  hound  to  aim  at 
the  general  welfare — which  is  only  equivalent  to  saying  that  it 
is  their  duty  to  do  it ;  thus  presupposing  moral  obligation  in  the 
very  act  of  denying  it ;  or  assuming  that  moral  quality  in  the 
premise,  which  they  deny  in  the  conclusion. 

31.  Seventhly,  the  theory  of  utilitarianism  confounds  cause 
and  effect,  or  the  nature  of  virtue  with  its  beneficial  tendencies. 
That  all  the  moralities  are  useful,  we  admit ;  but  to  infer  from 
this  that  utility  is  the  foundation  of  morality,  is  to  jump  to  a 
most  unwarrantable  conclusion.  “  Man  may  be  so  constituted 
as  instantaneously  to  approve  certain  actions  without  any  refer¬ 
ence  to  their  consequences,  and  yet  reason  may  nevertheless 
discover  that  a  tendency  to  produce  general  happiness  is  the 
essential  characteristic  of  such  actions.”*  So  that  even  when 


*  Ethical  Phil.  §  1. 

13 


146 


MAN. 


reason  has  made  this  discovery,  the  questions  remain,  whether 
that  moral  approbation  does  not  imply  a  distinct  moral  quality 
in  actions  ?  whether  virtue  may  not  be  useful  because  it  is  right, 
instead  of  being  right  because  it  is  useful  ?  whether  the  rectitude 
of  certain  principles  might  not  have  existed  from  eternity  apart 
from  all  possibility  of  trial  by  their  practical  tendencies  in  cre¬ 
ated  natures  ?  and  whether  their  utility,  subsequent  to  creation, 
be  not  either  their  direct  and  appropriate  result,  or  else  the  mark 
which  God  has  been  pleased  to  affix  to  them  in  token  of  His 
divine  approval  ?  These  important  inquiries  the  utilitarian  doc¬ 
trine  overlooks  or  negatives,  falsely  inferring,  that  because  virtue 
conduces  to  happiness,  therefore  utility  is  identical  with  virtue ; 
whereas,  if,  as  we  believe,  the  principles  of  rectitude  had  an 
existence  anterior  to  the  present  order  of  things,  their  condu¬ 
civeness  to  happiness  is  simply  the  manifestation  of  their  nature 
and  tendency. 

32.  Eighthly,  as  the  present  is  a  question  of  fact,  we  make 
our  appeal  to  consciousness.  W e  affirm,  that  when  we  are  con¬ 
scious  that  an  action  is  morally  wrong ,  the  consciousness  is 
neither  preceded  nor  produced  by  a  conviction  that  the  act  will 
be  followed  by  disadvantage  or  loss.  When  we  say,  for  example, 
that  theft  is  wrong,  we  mean  something  more  than  that  it  is  use¬ 
less,  and  this  something  more  is  the  inherent  criminality  of  the  act 
which  the  mind  perceives  intuitively.  Even  Bentham  admits 
that  “  the  mind  will  not  be  satisfied  with  such  phrases  as,  ‘  it  is 
useless  to  commit  murder,’  or,  ‘it  would  be  useful  to  prevent  it.’  ” 
And  the  reason  of  our  dissatisfaction  with  them,  as  Dr.  Whewell 
remarks,  is,  “  that  they  do  not  express  our  meaning  that  be¬ 
sides  the  calculable  injuriousness  of  theft  and  murder  to  society, 
and  prior  to  any  such  calculation,  we  instinctively  revolt  from 
the  wickedness  of  it.  And  to  Paley’s  objection,  that  a  wild  man 
of  the  woods,  when  first  caught  and  brought  into  civilized  society, 
would  exhibit  no  such  signs  of  moral  detestation,  it  is  sufficient 
to  reply,  that  neither  would  he  reason,  nor  intelligibly  converse, 
nor,  if  brought  suddenly  from  a  life  of  total  darkness  into  the 
presence  of  the  sun,  would  he  be  able  to  see ;  yet  no  one  would 
think  of  denying  on  this  account,  either  that  the  faculties  of 
reason,  speech,  and  sight,  belong  to  the  human  constitution,  or 
that  there  are  no  objective  realities  answering  to  them. 

33.  We  affirm,  also,  that  our  moral  approbation  of  an  action 
arises  previously  to  any  calculation,  or  even  thought,  of  its 
utility.  That  virtuous  conduct  does  impart  gratification,  we 
acknowledge ;  for  He  who  made  us  for  virtue,  made  us  for  hap- 


PROGRESSION. 


147 


piness  also.  But  to  sav,  with  the  advocates  of  the  selfish  system, 
that  disinterested  virtue  is  therefore  impossible,  is,  as  Butler  has 
shown,  to  be  blind  to  the  important  fact  that  self  is  not  the  im¬ 
mediate  object  of  the  benevolent  affections.  If  the  pleasure  of 
benevolence  is  selfish,  because  it  is  felt  by  self,  not  only  must 
reasoning  be  selfish,  inasmuch  as  the  reasoner  is  necessarily 
conscious  of  the  process,  but,  on  the  same  ground,  the  malevo¬ 
lent  affections  also  must  be  selfish.  The  mistake  consists  in  con¬ 
founding  self.  “  as  it  is  a  subject  of  feeling  and  thought,  with  self 
considered  as  the  object  of  either.” 

TTe  ask,  then,  with  full  confidence  in  the  result  of  our  appeal, 
whether,  when  we  describe  an  action  as  right,  we  do  not  mean 
something  more  than  that  it  is  pleasurable  or  useful  ?  Is  not 
the  pleasure  we  have  in  a  virtuous  act  previous  to  any  gratifi¬ 
cation  we  may  reap  from  the  advantage  of  it  ?  Does  not  this 
very  pleasure  presuppose  an  instituted  harmony  between  the 
mind  and  its  object,  or  the  existence  of  a  moral  constitution  ? 
and  are  we  not  conscious  that  the  more  ardently  we  are  set 
upon  virtue  for  its  own  sake,  the  less  we  think  of  its  enjoyment, 
and  yet  the  greater  our  enjoyment  is  ?  May  we  not  derive 
advantage  from  an  act  we  do  not  admire,  and  admire  an  act 
from  which  we  derive  no  advantage  ?  Indeed,  is  not  our 
admiration  of  an  act  of  apparent  virtue  diminished  in  the  ex£ct 
proportion  in  which  we  see  cause  to  suspect  that  there  is  a 
selfish  end  to  answer  by  it  ?  and  hence,  is  not  our  admiration 
of  an  act  sometimes  changed  into  detestation,  though  the  ex¬ 
ternal  benefits  flowing  from  it  remain  the  same  ?  And  is  it 
not  true  that  moral  education  attains  its  highest  end  in  the  forma¬ 
tion  of  a  character  capable  of  the  pure,  the  heroic,  and  the 
magnanimous,  apart  from  all  calculation  of  consequences ;  and 
that  all  civilized  languages  contain  epithets  and  phrases  ex¬ 
pressive  of  disinterestedness  and  impulsive  self-sacrifice  ? 

34.  Thus,  in  our  subjective  inquiry  respecting  the  faculty  by 
which  we  become  cognizant  of  virtue  and  vice,  we  have  inci¬ 
dentally  brought  into  view  the  principal  answers  to  the  objective 
question,  —  TThat  is  the  ground  of  virtue  ?  And  we  have  found 
that  each  different  theory  of  the  foundation  of  rectitude  gives 
us  a  different  doctrine  respecting  the  means  by  which  we  are 
supposed  to  recognize  its  existence.  The  remarks  which  fol¬ 
low  are  meant  to  illustrate,  or  to  harmonize  with,  the  view,  that 
the  moral  quality  of  actions  is  taken  cognizance  of  by  an  origi¬ 
nal  susceptibility  or  independent  faculty  of  the  mind. 

Let  it  be  premised,  however,  that  whether  conscience  be  a 


148 


MAff. 


distinct  and  simple  faculty,  or  be  resolvable  into  simpler  and 
anterior  faculties  of  our  nature,  is  of  little  practical  importance. 
All  that  is  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  moral  science  is,  the 
evidence  that  rectitude  has  an  objective  existence  and  character, 
and  that  man  is  endowed  with  the  means  necessary  for  placing 
him  in  harmonious  subjective  relation  to  it.  Nor  let  it  be  sup¬ 
posed  that  we  regard  the  mind  as  a  collection  of  distinct  mem¬ 
bers,  or  co-existent  parts,  resembling  an  organic  structure. 
We  view  it  as  a  substance  simple  and  indivisible.  And  we  so 
regard  it,  not  for  the  supposed  simplicity  of  the  view,  for  we 
profess  that  we  do  not  see  that  the  subject  is  simplified  by 
exchanging  parts  for  states,  but  because  the  contrary  is  incon¬ 
ceivable.  And  the  mind,  thus  simple  and  indivisible,  is  capable 
of  passing  into  different  states,  remembering,  hoping,  willing, 
approving,  being  so  many  distinct  acts  or  states  of  the  whole 
mind. 

35.  Among  these  capabilities,  we  regard  the  faculty  of  recog¬ 
nizing  and  responding  to  the  moral  quality  of  actions  as  a  sep¬ 
arate  one.  Other  faculties  are  psychologically  preliminary  to 
it,  and  its  operation  may  presuppose,  or  else  associate  to  itself, 
the  operation  of  all  the  rest ;  but  this  faculty  itself  we  believe 
to  be  distinct  and  ultimate.  We. infer  this,  first,  from  an  appeal 
to  consciousness.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  no  positive  evi¬ 
dence  to  contravene  our  view ;  on  the  other,  the  consciousness 
of  obligation,  and  the  emotion  of  approbation  or  disapprobation 
belonging  to  the  operation  of  conscience,  are  so  distinct  from 
every  other  perception  and  affection  of  which  the  mind  is  con¬ 
scious,  as  to  defy  analysis  or  explanation.  Secondly,  if,  as  we 
believe,  the  moral  quality  which  conscience  recognizes  be  sim¬ 
ple  and  ultimate,  it  may  be  inferred,  by  analogy,  that  the  coun¬ 
terpart  faculty  is  distinct  and  ultimate  also.  And,  thirdly,  if,  as 
we  shall  hereafter  see,  conscience  is  a  faculty  appointed  to  place 
us  in  relation  to  a  distinct  attribute  of  the  Divine  character,  and 
to  introduce  us  into  a  new  stage  of  the  Divine  manifestation, 
we  are  furnished  with  strong  presumptive  evidence,  at  least, 
that  it  is  uncompounded  and  ultimate. 

36.  What  then  is  the  function  of  this  ultimate  power  ?  Not 
to  legislate ;  not  even  to  supply  information  respecting  the  laws 
of  the  constitution  into  which  man  lias  come ;  but  to  recognize 
and  respond  to  the  rectitude  of  these  laws.  To  every  part  of  this 
constitution  man  is  so  related,  that,  even  apart  from  conscience, 
his  every  movement  is  (not  innocent  or  guilty)  but  objectively 
right  or  wrong,  accordant  or  discordant.  He  could  not  err  re- 


PROGRESSION. 


143 


specting  it,  even  involuntarily,  without  disadvantage ;  nor  culti¬ 
vate  the  right  state  of  mind,  even  though  ignorant  that  it  is 
right,  without  advantage.  But  the  lines  of  conduct  which  this 
constitution  prescribes,  he  is  competent  to  learn  from  his  own 
experience  of  the  course  of  nature,  and  from  the  word  of  God. 
Moreover,  he  is  conscious  of  motives  (I  speak  not  of  their  ade¬ 
quacy)  to  pursue  these  lines  of  conduct  —  the  appetites,  self- 
love,  the  benevolent  affections,  and  gratitude  and  obedience  to 
God  —  motives  answering  to  all  the  laws  and  objects  included 
in  this  constitution.  I  can  conceive,  however,  of  a  being  capa¬ 
ble  of  all  this,  while  yet  destitute  of  what  I  understand  by  con¬ 
science.  The  constitution  into  which  he  has  come  is  an  expres¬ 
sion  of  the  will  of  God,  and  as  such  it  prescribes  the  rules  of 
his  conduct :  and  as  a  creature  sentient,  intelligent,  and  emo¬ 
tional,  he  may  be  able  to  trace  them,  and  may  be  conscious  of 
motives  to  comply  with  them.  But  the  will  of  God  itself — 
of  what  is  that  an  expression  but  of  the  immutable  rectitude  of 
which  his  Nature  is  the  infinite  residence  ?  Now  it  appears  to 
be  the  function  of  conscience  to  place  man  in  relation  to  that 
rectitude  —  to  enable  him  to  recognize  and  respond  to  the  moral 
quality  of  actions.  As  the  will  of  God  presupposes  his  holy 
nature  of  which  it  is  the  exponent,  the  motives  which  I  have 
named  presuppose,  in  every  truly  virtuous  act,  that  conscious¬ 
ness  of  obligation  on  which  virtue  rests.  As  the  will  of  God 
derives  its  imperativeness  from  something  logically  anterior,  from 
his  intrinsic  excellence,  so  motives  derive  their  highest  authority 
from  this  consciousness  of  obligation.  Every  perception  of  ob¬ 
ligation,  indeed,  by  acting  impulsively  on  the  will,  is  a  motive , 
but  it  is  something  more.  Conscience  is  the  ultimate  term  in 
man’s  moral  nature,  answering  to  the  ultimate  rectitude  of  the 
Divine  nature. 

37.  What  is  the  manner  in  which  conscience  operates  in  re¬ 
lation  to  the  moral  quality  of  actions  ?  We  think  its  phenom¬ 
ena  will  be  found  to  be  threefold.*  First,  when  a  man  is  re¬ 
flecting  on  an  action  which,  on  some  accounts,  he  hesitates  to 
perform,  conscience  announces  its  presence  by  discriminating 
the  moral  quality  of  the  action.  His  ground  of  hesitation  to 
perform  the  act  may  be  the  labor,  the  time,  or  the  self-denial, 
it  may  require,  or  its  contrariety  to  the  prevailing  opinion  or 
custom.  But,  fixing  its  eye  on  the  moral  quality  of  the  act, 
conscience  regards  its  rectitude  alone,  and  tells  him  that  it  is 


*  Wayland’s  Ethics,  c.  ii.  §  2. 

*13* 


150 


MAN. 


right.  Or  let  us  take  the  instant  approbation  of  which  we  aic 
conscious  on  witnessing  the  conduct  of  a  dutiful  child.  But 
every  emotion  presupposes  an  intellectual  perception  or  convic¬ 
tion  as  its  immediate  occasion.  This  approbation,  therefore, 
implies  a  previous  notion  or  perception ;  and  as  it  cannot  be 
the  perception  of  the  mere  external  act,  it  must  relate  to  the 
inherent  rightness  of  the  child’s  conduct. 

38.  Secondly,  with  this  discrimination  of  the  moral  quality 
of  an  action  is  inseparably  allied  a  constraining  or  impulsive 
sense  of  obligation  to  perform  it.  This  is  the  to  dsov,  or  the 
sense  of  that  which  we  ought  to  do ;  the  notion  of  right  involv¬ 
ing  the  feeling  of  duty.  I  am  now  speaking  of  conscience  as 
that  which  has  for  its  proper  province  our  own  conduct.  But 
it  is,  I  think,  equally  true  of  our  estimate  of  the  moral  conduct 
of  others,  that  our  perception  of  what  is  right  for  them  to  do  is 
invariably  accompanied  by  a  feeling  that  they  ought  to  do  it ; 
and  by  a  sense  of  obligation  that,  in  the  same  circumstances,  we 
should  be  bound  to  do  it  also.  And  as  this  sense  of  obligation 
acts  impulsively,  we  rank  it  among  the  motives  to  action, 
though,  unlike  other  motives,  it  acts  imperatively,  by  a  sense  of 
inward  constraint.  Its  motive  power  is  felt  when,  coming  into 
conflict  with  interest  or  passion,  it  bears  them  down,  or  is  borne 
down  by  them ;  and  is  implied  in  the  fact  that  we  are  consid¬ 
ered  to  have  sufficiently  accounted  for  a  moral  act  by  affirming 
that  we  felt  we  ought  to  perform  it. 

39.  Thirdly,  supposing  the  action  to  be  performed,  there  is  in¬ 
separably  allied  with  it  a  consciousness  of  self -approbation.  If 
the  action  be  performed  by  another,  we  are  conscious  of  award¬ 
ing  him  our  esteem,  and  silently  pronounce  him  deserving  of 
reward.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  impulse  of  conscience  be  dis¬ 
obeyed,  the  sentence  of  approbation  is  replaced  by  one  of  im¬ 
plied  or  of  felt  condemnation.  The  remorse,  indeed,  conse¬ 
quent  on  our  own  moral  delinquency,  include^  elements  not  to 
be  found  in  the  estimate  we  form  of  similar  delinquency  in 
another,  but  the  feeling  of  revulsion  rests,  in  each  instance,  on 
essentially  the  same  moral  basis.  And  thus  the  discrimination 
of  that  which  is  right,  is  allied  with  the  impulsive  sense  that  it 
ought  to  be  done,  and  this  again  is  rewarded  with  a  conscious¬ 
ness  of  pleasure,  or  punished  with  a  consciousness  of  pain, 
according  as  it  is  done,  or  left  undone.  Or,  reversing  the  order, 
it  might  be  said,  that  a  moral  sentence  presupposes  an  impulsive 
sense  of  moral  obligation,  and  this  again  presupposes  the  capa¬ 
city  of  discriminating  right.  This  view  of  conscience  affirms  a 


PROGRESSION. 


151 


moral  determination,  but  without  rejecting  the  exercise  of  the 
judgment  respecting  the  object  to  which  it  should  be  applied ; 
a  moral  disposition,  but  without  implying  that  it  is  imperative  in 
the  sense  of  irresistible ;  and  a  moral  susceptibility  of  pleasure 
and  pain  consequent  on  the  conduct  of  the  will  in  relation  to 
that  determination  and  disposition. 

40.  What  is  the  manner  in  which  conscience  operates  in 
relation  to  the  different  classes  of  the  motives  ?  These  we  have 
said  may  be  divided  into  instinctive  desires,  or  such  as  have 
some  outward  thing  for  their  object;  self-love,  having  a  man’s 
own  happiness  for  its  end,  and  for  that  purpose  postponing  and 
even  refusing  the  gratification  of  the  private  desires ;  the  social 
affections  ;  and  regard  to  the  will  of  God.  Now  conscience 
itself,  we  have  just  remarked,  in  virtue  of  its  discriminating 
office  becomes  impulsive.  In  the  very  act  of  saying  what  is 
right,  it  commands  the  performance  of  the  right.  Its  impulsive 
power,  indeed,  by  no  means  overbears  any  of  the  motives  just 
named.  It  may  oppose  even  the  highest  —  regard  to  a  condi¬ 
tional  command  of  God  —  provided  the  sacrifice  be  that  of  a 
duty  of  mediate  to  one  of  primary  and  immediate  obligation ; 
and  it  may  unite  with  a  motive  of  the  lowest  class  —  with  one 
of  the  appetites.*  In  the  very  act  of  arbitration,  it  adds  its  own 
motive-influence  on  the  will  to  the  influence  of  the  motive  which 
it  pronounces  to  be  right. 

41.  This  leads  to  the  inquiry,  What  is  the  manner  of  its 
operation  in  relation  to  the  will?  We  have  said  that  in  the 
act  of  discriminating  between  right  and  wrong,  it  operates  im¬ 
pulsively  or  with  the  force  of  a  motive ;  and,  of  course,  like 
every  other  motive,  it  operates  on  the  will.  But  there  is  this 
important  distinction  between  conscience,  and  the  various  classes 
of  desires  and  affections,  that  while  they  do  not  terminate  on  the 
will,  but  require  ulterior  means  for  their  gratification,  the  moral 
faculty  looks  not  beyond  the  will ;  finds  its  end  in  obtaining  the 
consent  of  the  will  alone.  With  those,  the  consent  of  the  will 
is  only  the  first  step  to  an  end ;  with  this,  it  is  the  first  and  the 
last.  It  is  the  first ;  for  in  prohibiting  the  rising  desire  of  evil 
in  the  heart,  its  solemn  formula,  “  thou  shalt  not,”  is  addressed 
to  the  will :  and  it  is  the  last ;  for  even  if  the  prohibited  desire 
prevail  over  the  will,  and  become  embodied  in  outward  action, 
conscience  takes  cognizance  of  it,  and  employs  its  whip  of 
scorpions,  only  as  it  is  a  voluntary  action.  Thus,  “  nothing 


*  S.  Matt.  xii.  4  —  8. 


152 


MAN. 


stands  between  the  moral  sentiments  and  their  object.  They 
are,  as  it  were,  in  contact  with  the  will.  It  is  this  sort  of 
mental  position,  if  the  expression  may  be  pardoned,  that  ex¬ 
plains,  or  seems  to  explain,  the  characteristic  properties  which 
true  philosophers  ascribe  to  them,  and  which  all  reflecting 
men  feel  to  belong  to  them.”*  Conscience  regards  the  will 
as  the  prime  mover  of  the  man.  Until  the  desires  and  affec¬ 
tions  have  become  voluntary  dispositions,  responsibility,  in  the 
eye  of  conscience,  does  not  begin.  It  stands,  if  we  may  say  so, 
close  to  the  will,  and  the  objects  on  which  it  addresses  the  will 
are  the  emotions  approaching  the  will,  and  those  which  owe 
their  existence  to  the  will.  From  which  it  follows  that  con¬ 
science  itself  has  nothing  in  it  of  moral  excellence.  It  takes 
the  name  of  the  moral  faculty,  not  from  its  excellence,  but  from 
its  office,  in  having  to  pronounce  on  moral  qualities. 

42.  Can  conscience  be  said  to  be  universal  in  relation  to  the 
movements  of  the  mind  ?  Its  contact  with  the  will  authorizes  a 
reply  in  the  affirmative.  By  contemplating  those  dispositions 
which  depend  on  the  will,  its  office  embraces  the  whole  charac¬ 
ter  and  conduct.  For  what  dispositions  have  not,  more  or  less, 
this  character  of  dependence  ?  Emotions,  indeed,  are  not  vol¬ 
untary  in  themselves,  but  in  their  proximate  cause  they  are  so ; 
for  that  cause  is  the  object  of  thought  and  attention,  and  over 
the  attention  the  will  is  invested  with  a  controlling  power.  So 
that  even  if  the  emotion  of  which  the  mind  is  just  conscious, 
have  not  yet  obtained  the  consent  of  the  will,  the  will  is  respon¬ 
sible,  in  the  eye  of  conscience,  either  if  the  emotion  has  arisen 
in  consequence  of  some  former  object  of  attention,  or  if,  now 
that  it  has  arisen  in  the  mind,  the  will  consents  to  it  by  not  call¬ 
ing  for  some  object  of  thought,  which,  by  awakening  another 
emotion,  would  cause  this  to  fade  and  disappear.  The  eye  of 
conscience,  therefore,  ranges  over  all  the  interior  of  the  charac¬ 
ter,  nor,  in  the  whole  of  the  diversified  prospect,  does  it  behold 
anything  morally  indifferent.  Theoretically,  it  is  always  “ac¬ 
cusing,  or  else  excusing.”  Every  thought  as  it  is  suggested, 
and  every  emotion  as  it  is  excited,  was  meant  to  draw  on  it  the 
judicial  eye  of  conscience. 

43.  And,  for  the  same  reason,  its  activity  is  supposed  to  be 
unintemnitting .  Even  the  operation  of  human  law  is  seldom 
suspended.  It  draws  a  circle  around  us  and  our  property, 
accompanies  us  in  all  our  movements  on  the  land,  sails  with  us 


*  Ethic  Phil.  p.  199. 

%  ’ 


PROGRESSION. 


153 


on  the  deep,  penetrates  into  all  our  relations  and  situations, 
holds  us  as  in  the  grasp  of  an  invisible  hand.  But  the  law  of 
conscience  is  with  us,  literally,  everywhere,  and  at  all  times. 
Our  sleeping  moments  are  not  exempted  from  its  jurisdiction, 
for  he  who  sinks  into  the  deepest  slumber,  sleeps  with  a  purpose 
in  his  breast.  Long  time  may  have  elapsed  since  he  first 
formed  it,  for  opportunity  may  not  have  served,  or  the  time 
may  not  have  arrived  for  carrying  it  into  effect.  But  it  was  in 
the"  first  moment  of  its  formation  that  conscience  took  cognizance 
of  it ;  and  never  till  it  ceases  to  be  a  purpose,  can  conscience 
be  said  to  withdraw  its  eye  from  it.  Were  he  to  die  in  sleep, 
that  purpose  would  go  with  him  to  the  bar  of  God.  Meanwhile, 
though  lie  sleep,  his  purpose  remains  in  the  balances  of  con¬ 
science.  Never  are  they  laid  aside;  and  so  exquisitely  are  they 
adjusted,  that  the  ‘‘  light  dust”  of  other  balances  is  itself  weighed 
here. 

44.  The  view  which  wTe  have  taken  of  the  moral  faculty 
enables  us  to  answer  another  question,  What  is  the  authority 
of  conscience  ?  And  we  find  that,  besides  being,  by  right, 
universal  in  its  jurisdiction  and  unintermitting  in  its  activity, 
its  authority  is  supreme.  We  do  not  say  that  its  supremacy 
consists  in  superseding  the  exercise  of  the  intellectual  powers 
in  their  own  legitimate  sphere.  What  that  sphere  is  we  have 
seen  in  the  preceding  sections  on  reflection  and  reason ;  from 
which  it  would  appear  that  they  enable  us  to  perceive  those 
very  relations  which  involve  the  obligations  recognized  by  con¬ 
science.  Neither  do  we  say  that  its  supremacy  consists  in  abso¬ 
lutely  dictating  the  manner  in  which  the  obligations  resulting 
from  our  relations  should  be  externally  discharged  ;  this  may  be, 
and  generally  is,  a  subject  for  reflection.  When,  therefore,  the 
prediction  of  our  Lord,  that  the  time  would  come  when  the  ene¬ 
mies  of  the  gospel  would  think  that  they  did  God  service  by 
destroying  his  followers,  is  quoted  to  show  the  fallibility  of  con¬ 
science  as  a  guide,  its  office  is  misunderstood.  Its  province,  in 
this  instance,  is,  to  recognize  the  obligation  of  doing  God  service, 
and  to  enforce  it  as  superior  to  every  other  obligation.  But 
both  the  perception  of  the  relation  to  God  out  of  which  this  obli¬ 
gation  arises,  and  the  manner  of  discharging  it  in  this  particular 
instance,  fall  within  the  province  of  the  intellectual  powers. 
Nor  do  we  mean  that  its  supremacy  consists  in  superseding 
other  motives,  but  rather  in  arbitrating  between  them,  denounc¬ 
ing  the  wrong,  and  thus  authenticating  and  corroborating  the 
right.  In  this  repect,  it  not  only  fills  an  office  which  is  unique, 


154 


MAN. 


but  in  the  occupation  of  which  it  sways  de  jure,  an  authoritative 
influence  over  all  the  other  principles  of  action. 

45.  The  supremacy  of  conscience,  in  the  sense  explained,  may 
be  illustrated  by  the  following  considerations :  1.  That  if  the 
gratification  of  a  man’s  appetites  comes  into  collision  with  the 
dictates  of  conscience ;  and  he  yields  to  the  solicitations  of  the 
former,  he  afterwards  feels  mortified,  and  is  degraded  in  his 
own  eyes  as  well  as  in  the  eyes  of  others.  If,  for  so  doing,  he 
should  be  designated,  as  is  often  the  case,  a  sensualist,  an  ani¬ 
mal,  or  a  beast,  the  meaning  obviously  is  that  he  has  acted  as  if 
the  higher  principle  of  action  had  been  denied  him.  It  is  in  vain 
for  him  to  plead  the  greater  strength  of  the  inferior  impulse. 
Who  thinks  of  excusing  the  miser  on  the  ground  of  the  invinci¬ 
bleness  of  his  habit  ?  The  judgment  we  form  evidently  proceeds 
on  the  ground  that  the  least  whisper  of  conscience  ought  to  have 
greater  authority  with  us  than  the  strongest  impulse  of  any  infe¬ 
rior  principle.  2.  That  “  its  title  is  not  impaired  by  any  num¬ 
ber  of  defeats.”  Every  defeat  “  disposes  the  disinterested  and 
dispassionate  by-stander  to  wish  that  its  force  were  strengthened;” 
and  he  “  rejoices  at  all  accessions  to  its  force.”  3.  That  the 
supremacy  of  conscience  is  necessary  to  the  well-being  of  man. 
Whether  we  suppose  the  end  for  which  man  is  made,  to  be  the 
attainment  of  the  greatest  amount  of  holiness,  of  happiness,  or 
of  power  —  or  all  combined  —  either  as  an  individual  or  as  a 
society  —  it  will  be  found  to  be  gained  in  proportion  to  the  de¬ 
gree  in  which  conscience  restrains  the  various  classes  of  motives 
within  their  appropriate  limits.  Even  the  passions  themselves 
are  gainers  by  submitting  their  activity  to  the  regulation  of  con¬ 
science.  We  say  nothing  of  the  power  which  conscience  displays 
under  particular  circumstances  —  of  the  unquailing  fidelity  with 
which  it  will  sometimes  take  the  arrow  which  was  discharged  at 
a  venture,  and  compel  the  sinner  to  press  it  into  his  own  breast'; 
of  the  oracular  and  prophetic  manner  in  which  it  menaces  him 
on  his  way  to  some  guilty  deed,  turning  him  back,  time  after 
time,  and  making  him  flee  at  the  rustling  of  a  leaf ;  how,  at 
length,  when  the  deed  has  been  perpetrated,  it  recovers  from 
the  stunning  effects  of  the  blow,  in  the  character  of  an  avenger, 
and  refuses  again  to  be  silent,  clothing  every  man  who  looks  at 
him  with  the  character  of  a  prophet,  who  seems  to  say,  “  Thou 
art  the  man !”  and  inscribing  every  wall  on  which  his  eye  may 
rest  with  a  handwriting  which  tells  his  doom ;  how,  when,  by  a 
course  of  guilt,  it  has  been  gradually  drugged  to  stupefaction,  no 
rare  can  prevent  it  from  occasionally  starting  and  glaring  with 


PROGRESSION. 


155 


a  look  which  tells  of  suspended  vengeance ;  how  it  sometimes 
urges  the  culprit  to  surrender  himself  to  human  law  ;  prononnc- 
ing  its  own  verdict  so  quickly  as  to  anticipate  all  other  judg¬ 
ments,  so  distinctly  as  to  be  heard  above  the  tempest  of  the 
passions,  and  so  solemnly  as  to  be  remembered  after  every  other 
voice  is  hushed. 

We  will  only  advert  to  what  may  be  regarded  as  a  literary 
illustration  of  the  authority  of  conscience — the  fact  that  if  a 


wi  iter  be  forcible  on  any  subject  it  is  on  this  ;  and  that  the  most 
vigorous  passages  and  striking  imagery  of  writers  sacred  and 
profane  will  be  found  to  relate  to  subjects  which  involve  the 
office  of  conscience.  Reminding  us  of  the  language  of  Butler 
— itself,  indeed,  an  illustration  of  our  remark  —  “had  it  strength 
as  it  has  right,  had  it  power  as  it  has  manifest  authority,  it 
would  absolutely  govern  the  world.” 

•/  o  t  ^ 

46.  The  last  condition  implied  in  our  general  proposition  is 
that  the  moral  faculty  should  be  of  a  nature  to  affect  the  will 

w 

without  compelling  it.  That  it  does  not  bear  down  the  will, 
but  may  itself  be  overborne,  we  have  given  many  and  fearful 
intimations.  And  some  have  made  this  a  ground  of  objection ; 
for  if  a  man  chooses  to  violate  it,  and  to  suffer  the  pain,  then, 
says  Paley,  “  the  moral  instinct  has  nothing  more  to  offer.” 
But  to  infer  that  conscience  is  useless,*  because  it  is  not  irresist¬ 
ible,  or,  that  there  is  no  conscience,  because  it  is  not  invincible, 
does  not  oppress  the  will,  and  make  man  incapable  of  virtue,  by 
turning  him  into  a  machine,  is  to  mistake  the  nature  and  office 
of  conscience. 

47.  True  it  is,  that  by  leaving  man  capable  of  voluntary  ac¬ 
tion,  an  inlet  is  left  for  sin,  and  that  sin,  having  entered,  con¬ 
science  itself  has  been  involved  in  the  perverting  effects  of  the 
fall.  But  its  office  is  not  extinguished,  nor  has  its  activity 
ceased :  its  relative  position  among  the  other  faculties  is  what 
it  ever  was.  Its  original  design  and  tendency  are  obvious, 
whatever  its  subsequent  aberrations  may  have  been.  As  But¬ 
ler  justly  remarks,  “the  body  may  be  impaired  by  sickness, 
the  tree  may  decay,  a  machine  be  out  of  order,  and  yet  the  sys¬ 
tem  and  constitution  of  them  not  totally  dissolved.  Every  work 
of  art  is  apt  to  be  out  of  order,  but  this  is  so  far  from  being  ac¬ 
cording  to  its  system,  that,  let  the  disorder  increase,  and  it  will 
totally  destroy  it.  There  is  plainly  something  which  answers 
to  all  this  in  the  moral  constitution  of  man.”  Man,  indeed,  is 
not  only  “  apt  to  be  out  of  order,”  he  is  out  of  order.  But  his 
moral  derangement  is  functional,  not  organic.  And  even  where, 


156 


MAN. 


de  facto ,  his  conscience  is  at  present  silenced,  de  jure ,  it  is  an 
arbitrator  and  an  oracle  still.  Every  appeal  to  it  from  without, 
whether  from  God  or  man,  presupposes  its  official  existence. 
In  the  very  act  of  reproaching  it,  the  Scriptures  imply  its  power 
of  response.  The  fact  that  conscience  is,  by  right,  a  law  uni¬ 
versally  binding,  and  yet  a  law  capable  of  being  every  moment 
violated,  is  precisely  that  which  renders  man  capable  of  moral 
action. 

And  thus  the  conditions  of  our  general  proposition  are  satis¬ 
fied.  Man,  introduced  into  a  system  of  objective  moral  excel¬ 
lence,  is  found  capable  of  a  consciousness  of  obligation  in  every 
instance  in  which  he  has  the  means  of  subserving  the  system. 
He  is  thus  both  a  manifestation  of  the  Divine  character  of  God, 
and  is  justly  held  accountable  for  voluntarily  harmonizing  with 
the  Divine  procedure.* 


Sect.  VIH.  —  Language  and  Testimony ;  or,  a  Second 

Human  Mind. 

1.  If  man  is,  as  we  have  seen,  destined  to  be  the  intelligent 
interpreter  of  the  Divine  manifestation,  and  if  that  manifesta¬ 
tion  is  to  be  unlimited,  it 4 may  be  expected  that  every  variety 
of  means  will  be  employed,  consistent  with  other  things,  for  in¬ 
terpreting  the  manifestation,  for  the  greater  this  variety,  the 
more  enlarged  will  be  the  view  which  man  will  require  of  the 
Divine  perfection  displayed. 

If,  then,  to  a  single  intelligent  human  being  destined  to  this 
high  end,  a  second  be  added  —  provided  each  be  able  to  com¬ 
pare  his  views  with,  and  add  his  convictions  to,  those  of  the 
other  —  the  means  of  knowledge  possessed  by  each  will  be  more 
than  doubled.  Now  we  have  reached  that  part  of  the  history 
of  man  in  which  we  have  seen  a  second  human  being  called 
into  existence.  Here,  then,  is  another  intelligent  and  moral 
being,  whose  mind,  according  to  its  measure  of  development, 
interprets  the  visible  universe,  and  holds  responsible  relations 
with  the  invisible.  May  it  not  be  expected,  then,  that  man  will 
be  endowed  with  the  power  of  learning  more  from  his  intelligent 
fellow-man  than  from  any  other  object  of  external  nature  ?  In 
other  words,  that  a  community  of  knowledge  will  be  possible  ? 

2.  But  how  shall  this  great  desideratum  be  attained  ?  Two 


*  See  also  Chapters  XI.  and  XII. 


PROGRESSION. 


157 


things,  at  least  are  indispensable  —  that  they  possess  the  means 
of  interchanging  their  thoughts  and  feelings,  and  that  the  thoughts 
and  feelings  imparted  carry  with  them  satisfactory  evidence*  of 
their  credibility. 

3.  The  first  condition  —  the  means  of  interchanging  thoughts 
and  feelings  —  the  Creator  has  provided  for  by  the  intervention 
of  articulate  sounds,  or  speech.  But  speech,  in  order  that  it  may 
answer  this  important  end,  will  be  found  to  include  the  following 
things  :  —  First,  the  utterance  of  sounds.  And,  in  so  far,  as 
Locke  has  remarked,  the  materials  of  language  pre-existed  in 
Nature. 

4.  But,  secondly,  these  sounds  must  be  articulate.  And  this, 
of  course,  supposes  that  man  possessed,  from  the  first,  the  fac¬ 
ulty  of  speech,  or  an  organization  adapted  to  produce  articulate 
sounds. 

5.  But,  thirdly,  if  there  were  nothing  more  than  sounds,  even 
articulate  sounds,  there  would  still  be  nothing  more  than  the 
means  of  signs :  the  signs  themselves  would  be  wanting.  Be¬ 
tween  the  mere  sound  and  the  sign  there  is  ^a  gulf  'which  mind 
alone  can  span  or  fill  up.  The  sounds  can  become  signs  only 
on  this  condition,  —  that  the  mind  supply  something  to  be  signi¬ 
fied,  and  employ  articulate  sound,  in  order  to  signify  it.  Birds 
can  be  taught,  remarks  Locke,  “  to  make  articulate  sounds  dis¬ 
tinct  enough,  which  yet  by  no  means  are  capable  of  language. 
Besides  articulate  sounds,  therefore,  it  was  further  necessary 
that  man  should  be  able  to  use  these  sounds  as  signs  of  internal 
conceptions,  and  to  make  them  stand  as  marks  for  the  ideas  in 
his  own  mind.”*  Or,  in  the  language  of  W.  Humboldt, t  “  the 
intention  and  the  capacity  of  expressing  something  thought  is 
the  only  thing  which  characterizes  the  articulate  sound,  and 
which  distinguishes  it  from  the  animal  cry  on  the  one  hand,  and 
from  the  musical  tone  on  the  other.”  Thoughts  are  not  the 
creatures  of  sounds,  but  articulate  sounds  presuppose  thoughts. 

6.  Fourthly,  if  language  is  to  be  an  adequate  instrument  of 
the  human  mind,  its  form  must  correspond  with  the  leading 
powers  of  the  mind,  or  wdth  the  universal  laws  of  thought. 
There  are,  indeed,  numerous  vague  and  general  signs  in  nature, 
expressive  of  mere  feelings,  which  are  older  than  speech.  Such 


*  B.m.  c.  i.  §§  l,  2. 

t  On  the  Kawi  Language  on  the  Island  of  Java,  etc.,  Vol.  I.  p.  83,  of 
the  In  trod,  on  the  Diversity  of  the  Organization  of  Human  Languages, 
Berlin ,  1836. 


14 


158 


MAN. 


are  animal  cries  and  sounds,  and  such  the  motions  of  /he  body 
and  of  every  part  of  the  body.  But  even  if  man  possessed  all 
these,  and  possessed  them  in  perfection,  he  could  do  little  more 
than  express,  in  a  very  indefinite  manner,  some  of  his  sensa¬ 
tions  and  desires ;  whereas,  language,  besides  expressing  all  that 
can  be  indicated  by  such  corporeal  signs,  must  possess,  in  order 
to  be  a  suitable  vehicle  for  the  mind,  the  peculiar  power  of  con¬ 
veying  from  one  mind  to  another,  thoughts  which  have  only  a 
mental  existence,  as  well  as  the  order  of  sequence  in  which  they 
stand  to  each  other.  Accordingly  it  is  found  to  answer  this  end. 
Probably,  some  of  the  first  sounds  which  man  uttered  were  de¬ 
scriptive  of  sensible  objects  ;  when  his  Maker  called  his  vocal 
powers  into  activity,  by  bringing  to  him  “  the  living  creatures, 
to  see  what  he  would  call  them.”  Corresponding  to  other  ob¬ 
jects  which  are  not  sensible  —  ideal  objects  and  invisible  reali¬ 
ties  —  he  lias  universal  terms,  and  words  which  have  been  ap¬ 
propriated  to  the  special  use  of  the  reason  by  their  abstraction 
from  all  alliance  with  sensible  objects,  or  by  denoting  the  nega¬ 
tion  of  material  qualities  and  sensible  objects.  But  all  the  ob¬ 
jects  stand  in  different  relations  to  him  and  to  each  other.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  his  “  language  is  not  a  simple  collection  of  isolated 
words ;  it  is  a  system  of  the  manifold  relations  of  words  to  each 
other.  These  different  relations  are  all  referable  to  invariable 
relations,  to  universal  grammar,  which  has  its  necessary  laws 
derived  from  the  very  nature  of  the  human  mind.”*  Now, 
nouns  and  verbs,  the  names  of  objects,  and  their  diversified  re¬ 
lations  to  each  other  and  to  the  human  mind,  lie  at  the  basis  of 
all  grammar.  Everything  to  which  a  name  is  given  is  distin¬ 
guishable  by  number  and  gender.  By  avoiding  the  repetition 
of  the  noun  substantive  in  a  sentence,  the  pronoun  is  given  us ; 
by  naming  the  quality  or  appearance  which  distinguishes  one 
thing  from  another  of  a  like  kind,  we  have  the  noun  adjective ; 
the  degrees  of  comparison  arise  from  marking  the  measure  of 
intensity  belonging  to  these  qualities  themselves ;  and  the  prep¬ 
osition  denotes  the  order  and  the  place  of  a  thing  in  relation  to 
something  else.  As  the  action  by  which  a  thing  is  connected 
with  ourselves  or  with  other  things  denoted  by  the  verb,  admits 
of  modification,  it  gives  rise  to  the  adverb ;  the  tense  denotes  the 
time  in  which  the  action  takes  place ;  as  every  action  is  done  or 
suffered,  supposes  an  agent  or  patient,  the  distinction  is  express¬ 
ed  by  the  active  and  the  passive  voice ;  while  the  mode  of  ex- 


*  Cousin’s  Psychology,  c.  y . 


PROGRESSION. 


159 


pressing  an  action,  according  as  it  is,  as  it  may  be,  must  be,  and 
might  be,  as  it  is  wished  to  be,  commanded  to  be,  and  ought  to 
be,  varies  according  to  its  relation  to  the  different  faculties  and 
operations  of  the  mind.  In  this  simple  but  mysterious  manner, 
speech  becomes  the  exponent  of  mind,  the  objective  lends  itself 
to  the  subjective,  and  faithfully  expresses  its  most  subtle  and 
complicated  operations. 

7.  But,  fifthly,  all  this  only  describes  the  requisites  of  lan¬ 
guage  for  the  individual  man,  or  for  a  solitary  man  speaking 
“  to  the  air.”  Whether  language  is  necessary  for  the  individu¬ 
al  mind  as  a  means  of  thought,  we  stop  not  now  to  inquire : 
that  words  logically  presuppose  the  thoughts  and  the  classifica¬ 
tions  which  they  express,  is  as  evident  on  the  one  hand,  as  the 
historical  truth  on  the  other,  that  the  mind  thinks  chiefly 
through  the  medium  of  language.  In  order,  however,  that 
language  may  serve  as  a  means  of  communication,  it  is  evident 
that  the  mind  of  each  individual  must  be  similarly  constituted, 
so  that  each  may  be  similarly  affected  by  external  objects.  In 
a  former  section  we  showed,  that  in  order  that  God  might  im¬ 
part  his  mind  to  the  individual  man  through  the  intervention 
of  the  symbols  of  external  nature,  it  was  obviously  necessary 
that  each  symbol  should  mean  the  same  for  man  and  for  God. 
Equally  clear  is  it  that  external  objects  must  mean  substantially 
the  same  thing  for  the  two  human  minds ;  for  there  could  not 
otherwise  be  a  common  understanding  as  to  the  name  to  be 
given  to  a  thing,  and  knowledge,  as  it  relates  to  external  nature, 
would  be  impossible.  True  it  is  that  the  perfection  of  the  ad¬ 
justment  existing  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective  in 
the  case  of  each  individual,  and  which  we  considered  in  our 
section  on  Sensational  Perception,  is  so  delicate,  that  no  object, 
probably,  will  ever  affect  two  persons  alike  absolutely,  and  in 
every  respect ;  probably,  even  the  same  individual  will  never 
derive  from  the  same  object  two  sensations  perfectly  alike. 
But  this  inappreciable  difference  in  the  impressions  make  by 
the  same  objects  on  two  minds  will  be  owing  to  the  very  per¬ 
fection  of  the  adjustment  in  each  case  between  the  world  with¬ 
in  and  the  world  without.  For  as  each  will  view  every  object 
from  a  somewhat  different  point,  in  a  slightly  different  manner, 
and  with  an  organ  or  instrument  slightly  different  from  that 
of  the  other,  a  corresponding  difference  in  the  sensation  must 
be  the  result.  But  while  the  very  possibility  of  individual 
knowledge  implies,  on  the  one  hand,  this  distinctive  perfection 
of  sensation  for  each,  the  possibility  of  mutual  knowledge,  and 


160 


MAN. 


of  language  as  the  means  of  it,  takes  it  for  granted,  on  the 
other,  that  this  difference  of  sensation  is  restricted  to  narrow 
limits,  and  the  actual  existence  of  language  demonstrates  the 
fact  —  demonstrates  that  the  necessary  mental  agreement 
exists. 

8.  But,  sixthly,  besides  this  similarity  in  the  sensation  de¬ 
rived  by  each  from  the  objects  described,  the  words  employed 
must  convey  to  the  hearer  the  same  thoughts  and  impressions 
as  those  which  prompt  the  speaker  to  utter  them.  For  retain¬ 
ing  knowedge,  any  dots  or  strokes,  or  notations,  may  suffice : 
but  for  imparting  it,  the  primary  condition  is,  that  the  signs 
employed  be  common  to  speaker  and  hearer.  They  are  then 
standing  in  the  place  of  th  ings — of  things  which  (it  is  to  be  remem¬ 
bered,  as  far  as  external  nature  is  concerned)  are  themselves 
signs  of  other  things  —  of  God’s  symbolic  language  addressed 
to  man.  For  the  very  same  reason,  therefore,  for  which  these 
external  symbols  of  the  Divine  mind  must  mean  the  same  for 
the  two  human  minds,  their  verbal  signs  of  that  symbolic  mean¬ 
ing  must  denote  the  same  for  each.  If,  for  example,  the  crea¬ 
tion  of  a  world  is  the  Maker’s  mode  of  saying  symbolically  to 
a  man  “  I  am  mighty,”  that  man  cannot  impart  his  conviction 
of  this  truth  to  a  fellow  man,  unless  they  have  a  mutual  under¬ 
standing  respecting  the  meaning  of  the  terms,  I,  and  world ,  and 
mighty ,  relative  to  which  the  symbolic  meaning  was  conveyed. 
The  words  of  a  language,  then,  must  produce  in  the  hearer  the 
counterpart  of  the  mental  state  which  leads  the  speaker  to 
utter  them.  As  truth  in  sentiment  is  the  accordance  of  our 
conceptions  and  apprehensions  with  their  objects,  so  Truth  in 
language  is  the  agreement  of  the  words  or  signs  by  which  we 
express  our  conception  with  the  conceptions  themselves. 

9.  And,  seventhly,  in  order  that  the  words  of  which  a  lan¬ 
guage  is  composed  may  serve  as  a  means  of  knowledge,  their 
meaning,  both  separately  considered,  and  in  the  order  of  their 
collocation,  must  be  understood  to  be  fixed ;  or  their  meaning 
must  not  be  altered  in  any  respect,  except  by  mutual  under¬ 
standing.  That  external  nature  presents  itself  to  the  senses 
with  the  regularity  of  law,  we  have  repeatedly  shown.  And 
in  order  that  this  uniformity  might  be  known,  equally  necessary 
is  it  (as  we  have  seen  in  the  section  on  Sensation)  that  the 
mini  should  act  with  corresponding  regularity.  But  if  this  be 
necessary  for  the  knowledge  of  the  first  individual,  equally  im¬ 
portant  is  it  for  the  knowledge  of  a  second  that  the  words  in 
which  that  knowledge  is  conveyed  should  maintain  a  corres- 


PROGRESSION. 


161 


ponding  regularity.  An  unexpected  and  unperceived  change 
in  the  symbolic  uniformity  of  nature  would  not  be  more  detri¬ 
mental  to  the  knowledge  of  the  first  than  an  unperceived 
change  in  the  verbal  uniformity  of  language  would  be  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  second.  The  only  way  in  which  the  evil 
attending  the  change  could  be  obviated  would  be,  by  effecting 
it  by  a  mutual  understanding.  Only  let  this  condition  be  com¬ 
plied  'with,  and  kept  in  mind,  and  the  parties  might  safely,  as 
far  as  their  knowledge  of  each  other’s  meaning  is  concerned, 
“  call  sweet  bitter,  and  bitter  sweet.” 

10.  This  representation  awakens  an  inquiry,  which  leads  to 
the  second  part  of  the  section,  on  the  Credibility  of  Testimony. 
For  suppose  that  one  party  should  report  of  a  thing  that  it  is 
bitter  when  it  is  sweet,  without  warning  the  other  of  the  changed 
meaning  he  wished  him  to  attach  to  the  term ;  or  suppose  he 
should  affirm  that  he  had  seen  or  heard  that  which  he  had  not, 
here  would  be  a  violation  of  verbal  or  conventional  truth,  which, 
unless  the  evil  can  be  adequately  guarded  against,  may  be  re¬ 
peated  until  language,  so  far  from  increasing  the  knowledge  of 
one,  by  adding  to  it  the  knowledge  of  another,  may  only  serve 
to  cast  discredit  on  every  means  of  knowledge.  In  order,  then, 
that  language  or  testimony  may  be  a  means  of  knowledge,  in  a 
world  in  which  falsehood  is  possible,  two  things,  at  least,  are 
indispensable  ;  —  the  credibility  of  the  testimony  must  be  ascer¬ 
tainable,  and,  being  ascertained,  the  mind  must  be  so  constituted 
is  to  believe  it. 

11.  A  brief  analysis  of  this  subject  presents  us  with  the  fol- 
owing  particulars  :  —  First,  that  our  belief  in  testimony  is  to  be 
resolved  ultimately  into  that  law  of  the  mind  which  affirms  that 
every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause.  To  resolve  it,  as  is 
generally  done,  into  our  faith  in  the  unfailing  constancy  of  na¬ 
ture,  is  to  stop  short  of  an  ultimate  fact ;  for  our  faith  in  this 
rery  constancy  is  itself  resolvable  into  the  prior  principle,  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause.  This  prior  principle,  however, 
admits  of  no  simplification,  no  analysis ;  it  is  ultimate. 

12.  Secondly,  that  flowing  from  this  as  an  irresistible  but 
secondary  belief  is  the  conviction,  that  the  same  cause  will  uni¬ 
formly  produce  the  same  effect.  But  if  this  act  of  the  mind  be 
the  natural  result  of  the  prior  act,  the  truth  of  its  information  is 
equally  to  be  relied  on  with  the  information  of  that  act ;  and 
just  because  that  prior  belief  is  to  be  relied  on,  inasmuch  as  the 
operations  of  nature  are  uniform. 

13.  Thirdly,  that  as  man  becomes  acquainted  with  this  uni- 

14* 


162 


MAX. 


fortuity  of  operation,  primarily,  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses,  it  follows  that  the  senses  themselves  are  governed  by 
laws  which  are  uniform  in  their  operation.  How,  otherwise, 
could  we  know  anything  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  ?  And  the 
reasonableness  of  this  proposition  is  obvious ;  for  as  the  opera¬ 
tions  of  nature,  taken  as  a  whole,  are  uniform,  and  as  the  senses 
themselves  are  parts  of  that  whole,  the  regularity  of  the  whole 
-  presupposes  a  corresponding  regularity  in  all  its  parts,  and, 
therefore,  in  the  evidence  of  the  senses. 

14.  Fourthly,  that  if  the  uniformity  of  operation  in  the  ex¬ 
ternal  world  presupposes  a  corresponding  regularity  in  the  laws 
which  determine  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  this  regularity 
again  equally  presupposes  a  corresponding  uniformity  in  the 
testimony  of  those  who  report  it ;  otherwise  the  experience  of 
each  would  exist  in  vain  for  all  the  rest,  and  the  union  and 
progress  of  mankind  would  be  impossible.  Now  that  this  par¬ 
ticular  kind  of  testimony  exists  is  evident,  since  it  is  from  tes¬ 
timony,  chiefly,  that  we  derive  our  proof  of  the  constancy  of 
nature.  In  other  words,  there  is  an  evidence  of  the  senses  as 
unvarying  as  the  course  of  nature  itself ;  and  there  is  an  evi¬ 
dence  of  testimony  as  unvarying  as  that  of  the  senses ;  and  the 
unvarying  character  of  both  of  these  classes  of  evidence  is  to 
be  accounted  for  in  the  same  simple  way  —  that  they  form  a 
part  of  the  unvarying  constitution  of  nature  itself,  and  are  sim¬ 
ply  the  expression  of  its  lhws ;  so  that  if  them  certainty  were 
to  fail,  the  failure  would  impeach  nature  itself  of  uncertainty 
and  caprice. 

15.  Fifthly,  that  this  evidence  of  the  truth  of  testimony  is 
ascertainable ;  for,  if  the  uniformity  of  the  external  world  pre¬ 
supposes  a  corresponding  regularity  in  the  evidence  of  the 
senses,  and  if  them  regularity  equally  presupposes  a  similar 
fidelity  in  the  testimony  of  those  who  report  it,  this  threefold 
regularity  again  equally  presupposes,  or  rather  presupposes 
with  a  threefold  ground  of  certainty,  that  this  testimony  is  dis¬ 
tinguished  by  characteristics  which  make  it  certainly  ascertain¬ 
able  ;  otherwise,  the  laws  which  determine  the  constancy  of  the 
external  world,  of  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  and  of  testimony, 
would  all  exist  in  vain.  But  the  marks  of  credible  testimony 
are  as  certain  as  the  laws  of  nature,  simply  because  they  are 
the  expressions  of  some  of  these  very  laws. 

16.  Sixthly,  that  this  evidence  of  credible  testimony  is  capa¬ 
ble  of  increase  to  any  amount.  The  admission  that  there  is  a 
kind  of  testimony  worthy  of  some  degree  of  credit,  involves  the 


PROGRESSION. 


163 


conseq  :ence  that  that  kind  of  testimony,  multiplied  indefinitely, 
would  command  the  highest  degree  of  belief  of  anything  to 
which  it  might  testify.  Hume  himself,  indeed,  admits,  that 
some  kinds  of  probable  evidence  are  as  convincing  as  demon¬ 
stration. 

17.  And,  seventhly,  that  the  mind  is  constituted  to  believe 
the  evidence  of  certain  kinds  of  testimony.  This  appears  from 
the  fact  that  the  evidence  in  question  is  denominated  credible  ; 
and  that  it  is  to  the  spontaneous  belief  of  it,  chiefly,  that  we  are 
indebted  for  our  knowledge  of  the  uniform  operations  of  nature, 
as  well  as  for  our  power  of  conducting  the  affairs  of  social  and 
civil  life.  From  all  which  it  follows,  first,  that  this  evidence  of 
testimony  is  calculated  to  produce  belief,  just  because  the  laws 
of  nature  are  constant  in  their  operation ;  and,  secondly,  that 
not  to  believe  such  evidence  would  be,  not  only  to  believe  some¬ 
thing  else,  and  to  believe  it  without  evidence,  but  contrary  to  all 
evidence. 

18.  But  what  was  the  origin  of  language  ?  and  what  the 
primitive  language  of  mankind  ? 

Respecting  the  first  question,  it  might  be  premised  that  if  a 
person,  not  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the  subject,  were  to 
tax  his  ingenuity  to  the  utmost  in  imagining  all  the  possible 
modes  of  accounting  for  the  origin  of  language  —  not  shrink¬ 
ing  from  the  most  extravagant  and  absurd  his  fancy  could  de¬ 
vise  —  the  diversified,  baseless,  and  absurd  theories  which  have 
been  gravely  propounded  by  learning  and  philosophy,  would 
yet  eclipse  his  wildest  conjectures.  Lord  Monboddo,  Volney, 
Maupertuis,  and  others,  represent  man  as  originally  without 
speech  —  a  mere  “  mutum  ae  turpe  pecus  ”  —  beginning  with 
the  inarticulate  cries  “  by  which  animals  call  upon  one  another ;  ” 
the  last-named  writer  supposing  that  when  separate  dialects 
were  formed,  a  language  was  constructed  “by  a  session  of 
learned  societies  convened  for  the  purpose.”  Dr.  A.  Smith 
supposes  that  the  invention  of  language  began  with  substan 
tives ;  Herder  is  in  favor  of  interjections ;  Dr.  Murray  makes 
the  syllable  Ag  the  foundation  of,  at  least,  the  Indo-European 
tongues ;  while  Rousseau  proposes  the  problem,  “  Whether  a 
society  already  formed  was  more  necessary  for  the  institution 
of  language,  or  a  language  already  invented  for  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  society  ?  ” 

19.  That  man  had  originally  to  acquire  even  the  capacity  for 
speech  —  this  is  the  first  or  lowest  notion  respecting  the  origin 
of  language.  It  will,  however,  be  time  enough  to  point  out  the 


164 


MAN. 


inconsiderate  folly  of  this  view  when  anything  rational  has 
been  advanced  in  its  behalf. 

20.  That  man  was  primarily  endowed  with  the  organic  ca¬ 
pacity  for  speech,  though  not  to  any  degree  with  the  actual 
knowledge  of  language  —  this  may  be  regarded  as  the  second 
hypothesis  on  the  subject.  “  Speech,”  says  Humboldt,  “  accord¬ 
ing  to  my  fullest  conviction,  must  really  be  considered  as  in¬ 
herent  in  man ;  since,  as  the  work  of  his  intellect  in  its  simple 
knowledge,  it  is  absolutely  inexplicable.  This  hypothesis  is 
facilitated  by  supposing  thousands  and  thousands  of  years ; 
language  could  not  have  been  invented  without  its  type  pre¬ 
existing  in  man.”  Still,  he  considers  language  as  evolved  en¬ 
tirely  from  himself.  Now  to  this  idea  of  the  absolute  origina¬ 
tion  of  language  by  a  being  merely  preconfigured  to  employ  it, 
it  is  obvious  to  object,  first,  that  if  mankind  had  not  been  pre¬ 
viously  endowed  with  “  a  natural  language,  they  could  never 
have  invented  an  artificial  one  by  their  reason  and  ingenuity.”  * 
Secondly,  that  no  tribe  has  ever  been  known  to  emerge  from 
barbarism,  except  by  civilizing  influences  from  without.  And, 
thirdly,  that  the  uniform  tendency  of  an  uncivilized  tribe, 
left  to  itself,  is  to  sink  lower  in  the  scale  of  brutish  degrada¬ 
tion. 

21.  That  man  was  originally  endowed,  not  merely  with  the 
capacity  for  speech,  but,  to  a  certain  extent,  with  the  actual 
and  intelligent  use  of  language  —  this  is  the  third  theory,  and 
most  in  harmony  with  the  reason  of  the  case,  and  with  the  brief 
intimations  of  Scripture  on  the  subject.  If  to  this  view  it  be 
objected,  that  “  the  history  of  many  languages  shows  a  gradual 
progress  from  small  beginnings  to  a  more  perfect  state,”  we 
reply  that  this  is  perfectly  compatible  (admitting  it  to  be  true) 
with  the  idea  that  a  scanty  language  was  bestowed  on  man  in 
the  first  stage  of  his  existence.  If  it  be  further  objected,  that 
“  the  radical  words  of  a  language  are  clearly  referable  to  the 
source  whence  our  first  ideas  are  derived  —  namelv,  natural  and 
external  objects,”  we  reply  that  this  also  is  quite  compatible 
with  the  theory  that  a  certain  amount  of  language  was  originally 
taught  by  God ;  for  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  it  would  be  all 
derived  from  obvious  sources,  and  be  employed  analogically. 
If  it  should  still  be  urged,  that  the  communication  of  a  mature 
power,  such  as  that  which  the  theory  supposes,  is  quite  incon¬ 
ceivable,  we  reply  that  the  creation  of  a  man  with  immature 


*  Keid/s  Inquiry,  &c.5  c.  iv.,  §  2. 


PROGRESSION. 


165 


powers  is  not  more  conceivable.  The  great  miracle  is  the  cre¬ 
ation  of  man  at  all.  That  admitted,  the  admission  that  he  was 
literally  endowed  with  the  power  of  speaking  from  the  first, 
appeal’s  to  be  as  natural  as  that  he  could  literally  walk.  It  by 
no  means  follows  that  his  language  at  first  was  copious.  The 
probability  is  that  the  words  Divinely  taught  were  those  only 
which  denoted  the  objects  most  important  for  man  to  know, 
too-ether  with  his  most  urgent  wants,  and  with  certain  leading 
ideas  and  emotions.  From  these,  as  from  a  prolific  root,  the 
tree  of  language  gradually  developed  and  branched  off  in  every 
direction,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  human  mind. 

22.  In  strict  accordance  with  this  view,  almost  every  new 
explorer  in  comparative  language  returns  with  some  additional 
proof  of  the  original  unity  of  language,  whereas,  had  it  been 
left  absolutely  to  man’s  origination,  the  probability  is  that 
almost  every  family  would  have  had  its  own  language.  Fur¬ 
ther,  the  fact  that  man  had  a  real  and  adequate  language  im¬ 
mediately  after  his  creation  seems  to  be  implied  and  com¬ 
memorated  in  the  existence  of  a  dual  number  in  some  of  the 
earliest  tongues.  A  single  human  pair  would  have  occasion  for 
a  form  of  expression  denoting  duality ;  whereas,  when  society 
became  complex,  such  a  form  would  be  likely  to  be  superseded 
by  the  plural  numbers ;  and  accordingly  it  had  disappeared 
even  so  early  as  the  Latin  language.  But,  chiefly,  in  authenti¬ 
cation  of  tins  view,  the  Biblical  account  represents  the  first 
man  as  actually  using  language  immediately  on  his  creation ; 
not  only  giving  names  to  objects,  but  in  the  instance  of  Eve, 
assigning  reasons  for  the  names  given,  in  calling  her,  first, 
woman ,  and  afterwards  Eve ,  reasons  having  no  connection  what¬ 
ever.  with  the  sounds  of  the  words  or  with  any  sounds  in  na¬ 
ture. 

23.  Our  second  question  relates  to  the  particular  language 
originally  spoken  by  man.  Up  to  the  close  of  the  last  century, 
philologers  were  occupied,,  chiefly,  in  aiming  to  determine  the 
relative  antiquity  of  languages,  and  in  a  fruitless  search  after 
the  primeval  tongue.  The  low  Dutch,  the  Chinese,  the  Celtic, 
and  the  Biscayan,  have  each  found  learned  advocates  claiming 
for  it  the  honor  of  having  been  the  language  spoken  in  Para¬ 
dise.  And  even  when  the  suffrages  of  the  learned  determined 
in  favor  of  a  Semitic  language,  the  Abyssinian  and  the  Syrian 
disputed  the  honor  with  the  Hebrew.  The  most  probable  con¬ 
clusion  is  that  the  primary  language  was  one  from  which  the 
Semitic  or  Syro-Arabian  family  of  languages  has  sprung ;  and 


166 


MAN. 


on  3,  therefore,  not  now  actually  in  existence,  except  as  vari¬ 
ously  represented  by  the  different  members  of  this  family.  It 
is  by  no  means  unlikely  that  the  Hebrew  retains  many  of  the 
identical  vocables  uttered  by  the  first  man,  especially  of  the 
names  of  objects.  Beyond  this,  all  is  conjecture ;  and  even  in 
this  respect,  the  Hebrew  cannot  be  supposed  to  enjoy  a  mo¬ 
nopoly  of  the  distinction. 

24.  “  So  God  created  man  in  his  own  image ;  in  the  image 
of  God  created  He  him,  male  and  female  created  He  them.”  — 
And  such  was  the  mysterious  and  manifold  constitution  of  the 
being  to  whom  and  by  whom  the  perfections  of  the  Deity  were 
to  be  set  forth.  Some,  indeed,  have  spoken  of  his  knowledge, 
holiness,  and  actual  powers,  while  in  Eden,  in  terms  of  eulogy 
appropriate  only  to  “  the  second  Adam,  the  Lord  from  heaven.” 
But  to  claim  for  new-made  man  a  kind  and  degree  of  excel¬ 
lence  which  would  have  almost  made  progress  impossible  by 
placing  him  already  at  the  goal,*  is  to  err  as  egregiously  in  one 
extreme,  as  they  err  on  the  other,  who  represent  barbarism  as 
man’s  original  st^jte,  or  even  a  state  of  mere  animal  sensibility. 
The  view  which  we  are  able  to  take  of  man’s  constitution  at 
this  distance  of  time  from  his  creation,  and  which  we  have 
endeavored  to  give,  is  the  result  of  ages  of  development.  How 
much  more  rapidly  the  process  of  development  would  have 
proceeded  in  the  hypothetical  case  of  his  having  remained  un¬ 
fallen,  we  can  only  conjecture.  That  the  first  man  only  be¬ 
came  gradually  conscious  of  his  capabilities,  that  he  only 
potentially  answered  to  the  description  given  in  the  sections  of 
this  chapter,  must,  I  think,  be  admitted  by  every  one  who  duly 
considers  the  subject.  Like  the  language  of  which  we  believe 
him  to  have  been  made  the  recipient  —  rudimental  and  sugges¬ 
tive —  his  early  consciousness  disclosed  only  so  much  of  his 
intellectual  and  moral  capabilities  as  was  necessary  to  quicken 
his  activity,  and  to  justify  the  responsibility  of  Ins  new  and 
grave  position. 

Sect.  IX.  —  Man’s  Primitive  Condition. 

From  man’s  constitution,  we  pass  to  a  survey  of  his  primi¬ 
tive  condition.  His  nature,  we  have  seen,  was  a  sublime  novelty 
in  creation.  Did  his  circumstances  exhibit  corresponding  pro- 

*  As  Dr.  South  does,  for  example,  in  the  beautiful  and  oft-quoted,  but 
purely  imaginary  passage  on  this  subject,  in  his  Sermon  on  Man  created 
in  the  \mage  of  God. 


PROGRESSION. 


167 


gression?  The  great  miracle  of  the  introduction  of  such  a 
subj  >ct  prepares  us  to  expect  that  all  the  objective  arrange¬ 
ments  necessary  for  his  development  and  well-being  will  be 
found  to  await  and  to  attend  him. 

1.  Here,  our  attention  is  due,  first,  to  the  selected  and  pre¬ 
pared  abode  which  awaited  man.  “  And  Jehovah  Elohim  planted 
a  garden  in  Eden,  on  the  East,  and  placed  there  the  man  whom 
he  had  formed.  And  Jehovah  Elohim  caused  to  grow  out  of 
the  gound  there  every  tree  pleasant  to  the  sight  and  good  for 

eating . And  Jehovah  Elohim  took  the  man,  and  placed 

him  in  the  Garden  of  Eden,  to  cultivate  it  and  to  keep  it.  ...  . 
And  Jehovah  Elohim  formed  out  of  the  ground  every  beast  of 
the  field  and  every  fowl  of  the  heaven ;  and  He  brought  [each] 
unto  the  man  to  see  what  he  would  call  it,  and  whatever  the 

man  called  any  living  creature,  that  was  its  name . Elohim 

blessed  them,  and  Elohim  said,  ‘  Be  fruitful,  and  multiply,  and 
replenish  the  earth,  and  subdue  it,  and  have  dominion  over  the 
fish  of  the  sea,  and  over  the  birds  of  the  air,  and  over  every 
living  creature  that  moveth  upon  the  earth.’  ”  *  But  were  any 
of  these  species  now  absolutely  originated  for  the  first  time  ?  or 
were  they  all  reproductions  of  pre-existing  species  ?  or,  were 
some  of  them  reproductions,  and  the  remainder  newly  originated 
species  ?  It  will  never  be  possible,  perhaps,  to  return  categori¬ 
cal  answers  to  these  inquiries.  The  probability  is  that  most  of 
the  species  useful  to  man  co-existed  at  a  period  antecedent  to 
his  creation,  with  mammalia  long  ago  extinct.!  But  man’s  true 
distinction,  and  his  well-being,  depended  not  on  the  Divine  crea¬ 
tion  of  new  species  immediately  prior  to  his  appearance.  The 
tribes  of  animal  and  vegetable  life  which  actually  subserve  his 
interests,  were  not  the  less  designed  to  do  him  service  because 
the  'primary  origination  of  many  of  them  may  have  preceded 
his  own  by  an  unmeasured  period ;  rather,  that  period  implied 
the  importance  of  the  being  whose  coming  was  so  long  antici¬ 
pated. 

2.  That  which  truly  marks  the  progress  of  the  great  scheme, 
is  the  special  provision  made  by  the  Divine  Creator  for  the 
security,  instruction,  and  well-being  of  the  new-made  man. 
According  to  the  inspired  record  just  quoted,  pre-existing 
nature  was  now  raised  to  new  relations,  and  was  promoted  to 
offices  unknown  before.  As  if  Eden  itself  were  not  sufficiently 


*  Gen.  ii.  8,  9.  15,  19 ;  i.  28.  ♦ 

t  Owen’s  Reports  to  Brit.  Assoc.  1842, 1843;  and  Introd.  to  Brit.  Foss. 
Mamm.  p.  31. 


168 


MAN. 


paradisiacal,  a  particular  part  of  it  was  selected,  and  especially 
prepared  for  man’s  reception.  Here,  that  he  might  neithei 
starve  through  hesitation  respecting  what  he  might  safely 
partake,  nor  perish  through  making  a  wrong  selection,  he  was 
surrounded  by  such  fruit-bearing  trees  as  were  both  grateful 
to  the  senses  and  good  for  food.  His  muscular  and  mental 
system  required  activity ;  and,  that  he  might  not  expend  it  in 
vain,  he  is  shown  how  the  ground  invites,  and  will  repay,  his 
easy  cultivation,  developing  new  properties  at  his  touch ;  each 
flower  owning  his  care  by  an  added  perfume,  and  each  fruit  by 
assuming  a  richer  bloom  and  a  more  exquisite  flavor.  He  is 
endowed  with  powers  of  observation  and  reflection ;  and  the 
animals*  are  brought  into  his  presence  to  disclose  their  charac¬ 
teristics  under  his  eye,  and  to  receive  appropriate  names  from 
his  lips.  To  awaken  him  to  a  consciousness  of  his  supremacy, 
he  is  apprized  that  all  the  creatures  are  subject  to  his  will. 
The  whole  was  arranged  to  disclose  him  to  himself.  Nature 
was  moved  at  his  coming ;  and  so  moved  as  to  reveal  to  him 
his  poffer,  by  its  own  ready  subordination  to  his  will ;  his 
aptitude  for  knowledge,  by  giving  up  its  secrets  to  his  obser¬ 
vation  ;  and  his  capacity  for  enjoyment,  by  reflecting  his  own 
looks  of  gladness. 

3.  But  all  this  supposes,  secondly,  the  presence  and  the  ac¬ 
tual  superintendence  of  a  Divine  instructor.  To  assume  either 
that  man  was  not  originally  an  immediate  creation  of  God,  or 
that,  having  been  created,  he  was  then  abandoned  by  his  Maker 
to  his  own  unaided  efforts,  involves  a  complication  of  extrava¬ 
gances  which  only  the  enormous  credulity  of  scepticism  could 
entertain.  Even  if  geology  supplied  no  evidence  of  man’s 
recent  introduction  on  the  earth — if  history  afforded  no  proof 
that  man  has  never  been  known  to  emerge  from  barbarism, 
except  by  aid  from  withoutf — if  astronomy  had  never  asked  for 
a  primary  impulse,  hi  order  to  account  for  the  motions  of  the 

*  Such,  probably,  as  were  suited  for  domestication ;  just  as  the  trees  of 
-he  garden  were  such  as  were  pleasant  to  the  eye  and  good  for  food. 
There  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that  any  of  the  carnivora  were  present. 

t  “  The  most  conclusive  argument  against  the  original  civilization  of 
mankind,”  says  the  author  of  the  Vestiges ,  “  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
we  do  not  now  see  civilization  existing  anywhere  except  in  certain  con¬ 
ditions  altogether  different  from  any  we  can  suppose  to  have  existed  at 
the  commencement  of  our  race.”  But,  first,  do  we  find  civilization  inva¬ 
riably  resulting  from  these  said  conditions  ?  For,  if  not,  something  more 
than  these  conditions  is  necessary  to  account  for  it.  And,  secondly,  as 
the  continuance  of  the  race  is  a  process  requiring  peculiar  conditions 


PROGRESSION. 


169 


solar  system,  the  reason  of  the  case  would  yet  have  required 
the  hypothesis,  that,  whenever  man  commenced  his  career,  the 
hand  that  formed  him  was  not  withdrawn  till  his  faculties  had 
received  an  impulse  in  the  right  direction.  Hence,  Herder  scouts 
the  idea  of  “  every  wretched  wanderer  having  in  some  way, 
discovered  his  system  of  worship  as  a  kind  of  natural  theology,” 
and  “  places  at  the  head  of  all  history  an  original  and  higher 
state  of  cultivation  in  man,  proceeding  from  God.”  The 
“  customary  plan  of  beginning  the  history  of  religion,  or  of 
society,  with  the  savage  state,”  is  equally  rejected  by  Cousin* * 
as  unphilosophical.  “  Does  it  not  seem,”  asks  J.  von  Muller, 
“  as  though  the  breath  of  Divinity  dwelling  in  us,  our  spirit  had 
acquired,  through  the  immediate  teaching  of  a  higher  being, 
and  for  a  long  time  retained,  certain  indispensable  ideas  and 
habits,  to  which  it  could  not  easily  have  attained  of  itself?” 
F.  Schlegel,  too,  “  strikingly  shows  the  necessity  of  admitting 
the  original  teaching  of  the  human  race  by  the  spirit  of  God.” 
“  The  original  state  of  man,”  says  the  distinguished  antiquary, 
Ouverof,  “  is  neither  the  savage  state,  nor  a  state  of  corruptness, 
but  a  simple  and  better  state  approaching  nearer  to  the  Divinity.” 
And  the  universal  tradition  of  the  ancient  world  (accepted  by 
Plato)  told  of  man’s  divine  education  at  the  commencement  of 
his  earthly  course. 

4.  This  plain  dictate  of  reason  the  Bible  satisfies.  “  Who 
then  educated  the  first  human  pair?”  asks  the  elder  Fichte,  in 
a  burst  of  common  sense  too  strong  for  the  bonds  of  an  infidel 
philosophy.  “  A  spirit  bestowed  its  care  upon  them,  as  is  laid 
down  in  an  ancient  and  venerable  original  record,  which,  taken 
.altogether,  contains  the  profoundest  and  the  loftiest  wisdom, 
and  presents  those  results  to  which  all  philosophy  must  at  last 
return.”f  To  object  that  such  Divine  tuition  is  entirely  unknown, 
at  present,  to  the  course  of  nature,  is  to  forget  that  man  is  no 
longer  produced  by  miracle  ;  and  that  a  first  man  is  possible 

might  not  ;1  the  commencement  of  the  race  ”  have  required  conditions 
peculiar  also  —  conditions  which  have  never  since  been  supplied  because 
never  since  necessary  ?  If,  to  use  his  own  language,  “  man  started  at 
first  with  this  peculiar  organization  [of  speech]  ready  for  use,”  it  is  pre¬ 
suming  but  little  if  we  suppose  that  certain  words  were  supplied  to  this 
unique  organization.  The  grand  instrument  having  been  bestowed,  a 
lesson  on  its  use,  and  compass,  and  power,  seems  only  appropriate. 

*  Introduction  to  Hist,  of  Phil.,  Lect.  2.  For  the  other  authorities  re¬ 
ferred  to,  see  Prof.  Tholuck,  Bib.  Cabinet,  Yol.  XXVIII.  Appendix. 

f  Quoted  by  Dr.  J.  P.  Smith  in  Bib.  Cyclo.  Art.  Adam. 

15 


170 


MAN. 


but  once.  To  dispute  respecting  the  particular  mode  in  which 
the  tuition  in  question  was  imparted  and  made  available,  is  only 
a  contention  about  words.  All  that  we  seek  is  an  escape  from 
the  revolting  contradiction  of  supposing  that  man  was  created 
and  left  a  semi-brute  ;  that  with  fewer  and  feebler  instincts  than 
other  animals,  he  should  also  have  been  left  without  instruction ; 
that  he,  the  heir  of  the  world,  should  have  been  left  unapprized 
of,  and  unqualified  for,  his  inheritance ;  that  a  constant  miracle 
for  his  protection  and  support  should  have  been  made  necessary, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  transient  one  of  his  primary  instruction. 
And  the  Bible,  we  repeat,  meets  this  demand  of  our  reason.  It 
affirms,  in  effect,  that  man’s  first  exercises  were  those  of  a  man, 
and  not  of  a  child.  By  the  Creator’s  "wisdom,  a  circle  of  se¬ 
lected  objects  is  prepared,  and  man  is  no  sooner  transferred 
into  the  centre  than  his  senses  and  faculties  are  put  into  adult 
activity,  each  responding  to  its  appropriate  object.  The  vol¬ 
ume  of  creation  is  now  first  opened  at  a  chosen  page  to  man’s 
intelligent  eye,  and  the  Divine  author  himself  condescends  to 
interpret  for  him  some  of  its  earliest  lessons. 

5.  Thirdly,  besides  the  collection  of  assorted  objects  into  the 
midst  of  which  man  was  introduced,  another  being,  constituted 
like  himself,  was  brought  near  to  him,  and  placed,  by  the  mys¬ 
terious  medium  of  speech,  in  the  most  intimate  communication 
with  him.  When  the  living  creatures  were  brought  into  the 
presence  of  Adam,  how  little  would  he  have  found  in  them  all 
with  which  it  would  have  been  desirable  for  him  to  sympathize, 
even  had  he  been  enabled  to  interpret  all  their  sounds,  and  to 
understand  all  their  unsignified  sensations  and  instincts  !  How 
much  was  there  in  him  —  all  the  nobler  parts  of  his  nature  — 
"with  which  there  was  nothing  whatever  in  them  to  correspond ! 
So  far  was  he  in  advance  of  all  pre-existing  natures,  that  crea¬ 
tion  contained  for  him  “no  help-meet.”  “And  Jehovah  God 
said,  It  is  not  good  for  man  to  be  alone,  I  will  make  for  him  a 
help  suitable  for  him.”*  And  in  the  production  of  a  second 
human  being,  an  addition  was  made  to  man’s  means  of  im¬ 
provement,  greater,  in  some  respects,  than  as  if  the  number 
of  his  own  senses  and  faculties  had  been  doubled.  For  even 
if  increase  of  knowledge  had  been  the  only  end  to  be  answered 
by  the  arrangement,  by  placing  those  added  organs  and  powers 
as  a  distinct  and  independent  means  of  knowledge,  at  the  dis¬ 
posal  of  a  second  human  being,  the  two  can  be  in  different  places 


*  Gen.  ii.  18,  20. 


PROGRESSION. 


171 


at  the  same  moment,  and  be  employed  in  a  different  manner, 
and  yet  each  can  enjoy  the  acquisitions  of  the  other.  Each 
can  learn  more  from  the  other  than  from  all  creation  besides ; 
for  not  only  is  the  mind  of  one  a  compendium  of  creation  for 
the  other  —  a  speculum  in  which  that  outer  world  is  reflected 
for  him  —  in  the  constitution  and  operations  of  that  mind  itself 
an  object  of  contemplation  is  prepared  for  him,  richer  in  the 
materials  of  thought  than  all  the  physical  universe.  Each  can 
learn  more  from  the  other  than  as  if  a  second  world  had  been 
created  instead,  and  had  been  brought  within  the  reach  of  his 
senses. 

In  the  case  of  the  first  mind,  the  truth  of  its  impressions  from 
without  depended  on  the  continued  perfection  of  the  adjustment 
existing  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  But  in  the 
event  of  that  adjustment  being  in  any  respect  disturbed,  what 
standard  had  the  man  by  which  to  test  the  truth  of  his  impres¬ 
sions  ?  The  addition  of  a  second  mind  tended  to  supply  the 
want.  Every  look  was  symbolic.  Every  tone  touched  a  hid¬ 
den  sympathy.  Every  word  was  calculated  to  be  a  preservative 
from  error,  a  corroboration  of  knowledge,  or  an  incitement  to 
the  attainment  of  further  knowledge.  The  advent  of  a  fellow- 
mind  lifted  man  consciously  above  the  level  of  mere  nature,  and 
was  the  true  signal  for  the  subjection  of  nature.  It  was  the 
preternatural,  preparing  him  more  effectually  for  communion 
with  the  supernatural.  It  was  at  once  the  sign  of  progress,  and 
.  the  means  of  advancement  for  all  the  future. 

6.  Now  also,  fourthly,  the  institution  of  the  sabbath  awaited 
man.  For  “  God  blessed  the  seventh  day,  and  sanctified  it, 
because  thereon  he  rested  from  all  his  work  which  God  had 
created  and  made.”  This  is  the  historical  record  of  the  act  of 
institution.  By  some,  indeed,  it  is  contended  that  the  sabbath 
was  first  given  to  the  Israelites  in  the  'wilderness ;  because  no 
mention  is  made  of  it  in  the  histories  of  the  patriarchs.*  But 
to  this  it  may  be  replied,  first,  that  the  objection  rests  only  on 
negative  evidence ;  that  the  writings  referred  to  are  not  a  his¬ 
tory,  but  brief,  fragmentary  records,  embracing  twenty-five  cen¬ 
turies  in  a  few  chapters  ;  and  that  similar  omissions  can  be 
pointed  out  in  subsequent  parts  of  Scripture-history  from  which 
yet  no  one  thinks  of  drawing  a  similar  inference.  For  example, 


*  So  Palev  in  his  Mor.  Phil.,  chap,  on  the  Sabbath.  For  a  full  exposi¬ 
tion  of  the  arguments  on  both  sides,  see  Ikenius.  Diss.  de  Instt.,  etc.  Mo¬ 
saics  Legis,  §  xi. 


172 


MAN. 


in  the  account  of  the  four  or  five  hundred  years  from  JosUua  to 
David  there  is  not  the  remotest  allusion  to  the  sabbath ;  no 
mention  is  made  from  the  birth  of  Seth  till  the  flood  (a  period 
of,  at  least,  fifteen  hundred  years)  of  sacrifice ;  and  during  the 
eight  hundred  years  from  Joshua  to  Jeremiah,  the  rite  of  cir¬ 
cumcision  is  not  named.  But,  secondly,  we  deny  the  truth  of 
the  statement  itself.  The  division  of  time  into  weeks  is  re¬ 
ferred  to  repeatedly  during  the  period  in  question  ;*  and  what 
is  remarkable,  although  it  is  not  a  natural  division,  like  that  of 
day  and  night,  made  by  the  revolution  of  the  earth  on  its  axis ; 
or  of  the  year  and  its  seasons,  made  by  the  revolution  of  the 
earth  round  the  sun ;  or  of  the  month,  occasioned  by  the  revo¬ 
lution  of  the  moon ;  yet  nations  the  most  dissimilar  and  remote 
are  found  to  have  observed  it  from  the  earliest  antiquity  —  a 
fact  which  can  be  explained  only  on  the  supposition  of  some 
weekly  institution  coeval  with  our  race.  Thirdly,  that  the 
sabbath  was  not  instituted,  but  only  restored,  in  the  wilderness, 
appears  from  the  fact,  that  even  prior  to  the  promulgation  of 
the  law  on  Sinai,  the  people  spontaneously  gathered  a  double 
quantity  of  manna  on  the  sixth  day ;  that  Moses  notices  the 
sabbath  on  that  occasion  only  incidentally,  rendering  no  ex¬ 
planation  of  its  nature,  and  no  reason  for  its  observance,  as  if 
both  were  too  well  known  to  make  it  necessary.  Fourthly,  the 
consecration  of  the  sabbath  was  enjoined  on  Sinai  in  connection 
with  laws  all  of  which  were  as  old  as  human  nature  ;  leaving  it 
to  be  inferred  that  the  law  of  the  sabbath  was  of  equal  antiquity.  • 
A  fifth  reason,  of  peculiar  cogency  to  an  unbiassed  mind,  is  de¬ 
rivable  from  the  fact  that  the  law  of  the  sabbath  occurs  first  in 
the  history  of  the  Adamic  creation.  The  only  natural  inference 
is  that  it  was  instituted  at  that  time.  And  then,  sixthly,  the 
reason  assigned  for  the  sabbath  —  the  completion  of  creation  — 
began  to  be  in  force  at  the  period  of  that  completion,  and  not 
two  or  three  thousand  years  afterwards  ;f  nor  was  the  fact  which 
this  first-born  of  ordinances  commemorated  interesting  to  the 
Jew  only,  but  to  man  ;  nor  were  the  advantages  which  it  pro¬ 
posed  to  secure  needed  by  the  Jew  only ;  the  race  required 
them.  “  The  sabbath  was  made  for  man,”  said  the  Lord  of  the 


*  Gen.  vii.  4 — 10;  viii.  10 — 12;  xxix.  27,  28;  1.  10.  Job  ii.  13.  Ex. 
vii.  25. 

t  “  And  what  sense  were  it  to  read  the  command  thus:  ‘For  in  six 
days  the  Lord  made  heaven  and  earth,  &c.,  and  rested  the  seventh :  there- 
fore,  two  thousand  five  hundred  and  thirteen  years  after,  he  blessed  the 
seventh  day  aid  hallowed  it.’  ”  —  Lightfoot’s  Works,  vol.  vii.  p.  385. 


PROGRESSION. 


173 


sabbath ;  implying  that  the  making  of  the  sabbath  was  coeval 
with  man’s  creation. 

On  these  grounds  we  believe  in  a  primeval  sabbath.  He 
who  had  made  man’s  complex  constitution,  knew  that  a  sabbath 
was  one  of  the  necessities  of  his  nature.  He  who  had  prepared 
for  him  the  solace  of  a  fellow  mind ;  and  who  even  admitted 
him  to  the  hallowing  influence  of  communion  with  Himself, 
knew  that,  by  a  law  of  his  own  implanting  in  human  nature, 
that  communion  would  become  more  assimilating  by  recurring 
at  stated  intervals,  and  therefore  He  appointed  a  stated  season 
of  special  intercourse.  Man  is  made  for  great  occasions,  and 
must  have  them  in  prospect ;  and  therefore,  in  addition  to  his 
daily  worship,  the  sabbath  promised  him  the  return  of  peculiar 
joy.  Probably,  too,  a  place  was  set  apart  for  the  Divine  man¬ 
ifestation  —  the  shadow  of  the  tree  of  life  —  or  a  spot  where  the 
symbolic  glory  abode,  which  afterwards  lingered  at  the  gate  of 
Eden,  and  reappeared  in  the  Jewish  temple.  Here,  while  cre¬ 
ation  lay  around  him  still  wet  with  its  first  dews,  man  was  to 
come  and  minister  as  its  high  priest,  offering  up  the  incense  of 
a  grateful  heart  in  the  presence  of  Creating  sovereign  goodness. 

7.  A  fifth  element  of  man’s  condition  was  the  enactment  of  a 
special  law.  This,  too,  was  a  novelty  in  creation.  Natural  law 
indeed  was  ubiquitous,  penetrating  and  containing  all  things. 
And  man,  as  far  as  he  belonged  to  mere  nature,  took  these  laws 
into  his  own  constitution,  and  became  subject  to  them.  But 
there  is  a  part  in  him  above  nature ;  and,  accordingly,  a  law 
unknown  to  pre-existing  nature,  addresses  him.  “  And  Jeho¬ 
vah  God  commanded  the  man,  saying,  Of  every  tree  of  the 
garden  eating,  thou  mayest  eat :  but  of  the  tree  of  the  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil  thou  shalt  not  eat  of  it ;  for  in  the  day  that 
thou  eatest  thereof,  dying  thou  shalt  die.”  *  No  sooner  is  man 
endowed  with  the  elements  of  responsibility  than  the  hand  of 
Law  receives  him,  and  claims  him  for  a  subject.  In  the  same 
moment  in  which  his  faculties  begin  to  act,  the  Law,  already 
present  and  imperative,  prescribes  the  direction  of  their  activity. 
The  Creator  becomes  the  Governor,  and  the  creature  rises  into 
the  subject. 

8.  (1.)  With  the  vindication  of  this  law,  or  with  its  actual 
violation,  we  have  not  now  to  do.f  Our  present  concern  is 
only  with  the  truths  which  it  presupposed  and  taught.  Possibly, 
the  prohibited  tree  belonged  to  a  species  not  yet  extinct.  Nor 


*  Gen.  ii.  16,  17.  t  On  these  subjects,  see  Chaps.  XY111.  and  XIX. 

15* 


174 


MAN. 


is  it  improbable  that  it  was  a  tree  having  exciting  and  noxious 
properties ;  so  that  its  interdiction  may  have  been  wise  and 
beneficent.  But  these  are  points  of  mere  curiosity  and  conject¬ 
ure.  The  first  great  truth  which  it  forcibly  recalled  and  em¬ 
bodied  was  that  God  was  the  Creator  of  all ;  for  the  absolute 
authority  which  the  command  assumes,  is  the  right  of  the  Cre¬ 
ator  alone.  The  new-made  man,  indeed,  could  not  have  been 
in  danger  of  formally  denying  this  truth.  It  must  have  been 
one  of  the  first  thoughts  to  which  his  consciousness  awoke. 
The  very  name  of  God  implied  it.  Man’s  danger  lay  in  famil- 
liarly  admitting  the  fact  without  feeling  its  force.  He  knew  of 
no  other  mode  of  production  than  that  of  direct  Divine  origina¬ 
tion.  To  him,  therefore,  production  by  creation  was  the  natural 
mode.  Hence,  the  importance  of  making  him  feel  that  he  had 
been  really  and  truly  originated ;  that  he  owed  his  being  to  mir¬ 
acle.  One  of  the  Divine  designs  in  creating  the  woman  after 
the  man,  and  virtually  in  his  presence,  was,  probably,  to  vivify 
this  idea  of  his  own  creation.  And  now,  the  command,  in 
effect,  repeats  it  and  perpetuates  it.  “  I  am  the  Lord  thy  God 
that  created  thee  ;  and  have  therefore  an  absolute  right  in  thee 
this  was  the  solemn  preamble  and  formula  of  the  law,  not  form¬ 
ally  announced,  perhaps,  but  spontaneously  supplied  by  the 
human  heart, 

9.  (2.)  The  next  great  truth  which  the  law  disclosed  was  the 
existence  of  moral  government.  The  language  of  the  Law¬ 
giver  was,  in  effect,  “  I  have  made  thee  consciously  capable  of 
self-government,  and  therefore  of  my  government.  Thy  nature 
is  a  reflection  of  mine  own,  and  can  advance  and  be  happy  only 
by  remaining  in  harmony  with  it.  Awake  to  a  sense  of  thy 
dignity  and  responsibility.”  The  command  touched  a  new  part 
of  man’s  constitution.  The  sentieitt,  percipient,  reflective, 
rational,  and  emotional  parts  of  man’s  nature  had  already 
responded  to  their  appropriate  objects  —  objects  supplied 
by  Power  and  Wisdom  and  Goodness,  and  declarative  of  these 
attributes.  But  now  Holiness  speaks,  and  awakes  up  the  will 
and  the  conscience  to  a  perception  of  their  high  functions. 
Taking  its  mandate  into  the  very  sanctuary  of  man’s  nature,  it 
disclosed  to  him  the  great  fact  of  his  moral  power.  It  told 
him,  in  effect,  that  the  will  of  God  was  everywhere ;  and  that 
if  he  chose,, he  might  find  Thou  shalt  and  Thou  shall  not  in¬ 
scribed  on  everything.  So  that,  in  that  command,  all  nature 
may  be  said  to  have  found  a  voice,  and  to  have  republished  its 
ancient  laws ;  each  created  object  to  have  lifted  up  its  head  and 


PROGRESSION. 


175 


to  hare  caught  a  beam  from  the  Divine  sanctity.  Having  led 
man  to  a  throne  which  overlooked  and  commanded  all  earthly 
tilings,  the  Divine  Governor  now  unveiled  his  own  throne,  and, 
lo,  man  was  sitting  on  its  footstool ! 

10.  (3.)  But  law  implies  sanctions.  Now,  the  very  fact  that 
man  is  threatened  with  death  in  the  event  of  his  disobedience 
implies  that  he  is  made  for  uninterrupted  life.  For  to  suppose 
that  he  is  not,  is  to  suppose  that  his  life  will  terminate  at  some 
time  even  though  he  continue  to  obey ;  in  other  words,  that  his 
happy  existence  will  terminate  whether  he  obey  or  disobey. 

If  the  Divine  manifestation  is  to  be  continued  in  a  course  of 
unending  progression,  and  if  man  is  the  being,  or  one  of  the 
orders  of  being,  by  whom  the  manifestation  is  to  be  continued, 
and  to  whom  it  is  to  be  made,  a  twofold  reason  flows  from  the 
twofold  office  which  he  thus  sustains,  for  the  expectation  of  his 
unending  existence.  One  of  these  reasons  is  objective  and  the 
other  subjective ;  and  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  will  be 
found  included  all  that  has  ever  been  advanced  by  the  advo¬ 
cates  of  man’s  immortality. 

11.  The  objectve  reason  is  derived  from  the  assumption  that 
man  is  the  being  to  whom  the  Divine  manifestation  is  to  be 
made.  For,  if  such  be  the  fact,  the  duration  of  his  existence 
must  be  co-extensive  with  the  duration  of  the  manifestation ; 
and  as  that  is  never  to  end,  it  follows  that  man  must  have  been 
destined  for  immortality.  For  the  same  reason  that  he  has 
beins;  at  all,  that  being;  will  be  continued  to  him  for  ever.  This 
conclusion,  however,  assumes  that  man  continues  capable  of 
appreciating  the  Divine  display:  in  the  event  of  his  losing  that 
capacity,  it  may  be  thought  to  leave  us  in  doubt  respecting  the 
issue. 

12.  Let  us,  then,  look  next  to  the  subjective  reasons  for  man’s 
immortality,  or  to  those  derivable  from  his  constitution  as  view- 
ed  in  the  light  of  Divine  government.  The  manifestation  is 
continuous ;  and  he  possesses  the  power  of  recalling  and  re¬ 
taining  the  past,  and  of  carrying  it  on  in  an  unbroken  chain 
into  the  future.  The  manifestation  is  accumulative  and  pro¬ 
gressive  ;  and  though  his  capacity,  intellectual  and  moral,  is  to 
be  ever  filling,  the  same  activity  which  tends  to  fill  it,  tends 
also  to  enlarge  it  for  all  the  future.  To  the  cpiestion  then, 
might  not  the  great  end  have  been  answered  by  making  man 
immortal  as  a  race,  though  perishable  as  an  individual  ?  the 
reply  is  obvious.  The  highest  end  of  man’s  existence  is  not 
intellectual  but  moral ;  in  other  words,  the  manifestation  is  to 


176 


MAN. 


be  made  by  him  as  well  as  to  him.  Every  present  hour  finds 
and  leaves  him,  by  supposition,  not  less,  but  more  prepared  by 
the  influence  of  the  past  for  every  future  hour.  The  more  he 
sympathizes  with  the  laws  of  the  Divine  government,  the  great¬ 
er  his  power  of  obedience  becomes.  And  the  more  he  exhibits 
of  the  Divine  character,  the  more  he  becomes  capable  of  ex¬ 
hibiting  it.  So  that  if  these  capacities  and  powers  constitute  a 
reason  for  his  having  been  brought  into  existence,  the  reason 
grows  stronger  every  moment  for  its  indefinite  prolongation. 
At  no  moment  could  the  termination  of  his  existence  arrive 
without  finding  him  in  the  midst  of  unterminated  questions,  in¬ 
cipient  attainments,  with  hopes  and  expectations  projected  far 
into  the  future,  and  with  powers  and  capacities  for  taking  pos¬ 
session  of  it  such  as  he  was  never  conscious  of  before. 

Now  when  it  is  remembered  that  for  every  appetite,  organ, 
and  faculty,  whether  in  man  or  in  the  inferior  animal,  there  is 
found  to  be  a  corresponding  object  in  external  nature,  the  pre¬ 
sumption  is  suggested  that  man’s  noblest  aspiration  cannot  have 
been  enkindled  to  be  extinguished  in  disappointment.  But  be¬ 
sides  that  the  eye  finds  light ;  and  the  ear,  sounds ;  the  intellect, 
objects  of  knowledge ;  and  the  affections,  objects  of  love ;  it  is 
to  be  remarked  that  many  parts  of  the  human  constitution  exist 
latently  and  potentially  long  before  they  announce  themselves 
by  coming  forth  to  seek  their  appropriate  objects.  Like  the 
lungs  of  the  foetus  in  the  womb,*  they  are  of  no  immediate  use, 
but  form  a  part  of  a  prospective  arrangement,  and  point  to  a 
destination  not  yet  come ;  affording  analogical  ground  for  the 
conclusion  that  man’s  subjective  fitness  for  immortality,  and  his 
ardent  longing  after  it,  will  be  met  by  a  corresponding  arrange¬ 
ment  in  the  future  to  which  they  point ;  that  a  sphere  is  assign¬ 
ed  him  in  which  his  powers  can  expand  amidst  congenial  objects- 
without  end. 

13.  And  so  also  in  the  event  of  man’s  disobedience ;  as  the 
loss  of  his  holiness  does  not  involve  the  loss  of  any  of  the  con¬ 
stituent  parts  of  his  being,  that  being  itself  could  not  be  extin¬ 
guished  except  by  a  mechanical  act  of  omnipotence  —  an  act 
having  no  congenial  relation  to  a  moral  being,  and  an  act  imply¬ 
ing  that  an  obstacle  had  at  length  arisen  in  the  part  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  proceedure  which  could  not  be  turned  to  the  account  of  any 
further  manifestaton,  and  that  therefore  it  must  be  annihilated. 
This  surety,  would  be  the  weakness  of  justice,  not  its  strength. 


*  See  Butler’s  Analogy,  p.  i.  c.  1, 


PROGRESSION. 


177 


Besides,  the  extinction  of  the  sinner  would  not  be  the  extinction 
of  his  sin ;  that  would  live  on,  in  some  of  its  effects,  for  ever — 
an  inextinguishable  protest  against  the  perfection  of  the  Divine 
government :  while  yet  the  sinner  himself  who  first  uttered  the 
protest  is  supposed  to  to  be  placed  for  ever,  by  an  act  of  that 
government,  beyond  the  reach  of  punishment.  For,  further, 
the  extinction  of  being  is  an  escape  from  punishment ;  so  that 
here  would  be  the  singular  anomaly,  that  while  the  dread  of 
punishment  is  punishment,  the  infliction  itself  is  the  termination 
of  all  punishment.  In  addition  to  which  it  is  to  be  remarked 
that  the  very  prospect  held  out  of  unending  happiness  in  the 
event  of  obedience,  supposed  a  nature  capable  of  hoping  for 
and  desiring  it.  Now  the  same  constitution  which  renders  man 
capable  of  hoping,  renders  him  capable  of  fearing  to  the  same 
extent.  But  if  it  was  never  intended  that  such  fear  should  be 
realized  in  the  event  of  disobedience,  here  is  the  further  anoma¬ 
ly  of  a  part  of  the  human  constitution  to  which  there  is  nothing 
whatever  in  the  objective  and  the  future  to  correspond.  We 
believe,  then  that  the  soul  of  man  was  made  originally  immortal; 
not  necessarily,  indeed,  or  independently  of  the  Divine  will  (as 
if  it  were  a  substance  inherently  and  absolutely  indestructible) 
but  naturally ;  irrespective,  that  is,  of  its  subsequent  moral  char¬ 
acter  ;  and  that  disobedience  leaves  its  mere  duration  untouched. 

14.  Now  both  the  objective  and  the  subjective  argument  for 
man’s  immortality  are  distinctly  implied  in  the  threatening  of 
the  primal  prohibition.  “  In  the  day  that  thou  eatest  thereof,  thou 
shalt  surely  die.”  The  obvious  alternative  to  this  penalty  was, 
the  Divine  guarrantee  that  if  man  did  not  violate  the  law,  his 
obedience  should  exempt  him  from  every  evil  which  stands  in 
opposition  to  a  holy  and  happy  existence.  And  of  this  unend¬ 
ing  happy  life  “  the  tree  of  the  life  in  the  midst  of  the  garden,” 
was  appointed  to  be,  not  indeed  the  instrumental  cause,  though 
possibly  its  properties  were  highly  medicinal,  but  the  appropri¬ 
ate  symbol,  and  the  appointed  pledge. 

The  fact  that  death  was  threatened  as  the  forfeiture  of  un¬ 
limited  good,  implied  the  subjective  argument  also,  for  it  ap¬ 
pealed  to  man’s  love  of  happiness.  We  say  that  the  death 
threatened,  implied  (as  is  not  uncommon  in  Scripture)  the  loss  of 
all  that  belongs  to  a  holy  and  happy  existence :  nor  does  there 
appear  to  be  any  suostantial  ground  whatever  for  the  common 
conclusion  that  it  contemplated  the  extinction  on  the  day  of 
transgression  of  man’s  bodily  life.  We  do  not  take  this  view 
on  account  of  any  supposed  difficulty  respecting  the  manner  in 


178 


MAN. 


which  the  first  man  could  have  come  to  know  what  natural 
death  was.  His  Divine  instructor  might  have  described  it  to 
him  as  a  formidable  evil,  of  which  he  might  have  consequently 
stood  in  undefined  dread.  The  leaf  which  fluttered  and  fell  at 
his  feet  was  an  emblem  of  death  —  was  death.  The  ephemera 
which  perished  under  his  eye  at  the  close  of  day,  the  insect 
which  the  pressure  of  his  own  foot  unwittingly  crushed,  the  an¬ 
imalcules  which  the  larger  animals  unavoidably  imbibed  as 
they  drank  at  the  river’s  brink,  and  the  destruction  of  those 
insects  on  which  some  animals  are  constructed  to  live,  and  with¬ 
out  which  they  themselves  would  die,  any,  or  all  of  these  phe¬ 
nomena  might  have  been  employed  to  enable  him  to  apprehend 
natural  death  as  a  fearful  evil. 

15.  But  that  bodily  dissolution  not  only  falls  short  of  the 
penalty  denounced,  but  was  not  specified  in  it,  appears  probable 
on  these  considerations.  —  First,  that  as  the  evil  to  be  guarded 
against  was  of  a  moral  nature,  the  penalty  threatened  might  be 
antecedently  expected  to  be  connatural  with  it,  and  that  natural 
evils  would  only  follow  incidentally.  Secondly,  that  the  un¬ 
qualified  and  absolute  form  of  the  threatening  is  that  which  is 
employed  in  Scripture  to  denote  spiritual  death  alone,  quite 
irrespective  of  corporal  death.*  Thirdly,  that  man's  dissolution 
did  not  take  place  on  the  day  of  transgression,  but  was  on  that 
day  predicted  as  a  yet  future  event.  Fourthly,  that  it  was  not 
named  even  on  that  day  until  after  the  promise  of  a  Deliverer 
had  been  given,  leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  it  had  formed  no 
part  of  the  primal  threatening.  For  with  what  propriety  could 
a  promise  of  entire  deliverance  from  the  original  penalty  be 
immediately  followed  by  an  intimation  that  a  portion  of  it  must 
yet  be  endured?  And,  fifthly,  the  death  of  the  body  is  named 
as  only  one  of  a  series  of  evils,  including  corporal  toil,  pain, 
and  prolonged  sorrow  ;  and  surely  these  latter  were  not  directly 
included  in  the  primal  threatening,  for  the  instant  extinction  of 
man’s  bodily  life  would  have  made  them  impossible.  From 
all  of  which  we  infer,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  penalty  threat¬ 
ened  consisted  of  the  death  of  the  soul,  the  alienation  of  the 
heart  from  God,  the  loss  of  “  His  favor  which  is  life,”  and  the 
endurance  of  His  displeasure ;  and,  on  the  other,  that  bodily 
toil,  pain,  and  dissolution  ensued,  on  man’s  transgression,  as  the 
appropriate  exponents,  and  sensible  mementoes  of  man’s  fallen 


*  Deut.  xxx.  15 ;  Psalm  xxx.  5 ;  Prov.  viii.  35.  36 ;  John  iii.  36 ;  Eon* 
v.  17;  &c. 


PROGRESSION. 


179 


condition.  Had  his  spiritual  nature  maintained  its  standing  of 
love  and  obedience  to  God  —  its  natural  state  —  his  physical 
nature  would  have  continued  to  enjoy  preternatural  exemption 
from  the  laws  of  pain  and  death  belonging  to  the  whole  animal 
economy.  But  having  brought  himself  spiritually  into  an  un¬ 
natural  state,  and  so  incurred  the  threatened  penalty  of  spiritual 
death,  he  was  allowed  to  fall  physically  from  a  state  of  preter¬ 
natural  exemption  down  to  the  pre-existing  laws  of  animal  suf¬ 
fering  and  death. 

16.  As  to  the  question  where,  in  the  event  of  man’s  perse¬ 
vering  obedience,  his  immortality  would  have  been  spent,  or 
the  objection,  that  he  could  not  have  continued  to  live  here  for 
ever  —  an  objection  which  is  sometimes  urged  in  a  tone  which 
almost  implies  that  man  must ,  sooner  or  later,  have  sinned,  if 
onlv  in  accommodating  compliance  with  that  impossibility  — -  we 
have  only  to  reply,  that  the  universe  of  worlds  was  open  then 
for  the  localization  of  unfallen  man,  as  it  is  now  for  redeemed 
man  ;  that  he  might  have  spent  his  immortality  where  the  un¬ 
fallen  angels  are  enjoying  theirs;  and  that,  without  “tasting 
death,”  he  might,  like  Enoch  and  Elijah,  have  been  translated, 
generation  after  generation,  to  a  nobler  state  of  existence.  A 
more  interesting  speculation  would  it  be  to  follow  him  into  that 
higher  sphere,  and  to  imagine  what  his  attainments  and  dis¬ 
tinctions  might  there  have  been :  whether,  for  instance,  he 
would  not  have  been  qualified  and  employed  to  become  the 
exemplar,  in  knowledge,  in  purity,  and  in  spiritual  excellence, 
of  other  orders  of  intelligent  beings,  himself  ascending  from 
throne  to  throne  in  an  ever-advancing  career  of  glory.  But 
.this  is  to  speculate  on  a  hypothesis.  It  is  enough  for  us  to  find 
that  man  was  from  the  beginning  destined  to  an  immortality  of 
existence,  and  that  this  sovereign  appointment,  implied  in  the 
sanction  of  the  first  law,  harmonized  with  all  the  laws  of  the 
Divine  manifestation.  Such  was  the  theology  of  innocent  man 
—  a  powerful,  wise,  and  beneficent  Creator,  the  object  of  wor¬ 
ship  ;  that  Creator  his  equitable  moral  governor  ;  and  immortal 
life  in  prospect  as  the  reward  of  his  obedience,  and  a  threatened 
death,  standing  for  all  that  is  opposed  to  life,  as  the  deserved 
penalty  of  disobedience. 

17.  Here,  then,  both  in  the  constitution  and  condition  of 
man  is  the  progress  sought.  God  has  now  first  a  representative 
on  earth  —  a  son.*  And  he,  “  fearfully  and  wonderfully  made,” 


*  Luke,  iii.  38. 


180 


MAN. 


finds  himself  in  circumstances  suggestive  of,  and  corresponding 
to,  his  high  relation.  Nature  offers  itself  to  his  eye,  a  glorious 
picture-poem,  waiting  to  be  read.  In  relation  to  the  pre-ex¬ 
isting  creatures,  his  every  seat  is  a  throne,  and  he  walks  to  it 
through  ranks  of  objects  not  made  with  hands.  His  unuttered 
inquiries  are  answered  by  hints  and  intimations  from  a  Divine 
instructor.  He  is  joined  by  one  whose  presence  reveals  to  him 
the  resources  of  his  heart.  Every  word  articulated  was  new 
to  nature,  and  above  it.  Every  voluntary  act  disclosed  some 
wonder  of  his  being :  he  can  believe,  he  can  love,  he  can  obey, 
and  still  he  is  conscious  of  a  reserve  of  wonders.  Principles 
before  at  large  are  now  lodged;  his  person  encloses  them. 
The  Lawgiver  speaks  to  him,  and  Eden  becomes  an  anticipa¬ 
tion  of  Sinai ;  and  the  mere  purpose  to  obey  —  a  purpose  till 
now  unknown  on  earth,  gladdens  all  nature,  and  sanctifies  it. 
The  dial  of  time  was  now  first  set  for  worship,  that  he  might 
consecrate  its  moments.  Divine  properties  in  him  are  incar¬ 
nated —  humanized.  He  is  in  “the  image  of  God.”  So  true 
is  this,  that  his  conception  of  God  is  the  only  one  which  can 
satisfy  his  idea  of  perfect  excellence.  External  nature  cannot 
realize  it.  It  suggests  far  more  than  it  exhibits.  This  is  its 
highest  function,  to  make  the  mind  conscious  of  its  superiority 
to  outward,  things,  even  to  those  which  come  direct  from  the 
Creator’s  hand,  and  so  to  make  it  aware  of  its  connaturalness 
with  Him.  The  “  angel  standing  in  the  midst  of  the  sun  ”  did 
not  occupy  a  prouder  position  than  innocent  man  placed  in  the 
midst  of  nature.  Through  him  everything  pointed  away,  as  in 
rays  of  light,  to  God.  He  was  the  informing  spirit  of  the 
whole.  A  mind  had  come  to  fill  up  the  vacancy  between  earth 
and  heaven.  While  the  invisible  tribunal  within  him  looked 
away  to  the  unlimited  sphere  of  the  distant  and  the  future,  peo¬ 
pled,  not  with  shadows,  but  with  hardly  concealed  forms  of  glory 
or  of  terror. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CONTINUITY. 


1.  Man  is  not  an  abnormal  and  unconnected  part  of  the  sys¬ 
tem  in  which  he  appears.  Though  “  crowned  with  glory  and 


CONTINUITY. 


181 


honor,”  his  “  foundation  is  in  the  dust.”  He  is  the  last  member 
of  the  advancing  and  related  series  of  which  he  stands  at  the 
head.  In  other  words,  through  man,  “  the  Divine  manifesta¬ 
tion,  besides  being  progressive  is  continuous,  or  is  progressive 
by  being  continuous.” 

2.  Even  the  creative  process,  which  ended  in  man’s  produc 
tion,  did  not  introduce  a  new  system  of  nature.  It  took  its 
place  in  the  great  plan  as  preceding  changes  had  done ;  and  as 
those  epochs  had  been  manifestly  local ,  so  the  Adamic  creation 
was  no  doubt  compatible  with  the  uninterrupted  maintenance 
of  life  in  places  beyond  its  own  immediate  sphere.  Preceding 
epochs  exhibit  a  gradual  increase  in  the  number  of  species  till 
we  reach  the  multitudes  of  existing  species ;  as  well  as  the 
gradual  conformity  of  the  successive  animal  creations  to  the 
existing  types.  The  human  creation  is  only  the  most  advanced 
part  of  a  system  of  many  preceding  stages. 

3.  Man  stands  also  in  chronological  continuity  with  the  past. 
According  to  the  sacred  historian,  the  production  of  man  was 
the  continuous  and  crowning  act  of  a  six  days’  series  of  crea¬ 
tions.  Of  the  different  systems  of  sacred  chronology  —  the 
Samaritan,  the  Hebrew,  the  Septuagint,  and  that  of  Josephus  — - 
we  adopt  the  computation  which  results  from  the  guidance  of 
the  latter  two,  as  exhibited  by  Jackson,  Hales,  Russell,  and 
Wallace  ;  *  giving  a  period  of  from  5411  to  5478  years  from  the 
creation  to  the  Advent  of  Christ.  The  difference  of  this  time, 
indeed,  as  compared  with  the  vitiated  computations  of  the  He¬ 
brew  text,  (for  doubtless  its  chronology  agreed  originally  with 
that  of  the  Septuagint  —  rather,  the  chronology  of  the  Septua¬ 
gint  was  derived  from  it,)  amounts  to  nearly  1500  years.  But 
even  this  longer  period  makes  the  date  of  man’s  origin  to  be 
“but  of  yesterday.”  Whether  or  not  any  beings  of  other 
species  may  have  been  called  into  existence  since  the  time  of 
man’s  introduction  upon  the  earth,  is  a  subject  which  does  not 
affect  the  question  before  us.  We  only  affirm  that  man’s  crea¬ 
tion  was  an  event  in  chronological  continuity  with  a  series 
of  creative  acts :  that  in  addition  to  the  power,  and  wisdom, 
and  goodness  of  the  Creator  previously  displayed  by  these  acts, 
man  appeared  as  a  manifestation  of  his  Maker’s  moral  charac¬ 
ter  ;  and  that  his  introduction  dates  from  about  the  compara- 


*  See  Jackson's  “Chronological  Antiquities,-”  Hales’  “Analysis  of 
Chronology ;  ”  Russell’s  “  Connection  of  Sacred  and  Profane  History,” 
&c.;  and  Prof.  W allace’s  “  True  Age  of  the  World.” 

16 


182 


MAN. 


tively  recent  period  which  we  have  specified.  The  distance  of 
the  creation  from  the  Christian  era,  indeed,  is  different  as  esti¬ 
mated  by  different  systems  of  chronology.  The  Indian  chro¬ 
nology,  as  computed  by  Gentil,  would  make  the  interval  6174 
years ;  the  Babylonian,  by  Bailly,  6158  ;  and  the  Chinese,  by 
Bailly,  6157.*  But  this  difference,  considering  the  proneness 
of  every  early  nation  to  antedate  its  existence,  surprises  by  its 
minuteness  rather  than  by  its  magnitude,  and  justifies  our  con¬ 
fidence  in  the  Biblical  chronology  as  interpreted  by  the  Septua- 
gint.  Still  further  is  the  recency  of  man’s  origin  confirmed  by 
obvious  inferences  from  the  actual  state  and  number  of  the  spe¬ 
cies.  How,  for  example,  is  the  incipient  state  of  many  of  the 
arts  and  sciences,  compared  with  the  progress  of  human  discov¬ 
ery,  to  be  accounted  for ;  or  the  scantiness  of  the  world’s  popu¬ 
lation,  compared  with  its  ever-multiplying  and  expansive  power  ; 
or  the  absence  of  all  remains  of  man  and  of  his  works,  (as  far 
as  research  has  hitherto  gone,)  from  even  the  latest  of  the  ter¬ 
tiary  beds,  except  on  the  supposition  of  his  comparatively  mod¬ 
ern  introduction  on  the  earth  ? 

4.  The  order  of  man’s  appearance  exhibits  him  also  in  geo¬ 
logical  continuity  with  the  classes  of  animated  nature  to  which 
he  stands  most  nearly  related.  Geology,  indeed,  affords  no 
ground  whatever  for  the  hypothesis  of  a  regular  succession  of 
creatures,  beginning  with  the  simplest  forms  in  the  older  strata, 
and  ascending  to  the  more  complicated  in  the  later  formations. 
The  earliest  forms  of  life  known  to  geology  are  not  of  the  lowest 
grade  of  organization ;  neither  are  the  earliest  forms  of  any  of 
the  classes  which  appear  subsequently,  the  simplest  of  their 
kind.  Still,  the  succession  of  the  vertebral  classes  is  remarka¬ 
ble.  For,  notwithstanding  subordinate  exceptions  to  regular 
progress,  the  geological  order  in  which  we  find  these  classes  is 
that  of  an  ascending  series  —  fishes,  reptiles,  birds,  mammals ; 
and,  at  the  head  of  the  last  of  these  classes,  and  the  latest  in 
time,  comes  man. 

Among  the  subordinate  exceptions  to  regular  zoological 


*  The  chronology  of  Egypt  is  still  undetermined.  M.  Bunsen  begins 
his  exposition  of  it  with  Menes,  whom  he  places,  a.  c.  3643.  But  even 
'his  friendly  reviewer  in  the  Quarterly  questions  the  personal  existence  of 
Menes,  observing,  that  there  is  no  documentary  evidence  of  it  —  that 
Menu  among  the  Hindus,  Minos,  and  Minyas  among  the  Greeks,  Minerva 
among  the  Etruscans,  and  Mannus  among  the  Germans,  are  the  tradi¬ 
tional  authors  of  civilization,  and  that  the  name  is  always  linked  with  a 
root  denoting  mind  as  the  faculty,  and  man  as  the  agent. 


CONTINUITY. 


188 


progression  to  which  I  refer,  it  may  he  proper  to  instance  such 
quadrumana  as  the  orang,  the  ape,  and  the  monkey.  The  non- 
discovery  for  a  time  of  any  trace  of  these  tribes  among  the  fos¬ 
sil  records  of  extinct  mammalia,  had  led  some  to  the  conclusion, 
that  this  type  of  organization,  most  nearly  resembling  the  hu¬ 
man,  came  so  late  in  the  order  of  creation  as  to  be  little  anterior 
to  that  of  man.  Recent  discoveries,  however,  have  abundantly 
shown  that  the  inference  was  premature.  A  great  number  of 
extinct  species  are  now  added  to  our  fossil  collection  of  tertiary 
mammalia.  The  bones  of  a  gibbon,  or  one  of  the  tail-less  apes, 
standing  next  in  the  scale  of  organization  to  the  orang,  were 
found  in  1837  in  the  South  of  France  ;  but  they  were  imbedded 
in  strata  probably  of  the  miocene,  or  middle  tertiary  period, 
and  were  accompanied  by  the  remains  of  the  mastodon,  dinothe- 
rium,  palreotherium,  and  other  extinct  quadrupeds.  While  the 
British  quadrumane,  discovered  in  1839  near  Woodbridge,  in 
Suffolk,  occurred  in  a  still  more  ancient  stratum,  and  belongs 
also  to  an  extinct  species.* 

5.  The  physical  structure  of  man  places  him  in  a  zoological 
line  with  pre-existing  animals.  The  misconception  and  abuse 
of  this  fact  have  led  to  a  theory  of  development,  according  to 
which  an  unbroken  chain  of  gradually  advanced  organization 
has  been  evolved  from  the  crystal  to  the  globule,  and  thence 
through  the  successive  stages  of  the '  polypus,  the  mollusk,  the 
insect,  the  fish,  the  reptile,  the  bird,  and  the  beast,  up  to  the 
monkey,  and  the  man.  As  this  untenable  idea  came  under 
examination  in  the  previous  Treatise,  and  will  be  adverted  to 
again  in  the  next  chapter,  I  will  only  at  present  offer  two  re¬ 
marks  upon  it.  First,  that  the  continuity  which  it  advocates, 
even  if  its  existence  could  be  substantiated,  would  be  only  ap¬ 
parent  or  general.  No  two  species  so  nearly  approach  as  not 
to  leave  room  for  an  intermediate  third.  However  slight  the 
break  where  one  animal  may  appear  to  graduate  into  another, 
such  an  interruption  there  is ;  and  it  is  nothing  less  than  an  in¬ 
terruption  in  kind,  a  transition  from  identity  to  essential  differ¬ 
ence.  But,  secondly,  such  transmutation  is  unknown.  No 
animal  shows  any  signs  of  graduating  into  an  animal  of  a  higher 
class,  much  less  into  a  human  being. 

But,  speaking  generally,  the  type  on  which  the  animal  and 
human  structures  are  formed,  is  one.  The  type  of  the  human 
hand,  for  example,  is  found  in  beings  which  existed  prior  to  the 


*  See  Lyell’s  “  Principles,”  etc.  c.  ix. 


384 


MAN. 


creation  of  man.  Certain  analogies  exist  also  in  the  structure  o 1 
the  brain  between  some  of  the  Simiae  and  man.  Professor  Owen, 
indeed,  has  demonstrated  that  these  resemblances  have  been 
greatly  over-rated ;  and  that,  while  in  man  the  facial  angle  is, 
in  the  average  of  Europeans,  80°,  in  the  adult  chimpanzee, 
which  in  this  respect  approaches  the  nearest  to  man,  the  facial 
angle  is  only  35°,  and  in  the  orang  or  satyr  30°.  “  The  ape 

compared  with  man,”  says  Professor  Kidd,  “  may  indeed  be 
among  other  animals  4  proximus  huic  ;’  still,  however,  it  must 
be  added  1  longo  sed  proximus  intervallo.’  ”  In  other  words, 
the  physical  continuity  of  which  we  speak  is  found  to  consist 
with  essential  difference  and  with  a  permanency  of  specific  form. 
The  identity  of  the  species  is  unchangeable.  Even  the  higher 
phenomena  of  the  human  mind  are  not  without  their  suggestive 
pre-intimations  in  the  animal  world.  The  impelled  volitions  of 
the  brute  will,  is  a  faint  foreshadowing  of  man’s  free  will,  and 
an  apt  picture  of  the  constrained  condition  to  which  it  may  be 
reduced.  And  even  the  conscience  may  be  regarded  as  having 
an  inadequate  precursor  in  the  resentful  rage  of  the  animal 
when  suffering  from  the  hand  of  man,  though  of  the  moral  qual¬ 
ity  of  justice  it  knows  nothing.  Mere  external  resemblances  of 
this  nature  abound ;  nor  can  there  be  any  danger  in  allowing 
the  imagination  to  indulge  itself  in  tracing  them,  provided  the 
mind  does  not  lose  sight  of  the  still  greater  differences. 

6.  The  serial  character  of  the  Adamic  creation,  then ;  the 
chronological  relation  in  which  man  stands  to  the  great  process; 
the  order  of  his  appearance  in  respect  to  the  particular  classes 
of  animal  life  to  which  he  belongs ;  and  his  relation  to  pre¬ 
existing  types  of  physical  structure,  all  show  that  he  is  an  inte¬ 
gral  part  of  the  great  system  into  which  he  has  come.  He  was 
meant,  for  a  time  at  least,  to  be  at  home  in  it.  To  disturb  it, 
would  be  to  derange  his  own  nature.  If  he  would  understand  it, 
he  must  study  it.  If  he  would  command  it,  he  must  obey  its 
laws.  Such  is  the  harmony  between  it  and  him,  that  in  pro¬ 
portion  as  he  develops  its  resources,  he  promotes  his  own 
self-development.  And  while  his  intellectual  distinction,  as 
compared  with  animated  nature,  consists  in  his  perception  of 
this  fact,  and  in  his  consciously  acting  on  it,  his  moral  preroga¬ 
tive  lies  in  the  power  which  he  possesses  of  viewing  the  creation 
as  the  symbolical  utterance  of  the  Creator’s  perfections,  and  of 
voluntarily  making  it  the  occasion  of  a  homage  which  places 
him  in  communion  with  the  Uncreated. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


185 


CHAPTER  V. 

DEVELOPMENT. 

1.  T\te  have  seen  that  man  takes  up  into  his  constitution  the 
distinctive  characteristics  of  the  higher  classes  of  animals.  The 
law  of  development  leads  us  to  expect  “  that  the  same  character¬ 
istics  and  properties  which  existed  in  the  preceding  and  inferior 
stage  of  creation  will  be  found  to  be  not  only  brought  on  to  the 
present,  but  to  be  in  a  more  advanced  condition,  in  the  sense  of 
being  expressed  in  higher  forms,  or  applied  to  higher  purposes, 
(if  it  be  not  entirely  superseded  by  something  superior ;)  or  that 
it  will  be  in  the  power  of  the  subsequent  and  superior  production 
so  to  render  or  to  apply  it.”  For  as,  by  the  great  law  of  the 
Divine  manifestation,  everything  is  in  alliance  and  dependence ; 
and  as  everything  looks  on  to  an  end  beyond  itself,  its  nature, 
or  its  relations  and  results,  may  be  expected  to  advance,  the 
further  it  proceeds  from  its  original  starting-point  towards  the 
distant  end  for  the  sake  of  which  it  exists.*  The  development 
of  which  we  speak,  it  will  be  remarked,  is  not  of  one  thing  from 
another,  but  of  the  Divine  plan  of  creation,  and  of  our  concep¬ 
tions  of  that  plan. 

It  has  been  shown  already  (in  the  preceding  chapter)  that 
man  is,  geologically  speaking,  of  recent  origin.  Chronologically, 
the  inspired  records  anticipated  this  conclusion,  by  describing 
man  as  the  crowning  production  of  the  Adamic  creation.  And 
regarded  zoologically,  as  ranking  among  the  mammalia,  it  is 
found  that  the  series  of  structures  modelled  on  this  particular 
type,  after  exhibiting  the  gradual  development  of  its  character¬ 
istic  elements,  attains  a  point  of  perfection  in  man  which  places 
him  at  the  summit  of  the  scale  of  terrestrial  beings. 

2.  Physiologists  point  out  numerous  particulars  in  which  man 
specifically  differs  from,  and  surpasses  the  physical  structure 
and  physiological  constitution  of  such  animals  as  make  the  nearest 
approximation  to  him.f  The  most  obvious  of  these  distinctions 
is  his  erect  posture.  “  Man  presents  the  only  instance  among 
the  mammalia  of  a  conformation  by  which  the  erect  posture  can 

#  be  permanently  maintained,  and  in  which  the  office  of  support- 

*  The  Pre-Adamite  Earth,  p.  52. 

t  Blumenhaeh’s  De  generis  Humani  Varietate  Nativa,  §  1. 

16* 


186 


MAN. 


ing  the  trunk  of  the  body  is  consigned  exclusively  to  the  lower 
extremities.”  Even  M.  Lesson,  while  affirming  that  the  Si  mi*, 
m  general  organization,  are  nearer  to  man  than  to  the  brutes, 
iays  it  down  as  a  perfectly  ascertained  fact,  that  it  is  only  by 
accident,  or  external  help,  or  painful  training,  that  the  orangs 
tread  for  a  few  moments  on  their  posterior  limbs  alone,  or  inse¬ 
curely  keep  themselves  in  an  upright  position.  In  man,  however, 
the  length  of  the  heel-bone,  the  form  of  the  foot,  the  broad, 
articular  surfaces  of  the  knee-joint,  the  muscular  swelling  of  the 
calves,  the  length  of  the  leg,  the  width  and  direction  of  the  pelvis, 
the  manner  in  which  the  head  is  placed  on  the  spinal  column, 
and  the  adjustments  of  the  organs  of  sense,  all  combine  to  mark 
the  intention  of  the  Divine  Creator  that  man  should  maintain 
an  upright  attitude.*  4  How  many  excellences/  exclaims  Cicero, 
4  God  has  bestowed  upon  mankind  !  He  has  raised  them  from 
the  ground  and  made  them  lofty  and  erect.’f  The  os  homini 
sublime ,  of  Ovid,  celebrates  the  same  organic  distinction.  The 
primary  and  most  striking  advantage  of  this  arrangement  is,  that 
the  anterior  limbs,  the  arms  and  hands,  by  being  exempted  from 
the  service  to  which  other  animals  apply  them,  are  left  at  liberty 
to  be  employed  by  man  as  instruments  of  prehension  and  touch. 

3.  This  brings  us  to  remark  on  that  structure  of  unrivalled 
excellence,  the  human  hand ;  for  were  it  not  differently  consti¬ 
tuted  from  the  anterior  limb  of  other  animals,  in  vain  would  be 
its  exemption  from  the  office  of  supporting  the  body.  The  limb 
which  comes  nearest  to  the  human  hand  is  the  paw  of  the  adult 
chimpanzee.  But  its  distinguishing  peculiarity  is  the  smallness 
of  the  thumb,  (so  insignificant  as  to  have  been  termed  by  Eusta- 
cliius  “  omnino  ridiculus”)  which  44  extends  no  further  than  to  the 
root  of  the  fingers.  Now,  it  is  upon  the  length,  strength,  free 
lateral  motion,  and  perfect  mobility  of  the  thumb,  that  the  power 
of  the  human  hand  depends.  The  thumb  is  called  pollex,  because 
of  its  strength ;  and  that  strength  is  necessary  to  the  power  of 
the  hand,  being  equal  to  that  of  all  the  fingers.  Without  the 
fleshy  ball  of  the  thumb,  the  power  of  the  fingers  would  avail 
nothing ;  and  accordingly,  the  large  ball,  formed  by  the  muscles 
of  the  thumb,  is  the  distinguishing  character  of  the  human  hand, 
and  especially  of  that  of  an  expert  workman.”!  Doubtless,  the 


*  Dr.  Elliotson’s  Human  Physiology,  c.  1.  p.  9 ;  Dr.  Prichard’s  Re 
searches,  etc.  Yol.  I.  p.  171,  etc. 

t  Cicero’s  Nat.  Deor.  lib.  ii.  p.  173. 
f  Sir  C.  Bell’s  Treatise  on  the  Hand,  p.  121. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


187 


variously  formed  and  armed  extremities  of  other  animals  give 
them  great  advantages.  “  But  to  man,”  says  Galen,  “  the  Crea- 
tor  has  given,  in  lieu  of  every  other  natural  weapon  or  organ  of 
defence,  that  instrument,  the  hand ;  an  instrument  applicable  to 
every  art  and  occasion,  as  well  of  peace  as  of  war.  Rightly  has 
Aristotle  defined  the  hand  to  be  the  instrument  antecedent  to, 
or  productive  of,  all  other  instruments.”* 

Were  we  aiming  to  establish  the  right  of  man,  then,  to  occupy 
the  summit  of  the  zoological  pyramid,  whether  we  compared 
his  physical  claims  with  the  claims  of  any  other  single  species, 
or  with  the  selected  and  aggregate  perfections  of  the  whole  ani¬ 
mal  creation,  we  could  be  content  to  rely  on  the  mechanism  and 
endowments  of  the  hand  alone.  Such  is  its  perfection,  in  these 
respects,  that  some  philosophers,  like  Anaxagoras  in  ancient, 
and  Helvetius  in  modern  times,  have  ascribed  man’s  superiority 
to  his  hand  alone.  True,  his  advancement  is  owing  ultimately 
to  his  intellectual  power.  Yet  with  hoofs  instead  of  hands,  he 
would  be  physically  unable  to  construct  the  simplest  instruments. 
It  is  his  hand  which  executes  the  plans  which  his  mind  con¬ 
ceives  ;  though  it  does  no  more.  It  is  the  human  hand  which 
multiplies  its  own  power  by  adding  to  it  the  wheel,  the  axle, 
and  all  the  mechanical  powers  ;  which  appropriates  the  strength 
of  one  animal,  and  the  swiftness  of  another ;  which,  by  the  con¬ 
struction  of  suitable  instruments,  increases  indefinitely  our  powers 
of  hearing  and  of  sight ;  and  gives  us  that  complete  dominion 
we  possess  over  the  various  forms  of  matter.  Man,  then,  is  supe¬ 
rior  in  organization  to  all  other  animals ;  for  his  hand  is  not  an 
isolated  part,  or  a  thing  appended  ;  every  part  of  his  frame  con¬ 
forms  to  it,  and  acts  with  reference  to  it.  Yet  the  bones  whose 
distribution  we  so  much  admire  in  the  human  arm  and  hand,  we 
recognize  in  the  fin  of  the  whale,  in  the  paddle  of  the  turtle,  in 
the  wing  of  the  bird,  and  in  the  paw  of  the  lion  or  the  bear. 
But  concerning  men  it  was  the  pleasure  of  the  Creator  to  say, 
“  Let  them  have  dominion  over  all  these :”  and  He  devised  and 
created  the  human  hand  as  the  instrument  of  acquiring  that  do¬ 
minion. 

4.  Ascending  from  the  mechanism  of  man’s  structure  to  the 
functions  of  his  organic  life,  we  find  that  he  is  distinguished  by 
that  kind  of  superiority  which  his  social  and  moral  relations 
might  have  led  us  to  expect.  The  form  and  arrangement  of 


*  Quoted  in  Prof.  Kidd  s  Bridgewater  Treatise  on  the  Physical  Con¬ 
dition  of  Man,  p.  33. 


188 


MAN. 


his  teeth,  as  well  as  the  structure  of  his  digestive  urgans,  show 
that  he  is  omnivorous,  or  capable  of  subsisting  alike  on  vege¬ 
table  and  animal  food,  while  his  means  of  culinary  preparation, 
and  his  natural  and  artificial  means  of  adapting  himself  to  the 
temperature,  better  qualify  him  for  every  variety  of  soil  and 
climate  than  any  other  animal.  Hence  he  is  found  alike  in  the 
arctic  circle,  and  under  the  equator,  and  supporting  the  widely 
different  degrees  of  atmospheric  pressure  in  valleys,  and  on  lofty 
table  lands,  ten  thousand  feet  high.  And  it  is  singular  that  the 
animals  which  make  the  nearest  approach  to  him  in  structure 
should  be  among  those  which,  in  this  respect  of  geographical 
distribution,  differ  most  widely  from  him  —  such  as  the  chim¬ 
panzee  and  ourang-outang.  Now,  as  we  found  animal  existence 
superior  to  vegetable,  partly  because  it  is  rendered  independent 
of  local  situation  for  food,  and  enjoys  the  liberty  of  moving  from 
place  to  place,  the  superiority  of  human  existence  to  mere  ani¬ 
mal  life,  in  this  respect,  is  proportionate  to  the  wider  sphere  in  . 
which  he  is  free  to  range.  Yet  who  but  the  Maker  of  man 
could  have  known  that  his  nutritive  system  was  thus  general¬ 
ized,  as  the  fact  is  implied  in  the  primitive  appointment,  “  Be¬ 
hold  I  have  given  you  every  herb  bearing  seed  which  is  upon 
the  face  of  all  the  earth,  and  every  tree  on  which  is  fruit  bear¬ 
ing  seed  ;  to  you  it  shall  be  for  food.”  And  the  system  of  nu¬ 
trition  thus  generalized  is,  remarks  Roget,  one  vast  laboratory, 
where  mechanism  is  subservient  to  chemistry,  where  chemistry 
is  the  agent  of  the  higher  powers  of  vitality,  and  where  these 
powers  themselves  minister  to  the  more  exalted  faculties  of  sen¬ 
sation  and  intellect. 

5.  Still  more  marked  is  the  superiority  of  man  if  we  ascend 
to  the  department  of  his  animal  life.  Here,  that  relation  of  the 
sexes  which  is  a  law  of  the  whole  animated  kingdom,  is  the 
means  of  producing  intellectual  improvement  and  moral  excel¬ 
lence.  For  this  we  are  prepared  by  the  inspired  historian  of 
Eden.  “  And  Jehovah  God  caused  a  deep  sleep  to  fall  upon 
the  man,  and  he  slept :  and  he  took  out  one  of  his  ribs,  and 
closed  up  the  flesh  in  its  place.  And  Jehovah  God  formed 
[built  up]  the  rib  which  he  had  taken  from  the  man  into  a 
woman,  and  he  brought  her  to  the  man.  And  the  man  said, 
this  now  is  it*  —  bone  out  of  my  bones,  and  flesh  out  of  my 
flesh;  this  shall  be  called  woman,  for  out  of  man  was  this 


*  Meaning  —  “  now  at  length  I  see  a  being  like  myself,  one  of  my  own 
species,”  referring  to  ver.  20. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


189 


taken.”*  In  this  simple  and  tender  narrative  it  is  intimated 
that  the  creation  of  woman  was  the  tilling  up  of  a  divine  plan 
for  the  paradisiacal  well-being  of  man,  and  was  essential  to  it ; 
that,  prior  to  such  creation,  man  felt  “  the  unsufficingness  of 
himself  for  himself that  the  first  woman  was  connatural  with, 
and  a  part  of,  the  first  man ;  that  she  was  presented  to  Adam 
by  the  hand  of  God ;  that  she  was  received  by  Adam  as  Ins 
other  self,  the  supplement  and  complement  of  his  own  being ; 
and  that  they  were  regarded  by  God  as  being  (in  a  sense  here¬ 
after  to  be  explained)  indissolubly  one.  And  thus,  while 
among  the  inferior  animals  the  sexual  relation  contemplates  a 
specific  end,  which,  generally  speaking,  begins  and  ends  with 
itself,  here,  propensity  is  promoted  into  moral  principle ;  tem¬ 
porary  connection  into  the  sacred  and  enduring  bond  of  mar¬ 
riage  ;  the  daily  utterances  of  external  life  into  “  the  outward 
and  visible  signs  of  an  inward  sacrament”  of  sanctified  love. 
Here,  the  tenderness  and  susceptibility  of  one  sex  are  to  exer¬ 
cise  a  refining  influence  on  the  sterner  attributes  of  the  other, 
while  these  again  are  to  re-act  in  fortifying  and  ennobling  the 
character  of  the  former ;  the  distinguishing  excellences  of  each 
being  added  to  the  other. 

6.  The  gregarious  instinct  of  certain  animal  species  is  re¬ 
placed  in  man  by  the  social  principle.  The  relation  of  the 
sexes  is  made  eminently  subservient  to  this  very  purpose,  and 
other  means  are  added  to  it.  By  making  “  of  one  blood  all 
nations  of  men”  —  by  giving  the  human  race  the  same  parentage, 
all  its  members  sustain  from  the  beginning  a  family  relation¬ 
ship  ;  by  creating  at  first  only  one  man  and  woman,  and  by  per¬ 
petuating  the  sexes  ever  since  in  the  same  numerical  propor¬ 
tion,  wise  and  gracious  provision  is  made  for  the  cultivation  of 
those  family  affections  which  are  the  foundation  of  all  other 
affections  ;  by  prolonging  the  period  of  human  infancy  and  help¬ 
lessness  so  much  beyond  the  period  of  dependence  with  the 
young  of  mere  animals ;  and  by  thus  giving  the  mother  an  op¬ 
portunity  of  instilling  her  own  yearning  affection  into  the  child, 
the  child  an  opportunity  of  acquiring  a  deep  sense  of  filial  obli¬ 
gation,  and  the  children  time  for  cementing  the  pure  union  of 
brotherly  and  sisterly  affection,  further  scope  is  afforded  for  the 


*  Gen.  ii.  21  —  23.  The  verse  following,  “  Therefore  shall  a  man  leave 
his  father  and  mother  and  cleave  unto  his  wife,  and  they  shall  be  one 
flesh”  —  is  doubtless  the  inspired  application  of  the  narrative  —  the  formal 
authentication  of  the  great  law  of  marriage  as  inserted  and  founded  in  the 
original  constitution  of  human  nature. 


190 


MAN. 


full  development  of  the  social  affections.  Sometimes,  indeed, 
we  hear  certain  species  of  the  Simias  tribe  vaguely  spoken  of 
as  apparently  resembling  man  in  many  of  his  social  habits.  But 
sociality,  though  based  in  the  union  of  the  sexes,  does  not  be- 
long  to  man’s  animal  nature  ;  it  is  an  attribute  of  his  intellectual 
and  moral  constitution.  Hence,  while  the  bond  of  cohesion 
among  animals  remains  stationary  from  age  to  age,  the  social 
principle  in  humanity  has  shown  itself  capable  of  perpetual  de¬ 
velopment.  And  the  Divine  appointment  that  man  should  take 
possession  of  the  earth,  and  have  dominion  over  it,  plainly  re¬ 
ferred  us  to  each  other’s  help,  and  implied  the  mutual  depend¬ 
ence  and  co-operation  of  social  life.  And,  what  is  strikingly 
distinctive  of  man,  the  earth  may  be  said  to  be  covered  with 
monumental  proofs*  of  affection  for  departed  friends,  of  the  con¬ 
viction  that  they  survive  elsewhere,  and  of  the  hope  that  in 
some  other  state  the  social  principle  will  triumph  in  the  re-union 
of  those  whom  death  has  temporarily  severed. 

7.  With  respect  to  the  sensorial  functions  in  man,  they  will 
be  found  to  be  either  in  themselves,  or  in  their  application,  in 
advance  of  those  of  animals.  It  is  generally  allowed  that  few 
of  any  class  of  animals  excels  man  in  more  than  in  one  of  the 
senses.  But  it  seems  to  have  escaped  remark,  that  no  animal 
probably  excels  man  in  the  use  of  any  one  sense  in  more  than 
in  one  or  two  respects,  and  these  directly  connected  with  the 
preservation  and  propagation,  of  life,  while  in  every  other  re¬ 
spect  man  may  excel  the  animal,  even  in  the  use  of  that  par¬ 
ticular  sense.  The  sight  of  the  hawk,  for  example,  may  be 
more  acute  for  a  special  purpose  —  that  of  perceiving  a  small 
object  at  a  great  distance  below  it,  but  unless  it  could  be  shown 
that  it  is  capable  of  sweeping  the  magnificence  of  the  midnight 
heavens,  of  combining  in  one  view  a  whole  field  of  separate  ob¬ 
jects —  say  an  army,  of  looking  steadily  at  the  same  objects  for 
hours  together,  and  of  enjoying  alike  the  presence  of  artificial 
and  of  natural  light,  the  only  case  made  out  is  one,  not  of  supe¬ 
riority,  but  simply  of  variety. 

Now,  (to  say  nothing  of  that  robe  of  civilizing  sensibility,  the 
human  skin,)  the  sense  of  touch  —  the  only  sense,  perhaps, 
common  to  the  whole  animal  creation  —  attains  its  greatest  per¬ 
fection  in  the  human  hand.  Taste  enlarges  our  range  of  sense- 
perceptions,  by  making  us  acquainted  with  the  qualities  of  bodies 
in  a  fluid  or  liquefied  state.  Smell  still  further  extends  our 


*  Dr.  Prichard  has  an  elegant  paragraph  (6)  on  this  subject  in  his 
“Researches.”  Vol.  I.,  c.  ii.,  §  2. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


191 


circle  of  perception,  by  acquainting  us  with  the  qualities  of 
bodies  in  their  volatile  and  gaseous  state.  And  though  within 
certain  limits  some  animals  may  possess  these  senses  in  greater 
perfection  than  man,  the  probability  is,  that  in  man  they  are  ca¬ 
pable  of  application  to  a  much  greater  variety  of  objects  ;  and 
that  over  and  above  their  direct  utility,  they  become  to  him  a 
source  of  enjoyment  which  the  animal  is  denied.  This  is  cer¬ 
tainly  the  case  with  the  sense  of  hearing,  which  still  further 
widens  our  range  of  perception.  In  the  construction  of  this 
organ,  a  gradation  can  be  traced  from  the  simplest  form  of 
which  it  is  susceptible  in  the  lower  animals  through  eight  or 
nine  successive  additions,  till  we  arrive  at  the  combination  of 
the  whole  in  the  higher  orders  of  the  mammalia,  and  find  them 
finally,  in  their  most  highly  developed  state  in  man.  The 
hearing  of  some  animals,  indeed,  may  comprehend  a  range  of 
vibrations  which  escapes  the  human  ear.  But  more  probable 
is  it  that  our  ear  perceives  sounds  which  theirs  cannot,  and  that 
it  commands  a  greater  scale  of  sounds.  And  this,  moreover,  is 
certain,  that  the  human  ear  perceives  the  relation  of  sounds  in 
a  manner  denied  to  animals,  and  that  from  the  harmony  of 
sounds  man  derives  some  of  his  deepest  emotions.  Sight  en¬ 
larges  our  field  of  perception  to  the  utmost  by  taking  us  beyond 
the  range  of  animal  existence,  and  enabling  us  to  explore  the 
remote  regions  of  creation.  And  here,  again,  from  the  first 
appearance  of  visual  organs  among  the  infusoria  we  can  trace 
successive  degrees  of  refinement,  and  extensions  of  power,  till 
we  come  to  those  of  quadrupeds  which  agree  in  their  general 
structure  with  the  human  eye.  In  the  lower  quadrupeds,  how¬ 
ever  the  eyes  —  to  name  no  other  difference  —  are  placed  lat¬ 
erally,  “  so  that  the  optic  axes  form  a  very  obtuse  angle  with 
.each  other.”  Approaching  the  quadrumana,  we  find  this  angle 
becoming  smaller.  In  the  human  species,  the  axes  of  the  two 
orbits,  approach  nearer  to  parallelism  than  in  any  of  the  other 
mammalia ;  and  the  fields  of  vision  of  both  eyes  coincide  nearly 
in  their  whole  extent.  This  is  probably  a  circumstance  of  con¬ 
siderable  importance  with  regard  to  our  acquisition  of  correct 
perceptions  by  this  sense. 

8.  Facts  demonstrate,  however,  that  the  perfection  of  man’s 
perceptions  exceeds  the  comparative  perfection  of  his  different 
organs  of  sense.  The  reason  of  this  superiority,  therefore, 
must  be  looked  for  either  in  the  brain,  in  the  percipient  mind, 
or  in  the  brain  employed  as  the  organ  of  the  mind. 

One  of  the  modes  employed  for  the  classification  of  animals 


102 


MAN. 


is  Tased  on  the  difference  of  the  nervous  system ,  which  they 
progressively  exhibit.  This  system  consists  of  nerves  and 
variously  shaped  masses  of  nervous  matter,  or  ganglia,  distrib¬ 
uted,  in  some  animals,  symmetrically,  and  in  others  irregularly; 
and  also,  in  vertebrals,  of  a  spinal  chord,  and  a  brain  in  a  bony 
skull.  Physiology  points  out  a  threefold  division  of  the  nerves  — 
the  sympathetic,  the  sensitive,  and  the  motor.  Of  these,  the 
office  of  the  sympathetic  nerves  is  simply  to  maintain  life  ;  hence 
they  are  distributed  over  every  part  connected  with  nutrition, 
respiration,  and  circulation ;  and  like  those  parts,  they  act  spon¬ 
taneously,  without  any  cognizance  or  effort  of  the  living  being. 
These  involuntary  nerves  of  organic  life  are  regarded  as  com¬ 
mon  to  all  animated  nature ;  and  probably  they  are  the  only 
kind  of  nerves  which  the  lowest  classes  of  animals  possess. 
The  sensitive  nerves  subserve  a  higher  purpose.  They  form  the 
nerves  of  the  several  senses,  or  the  media  by  winch  external 
objects  become  the  occasions  of  perceptions ;  each  sense  having 
its  own  special  nerve  endowed  with  its  peculiar  properties,  and 
being  affected  according  to  its  own  proper  function  even  when 
all  are  acted  on  by  the  same  stimulus.  The  motor  nerves  re¬ 
late  to  the  power  of  voluntary  motion.  And  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  while  the  sensitive  system  of  nerves  communicates  to  the 
brain,  the  motor  system  issues  from  the  brain  to  the  organs  of 
action. 

9.  Now,  on  comparing  the  relative  proportions  of  the  brain 
and  nerves  in  the  four  classes  of  vertebrated  animals,  Tiedemann 
and  others  have  shown  that  there  is  a  regular  progression  as  we 
ascend  from  fishes  to  reptiles,  birds,  and  mammalia.  Further, 
the  brain  itself  is  naturally  divided  into  the  cerebellum  or  little 
brain,  and  the  large  hemispheres  of  the  cerebrum ;  the  former 
lying  at  the  posterior  base  of  the  latter,  and  thought  to  contain 
the  nerves  of  the  instinctive  propensities ;  the  cerebrum  being, 
by  supposition,  related  more  directly  to  the  functions  of  the 
intellect ;  and  it  is  in  the  cerebral  hemispheres  chiefly  that  this 
progressive  enlargement  of  the  brain  is  seen  —  an  enlargement 
which  appears  to  require  that  the  convoluted  mass  should  be 
folded  and  packed,  in  order  that  the  cranium  might  contain  it. 
Now,  on  looking  at  the  human  brain,  this  gradation  of  devel¬ 
opment  is  found  to  be  rather  disturbed,  than  continued  by  the 
great  and  sudden  increase  of  its  size,*  and  this  chiefly  in  the 

*  Some  pretend  to  discover  a  striking  resemblance  between  the  brain 
of  the  orang-outang  and  that  of  man.  But,  in  the  first  place,  the  differ¬ 
ence  in  their  volume  is  as  five  to  one,  &c.  Gall,  1.  c.  t.  vi.  p.  298. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


193 


expansion  of  the  hemispheres.  And  still  further  it  is  shown 
not  only  that  it  is  in  these  cerebral  parts,  eight  or  nine  times 
larger  than  the  cerebellum,  and  that  the  human  brain  exceeds, 
in  proportion  to  the  rest  of  the  nervous  system,  that  of  other 
animals,  but  that,  when  fully  developed,  it  contains  parts  which 
do  not  exist  in  the  brain  of  any  other  animal  species.  Whence 
it  is  to  be  inferred  that  the  intellectual  superiority  of  man,  as 
far  as  its  physical  conditions  are  concerned,  depends  on  the  dis¬ 
tinctive  peculiarity  of  lhs  brain. 

10.  But  do  not  these  facts  countenance  the  embryotic  hypo¬ 
thesis  which  teaches  that  the  organic  germs  of  all  animals  are 
identical,  and  that  the  higher  animals  while  in  the  womb,  pass 
through  all  the  successive  conditions  which,  in  the  lower  grades 
of  animals,  are  permanent;  the  human  brain,  for  example,  as- 
s amine  in  its  formation  the  characters  of  the  brain  in  the  fish, 
the  reptile,  the  bird,  and  the  quadruped  successively?  Doubt¬ 
less,  we  reply,  A  the  hypothesis  were  first  established  on  its 
own  proper  evidence,  the  facts  we  have  adduced  would  har¬ 
monize  with  it,  up  to  a  certain  point  —  the  point,  namely, 
where  the  mind  asserts  its  independence  of  matter.  But  the 
hypothesis  itself  is  without  proof.  The  resemblances  observ¬ 
able  between  the  embryo  of  different  animals  imply  chiefly  the 
imperfection  of  our  tests.  Mere  likeness  is  mistaken  for  iden¬ 
tity.  The  analogy  relates  only  to  some  one  organ,  or  part  of 
the  foetus,  at  a  time ;  the  likeness  becoming  apparent  only  by 
dint  of  refusing  to  see  the  attendant  differences.  The  serial 
character  .of  the  supposed  development  fails  in  the  most  essen¬ 
tial  parts ;  such  as  the  primitive  trace  exhibiting  the  rudiment 
of  a  backbone  instead  of  a  vegetable  resemblance ;  the  heart 
of  the  foetus  of  a  mammal  not  passing  through  the  form  which 
is  permanent  in  the  amphibia,  though  it  does  pass  through  a 
form  not  found  permanent  in  any  known  creature ;  and  in 
numerous  similar  instances.  Even  by  those  who  look  favorably 
on  the  hypothesis,  it  is  admitted  that  “  the  brain  of  the  human 
foetus  at  no  time  precisely  resembles  that  of  any  individual 
whatever  among  the  lower  animals.”  The  truth  appears  to  be 
that,  as  soon  as  ever  organs  begin  to  be  distinguishable,  the  dis¬ 
tinctions  are  found  to  be  specific.  And,  as  far  as  we  know  any¬ 
thing  on  the  subject,  these  specific  differences  are  constant  and 
immutable. 

11.  So  also  the  facts  which  we  have  adduced  might  seem  to 
harmonize  with  that  theory  of  Transmutation  which  teaches 
that  originally  there  wras  no  distinction  of  species,  but  that 

17 


194 


MAN. 


each  class  has  in  the  course  of  ages  been  derived  from  some 
different  class,  less  perfect  than  itself,  by  a  spontaneous  effort  at 
improvement.  First,  however,  the  theory  itself  must  be  based 
on  independent  evidence.  Now  the  observations  of  mankind 
for  thousands  of  years  have  furnished  no  instance  of  a  trans¬ 
mutation  of  species.  The  crowded  worlds  of  fossil  geology 
present  no  remains  whatever  of  any  species  in  a  state  of  tran¬ 
sition  into  any  other  species  ;  not  even  a  trace  of  any  char¬ 
acteristic  part  of  a  species  having  exhibited  such  progress. 
Striking  as  the  resemblance  may  be  between  any  two  species, 
still,  what  more  can  be  said  than  that  the  difference  is  specific  ? 
The  hypothesis  supposes,  moreover,  that  the  propensities  of  an 
animal  determine  its  organization,  for  it  assumes  that  the  struc¬ 
tural  peculiarities  of  a  species  have  resulted  from  its  prolonged 
efforts  at  something  for  which  it  was  not  originally  adapted. 
But  if  the  organization,  so  far  either  from  being  one  with  the 

o  7  o 

propensity,  or  from  giving  direction  to  it,  has  had  actually  to  be 
conformed  to  it,  what,  we  ask,  determines  the  propensity  ?  or 
whence  this  presupposed  organizing,  creative  propensity  ?  Be¬ 
sides,  all  the  great  changes  of  animal  conformation  which  come 
under  our  notice  are  prospective  ;  taking  place,  not  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  a  new  condition,  but  in  preparation  for  it ;  thus,  the 
embryotic  life  of  the  animal  is  subordinate  to  the  formation  of 
organs  for  a  life  after  birth.  It  is  only  in  accordance  with  this 
fact  to  add,  that  the  brain  of  the  savage  is  prospective  of  his 
civilization.  Great  as  is  the  difference  between  the  civilized 
and  the  uncivilized  man,  there  is  no  perceptible  distinction  in 
the  cerebral  organs  of  the  two.  Soemmering  has  enumerated 
as  many  as  fifteen  important  anatomical  differences  between  the 
human  brain  and  that  of  the  ape  ;  and  these  are  all  present  in  the 
brain  of  the  least  cultivated  of  the  human  species.  In  a  word,  the 
only  deviation*  from  specific  forms  with  which  we  are  acquainted 
are  those  of  monsters,  or  of  lusus  naturae,  in  which,  instead  of 
the  brain  of  an  individual  of  a  lower  class  being  promoted  intu 
that  of  a  higher,  the  brain  of  an  individual  of  a  higher  class  is 
arrested  in  its  growth  at  some  stage  short  of  its  full  develop¬ 
ment  ;  and  we  are  presented  with  retrogression  instead  of  ad¬ 
vancement.  For  the  reasons  stated,  then,  we  see  in  that  cere¬ 
bral  gradation  -which  finds  its  perfection  in  man,  not  the  opera¬ 
tion  of  a  self-evolving  law,  or  the  necessary  self-development 
of  any  supposed  powers  in  nature,  but  the  progressive  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  Divine  plan  respecting  nature. 

12.  Nor  do  the  facts  we  have  adduced  respecting  the  human 


DEVELOPMENT. 


195 


brain  afford  any  adequate  support  to  phrenology  as  a  science. 
Thev  evince,  indeed,  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the 
brain  and  our  mental  manifestations ;  but  this  is  widely  remote 
from  the  notion  that  mind  is  an  essential  property  of  brain,  as 
well  as  from  the  fundamental  law  of  phrenology  —  “  That  the 
power  of  anv  mental  feeling  or  faculty  is  measured  directly  and 
necessarily  bv  the  size  of  the  organ.”  The  investigations  to 
which  phrenology  has  led  have  doubtless  resulted  in  valuable 
additions  to  cerebral  physiology.  But  were  the  data  neces¬ 
sary  for  his  system  as  full  and  complete  as  the  most  ardent 
phrenologist  could  desire,  he  could  contribute  nothing  whatever 
directlv  to  the  science  of  psychology.  His  science  is  physiology ; 
and  in  all  his  cerebral  researches  he  is  presupposing  a  psychol¬ 
ogy,  assuming  certain  mental  faculties  as  already  known  on  other 
grounds.  All  that  he  can  properly  undertake  is  to  distribute 
and  place  them  in  different  parts  of  the  brain.  Consciousness 
first  supplies  the  mental  facts,  observation  is  his  only  guide  in 
physiology.  His  very  data,  however,  are  at  present  incomplete 
and  unsatisfactory.  Whether  or  not,  for  example,  there  are 
distinct  portions  of  the  brain  for  distinct  mental  faculties ; 
whether  or  not  phrenology,  if  there  are  such  organs,  has  cor¬ 
rectly  identified  them  ;  whether  or  not  the  brain  has  convexities 
on  its  surface,  or  any  other  signs,  answering  generally  to  the 
external  convexities  of  the  cranium  ;  whether  or  not  the  same 
nervous  fibres  run  between  similar  organs  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  brain,  or  only  between  the  two  sides,  merely  indicating  a 
unity  of  action  between  the  two  hemispheres  as  one  organ 
rather  than  as  made  up  of  many  organs  ;  and  how  the  system 
is  reconcilable  with  the  irregularity  which  the  surface  of  the 
brain  presents  on  the  different  sides  of  the  same  head  —  these 
questions,  elementary  as  they  are  to  phrenology  as  a  science,  are 
yet  unsettled. 

13.  “  Of  all  the  organs  of  the  body,  the  brain  presents  the 
least  intimacy  of  connection  between  the  results  of  dissection 
and  the  phenomena  of  disease.  The  most  violent  symptoms 
referable  to  this  organ  often  exist  during  life ;  and  yet,  on  the 
most  careful  examination,  after  death,  either  no  appreciable 
lesson,  or  none  sufficient  to  account  for  the  phenomena,  can  be 
detected.  Whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  many  and  most  important 
changes  are  frequently  discovered  in  both  the  brain  and  its  mem¬ 
branes,  in  cases  which  betrayed  either  no  cerebral  disorder,  or 
none  calculated  to  excite  suspicion  during  life  of  any  organic 


196 


MAN. 


change.”  *  The  truth  is,  says  Dr.  Roget,  that  there  is  not  a  sin- 
gle  part  of  the  encephalon  which  has  not,  in  one  case  or  other, 
been  impaired,  destroyed,  or  found  defective,  without  any  appa¬ 
rent  change  in  the  sensitive,  intellectual,  or  moral  faculties ;  a 
statement  confirmed  by  a  large  collection  of  cases  made  by  Hal¬ 
ler,  Ferrier,  and  others.  Dr.  Carpenter  remarks  on  it  as  “a 
very  curious  circumstance,  that  the  difference  in  the  antero¬ 
posterior  diameter,  between  the  brain  of  man  and  that  of  the 
lower  mammalia,  principally  arises  from  the  shortness  of  the 
posterior  lobes  in  the  latter,  these  being  seldom  long  enough  to 
cover  the  cerebellum ;  yet  it  is  in  these  posterior  lobes  that  the 
animal  propensities  are  regarded  by  phrenologists  as  having 
their  seat.  On  the  other  hand,  the  anterior  lobes  in  which  the  in¬ 
tellectual  faculties  are  considered  as  residing,  bear  in  many  ani¬ 
mals  a  much  larger  proportion  to  the  whole  bulk  of  the  brain. 
Again,  comparative  anatomy  and  experiment  alike  sanction  the 
conclusion,  that  the  purely  instinctive  propensities  have  not 
their  seat  in  the  cerebrum.” 

14.  Indeed,  physiology  proves  that  the  superiority  of  the 
brain  as  the  means  of  mental  manifestation  depends  not  on  its 
absolute  size ;  for  the  brain  of  the  elephant  and  of  some  of  the 
larger  cetacea,  is  larger  than  that  of  man :  nor  on  its  propor¬ 
tional  size  as  compared  with  the  size  of  the  entire  body ;  for 
the  brain  of  the  elephant  is  smaller  in  proportion  to  its  body 
than  that  perhaps  of  any  other  quadruped,  and  yet  few  exceed 
the  elephant  in  sagacity  ;  and,  judged  by  this  criterion,  several 
even  of  the  smaller  birds  must  rank  above  man  :  nor  on  its 
inter-proportional  size,  comparing  either  the  mutual  proportions 
of  its  constituent  parts,  or  of  the  whole  of  it  with  the  nerves 
which  it  sends  forth.  For  though  it  is  only  in  this  latter  sense, 
according  to  Soemmering,  that  man  can  be  said  to  have  a  larger 
brain  than  any  other  animal,  tested  by  this  standard  the  dog 
should  rank  in  intelligence  below  the  ox,  the  orang-outang  be¬ 
low  the  porpoise,  and  the  dolphin  next  to  man.  From  all 
which  it  is  to  be  inferred  that,  while  the  brain  may  have 
been  placed  by  the  Divine  Creator  in  instrumental  relation  go 
the  mind,  and  while  the  mental  and  moral  superiority  of  man, 
physically  considered ,  may  depend  on  the  distinctive  peculiarity 
of  his  brain,  that  superiority  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  measured 
bv  this  cerebral  distinction,  any  more  than  the  amount  of  cere 
bral  activity  is  determined  by  the  muscular  instruments  which 
’t  is  the  means  of  setting  in  motion. 


*  Art.  “Brain,”  in  Dr.  Copland’s  “  Diet,  of  Practical  Medicine.” 


DEVELOPMENT. 


197 


15.  This  conclusion  affirms  an  essential  distinction  between 
mind  and  matter,  and  the  grounds  on  which  we  have  arrived  at 
this  conclusion  prove  the  distinction.  To  the  vulgar  demand  to 
see  mind  in  order  to  believe  in  its  existence,  it  might  be  suffi¬ 
cient  to  retort,  Show  us  matter  in  order  that  we  may  credit  its 
existence.  And  all  that  the  materialist  could  reply  would  be, 
not  that  the  hand  touches  it,  or  that  the  ej e  sees  it,  but  that  we 
touch  it  with  our  hand  and  see  it  with  our  eye  ;  in  other  words, 
that  the  brain  feels  and  sensibly  attests  its  existence.  But  the 
feeling;  itself  he  cannot  show  us.  No  cerebral  commotion  he 
can  exhibit  is  a  conviction,  no  physical  process  a  conclusion,  a 
judgment,  that  a  material  object  is  lying  before  him.  He  is  con¬ 
scious  that  an  object  is  before  him ;  but  who  can  see  this  act  or 
state  of  his  consciousness?  We  believe  it  to  be  an  act  of  the 
very  essence,  mind,  whose  existence  he  denies  ;  and  regard  him, 
therefore,  as  presupposing  and  employing  mind  in  the  very  act 
of  disproving  its  reality,  or  as  begging  the  question  at  issue. 

16.  So  also  of  those  who  argue  analogically,  as  they  suppose, 
and  affirm  that  as  the  liver  secretes  bile,  so  the  brain  secretes 
thought,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  first,  that  they  begin  by  assuming 
the  brain  to  be  a  gland,  and  then  infer  the  secretory  character 
of  thought,  or  by  assuming  thoughts  to  be  secretions,  and  then 
infer  the  glandular  structure  of  the  brain ;  in  either  case  beg¬ 
ging  the  very  premiss  from  which  their  conclusion  is  to  be  drawn. 
Secondly,  the  elementary  particles  in  the  blood,  out  of  which 
bile  is  formed  by  the  liver,  can  be  pointed  out ;  unless,  there¬ 
fore,  the  materialist  can  point  out  in  the  brain  the  matter  of  hope, 
surprise,  or  doubt,  he  is  chargeable  with  the  self-inconsistency 
of  arguing  from  the  visible  to  the  invisible.  He  professes  to 
rely  for  proof  on  observation  alone,  and  yet  lie  is  here  inferring 
more  than  lie  sees,  concluding  from  the  known  to  the  unknown. 
And,  thirdly,  the  very  mental  act  by  which  he  thus  generalizes 
the  supposed  functions  of  different  organs,  is  of  a  nature  for 
which  nothing  he  observes  in  the  brain  can  account.  All  that 
he  observes  are  material  phenomena,  the  act  by  which  he  gene¬ 
ralizes  these  isolated  phenomena  and  gives  them  unity,  is  a 
phenomenon  of  which  he  becomes  aware  only  by  consciousness ; 
an  act  therefore  lying  entirely  out  of  the  range  of  his  physiology, 
and  not  to  be  confounded  with  it,  except  by  again  begging  the 
very  question  at  issue. 

17.  (1.)  This  last  remark  serves  to  introduce  the  first  great 
distinction  to  which  I  .would  advert  between  matter,  however  or¬ 
ganized,  and  mind — the  fact  that  the  phenomena  of  matter  are 

17* 


198 


MAN. 


learned  by  outward  observation,  while  those  of  mind  are  learned 

w  * 

only  by  consciousness.  “  These  two  regions  lie  entirely  without 
each  other,  so  much  so,  that  there  is  not  a  single  fact  known  by 
consciousness  which  we  could  ever  have  learned  by  observation, 
and  not  a  single  fact  known  by  observation  of  which  we  are  ever 
conscious.  A  sensation,  for  example,  is  known  simply  by  con¬ 
sciousness  ;  the  material  conditions  of  it,  as  seen  in  the  organ 
and  the  nervous  system,  simply  by  observation.  Xo  one  could 
ever  see  a  sensation,  or  be  conscious  of  the  organic  action ; 
accordingly,  the  one  fact  belongs  to  psychology,  the  other  to 
physiology.”*  Xow  the  broad  line  of  distinction  between  the  two 
sciences  here  apparent,  is  the  essential  distinction  between  sub¬ 
ject  and  object.  And  hence  it  is  that  physiology  itself  as  a 
science  presupposes,  and  is  indebted  for  its  scientific  form  to,  that 
conscious  subject  whose  nature  forbids  it  to  be  observed.  Let 
the  physiologist  write  down  only  what  he  sees,  and  he  will  find 
himself  in  possession  merely  of  an  assemblage  of  facts  or  ob¬ 
jects,  without  any  internal  relation  or  bond  of  union.  Surely 
the  power  which  classifies  these  separate  materials,  and  unites 
them  all  into  a  single  fact,  is  not  itself  connatural  with  the 
materials. 

18.  (2.)  The  phenomena  which  observation  brings  to  light 
are  only  instruments  and  organs,  while  consciousness  reveals  a 
force  or  cause.  The  only  conception  which  I  have  of  cause  or 
power,  I  derive  primarily  from  the  exercise  of  my  own  will  in 
moving  some  part  of  my  body.  In  accomplishing  such  a  move¬ 
ment,  I  am  conscious  (as  stated  in  a  previous  chapter)  of  more 
than  a  mere  sequence,  of  volition  and  personal  effort,  and  of  an 
event  as  the  result  of  the  causal  effort.  And  having  thus  gained 
our  notion  of  causality  from  the  consciousness  of  our  own  per¬ 
sonal  effort,  we  transfer  the  notion  to  all  the  changes  observable 
in  matter.  These  changes  or  effects  necessarily  presuppose  the 
cause  which  produces  them.  When,  therefore,  the  material 
physiologist  affirms  that  he  has  the  same  proof  that  the  brain 
secretes  thought  as  he  has  that  the  liver  secretes  bile,  and  that 
the  stomach  digests  food,  we  have  not  only  to  remind  him  of  the 
threefold  reply  to  this  assumption  already  given,  we  have  now 
to  add,  in  direct  opposition  to  his  statement,  that  the  liver  does 
not  secrete,  nor  the  stomach  digest,  any  more  than  the  eye  sees, 
or  the  hand  feels.  To  suppose  that  they  do,  is  to  confound  con¬ 
dition  with  cause,  the  instrument  with  the  force  which  employs 


*  ••  Morell’s  Hist,  of  Modem  Philosophy,”  Vol.  I.  40G. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


199 


it.  Organization  is  not  the  cause  of  life,  but  only  its  instrument, 
for  life  precedes  it.  The  hand  is  not  the  cause  of  its  own  mo¬ 
tions,  but  only  the  organ  of  that  spiritual  force,  the  will’;  and  as 
an  organized  body  is  only  the  instrument  of  the  living  principle 
which  employs  it.  and  the  movement  of  the  hand  manifests  the 
cause  or  power  by  which  it  is  moved,  so  the  action  of  the  stom¬ 
ach,  the  mere  place  and  organ  of  digestion,  manifests  a  cause, 
of  which  digestion  is  the  effect. 

The  only  difference  in  the  two  cases  is,  that  in  the  movement 
of  mv  hand -I  am  conscious  of  being  myself  the  cause,  while  in 
digestion  and  all  those  physical  processes  which  proceed  irre¬ 
spectively  of  my  consciousness  and  will,  the  pervading  activity 
of  the  great  Sustaining  will  is  presupposed.  Wherever  there  is 
movement  there  is  power.  When,  therefore,  the  materialist  af¬ 
firms  that  thought  results  solely  from  the  movement  of  the  brain, 
he  evades  or  overlooks  the  great  question  at  issue,  What  moves 
the  brain  ?  The  movement  itself  is  not  power,  but  the  effect 
of  it.  Gravitation  itself  is  not  power  or  force,  but  only  the  law, 
according  to  which  the  Moving  Force  is  pleased  to  regulate  the 
movements  of  matter ;  and  hence  it  supposes,  even  in  the  eye  of 
science,  a  primary  impulse,  at  least.  It  is  the  aim  of  enlightened 
science  to  push  its  inquiries,  in  its  several  departments,  until  it 
has  reached  the  point  which  touches,  or  is  impressed  by,  that 
Prime  spiritual  force.  It  is  the  office  of  enlightened  piety  to 
acknowledge  and  adore  that  Force  as  a  pervading  Presence. 
In  the  voluntary  movements  of  man’s  own  material  frame,  con¬ 
sciousness  gives  him  the  proof  of  a  spiritual  power  of  his  own 
adequate  to  produce  them ;  and  in  all  the  processes  of  nature 
by  which  he  is  surrounded  —  instinctive,  animate,  and  inanimate 
—  reason  gives  him  a  Divine  cause  which  pervades,  as  it  once 
originated,  the  whole. 

19.  (3.)  All  material  properties  and  processes  give  us  the 
idea  of  space,  but  nothing  that  we  know  of  the  properties  and 
affections  of  the  mind  sustains  any  such  spacial  relations.  We 
speak  of  matter  as  extended  and  divisible ;  or  as  endowed  with 
certain  properties  of  attraction  and  repulsion,  as  occupying  cer  ¬ 
tain  portions  of  space,  and  capable  of  moving  in  it,  so  that  its 
parts  thereby  assume  different  relative  positions  and  configura¬ 
tions.  And  this  description  is  as  applicable  to  organized  matter 
as  it  is  to  unorganized,  and  therefore,  to  the  brain ;  and  hence 
we  can  speak  of  its  form,  its  parts,  its  color,  weight,  and  con¬ 
sistence.  And  if  it  should  be  proved  to  be  a  galvanic  battery, 
we  may  be  able  to  point  the  course  which  the  subtle  process 


200 


MAN. 


takes,  and  the  chemical  changes  which  it  produces.  But  mind 
is  the  negation  of  all  this,  and  resists  every  effort  to  be  brought 
within  the  terms  of  such  a  description.  To  speak  of  the  con¬ 
figuration  of  a  hope,  or  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  a  thought, 
of  the  angle  of  a  doubt,  or  of  the  easterly  direction  of  a  fear,  is 
felt  to  be  utterly  absurd.  And  the  only  satisfactory  manner  of 
accounting  for  this  sense  of  absurdity  is  the  conclusion  that 
thought  and  feeling  are  not  material  products;  that  mind  is,  in 
a  material  sense,  unconditioned  by  space.  “  But  neither  can  you 
speak  of  the  top  or  bottom  of  a  moving  power,  or  of  the  vital 
principle.”  Admitted,  we  reply,  and  for  the  reason  previously 
assigned,  that  these  are  properties  of  Mind.  They  are  effects. 
Matter  is  only  employed  by  the  Producing  cause  as  the  means 
of  their  manifestation.  And  this  remark  includes  a  reply  to  the 
further  objection  sometimes  urged  b}r  the  materialist,  that  as 
mind  is  related  to  matter,  it  is  capable,  like  matter,  of  being  lo¬ 
calized,  and  may,  therefore,  partake  of  the  same  nature.  But 
this,  again,  is  to  assume  the  very  point  in  dispute,  by  comparing 
a  subjective  relation  with  a  material  object.  Like  the  vital 
principle,  mind  is  related  to  matter  ;  but  who  can  conceive  of  the 
top  or  bottom  of  a  relation  ?  It  will  be  time  enough  to  consider 
further  the  subject  of  the  localization  of  mind  when  philosophy 
has  determined  the  nature  of  the  relation  of  the  Creating  mind 
to  matter,  or  even  when  physiology  has  discovered  the  relation 
of  life  to  organization. 

20.  (4.)  The  material  phrenologist  can  present  us  only  with 
a  plurality  of  cerebral  organs ;  but  how  does  such  multiplicity 
of  parts  consist  with  that  unity  and  individuality  of  self  of 
which  every  man  is  conscious  ?*  If  something  in  common  to 


*  u  But  (says  the  materialist)  a  planaria  from  our  ponds  maybe  cut 
into  ten  pieces,  and  each  become  a  perfect  animal ;  does  he  then  acquire 
ten  minds,  or  personalities  ?”  On  the  one  hand,  the  spiritualist  cannot  be 
reasonably  expected  to  admit  a  mere  physiological  curiosity  as  a  grave 
set-off  against  a  great  fact  of  human  consciousness ;  nor,  on  the  other,  is 
the  materialist,  it  is  presumed,  prepared  to  admit  the  alternative  to  which 
his  use  of  the  fact  would  seem  to  conduct  him  —  namely,  that  in  the  pla¬ 
naria,  both  mind,  and  the  means  of  mind,  are  vastly  superior  to  the  same 
in  man,  for  the  planarian  method  of  mental  multiplication  (be  mind  what 
it  may)  is  a  distinction  to  which  man  cannot  pretend.  Doubtless  the 
truth  is,  that  mind,  in  the  planaria,  is  such  as  barely  suffices  for  instinctive 
animal  motion :  and  that  it  has  no  intelligent  consciousness  of  identity 
about  which  any  question  can  be  justly  raised.  To  speak  of  personality 
in  such  a  connection  is  an  abuse  of  language.  And  to  attempt  to  argue 
from  the  mere  power  of  instinctive  emotion  in  a  polype  to  the  profoundest 
lepths  of  man’s  consciousness,  is  no  compliment  to  reason.  Even  life  is 


DEVELOPMENT. 


201 


all  the  organs  is  supposed  to  unite  them  into  one. being,  that 
unitive  something  is  the  very  power  in  dispute ;  especially,  too, 
as  that  is  the  only  power  which  makes  itself  to  be  felt,  or  of 
which  we  are  conscious.  Or  if  the 'materialist,  repudiating  the 
theory  of  a  plurality  of  organs,  regards  the  entire  brain  as  a 
single  organ,  of  which  thought  is  the  function,  the  same  question 
returns  in  a  slightly  altered  form  —  what  can  that  power  be 
which,  withholding  the  property  of  thought  from  every  separate 
particle  of  the  brain,  imparts  it  to  the  whole ;  and  which,  not¬ 
withstanding  the  greatest  diversity  among  the  sensations  them- 
selves,  imparts  unity  to  the  whole  ?  The  only  reply  which 
satisfies  the  consciousness  is,  that  the  power  sought  for  is  that 
spiritual  substance  which  I  call  myself,  which  cannot  be  numer¬ 
ically  divided,  nor  be  resolved  into  physical  parts,  and  by  which 
alone  we  gain  the  idea  of  perfect  unity. 

21.  (5.)  Still  stronger  does  the  demand  for  this  spiritual 
principle  become  when  the  constant  change  of  the  particles,  of 
which  the  brain  is  composed,  is  contrasted  with  that  feeling  of 
personal  identity  of  which  we  never  cease  to  be  conscious.  It 
is  no  adequate  reply  to  say,  that  “  all  the  properties  of  the  body 
remain  the  same  through  life,”  nor  to  say,  that  “  if  the  face  is 
marked  with  small-pox,  the  pits  remain  throughout  life.”  For 
the  question  relates,  not  to  the  indestructibility  either  of  proper¬ 
ties  or  of  form,  but  to  identity  of  substance.  A  true  analogy  is 
wanting.  If  it  be  said,  further,  that  the  particles  which  are 
passing  away  communicate  to  those  by  which  they  are  succeed¬ 
ed,  the  impressions  which  external  objects  originally  made  on 
themselves,  it  should  be  sufficient  to  reply,  that  this  is  a  process 
entirelv  unknown,  both  to  physiology  and  to  .consciousness. 
But  the  very  hypothesis  itself  calls  back,  and  leaves  unanswered, 
the  ever-recurring  difficulty,  what  that  principle,  unknown  to 
physiology,  can  be,  which  is  said  to  endow  the  departing  parti¬ 
cles  with  this  mysterious  power.  An  appeal  to  reason  assures 
us  that  the  identical  and  indivisible  oneness  which  we  feel,  as  it 
is  utterlv  foreign  to  matter,  must  be  an  attribute  of  a  different 
substance.  And  consciousness,  the  only  appropriate,  and  the 
ultimate  authority  here,  affirms  the  decision,  giving  us  to  feel 
that  the  substance,  which  is  I,  will  remain  the  same  in  the  wdiole 
circuit  of  my  being ;  and  that  it  is  this  feeling  of  personal  iden¬ 
tity  which  makes  me  capable  of  rising  to  the  conception  of  the 
essentially  Immutable. 


not.  in  the  same  sense,  divisible  by  ten  in  man.  Haw  is  it  divisible  in  the 
worm  '!  for  it  is  a  principle  distinct  from  organization,  and  precedes  it. 


202 


MAN. 


22.  (6.)  Contrary  to  all  our  experience  of  what  we  know  to 
be  a  material  instrumentality,  there  is  a  power  within  us  uncon¬ 
scious  and  incapable  of  fatigue.  Certain  exercises  of  the  mind, 
such  as  continuous  thought  and  emotion,  induce  exhaustion  and 
weariness,  for  in  these  it  emplo}rs  an  organization  which  requires 
rest.  But  the  individual  will  is  perfectly  insusceptible  of 
fatigue.  In  its  volitions,  the  mind  asserts  its  proper  spirituality. 
As  far  as  material  help  is  concerned,  the  will  acts  from  itself.  It 
discloses  the  fact,  that  in  itself  the  mind  is  an  energy,  and 
the  source  of  untiring  energy.  It  soon  exhausts  the  muscular 
system  placed  at  its  disposal,  but  only  suspends  its  purposes 
while  its  wearied  servant  sleeps,  to  weary  it  out  again  in  the 
execution  of  them  when  it  awakes.  Often  it  forbids  thought, 
that  the  body  may  repose.  And  often  it  is  impatient  at  the 
repose  necessary,  indignant  that  its  servant  should  be  so  unlike 
itself.  Obviously,  this  easily  tired  servant  cannot  be  the  cause 
of  the  untiring  intelligent  will.  The  will  and  it  have,  beyond 
a  certain  point,  separate  natures,  pleasures,  and  ends ;  and 
hence  the  indomitable  will  not  unfrequently  compels  it  to  under¬ 
go  privation  and  pain  in  its  service,  and  even  otfers  it  up  as  a 
sacrifice. 

23.  (7.)  Man’s  expectation  of  immortality  comes  indirectly 
in  confirmation  of  the  spirituality  of  the  soul.  Its  immaterial¬ 
ity,  indeed,  cannot  be  deduced  directly  from  its  immortality, 
except  on  the  untenable  supposition  that  spirit  is  inherently  and 
absolutely  indestructible.  That  the  human  spirit  is  naturally 
indestructible,  as  “  the  Father  of  spirits”  has  chosen  to  consti¬ 
tute  it,  we  have  already  expressed  our  conviction.  But  we  also 
believe  that  the  spiritual  nature  might  have  been  mortal,  and 
the  material,  and  therefore  the  animal,  immortal,  had  it  so 
pleased  the  Creating  will.  If,  however,  the  doctrine  of  the 
soul’s  immortality  be  first  accepted  on  independent  grounds,  it 
will  surely  be  allowed  that  the  idea  of  a  spiritual  principle,  as 
the  heir  of  that  immortality,  better  accords  with  our  views  of 
such  a  state,  than  that  of  any  mere  material  organization. 
Here,  too,  is  boundless  scope  for  that  personal  identity  which 
we  have  found  to  be  one  of  the  exponents  of  a  spiritual  sub¬ 
stance.  And  here  the  ideas  of  accountability  and  of  future 
retribution  find  a  congenial  place  —  phenomena  which  seem 
inexplicable  on  the  supposition  of  an  assemblage  of  mere  ma¬ 
terial  properties,  for  they  imply,  not  only  a  deep  consciousness 
of  dependent  existence,  but  also  a  nature  kindred  with  that  of 
the  Infinite  Spirit,  and  :he  possibility,  if  not  the  prospect,  of 


DEVELOPMENT. 


203 


alliance  with  it  for  ever.  Our  investigation,  then,  brings  us  to 
the  conclusion,  that  matter  and  mind,  as  known  to  us  by  their 
properties,  are  negations  of  each  other,  and  that  mind  is  an 
immaterial  spiritual  substance. 

24.  Mind,  we  have  seen,  must  be  conceded,  in  some  sense, 
to  the  animal  creation,  (though  not,  on  that  account ,  immortal¬ 
ity)  ;  and  hence  the  question  arises  respecting  those  character¬ 
istics  of  the  human  mind  by  which  it  is  distinguished  from,  and 
proves  its  superiority  to,  the  mind  of  the  mere  animal.  In 
order  to  form  an  opinion  on  this  subject,  we  must  recur  to  the 
physiology  of  the  nerves.  We  have  seen  that,  besides  the  un¬ 
conscious  nerves  of  life,  or  the  sympathetic  system  of  which  we 
have  not  now  to  speak,  there  is  the  sensitive  system,  conducting 
to  the  brain,  and  also  the  motor  system,  proceeding  from  the 
brain  to  the  muscular  organs  fitted  for  action.  Now,  the  effect 
directly  consequent  on  sensation  is  perception,  a  notice  or 
knowledge  of  the  object  occasioning  the  sensation ;  and  the 
effect  consequent  on  perception  is  volition,  or  that  mental  act 
which  immediately  determines  the  motor  nerves  to  muscular 
action.  Here,  then,  is  a  circle  of  operations  which  apparently 
takes  place  whenever  an  animal  acts  in  reference  to  external 
objects  —  sensation,  perception,  volition,  muscular  activity.  But 
does  this  circle  include  the  whole  of  the  process  belonging  to  the 
animal  mind?  In  the  human  mind,  one  additional  link,  at 
least,  intervenes  between  perception  and  volition.  To  this  link 
we  give  the  name,  not  of  understanding,  but  of  reason,  by  which 
we  mean  the  power  which  the  mind  lias  of  apprehending  ulti¬ 
mate  and  necessary  truth,  of  contemplating  the  ideal  relations 
of  things  so  as  to  be  able  to  deduce  universal  truths  from  par¬ 
ticular  appearances,  preparatory  to  willing  and  determining  in 
harmony  with  such  truths.  So  that  the  question  to  be  decided 
may  be  put  thus  :  —  Is  the  volition  of  brutes  determined  without 
the  intervention  of  reason  ?  For  if  it  be,  it  follows  that  the  vo¬ 
lition  of  the  animal  is  constrained,  and  is  therefore  the  expres¬ 
sion  of  a  will  in  no  proper  sense  free ;  that  the  human  mind,  be¬ 
sides  differing  from  the  animal  mind  in  degree  up  to  a  certain 
point,  beyond  that  point  differs  from  it  also  in  kind ;  and  that 
the  end  which  the  human  being  is  designed  for  may  be  expect¬ 
ed  to  correspond  with  his  superior  endowments. 

25.  In  stating  the  grounds  of  our  conviction  that  the  animal 
volition  is  determined  necessarily,  and  not  by  reason,  it  may 
conduce  to  clearness  if  we  glance  at  the  different  classes  of  in¬ 
stinctive  phenomena.  By  some,  instinct  and  life  are  regarded 


204 


MAX. 


as  co-extensive.  Sucli  persons  would  denominate  all  the  un¬ 
conscious  motions  of  mere  organic  life,  of  the  sympathetic 
nerves,  as  instinctive.  These  instincts  might  be  called  vital. 
Next  come  the  adaptive ,  or  those  which  call  into  action  the 
muscles  considered  to  he  under  the  control  of  volition.  Such 
are  the  beautiful  and  perfect  nest-building  of  birds,  and  the 
mathematical  cell-making  of  bees.  These  constitute  the  great 
class  of  actions,  allowed  on  almost  all  hands  to  be  strictly  in¬ 
stinctive  ;  and  whose  direct  tendency  is  to  the  continuance  of 
animal  existence.  And  yet,  as  far  as  the  animal  is  promoting 
this  object,  it  is  evidently  acting  towards  an  end  which  is  un¬ 
known  to  itself;  and,  therefore,  acting  blindly.  Agreeably  to 
Paley’s  definition  of  instinct,  it  is  acting  “  prior  to  experience, 
and  independent  of  instruction,”  and,  we  might  add,  acting  with 
a  perfection  which  no  instruction  could  teach,  and  no  experience 
improve.  But  thirdly,  there  are  those  actions  whidi  appear  to 
be  the  result  of  experience,  and  which  discover  a  power  of 
selecting  means  for  proximate  ends  according  to  varying  cir- 
cumstances ;  these  may  be  said  to  be  mental.  These  are  the 
phenomena  which  claim  our  attention  ;  for  to  this  class  belong 
those  instances  of  animal  sagacity,  at  the  recital  of  which  every 
one  has  been  more  or  less  interested.  Now,  even  allowing,  as 
we  do,  some  mental  act  to  intervene,  in  such  cases,  between 
perception  and  volition,  our  conviction  is  that  such  intermediate 
act  or  operation  does  not  belong  to  reason. 

If  the  bird  for  example,  on  perceiving  that  the  rising  stream 
is  approaching  its  half-finished  nest,  begins  to  build  higher  up 
the  bank,  it  does  but  build  on  the  spot  where  it  would  have 
placed  its  nest  at  first,  had  the  waters  then  been  as  high  as  they 
have  since  become ;  and  the  end  in  both  cases  is  the  same  — 
the  continuance  of  the  species.  Here  is  only  an  instance  of 
the  provisional  operation  of  instinct.  Again,  actions  are  some¬ 
times  related  of  animals,  to  which  human  sagacity  would  be 
unequal,  simply  because  they  afford  no  scope  for  reasoning. 
All  such  must  be  evidently  referred  either  to  an  instinctive  in-  * 
telligence,  or  (which  would  be  proving  to  much)  to  the  exercise  of 
a  reason  superior  to  that  of  man.  The  same  must  be  said  of 
the  power  which  some  animals  possess  hereditarily  of  perform¬ 
ing  certain  remarkable  feats.  Knowledge,  the  result  of  expe¬ 
rience,  is  not  transmissible  in  this  way.  The  reasoning  in  such 
instances,  if  there  were  any,  being  destitute  of  data,  could  be 
nothing  less  than  a  profound  train  of  ci  priori  speculation.  The 
most  wonderful  feats  of  animal  sagacity,  perhaps,  are  the  result 


DEVELOPMENT. 


205 


of  human  instruction ;  and  merely  evince  the  adaptiveness, 
within  certain  fixed  and  narrow  limits,  of  the  mental  instinct. 
Even  the  plant  has  a  confined  power  of  adapting  itself  to  cir¬ 
cumstances.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  conclude  that  the  su¬ 
perior  adaptiveness  of  animal  instinct  is  accompanied  with  any 
intelligent  consciousness  of  its  possession. 

26.  Among  the  presumptive  proofs  against  the  rationality  of 
brutes,  it  is,  we  think,  justly  alleged  that  their  experience,  con¬ 
fined  at  most  within  narrow  limits,  is  incapable  of  accumulation 
and  transmission ;  that  they  practice  nothing  approaching  to 
barter  ;  and  especially,  that  they  are  destitute  of  the  power  of 
speech.  To  say  that  they  have  voices,  or  inarticulate  language, 
adequate  to  the  indication  of  certain  appetites  and  passions,  only 
increases  the  force  of  this  last  reason.  For  how  unlikely  is  it 
that  they  would  be  endowed  with  the  means  of  expressing 
animal  feelings,  and  be  denied  the  power  of  imparting  ideas, 
supposing  them  to  have  ideas  to  impart.  To  say,  again,  that 
the  animal  is  not  entirely  denied  the  organs  of  speech,  still  fur¬ 
ther  serves  our  purpose.  That  some  animals,  especially  birds, 
have  at  least  imperfect  organs  of  speech  is  evident,  for  they  can 
be  taught  to  speak ;  and  the  only  reason  which  can  be  assigned 
why  they  do  not  utter  a  single  untaught  sentence  of  their  own 
is,  that  they  have  not  a  single  thought  to  express.  F or  “  in  a 
question  respecting  the  possession  of  reason,  the  absence  of  all 
proof  is  tantamount  to  a  proof  of  the  contrary.” 

27.  But  while  these  considerations  impel  us  to  the  conclusion 
that,  in  the  mental  process  of  the  animal,  reason  does  not  inter¬ 
vene  between  its  perceptions  and  volitions,  they  forcibly  indi¬ 
cate  what  may  or  does  intervene  —  namely,  the  operation  of 
appetites,  passions,  habits,  and  the  passive  memory  or  associa¬ 
tions  of  past  impressions.  To  the  expression  of  these  alone, 
its  sounds  and  signs  are  adequate ;  and  of  these  alone  we  be¬ 
lieve  it  to  be  conscious.  As  sensation  issues  in  perception, 
perception  awakens  desire  or  attachment,  aversion  or  anger, 
fear,  or  the  operation  of  habit,  or  some  past  impression  or 
mental  association ;  the  influence  of  these  again  determine  the 
volitions  necessarily,  and  determine  them  differently  according 
as  they  act  feebly  or  powerfully,  singly  or  in  combination ; 
while  the  volitions,  so  determined,  issue  in  corresponding  mus¬ 
cular  action.*  The  only  will,  properly  speaking,  which  is  here 


*  The  subject  of  animal  instinct  is  considered  at  greater  length  in  the 
Pre-Adamite  Earth.”  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  give  a  condensed 

18 


206 


MAN. 


manifested  is  the  Creating  will  in  its  divine  appointments,  ex¬ 
pressing  themselves  in  laws  of  which  the  animal  knows  nothing, 
and  over  which  it  has  no  control ;  and  hence  our  treatment  of 
it  as  irresponsible. 

28.  We  have  now  prepared  the  way  for  showing  that  the 
human  mind  differs  from  the  animal  mind  partly  in  degree  and 
partly  in  kind.  The  infant  human  being  and  the  animal  both 
appear  to  start  from  the  same  point  of  instinct ;  both  advance 
together  across  the  line  of  sensational  perception,  into  that 
sphere  where  the  desires  are  excited,  the  passions  gratified, 
where  means  are  sought  adapted  to  these  ends,  and  where  as¬ 
sociations  of  past  impressions  are  formed  unconsciously,  and 
return  unsought.  But  here  their  companionship  terminates. 
Indeed,  immediatelv  on  crossing  this  fine  the  divergence  begins. 
In  the  animal,  the  mind  subserves  the  body;  in  the  human 
being,  the  body  is  made  to  subserve  the  mind.  He  can  rc-flect. 
He  can  look  at  his  desire,  and  question  it.  He,  the  subject,  can 
become  his  own  object.  He  becomes  conscious  of  desires 
which  the  wfide  world  cannot  gratify.  For  the  animal,  the  point  of 
starting  is  not  more  fixed  than  is  its  goal ;  and  only  a  few  steps 
separate  the  two.  But  for  the  human  being  there  is  no  goal : 
before  him  stretches  a  prospect  wfithout  a  horizon.  In  that 
direction  infinity  lies,  and  all  is  open. 

29.  Already,  then,  man  has  entered  a  domain  where  the 
faint  and  flickering  light  of  the  animal  understanding  is  eclipsed. 
All  beyond  and  above  is  his  own  —  “a  path  which  no  fowl 
knoweth,  and  which  the  vulture’s  eye  hath  not  seen”  —  and  he 
travels  it  alone.  In  the  brightening  ascent  of  mind,  man  leaves 
behind  him  whole  classes  of  animals  at  every  step ;  till,  having 
reached  the  sphere  of  the  true  reason,  he  finds  himself  not 
merely  alone,  but  enthroned,  on  a  height.  The  inferior  parts 
of  his  own  nature  are  carried  up  with  him.  The  appetites 
become  virtues,  and  the  social  affections,  religion.  The  loftiest 
summit  of  creation  no  longer  ends  in  a  machine,  but  in  a  will, 
whose  freedom  renders  it  a  representative  of  the  Divine  will. 
Here  too,  the  sacred  domain  of  conscience  is  all  his  own,  a 
realm  of  invisible  fife,  which  draws  its  breath  direct  from 
heaven.  And,  here,  instead  of  instinctive  signs,  and  inarticulate 
sounds,  wrords,  the  new  messengers  of  thoughts  and  feelings 
equally  new,  wing  their  way  from  soul  to  soul,  and  from  earth 


view  of  it  here,  in  order  to  be  able  to  estimate  the  superiority  of  the 
human  mind. 


DEVELOPMENT. 


207 


to  heaven  —  parts  of  the  great  hymn  of  language  which  is  des¬ 
tined  to  receive  additions  from  every  age.  and  to  reach  its  chorus 
in  the  Name  of  God. 

30.  And  the  end  which  the  human  being  is  designed  to  an¬ 
swer  corresponds  with  his  superior  constitution.  Here,  again, 
our  theory  supplies  us  with  the  means  of  drawing  the  line  which 
separates  the  animal  from  the  human  being.  The  animal  has 
an  end  to  answer,  to  preserve  its  own  life  and  to  perpetuate  its 
kind.  To  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  all  its  natural  actions 
unconsciously  tend  ;  for  the  end  is  proposed  by  the  same  Infi¬ 
nite  intelligence  as  proposes  ends  for  all  the  laws  of  nature. 
Even  the  limited  adaptive  power  which  it  unknowingly  exhibits 
is  only  the  slightly  diversified  application  and  perseverance  of 
instinct  in  gaining;  its  own  great  end.  Man  shares  with  the 
animal  in  answering  this  end.  But  while  it  is  the  great  and  the 
only  end  with  the  animal,  with  man  it  is  merely  a  medial  end  — 
means  to  an  ultimate  end  immeasurable  beyond.  To  the  at- 
tainment  of  that  end  he  can  voluntarily  subordinate  and  sanctify 
even  his  instincts :  while  everything  which  leads  directly  to  it, 
he  enjoys  alone.  Though  standing  in  the  midst  of  mere  nature 
he  towers  above  it.  As  a  free  intelligence  he  is  super-terres¬ 
trial.  and  can  raise  the  earthly,  infer  the  unknown,  anticipate 
the  future,  and  choose  the  ultimate.  Instead  of  living  only  in 
the  present,  he  can  “  look  before  and  after,”  and  consciously 
become  the  vital  link  of  the  two.  Instead  of  gathering  his  en- 
jovments  from  the  dust,  he  can  erect  himself,  and  reach  for 
them  to  heaven.  He  has  faculties  for  which  he  has  no  other 
use.  Ascending  from  his  appetites  to  a  well-regulated  self-love, 
he  can  rise  to  an  all-embracing  disinterested  affection,  and 
thence  to  a  lofty  sense  of  duty  which  places  him  in  emulation 
with  celestial  natures.  “  Like  natures  must  have  like  enjoy¬ 
ments  and  as  his  holy  will  is  akin  to  the  will  of  God,  he  aims 
at  a  like  happiness ;  aspires  to  live  for  the  very  same  end  as 
that  for  which  God  himself  lives  and  reigns  —  the  manifestation 
of  the  Divine  glory. 

31.  In  proportion  to  the  superiority  of  man’s  constitution,  the 
resources  of  pre-existing  nature  were  disclosed,  and  its  relations 
advanced.  In  man  himself,  indeed,  all  its  great  laws,  mechan¬ 
ical.  organic,  and  animal,  were  summed  up,  and  attained  per¬ 
fection.  Art  is  not  so  much  the  representation  of  nature  as  of 
nature's  design.  And  “  man  expresses  the  ultimate  goal  or 
purpose  ot  nature’s  design.”  Accordingly,  he  appears  on  the 
earth  as  a  being  for  whose  coming  all  nature  had  been  precon- 


208 


MAN. 


figured.  His  ear  only  had  been  wanting  to  discover  that  its 
sounds  were  music.  Classes  of  animals,  since  domesticated, 
had  awaited  his  sway,  and  developed  new  qualities  under  it 
He  is  their  melior  nciturci,  the  mediator  for  lower  natures,  and 
his  influence  over  them  a  perpetual  benediction.  They  look  up 
to  him,  and  he  carries  the  look  up  to  God.  Everything  no^ 
began  to  stand  for  something  above  itself.  Literally,  “  truth 
sprang  out  of  the  earth.”  Nature  was  no  longer  an  outside 
siiow.  Its  great  symbolism  had  found  an  interpreter.  Its  ob¬ 
jects  supplied  the  mind  with  images  for  ideal  conceptions ;  and 
forthwith  passed  into  human  language.  Nature  was  indulged 
by  man’s  presence,  and  exalted.  Ordained  “  without  hands,” 
he  was  its  minister  and  high-priest.  The  great  temple  in  which 
he  served  was  filled  with  emblems  of  the  Divine  Presence.  As 
he  walked  to  the  altar,  the  proofs  of  goodness  lay  profusely  in 
his  path ;  and  the  light  by  which  he  ministered  was  a  symbol 
of  purity.  Nature  had  kept  no  sabbath ;  but  heavenly  days 
were  now  to  be  intercalated  ;  and,  through  his  lips,  “  everything 
that  had  breath  was  to  praise  the  Lord.”  Providence  no  longer 
limits  its  cares  to  “  the  lilies  of  the  field  ”  or  to  “  the  fowls  of  the 
air ;  ”  henceforth  it  charges  itself  with  the  well-being  of  a  creature, 
“  how  much  better  than  they !  ”  Even  “  Righteousness  looks 
down  from  heaven ;  ”  and  descends  to  govern  him.  Physical 
laws  are  promoted  into  a  moral  discipline.  The  kingdoms  of 
nature  have,  in  a  sense  unknown  before,  become  the  kingdom 
of  our  God.  Life  has  become  a  religion.  “  Lord,  what  is 
man  !  Thou  hast  crowned  him  with  glory  and  honor  !  ” 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ACTIVITY. 

1.  'We  regard  it  as  a  law  of  creation,  “that  everything  man¬ 
ifests  all  that  it  is  calculated  to  exhibit  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
by  developing,  or  working  out  its  own  nature.”  A  creation 
devoid  of  regulated  activity  would  be  no  manifestation  of  an 
ever-living  and  ever-active  Creator.  It  is  only  by  a  universe 

of  activitv  that  He  can  be  manifested  to  whose  activitv  the  uni- 
%/  * 

verse  owes  its  existence.  Still  more  may  an  active  nature  be 


ACTIVITY. 


209 


expected  in  that  order  of  creatures  whose  distinction  it  is  to  be, 
that  not  only  by  them,  but  to  them,  the  manifestation  will  be 
made.  For  such  activity  may  be  looked  for  in  them  if  only 
to  help  them  to  understand,  by  sympathy,  the  same  property 
in  the  Divine  Nature.  Accordingly,  man  is  constituted  a  self¬ 
regulating  force,  pressing  like  the  power  of  a  spring  on  every 
resistance,  and  requiring  unlimited  time  and  space  for  the  de¬ 
velopment  of  his  energies.  Everything  within  him  and  around 
him  indicates  that  he  is  designed  to  occupy  a  sphere  of  activity 
which  circumscribes,  and  indefinitely  exceeds,  every  sphere  of 
activity  known  to  the  prior  creation. 

2.  Everv  part  of  the  bodilv  frame  circulates  more  or  less 
rapidly.  “  At  every  moment,”  says  Liebig,  u  with  every  expi¬ 
ration.  parts  of  the  body  are  removed,  and  are  emitted  into  the 
atmosphere.”  The  motion  of  any  one  part  of  the  body  involves 
the  motion  of  every  other  part.  The  mechanism  of  certain 
parts  admits  of  action  more  instantaneous  than  the  quickest 
suggestion  of  the  will. 

3.  But  man  was  made  for  voluntary  external  action.  This 
is  evident,  on  the  one  hand,  from  the  fact  that  a  state  of  inac- 
tivitv  is  soon  attended  with  a  sense  of  uneasiness.  Standing 
still  quickly  tires.  Properly  speaking,  there  is  no  standing 
still ;  “  the  action  of  standing,  consists,  in  fact,  of  a  series  of 
small  and  imperceptible  motions,  by  which  the  centre  of  gravity 
is  perpetually  shifted  from  one  part  of  the  base  to  another.” 
Besides  which,  the  mechanical  properties  of  the  living  frame 
soon  suffer  deterioration,  if  they  lie  idle  ;  the  power  of  the  mus¬ 
cles  diminish,  and  the  strength  of  resistance  in  its  bones  and 
tendons  degenerate.  On  the  other  hand,  activity  develops  the 
physical  structure,  augments  its  power,  and  is  attended,  as  the 
playful  motions  of  the  young  of  all  animals  show,  with  muscu  • 
lar  pleasure. 

4.  The  appetites  are  regularly  urging  us  to  activity  in  order 
to  their  gratification.  Mere  sensations,  or  impressions  from 
without,  may  be  pleasurable ;  but  as  if  to  prevent  their  ter¬ 
minating  in  themselves,  or  detaining  us  from  activity,  they  re¬ 
quire  to  be  frequently  varied.  “  The  continuance  of  an  im¬ 
pression  on  any  one  organ,  occasions  it  to  fade.”  Let  the  eye 
look  steadfastly  on  one  object,  and  the  image  is  soon  lost.  The 
senses  themselves  require  to  have  their  reports  compared,  and 
mutually  corrected ;  thus  keeping  the  mind  on  the  alert,  and 
involving  its  activity.  Perception,  reflection,  and  reasoning,  all 
suppose  attention  either  to  external  or  internal  phenomena  ; 

18* 


210 


MAN. 


and  attention  is  the  mind  in  an  active  state.  We  know  only 
as  we  act.  Our  notions  of  time,  space,  and  all  their  modifica¬ 
tions,  involve  a  certain  activity  of  mind.  Activity  is  the  con¬ 
dition  of  all  knowledge.  What,  also,  is  the  object  of  emotion, 
but  action  ?  What  is  the  office  of  volition,  but  to  determine  the 
direction  our  activity  shall  take  ?  What  the  design  of  con¬ 
science,  but  to  indicate  the  course  which  it  ought  to  take  ? 

5.  Let  us  pass  from  the  constitution  of  man  to  the  constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  world  around  him,  and  to  which  he  is  preconfigured. 
Here,  we  find,  “  all  things  full  of  labor ;  ”  thus  sympathizing 
with  his  own  susceptibilities  of  activity,  as  well  as  inviting  and 
inciting  him  to  it.  That  sensibility  to  the  varieties  of  temper¬ 
ature,  which  is  seated  in  the  skin,  is,  the  physiologist  informs 
us,  a  never-failing  excitement  to  activity,  and  a  constant  source 
of  enjoyment.  Those  objects  which  appeal  to  man’s  appetites, 
promise  gratification  only  on  the  condition  of  his  muscular  exer¬ 
tion  to  appropriate  them.  A  world  of  raw  material  surrounds 
him.  Nature  sells  everything  good,  and  effort  is  the  price. 
As  a  social  being,  his  affections  are  kept  in  constant  play  to 
provide  for  the  safety,  comfort,  and  well-being  of  their  objects. 
As  an  intelligent  being,  the  objects  of  knowledge  lie  around  him 
in  apparent  disorder.  If  he  would  perceive,  he  must  approach 
them ;  if  understand,  he  must  compare  them ;  if  reason,  he 
must  arrange  and  classify  them ;  if  believe,  he  must  call  for 
and  examine  the  necessary  evidence.  The  physical  points  him 
forwards  to  the  metaphysical ;  and  from  phenomena  he  finds 
himself  beckoned  onwards  to  the  reality  of  ultimate  facts. 
Every  relation  which  he  discovers,  and  every  law  which  he  ver¬ 
ifies,  proclaims  his  patient  activity,  and  is  its  precious  fruit. 
Even  his  knowledge  of  duty  is  not  a  spontaneous  growth,  but 
comes  to  him  as  the  result  of  consideration,  and  has  to  be 
guarded  with  jealous  care.  While,  as  the  subject  of  emotion, 
objects  and  events  are  constantly  awakening  fresh  susceptibili¬ 
ties,  and  thus  making  him  known  to  himself. 

6.  The  power  of  volition  with  which  man  is  endowed  is  never 
allowed  to  rest ;  for  he  finds  himself  constantly  solicited  by  dif¬ 
ferent  objects,  or  attempting  to  master  the  difficulties  which  He 
in  his  path.  If  the  difficulty  relate  to  an  object  of  knowledge, 
spontaneously  the  mind  tasks  its  power  to  pierce  the  obscurity. 
And  this  effort  is  “  a  concentration  upon  one  point  of  forces 
before  diffused.”  According  to  Spinoza,  indeed,  action  is  only 
another  name  for  goodness,  and  passion  for  evil ;  and  the  only 
difference  between  the  good  man  and  the  bad  is,  that  the  former 


ACTIVITY. 


211 


has  a  greater  power  of  action  in  him  than  the  latter.  But.  re¬ 
jecting  this  extreme  and  one-sided  view,  it  is  unquestionable 
that  this  power  is  essential  to  virtue.  Man  is  a  cause,  and  is 
constantlv  acting  under  the  conviction  that,  amidst  all  the  exter- 
nal  influences  which  surround  him.  he  has  the  power  of  reaction 
and  self-regulation.  These  opposing  external  agents  are  neces¬ 
sary  in  order  to  acquaint  him  with  his  own  causative  power, 
and  to  develop  it.  Even  Fichte,  while  denying  a  material  uni¬ 
verse.  had  to  suppose  an  ideal  objective,  in  order  to  afford  a 
sphere  of  activity  to  the  subjective.  He  admits  that  it  is  only 
by  such  means  that  we  can  “  place  before  us,  as  object,  the  end 
and  aim  of  our  existence.”  On  the  faith  of  our  consciousness, 
however,  we  find  ourselves  placed  in  the  midst  of  a  real  object¬ 
ive.  And  in  this  external  sphere,  everything  in  turn  appeals 
to  our  causative  power,  and  challenges  us  to  exercise  it.  Calls 
to  vigilance,  gratitude,  and  usefulness,  appeal  to  our  sense  of 
obligation :  and  make  activitv  a  dutv.  and  a  means  of  moral 
excellence. 

7.  'Without  object  or  impulse,  every  part  of  our  active  nature 
would  soon  be  lost  to  us,  or  rather,  would  never  be  known  to 
us.  But  with  these,  that  active  power  is  disclosed  to  us  ;  by 
exercise  it  is  increased;  difficult  and  occasional  acts  become 
easy  and  confirmed  habits :  physical  weakness  is  replaced  by 
muscular  strength :  ignorance  bv  knowledge  :  and  a  mere  sense 
of  dutv  grows  into  a  course  of  intelligent  and  delighted  obedi- 
ence.  Thus,  activity  is  a  law  of  our  nature,  and  the  condition 
of  its  development. 

How  impressively  was  this  fact  disclosed  to  the  first  man  on 
the  day  of  his  creation.  The  fruits  and  luxuriance  of  paradise 
were  not  a  dispensation  from  labor,  but  a  call  to  it :  for  there 
his  Maker  placed  him  K  to  till  it,  and  to  keep  it.”  His  intel¬ 
lectual  powers  were  called  into  exercise  by  the  task  assigned 
him.  to  observe,  compare,  and  give  appropriate  names  to  the 
animals  ;  while  his  moral  nature  probably  received  its  first  im¬ 
pulse.  and  was  quickened  into  a  state  of  activity,  from  which  it 
has  never  since  ceased,  by  the  sovereign  interdict  of  the  proba 
tionary  tree.  He  was  no  sooner  made,  than  every  great  part 
ot  his  nature  was  put  into  motion  by  an  appropriate  impulse 
from  the  hand  of  God ;  and  in  that  activity  he  became  conscious 
of  his  own  faculties,  and  began  to  develop  them. 

But  it  activity  be  thus  a  law  of  our  nature,  how  hopeless  is 
the  task  ot  some  in  aiming  to  combine  happiness  and  inactivitv ! 
How  infatuated  those  who  regard  the  enjoyment  of  the  heavenly 


212 


MAX. 


world  as  consisting  in  luxurious  indolence  !  The  rest  of  heaven 
is  a  calm  opposed,  not  to  activity,  but  to  suffering.  Relative  to 
the  activity  of  “  the  living  creatures,”  the  many-winged  and 
myriad-eyed  symbols  of  the  highest  celestial  life,  it  is  said,  that 
“  they  rest  not.”  The  perpetual  striving  after  self-development, 
the  struggle  to  bring  into  actual  existence  all  that  lies  poten- 
tially  in  our  nature,  which  here  encounters  so  many  obstacles,  is 
there  resumed,  and  resumed  under  advantages  which  are  here 
unknown.  Every  step  there  is  advance  in  the  ever-present 
light  of  distant,  yet  approachable,  perfection.  Heaven  is  a 
state  of  greater  enjoyment,  and  progress  in  excellence,  than 
earth,  partly  because  of  its  superior  scope  for  activity. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

RELATIONS. 

1.  We  seem  warranted  to  expect  “that  the  process  of  the 
.  Divine  disclosure  into  which  man  has  come  will  be  carried  on 
by  a  system  of  means,  or  of  medial  relations.”  For,  in  no 
other  way,  as  far  as  we  know,  can  we  be  brought  to  conceive 
of  the  relation  which  the  Creator  himself  sustains  to  his  own 
creation.  And,  if  the  creation  is  designed  to  answer  an  end, 
it  is  only  as  every  part  of  it  sustains  a  relation  to  that  end,  and, 
therefore,  to  every  other  part  —  a  relation  of  mutual  dependence 
and  influence  —  that  the  end  can  be  attained.  Now  the  com¬ 
plicated  and  universal  activity  of  the  human  being  discloses  a 
system  of  relations,  not  merely  equal  to  all  the  relations  of  the 
pre-existing  creation,  but  indefinitely  exceeding  them.  Abso¬ 
lute  division  or  isolation  is,  here,  impossible.  Our  attention  no 
sooner  fixes  on  a  given  faculty  or  function,  than  we  find  it  to  be 
an  indivisible  part  of  an  all-related  aggregate  united  in  the 
integrity  of  the  living  man. 

2.  Relations  exist  between  the  various  parts  of  his  physical, 
his  organic,  and  his  animal  systems  respectively,  and  between 
these  three  considered  mutually  and  collectively.  Each  paid  is 
sympathetically  and  really  united  to  the  other  two,  nor  can 
either  of  them  act  or  suffer  without  the  others  being  consen¬ 
taneously  affected.  A  change  in  one  part  would  render  neces- 


RELATIONS. 


213 


sary  the  re-construction  of  the  whole.  In  our  examination  of 
his  mental  constitution,  we  found  that  his  sentient  nature  is  the 
consequence  of  a  system  of  relations  between  his  mind  and 
the  bodily  organs  and  nervous  apparatus  assigned  for  its  use; 
while  every  sensation  involves  a  corresponding  perception. 
Reflection  discloses  a  neve  world  of  purely  mental  relations,  or 
between  one  state  of  mind  and  another.  But  though  purely 
mental  themselves,  they  owe  their  conscious  existence  to  sen- 
tient  and  percipient  states.  Each  power  supposes  a  conse¬ 
quent  ;  each  susceptibility  an  antecedent.  Reason  brings  to 
light  a  yet  profounder  system  of  relations,  having  necessary 
truth  for  their  object.  The  laws  of  causation,  successiveness, 
and  resemblance,  presuppose  these  ultimate  relations,  and  de¬ 
pend  on  them  by  a  logical  necessity.  Theory  without  induc¬ 
tion  is  a  fancy  ;  induction  or  facts  without  theory,  a  useless  un¬ 
connected  mob  of  materials.  If  imagination  retires  within 
itself  to  think  with  closed  senses,  it  is  only  as  memory  waits 
on  it,  and  supplies  it  with  materials,  that  it  can  select  from 
them,  and  re-construct  new  events  and  worlds.  Language,  as 
we  have  seen,  involves  relations  between  the  organs  of  voice 
and  the  nerves,  which  combine  them  in  one  simultaneous  act  — 
between  these  and  the  articulate  sounds  uttered  —  between 
these,  again,  and  the  mind  which  employs  them  as  signs  of 
separate  internal  conceptions  —  and  between  these  conceptions, 
when  combined,  and  the  language  which  expresses  that  com¬ 
bination.  Each  of  the  innumerable  emotions,  by  which  the 
mind  is  kept  in  constant  play,  is  related  directly  or  indirectly 
to  a  mental  state  as  the  exciting  cause.  Every  volition  pre¬ 
supposes  a  motive,  and,  at  the  same  time,  sustains  a  relation  to 
man’s  moral  nature  as  a  movement  which  ought,  or  ought  not 
to  be,  while  reflection  gives  him  the  perception  of  those  rela¬ 
tions  from  which  conscience  receives  its  sense  of  obligation. 

3.  So  intimate  is  the  union  between  the  mind  and  the  body, 
that  a  slight  derangement  of  the  latter  will  often  impede  the 
exercise  of  the  former,  or  fill  it  with  groundless  apprehensions ; 
while  grief,  expectation,  or  profound  attention,  will  render  the 
body  insensible  to  its  ordinary  wants.  According  to  Liebig, 
every  conception,  every  mental  affection  is  followed  by  changes 
in  the  chemical  nature  of  the  secreted  fluids.  Form  and  fea¬ 
tures  often  impart  a  character  to  the  mind,  and  a  bias  to  the 
life  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  mental  and  moral  character  often 
impress  themselves  on  some  part  of  the  outward  form.  Aristotle 
treated  at  some  length  on  the  shades  of  the  hair,  the  form  of  the 


214 


MAN. 


features,  the  complexion,  and  of  the  different  parts  of  the  body, 
as  indicative  of  particular  temperaments  and  mental  character¬ 
istics.  Indeed,  it  is  on  the  assumption  of  the  conformity  between 
the  soul  and  the  body,  that  cheiromancy,  physiognomy,  and  phre¬ 
nology,  have,  at  different  times,  essayed  to  take  the  rank  of 
sciences.  And  so  intimate  is  the  union  of  the  moral  nature  of 
man  with  the  other  parts  of  his  constitution,  that  conscience  has 
been  represented  at  different  times  as  a  modification  of  nearly 
every  one  of  these  parts  ;  duty  has  been  based  on  considerations 
derived  from  each ;  and  virtue  and  utility,  though  essentially 
distinct,  regarded  as  ultimately  one.  “  The  coincidence  of  mo¬ 
rality  with  individual  interest  is  an  important  truth  in  ethics.” 
Now  these  are  only  some  of  the  more  obvious  relations  existing 
between  the  continuous  parts  of  his  nature,  yet  no  mind,  except 
that  of  the  Infinite,  can  comprehend  the  number  which  they 
potentially  comprise.  But  each  of  these,  again,  is  associated 
with  all  the  rest  by  relations  more  subtle  and  complicated  still, 
so  that  no  part  can  be  touched,  however  lightly,  but  the  whole 
being  vibrates  in  sympathy. 

4.  In  addition  to  these,  the  human  constitution  exhibits  rela¬ 
tions  successively  existent.  We  speak  not  now  of  the  relation  of 
generation  to  generation,  nor  even  of  that  between  parent  and 
child,  but  of  the  connection  between  the  successive  periods  of 
the  same  human  being.  By  the  faculty  of  memory  he  is  enabled 
to  retain  the  knowledge  he  has  acquired,  to  recall  former  im¬ 
pressions,  and  to  live  the  past  over  again.  Every  voluntary  act 
tends  to  the  formation  of  habit ;  thus  increasing  his  power  of 
action  for  all  the  future.  Every  word  uttered,  every  emotion 
cherished,  alters  the  relation  of  the  man’s  character  for  the  whole 
of  futurity.  Even  if  it  could  be  shown  that  some  of  his  emo¬ 
tions  and  volitions  pass  from  his  memory  never  to  be  recovered, 
they  do  not  pass  from  his  character.  They  blend  with  his  moral, 
if  they  escape  from  his  intellectual  nature.  But  it  is  more  than 
probable  — judging  from  well  attested  facts  related  of  persons 
in  fever  and  delirium  —  that  the  memory  never  loses  entirely 
anything  which  has  been  once  given  into  its  charge  ;  that,  in  a 
certain  state,  it  can  give  up,  as  from  the  dead,  everything  of 
which  the  mind  had  ever  been  conscious.  Here  is  continuity 
of  moral  being  of  the  highest  order  —  continuity  with  accurnu- 
lation.  Not  only  is  the  last  moment  of  his  history  connected 
with  the  first,  his  character  of  to-dav  is  carried  on  to  the  account 
of  his  character  of  to-morrow ;  so  that  his  character  at  the  last 
is  the  sum  o1  all  the  past.  And  thus  he  is  at  once  adapted  to 


RELATIONS. 


215 


the  progressiveness  of  the  scheme  into  which  he  has  come,  and 
is  a  representative  of  it  His  own  nature  is  a  constitution  —  a 
system  of  self-relations  —  distinct  from  the  constitution  of  things 
around  it,  though  in  entire  accordance  with  it. 

5.  Passing  from  man’s  relations  to  himself,  we  have  to  specify 
next  some  of  his  relations  to  the  objective  universe.  “The  hand 
of  God,”  remarks  lord  Ivames;  “  is  nowhere  more  visible  than 
in  the  nice  adjustment  of  our  internal  frame  to  our  situation  in 
this  world.” 

The  period  of  man’s  creation  was  relative  to  the  physical 
condition  of  the  globe.  Constituted  as  man  now7  is,  the  condition 
of  the  earth  during  the  earlier  geological  formations  would  have 
been  incompatible  with  his  continued  existence.  And  as  the 
first  remains  of  races  of  animals  now  extinct  reveal  the  prevail¬ 
ing  condition  of  the  earth  at  the  time  of  their  existence,  so  the 
commencement  of  the  human  race  and  the  physical  conditions 
of  the  globe  were  in  strict  co-relation.  In  a  similar  manner 
the  different  classes  of  animals  which  co-exist  with  him,  are 
so  many  related  parts  of  a  great  whole. 

6.  The  relations  which  man  sustains  to  the  atmosphere,  and 
to  everything  of  which  the  atmosphere  is  a  medium,  are  innu¬ 
merable.  The  first  impulse  given  to  his  lungs,  and  therefore  the 
first  moment  of  what  may  be  called  his  independent  life,  depend 
on  the  air.  The  sensibility  of  his  skin  is  related  to  the  tem¬ 
perature.  The  agency  of  light  is  related  to  the  production  and 
to  the  taste  of  his  food,  to  his  activity,  and  consequently  to  his 
knowledge,  his  cheerfulness,  and  his  moral  character.  Day  and 
night  alternate  in  his  frame.  The  motion  of  the  air  maintains 
him  in  health.  Electricity  pervades  him.  And  wrater,  besides  en¬ 
tering  into  his  physical  composition  to  a  degree  which  imparts 
to  it  about  three-fourths  of  the  whole  weight,  is  an  indispensable 
element  of  his  life.  Equally  manifold  are  man’s  relations  to  the 
mineral  kingdom.  Even  the  constitution  of  the  atmosphere, 
just  referred  to,  materially  depends  on  it.  The  strength  of  his 
bones,  and  the  powrer  of  his  muscles,  bear  a  proportion  to  the 
mass  of  the  earth,  as  this  again  depends  on  its  magnitude  and 
density.  The  supply  of  some  of  his  simplest  wants  depends  on 
the  distribution,  and  the  relative  proportions,  of  sea  and  land. 
The  dark  and  central  depths  of  the  earth,  where  the  lamp  of  the 
miner  will  never  shed  a  ray,  as  well  as  the  geological  arrange¬ 
ment  and  physical  character  of  some  of  the  superficial  strata, 
bear  a  relation  to  every  step  he  takes,  every  breath  he  drawrs, 
and  every  comfort  he  enjoys.  Hunger  impels  him  to  look  abroad 


216 


MAN. 


for  food ;  and  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms  minister  to  the 
gratification  of  his  appetite.  As  his  powers  are  developed  and 
his  civilization  advances,  he  multiplies  his  relations  with  every 
department  of  nature  indefinitely.  Discovery  after  discovery 
enlarges  his  horizon,  and  widens  his  domain.  This  part  of  the 
subject,  however,  belongs  to  the  historical  portion  of  our  series. 

7.  As  man  is  a  sentient  being,  he  has  organs  which  place 
him  in  percipient  relations  to  all  the  objects  of  external  nature. 
By  the  organ  of  touch,  he  is  related  especially  to  solid  bodies  ; 
by  taste,  to  liquid ;  by  smell,  to  gaseous ;  by  hearing,  to  the  at¬ 
mospheric  medium  ;  and  by  sight,  to  objects  beyond  the  region 
of  the  air  —  to  the  distant  worlds  of  light.  How  exquisite  the 
relation  between  the  subject  and  the  object  —  that  light,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  whether  resulting  from  the  movement  of  an  elastic  ether, 
or  emanating  from  celestial  bodies,  at  such  vast  distances  “  that 
thousands  of  years  shall  elapse  during  its  progress  to  the  earth, 
and  yet  that,  impelled  by  a  force  equal  to  its  transmission  through 
this  space,  it  should  enter  the  eye,  and  strike  upon  the  delicate 
nerve  with  no  other  effect  than  to  produce  vision  !”  And  although 
the  nature  pf  the  connection  between  the  object  presented  in  any 
given  instance,  and  the  sensation  occasioned,  is  utterly  inexpli¬ 
cable,  yet  are  they  so  indissolubly  united  that  the  knowledge  of 
the  object  thus  obtained  is  attended  with  an  absolute  conviction 
of  its  reality.  The  too  ideal  philosophy  of  a  Sclielling  regards 
the  subject  and  the  object,  the  percipient  and  perceived,  as  even 
identical.  While  Hegel,  proceeding  yet  a  step  further  in  his 
analysis,  represents  the  only  reality  as  the  relation  itself  to  which 
they  both  owe  their  existence.  The  bare  possibility  of  such  views 
denotes,  at  least,  the  perfection  of  the  relation  which  combines 
together  the  subject  and  the  object,  and  imparts  a  sublime  idea 
of  that  Power  which  has  thus  wrought  the  worlds  of  matter  and 
of  mind  into  the  unity  of  a  single  system. 

8.  Man’s  reflective  power  places  him  in,  at  least,  a  twofold 
relation  to  the  objective  universe.  By  one  of  its  laws,  objects 
which  have  been  present  to  his  mind  before,  often  recall,  when 
they  occur  again,  not  merely  the  single  objects  with  which  they 
were  formerly  associated,  but  long  trains  and  progressions  of 
thought.  So  that,  besides  the  objective  world  of  the  present  mo¬ 
ment,  he  is  in  effect  attended  by  the  worlds  of  the  past.  Every 
day  has  its  own  objects  and  events  which  distinguish  it  from 
every  other  day ;  every  day,  therefore,  has  its  own  world ;  yet 
the  mind  retains  its  relation  to  each,  takes  them  all  on  with  it, 
and  may  thus  virtually  inhabit  a  number  of  worlds  in  quick  sue- 


RELATIONS. 


217 


session.  By  another  of  its  laws  it  sustains  a  very  similar  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  future.  The  mind  confidently  expects  the  same 
sequences  in  the  future  which  it  has  observed  in  the  past.  And 
this  universal  expectation  of  the  subjective  mind,  is  universally 
responded  to  by  objective  nature.  “ In  the  instinctive,  the  univer¬ 
sal  faith  of  Nature’s  constancy,”  says  Dr.  Chalmers,  “we  behold 
a  promise.  In  the  actual  constancy  of  Nature,  we  behold  its 
fulfilment.”  God  “  hath  not  only  enabled  man  to  retain  in  his 
memory  a  faithful  transcript  of  the  past ;  but,  by  means  of  this 
constitutional  tendency,  this  instinct  of  the  understanding,  as  it 
has  been  termed,  to  look  with  prophetic  eye  upon  the  future. 
It  is  the  link  by  which  we  connect  experience  with  anticipation.” 

9.  The  relation  of  adjustment  established  between  the  reason 
of  man,  and  the  necessary  truths  embodied  and  implied  in  the 
external  universe  is  equally  apparent.  In  the  mixed  mathe¬ 
matics,  the  mind  having  ascended  analytically  from  the  obser¬ 
vation  of  external  phenomena  to  general  principles,  can  then 
retire  into  itself,  and  reason  synthetically  from  these  principles 
downwards  to  phenomena  which  it  has  never  observed,  but  which 
subsequent  observation  will  infallibly  verify.  In  the  pure  mathe¬ 
matics,  let  the  mind  arrive  by  a  single  observation  at  the  simplest 
conception  of  quantity  or  number,  and  then,  shutting  itself  up  in 
its  own  recesses,  it  can  reason  out  a  number  of  conclusions,  to 
the  truth  of  which  external  nature  is  found  subsequently  to  re¬ 
spond.  By  observation  alone,  these  conclusions  would  never 
have  been  arrived  at ;  how  wonderful  the  relations,  then,  be¬ 
tween  the  mental  and  the  material  systems,  that  observation 
should  subsequently  verify  these  intellectual  truths,  though  after 
the  lapse  of  ages,  it  may  be,  and  in  the  remotest  parts  of  the 
material  universe. 

In  further  illustration  of  the  profound  relation  in  which  our 
intellectual  processes  stand  to  external  nature,  we  might  advert 
to  the  remarkable  manner  in  which  some  natural  object  or  inci¬ 
dental  discovery  is  often  found  to  be  susceptible  of  extensive 
application  to  the  affairs  of  life.  The  discovery  of  the  telescope, 
and  the  observation  of  the  polarity  of  the  magnet,  are  examples 
in  point.  So  also  “  the  chief  use  of  the  moon  for  man’s  imme¬ 
diate  purposes  remained  unknown  to  him  for  five  thousand 
years  from  his  creation.”*  Every  department  of  modern  science 
exhibits  illustrations  of  the  complicated  and  remote  correspon¬ 
dences  between  the  objective  system  and  the  preconceptions  of 


*  Sir  John  Herschell’s  Discourse,  p  $09, 

19 


218 


MAN. 


the  mind.  Deduction  and  induction  answer  to  each  other.  The 
arguments  a  'priori  and  a  posteriori  require  each  other.  Each 
kind  of  truth  asks  for  its  own  kind  of  evidence,  though  all  evi¬ 
dence  is  ultimately  related.  A  truth  requiring,  in  order  to  its 
discovery,  a  degree  of  elaboration  and  abstraction  of  which  few 
are  capable,  is  often  found  when  elicited  to  admit  of  a  number 
of  useful  applications  to  which  all  are  competent. 

10.  The  specific  preferences  which  men  show  for  different 
branches  of  knowledge,  prove  that,  besides  the  general  accord¬ 
ance  existing  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  there 
are  special  relations.  All  great  works  form  a  series.  “  One 
soweth,  and  another  reapeth.”  In  this  division  of  labor,  indeed, 
the  laborers  may  be  inclined  to  depreciate  each  other’s  particu¬ 
lar  pursuit ;  but,  when  it  is  found  that,  without  any  preconcerted 
scheme,  the  hewn  and  sculptured  stones  which  they  have  brought 
from  their  respective  quarries  only  need  to-be  put  together  in 
order  to  form  a  magnificent  temple  of  the  most  harmonious  pro¬ 
portions,  what  a  sublime  view  does  it  give  us  of  the  wisdom 
which,  besides  harmonizing  the  material  with  the  material  and 
the  mental  with  the  mental,  includes  the  material  and  the  men¬ 
tal  creations  in  the  harmony  of  one  system. 

11.  Imagination  invests  man  with  a  kind  of  creative  power. 
Besides  discovering  laws,  he  can  himself  body  forth  ideas ;  and 
this  world  appears  to  be  studiously  adapted  for  awakening,  de¬ 
veloping,  and  giving  them  objective  existence.  It  is  a  world 
already  replenished  with  symbols  and  representations  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  ideas  —  images  of  the  beautiful,  the  proportionate,  the 
graceful  and  the  sublime  ;  and  he  feels  that,  so  far  from  being 
strange  and  unknown  to  him,  they  are  the  mirrored  forms  of 
his  own  being.  He  might  have  been  entirely  destitute  of  the 
imaginative  faculty,  and  then  would  a  world  of  beauty  have 
been  unveiled  to  Ins  eye  in  vain;  or  else, though  endowed  with 
the  power,  the  objects  into  the  midst  of  which  he  came,  might 
have  presented  more  to  repress  than  to  stimulate  the  faculty. 
But  he  is  surrounded  by  objects  every  one  of  which  appeals, 
suggests,  and  incites.  Varied  as  they  are,  they  are  suggestive 
of  greater  variety  still.  The  Divine  Mind  has  not  exhausted 
the  ideal  in  creation,  and  man  is  invited  to  unfold  it  yet  further, 
and  to  draw  out  some  of  its  still  hidden  forms.  His  art,  indeed, 
is  homogeneous  with  nature,  but  not  limited  by  it.  Multitudi¬ 
nous  as  the  objects  may  be  which  appeal  to  his  imagination, 
they  do  not  distract  nor  depress.  On  the  contrary,  they  enlarge 
the  horizon  of  the  mind,  give  it  glimpses  into  other  worlds,  and 


RELATIONS. 


219 


dispose  it  to  derive  from  thence  additional  creations.  Nor,  if 
the  imagination  is  to  have  scope  for  its  activity,  must  it  be  op¬ 
pressed  by  the  inimitable  perfection  of  external  objects.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  that  perfection  is  of  a  nature  to  suggest  an  order  of 
excellence  beyond  itself.  Man  can  represent  ideas  which  it 
would  require  a  loftier  state  of  being  fully  to  realize ;  and  can 
entertain  himself  with  visions  of  majesty  and  beauty  beyond  his 
power  to  reveal.  Nor,  if  any  of  his  visions  are  to  take  external 
form,  must  he  be  placed  in  a  world  all  of  whose  materials  are 
either  too  rigid  to  receive  it,  or  too  fluid  to  retain  it.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  the  substances  placed  at  man’s  disposal  are  of  a  nature  to 
conspire  with  the  harmonies  and  glories  of  creation  to  invite 
him  to  an  exercise  of  his  skill,  and  at  the  same  time  to  teach 
him  patience  and  humility  while  so  employed.  Comply  with 
the  laws  of  nature  he  must,  even  while  emulating  her  beauties. 
But  let  him  fall  in  with  these,  and  he  will  find  himself  complet¬ 
ing  the  suggestions  of  the  Creating  Mind  in  carrying  out  his 
own  ideas.  Nor  can  it  be  thought  the  least  important  of  the 
laws  which  the  imagination  brings  to  light,  that  the  more  suc¬ 
cessful  it  is  in  mediating  between  the  world  of  ideas  and  the 
world  of  sense,  the  less  satisfied  it  becomes  with  its  own  revela¬ 
tions,  and  the  more  earnest  in  its  aspirations  after  an  excellence 
which  “  eye  hath  not  seen.” 

12.  Man’s  susceptibility  of  emotion  gives  rise  to  another  sys¬ 
tem  of  relation  between  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  Each 
sensibility  within,  has  its  own  appropriate  intonation  in  the 
world  without.  By  a  skilful  combination  of  these  sounds,  a 
whole  tale  may  be  told  to  the  feelings  without  the  articulation 
of  a  word.  To  this  part  of  our  nature,  all  creation  is  vocal, 
often  combining  in  a  concert  in  wdiich  “  everything  that  hath 
breath,  praises  the  Lord.”  Similar  are  the  relations  traceable 
between  our  sensibilities  and  the  objects  of  sight.  “  It  is  hardly 
possible  to  watch  the  night,  and  view  the  break  of  day,  in  a  fine 
country,  without  being  sensible  that  we  have  feelings,  in  sym¬ 
pathy  with  every  successive  change,  from  the  first  streak  of  light 
until  the  whole  landscape  is  displayed  in  valleys,  woods,  and 
sparkling  waters.  The  changes  on  the  scene  are  not  more 
rapid  than  the  transitions  of  the  feelings  which  attend  them.” 
And  what  a  view  does  it  open  to  man  of  his  relation  to  all  the 
past,  when  he  reflects  that  the  emotions  which  he  experienced 
when  last  he  looked  on  the  face  of  nature,  were  connected  with 
changes  which  took  place  in  its  formation  an  indefinite  number 
of  ages  ago ! 


220 


MAN. 


Regard  whatever  part  of  man’s  nature  we  may,  we  find  it 
the  centre  of  a  large  circle  of  objects  acting  upon  it.  As  an 
intellectual  being,  all  nature  acts  on  him  as  if  it  were  a  system 
of  contrivances  for  the  special  design  of  engaging  his  attention, 
and  educating  his  mind.  As  a  social  being,  objects  of  affection 
throng  around  him,  and  keep  his  heart  in  constant  activity.  As 
a  moral  being,  an  object  of  a  higher  order  reveals  His  relations 
to  him,  and  moves  the  depths  of  his  nature.  “  Thou  shalt  love 
the  Lord  thy  God  "with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thy¬ 
self,”  was  the  law  of  the  heart  before  it  was  the  law  of  Sinai ;  a 
law  evidently  implying  that  every  object  in  the  universe  sus¬ 
tains  a  relation  to  us ;  that  the  degree  in  which  objects  are  to 
move  us,  or  to  engage  our  regard,  is  to  be  regulated  by  their 
value  as  a  means  of  Divine  manifestation ;  that,  as  man  ranks 
highest  in  this  respect,  he  challenges  our  highest  subordinate 
regard ;  and  that,  by  the  same  rule,  the  Being  manifested,  is  to 
be  loved  supremely.  Now,  when  we  remember  that  through 
the  whole  of  life  our  emotions  are  kept  in  constant  play,  and  that 
every  emotion  has  its  counterpart  object,  what  a  system  of  rela¬ 
tions  is  disclosed  to  us  !  But  how  fine,  and  exquisitely  adjusted 
must  these  relations  be  when  the  great  majority  of  the  emotions 
excited  are  compatible  with  a  state  of  mental  tranquillity !  And 
how  obvious  and  godlike  their  tendency  when,  according  to  that 
law  of  their  operation  we  have  noticed  —  that  the  greatest  and 
the  best  should  move  us  the  most  —  the  only  effect  would  be 
that  of  constant  assimilation  to  Infinite  excellence,  and  closer 
relationship  to  Him ! 

13.  On  turning  our  attention  to  the  voluntary  part  of  man’s 
nature,  our  view  of  the  relations  between  the  subjective  and  the 
objective  becomes  still  more  impressive.  We  have  seen  that, 
by  one  system  of  nerves,  communication  is  kept  up  between  the 
external  world  and  the  indwelling  mind,  and  that,  by  another, 
the  mind  reacts  and  determines  to  muscular  action.  In  this 
way,  the  spiritual  will  comes  out  into  external  nature,  and  lit¬ 
erally  finds  the  world  given  into  its  hand.  We  have  seen,  also, 
that,  for  every  object  of  perception,  the  mind  has  a  correspond¬ 
ing  emotion.  And  it  is  certain  that  the  object  contemplated 
excites  the  emotion  whether  we  will  or  not;  and  thus  touches 
the  springs  of  our  character  and  conduct.  But  it  is  equally 
certain  that,  by  the  command  which  the  will  gives  us  over  the 
attention,  we  can  withdraw  our  contemplation  from  one  object, 
and  fix  it  on  another.  W e  cannot  determine  what  emotion  an  ob¬ 
ject  shall  excite  in  us ;  but  we  can  determine  what  object  shall 


RELATIONS. 


221 


engage  our  attention,  and  how  much  it  shall  engage  our  attention  ; 
and  thus  we  become  responsible  for  our  feelings.  We  cannot 
determine  what  conviction  any  evidence  shall  produce  in  our 
minds  :  but  we  can  determine  what  attention  we  will  give  to  it ; 
and  thus  we  become  responsible  for  our  beliefs.  At  one  time, 
we  may  be  placed  in  visible  relation  to  only  a  single  object ; 
but,  turning  our  regards  from  that,  we  may  call  for  a  thousand 
mental  objects  in  rapid  succession,  and  thus  voluntarily  put  our¬ 
selves  in  emotional  relation  to  them  all.  At  another,  mental 
objects  may  crowd  into  the  view  of  the  mind,  but,  to  chase  them 
all  away,  we  may  take  into  our  hand  some  outward  object,  and, 
by  fixing  our  attention  upon  it,  determine  the  state  of  our  minds. 
But,  if  we  thus  possess  the  power  of  choosing  the  objects  which 
shall  atfect  us,  and  the  degree  in  which  they  shall  affect  us,  how 
vitally  important  that  our  attention  should  be  given  to  objects 
according  to  their  importance  in  the  scale  of  Divine  manifesta¬ 
tion.  That  we  do  possess  this  power  is  implied  in  the  law  which 
we  have  already  quoted  —  that  we  love  God  supremely.  Se¬ 
lecting  Him  for  the  object  of  its  chief  contemplation,  the  mind 
will  take  the  sublime  impression  of  his  character.  The  view 
of  his  goodness  will  excite  gratitude ;  thoughts  of  his  holiness 
will  produce  veneration ;  the  sight  of  his  judgment-throne  will 
inspire  awe.  The  subjective  will  be  as  is  the  view  of  the  ob¬ 
jective.  And  thus  by  voluntarily  putting  itself  into  communi¬ 
cation  with  superior  excellence,  the  world  without  not  only 
evolves  the  world  within  into  a  state  of  manifestation,  but  leaves 
on  it  traces  of  its  transforming  and  exalting  influence. 

14.  (1.)  4Ye  have  shown  that  in  the  very  make  of  our  moral 
constitution,  virtue  has  a  subjective  world  of  its  own ;  but  He 
who,  in  the  language  of  the  son  of  Sirach,  “  hath  made  all  things 
double,”  hath  placed  in  it  vital  connection  with  an  objective 
arrangement,  answering  to  it.  A  casual  sight  or  sound,  “  the 
shaking  of  a  leaf,”  may  call  forth  from  the  depths  of  the  con¬ 
science  a  loud  and  thrilling  response.  The  poetic  temperament 
recognizes  the  image  of  purity  in  the  lily,  and  of  humility  in 
the  violet,  and  the  reflection  of  one  virtue  or  another  in  every 
object  of  nature.  To  express  sentiments  of  gratitude  and  adora- 
ation,  the  musician  calls  lorth  and  combines  the  richest  and  the 
loftiest  sounds.  To  personify  fortitude,  wisdom,  amiableness, 
justice,  any  of  the  virtues,  the  painter  and  the  sculptor  body 
forth  the  noblest  forms  and  the  highest  order  of  physical  beauty  ; 
facts,  which  show  that  that  is  the  true  theory  of  Taste  which 
derives  it  ultimately  from  morality ;  and  that  He  who  has  made 

19* 


222 


MAN. 


both  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  has  so  harmonized  moral 
and  material  loveliness,  as  to  typify  and  express  the  idea  that 
“the  First  Good  and  the  First  Fair”  are  one. 

15.  (2.)  If  we  ascend  from  material  nature  to  social  life,  we 
shall  find  that  there  is  not  a  virtue  inscribed  on  the  tablet  of  the 
conscience  which  society  has  not  inscribed  on  its  public  tables, 
and  for  the  exercise  of  which  it  does  not  loudly  and  constantly 
call.  Compassion,  truth,  justice  —  these  are  enshrined  within  ; 
and  society  builds  them  temples  without ,  prepares  them  balances, 
or  amis  them  with  a  sword,  or  erects  for  them  thrones. 

16.  (3.)  But  conscience  has  higher  objective  relations  yet 
Our  moral  nature  has  a  moral  world  of  its  own  without ,  as  mucl 
as  our  physical  nature  has  an  external  physical  world.  The  very 
fact  that  some  have  regarded  virtue  as  entirely  subjective,  an<§ 
some  as  entirely  objective,  furnishes  strong  presumptive  evidence 
at  least,  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is  both,  and  that  the  twc 
are  intimately  related.  The  truth  is,  that  the  existence  of  a 
subjective  morality  presupposes  a  corresponding  objective  mo¬ 
rality,  quite  as  much  as  the  body  presupposes  a  world  in  harmonj 
with  it.  The  laws  of  conscience  refer  to  a  moral  Lawgiver, 
just  as  the  laws  of  matter  refer  to  a  physical  Lawgiver.  W< 
have  seen  that  for  every  intellectual  faculty  of  man’s  nature 
there  is  scope  for  exercise  in  the  world  without ;  and  for  ever} 
desire,  a  counterpart  object.  Nor  does  this  parallelism  fail  in 
the  case  of  man’s  moral  nature.  The  authority  within  is  felt  to 
be  related  to  sanctions  on  high.  The  reign  in  the  breast  is  felt 
to  be  a  part  of  a  universal  government ;  and  the  pains  and  the 
pleasures  which  it  involves,  the  foretastes  of  a  righteous  award 
yet  to  be  made.  And  thus  man  feels  himself  related  to  the  ir  - 
visible  and  the  future,  as  well  as  to  the  visible  and  the  present. 

17.  Man  himself  is  a  part  of  the  objective  universe  to  his 
fellow-man,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  of  another  is  like 
the  reduplication  of  his  own  mental  powers.  But  in  order  to 
attain  this  knowledge,  a  system  of  relations  has  to  be  established. 
All  that  we  have  described  hitherto,  together  with  the  organs 
of  speech,  and  the  connection  of  these  with  the  mind,  is  but 
preparatory  to  it.  Answering  to  all  these  in  the  subjective, 
there  must  be  objectively  the  aerial  medium  of  sound,  organs 
of  hearing,  a  common  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the 
language  employed,  and  the  same  mental  affections  and  intel¬ 
ligent  belief,  when  acted  on  by  the  same  causes.  rIhe  vocal 
interchange  of  thoughts  between  two  minds  is  **  esult  of  a 
complicated  system  of  profound  relations. 


RELATIONS. 


223 


18.  Regarding  man’s  complex  nature  as  a  whole,  the  relation 
which  comprehends  and  transcends  every  other  is  that  of  the 
creature  to  the  Creator.  First,  it  is  that  of  an  intelligent  being 
made  capable  of  consciously  perceiving  his  relationship.  He 
sustains  the  relation  of  a  Divinely  originated  being,  and  he 
knows  it.  Secondly,  it  is  that  of  an  emotional  creature  made 
capable  of  appreciating  unlimited  excellence,  and  the  Being 
possessing  and  manifesting  such  excellence.  Not  only  is  He 
the  fountain  of  all  the  perfections  disclosed  in  the  wide  creation, 
but  from  eternity  there  has  dwelt  in  Him  an  amplitude  of  glory 
which  no  creation  can  ever  reflect.  Now,  that  He  should  have 
formed  us  capable  of  recognizing,  not  only  the  glory  which  He 
has  revealed,  but  of  being  as  much,  or  even  more,  affected  by 
that  which  He  has  only  suggested  and  afforded  us  glimpses  of, 
and  of  adoring  Him  on  account  of  it,  this,  we  say,  constitutes 
a  second  relation.  A  third  relation  is  that  which  springs  from 
man’s  voluntary  nature,  by  which  he  can  freely  will  to  obey  God, 
to  act  like  Him,  and  with  Him.  By  this  means,  he  can  not  only 
admire  the  perfections  of  God,  he  himself  contains  and  reflects 
more  of  these  perfections  than  all  creation  besides.  Besides  re¬ 
ceiving  the  Divine  manifestation,  he  can  consciously  subserve 
and  promote  it.  A  fourth  relation  is  that  t>f  a  moral  creature 
made  capable  of  personally  enjoying  the  proper  result  of  all  the 
prior  relations.  So  that,  without  any  original  claim  whatever, 
he  sustains  a  relation  to  the  infinitely  blessed  God,  which  makes 
him  capable  of  receiving,  at  every  moment  of  his  existence,  the 
ever-enlarging  results  of  the  exercise  of  all  the  Divine  perfec¬ 
tions. 

Now,  during  any  moment  of  his  life,  the  first  man  could  easily 
realize  the  thought,  that  a  short  period  before,  he  had  no  exist¬ 
ence  ;  that  a  comparatively  short  period  before  that,  the  material 
system  to  which  he  belongs  had  yet  to  begin  to  be  ;  that  all  the 
adaptations  and  relations  between  the  different  parts  of  his  na¬ 
ture  and  the  objective  universe  were  originated,  and  derived 
their  power  of  beneficially  affecting  him,  entirely  and  directly 
from  omnipotent  goodness ;  and  that  his  distinctive  capacity  for 
knowing  and  loving,  serving  and  enjoying,  uncreated  perfection 
was  a  pure  gift  from  the  same  Sovereign  source.  Here,  then, 
is  a  relation  of  which  the  essence  is  dependence  —  utter  depend¬ 
ence  on  independent  and  all-providing  goodness  —  a  relation 
more  intimate,  profound,  and  entire,  than  it  is  in  the  power  of 
the  human  mind  adequately  to  comprehend. 

19.  A  e  have  to  regard  man  also  as  a  being  successively  ex- 


224 


MAN. 


istent.  Tlie  relations  which  he  sustains,  when  viewed,  in  this 
light,  may  be  thus  arranged :  —  Relations  of  property,  or  pos¬ 
sessory  relations ;  of  humanity,  or  between  man  and  man ;  of 
family,  or  between  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  brother 
and  sister,  master  and  servant,  family  and  family ;  of  society,  or 
between  citizen  and  citizen,  citizen  and  State ;  of  nations,  or 
between  society  and  society ;  of  religion,  or  between  man  and 
God ;  these  relations  are  named  here  for  the  sake  of  the  con¬ 
nected  view  which  they  enable  us  to  take  of  man’s  all-related 
position.  The  exposition  of  these  relations,  however,  with  the 
exception  of  the  last,  belongs  to  a  subsequent  part  of  the  series. 

20.  In  the  first  moment  of  man’s  existence,  God  stood  to  him 
in  the  relation  of  his  Creator ;  but  with  the  lapse  of  time  —  with 
the  very  next  moment  —  the  Creator  added  the  new  relation  of 
his  Preserver  also.  In  quick  succession,  he  may  be  said  to 
have  taken  up  the  different  parts  of  man’s  constitution,  and  to 
have  significantly  bound  them  to  Himself.  By  preparing  a  place 
for  man’s  reception,  and  storing  it  with  selected  fruits,  man’s 
dependence  as  a  physical,  organic,  and  sentient  being  was  de¬ 
noted.  By  placing  him  in  sexual  relationship,  his  social  depend¬ 
ence  was  made  manifest.  The  knowledge  divinely  poured  into 
his  opening  mind  evinced  the  relation  between  his  intellect  and 
God.  The  law  which  prohibited  a  certain  act,  disclosed  the 
vital  relation  of  the  human  will  to  the  Divine  will,  or  that  man 
was  made  to  find  perfection  in  obedience.  By  this  special  enact¬ 
ment  the  Creator  and  Preserver  of  the  new-made  man  appeared 
in  the  additional  capacity  of  his  moral  Governor,  while  the  in¬ 
institution  of  the  sabbath  intimated  the  wants  of  man’s  spiritual 
nature  by  bringing  him  into  conscious  and  special  communion 
with  God.  Engaged  in  this  sublime  fellowship,  man  was  to  find, 
in  the  love  and  adoration  of  which  he  was  made  capable,  the  ut¬ 
terness  and  happiness  of  his  dependent  relation,  and  an  earnest 
of  the  grandeur  of  his  destiny. 

21.  Such  are  some  of  the  complicated  and  far-reaching  rela¬ 
tions  which  the  first  man  sustained  to  the  objective  universe. 
The  busy  occupation  of  philosophy  and  science  ever  since  has 
consisted  in  tracing  them.  Treatises,  the  most  elaborate  and 
voluminous,  expound  only  a  few  of  them.  Man  came  into  a 
universe  of  pre-existing  relations ;  a  universe  in  which  at  every 
previous  progressive  stage  these  relations  had  been  multiplying 
and  complicating  indefinitely.  He  came  to  take  them  all  up 
into  his  own  nature.  His  mind  was  constructed  on  a  plan  rela¬ 
tive  to  the  plan  of  the  universe,  in  order  that  he  might  perceive 


RELATIONS. 


225 


the  rhythm  of  the  whole.  But  the  new  powers  requisite  for  this 
end  still  further  complicated  these  lines  of  relation.  Psychology 
was  added  to  physiology.  As  the  body  is  the  medium  through 
which  the  outer  world  gains  access  to  the  spirit,  so  also  it  is  the 
instrument  or  mediator  through  which  the  spirit  reacts,  reaches 
the  outer  world,  knows  it,  and  impresses  itself  upon  it.  Science 
is  directly  conversant  with  the  objective.  Philosophy  finds  its 
elements  in  the  subjective.  But,  without  the  objective,  philoso¬ 
phy  cannot  take  the  first  step  ;  without  the  aid  of  the  subjective, 
science  is  impossible.  The  ideas  of  philosophy,  the  laws  of  sci¬ 
ence,  and  the  constructions  of  art,  all  proceed  together.  Every 
phenomenon  is  both  an  antecedent  and  a  consequent,  sustains 
different  relations.  So  vital  and  perfect  is  this  system  of  rela¬ 
tions,  that  whatever  part  or  function  of  the  human  being  engages 
our  attention,  we  feel  inclined  to  conclude  that  the  whole  has 
been  adjusted  for  that  particular  point.  Nor  can  any  one  de¬ 
partment  of  knowledge  be  properly  arranged  which  does  not 
provide  for  its  relation  to  every  other  branch  of  knowledge. 

22.  It  hardly  need  be  added  that  these  relations  are  continu¬ 
ous ,  never  pausing  from  the  first  moment  of  man’s  existence. 
Indeed,  it  might  be  shown  that  if  he  lives  to  draw  only  a  single 
breath,  the  record  of  that  breath  is  written  on  the  atmosphere 
itself  in  a  manner  never  to  be  effaced.  And,  in  the  same  man¬ 
ner,  that  subtle  element  becomes  the  tablet  of  every  word  he 
utters,  and  of  every  action  he  performs  through  life.  His  rela¬ 
tions  are  ever-chcinying. Like  a  traveller  changing  his  rela¬ 
tions  to  the  scenery  through  which  he  is  passing  at  every  step 
he  takes,  man  takes  up  new  relations  to  the  objective  universe 
through  every  moment  of  life,  relations  which  modify  all  those 
which  he  already  sustains,  and  all  which  await  him  in  the  fu¬ 
ture.  So  also  are  they  ever-increasing.  As  his  powers  are 
developed  and  advance  towards  maturity,  the  sphere  of  his 
knowledge  enlarges,  the  objects  which  attract  his  attention  mul¬ 
tiply  ;  the  points,  so  to  speak,  at  which  the  subjective  and  ob¬ 
jective  touch,  increase  daily.  He  takes  up  new  relations,  with¬ 
out  ever  becoming  entirely,  and  in  every  sense,  divorced  from 
any  which  he  before  sustained.  And  his  relations  are  univer¬ 
sal.  From  the  first  hour  of  life,  he  is  potentially  an  all-related 
being.  Before  he  knows  it,  the  capabilities  of  his  nature  pre¬ 
pare  him  for  entering  into  relations  with  every  department  of 
the  universe.  But  as  those  capabilities  are  developed  by  ac¬ 
tivity,  these  relations  become  matters  of  consciousness.  Look 
where  he  mav,  man  finds  himself  in  the  centre  of  multitudinous 


226 


MAN.. 


relations  stretching  away  into  infinity  and  eternity.  On  no  one 
point  can  he  lay  his  finger  and  positively  affirm,  Here  ends 
one  class  of  relations  and  begins  another.  Even  his  will  is 
conditioned  by  motives,  and  owes  its  freedom  to  its  harmonious 
relation  with  the  Supreme  will.  Viewed  in  this  relation,  the 
arched  heavens  become  a  dome  in  which  his  lightest  whis¬ 
per  is  repeated  through  all  nature,  and  carried  in  thunder  to 
the  throne  of  God ;  and  the  wide  earth  a  theatre  in  which  his 
softest  step  alights  on  chords  which  vibrate  through  eternity. 

23.  Among  the  reflections  to  which  this  view  of  man’s  rela¬ 
tions  gives  rise,  one  is,  that  every  man  must  be,  within  certain 
limits,  different  from  every  other  man ;  and  another,  that  the 
ways  in  which  man’s  relationships  may  be  disturbed  must 
be  indefinitely  numerous ;  and  a  third,  that  no  one  of  these  re¬ 
lationships  can  be  affected  without  affecting  all  the  rest.  On 
these  particulars  we  shall  have  hereafter  to  enlarge. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ORDER. 

1.  Man,  then,  is  an  all-related  being  in  an  all-related  system. 
Another  of  our  principles  suggests  the  idea  “  that  these  laws  of 
relation  themselves  do  not  come  into  operation  simultaneously 
nor  capriciously,  but  that  as  many  of  them  as  pre-existed  take 
effect  in  the  case  of  the  individual  man  according  to  the  order 
of  their  appearance  in  the  great  scheme  of  the  Divine  pro¬ 
cedure.”  For  as  by  the  law  of  continuity  with  progression, 
every  law  has  come  into  operation  in  orderly  succession,  that 
order  of  succession  is  itself  a  law.  And  as  laws  operate  uni¬ 
formly,  for  the  same  reason  that  they  operate  at  all  —  namely, 
for  the  purpose  of  manifestation,  the  order  of  their  introduction 
at  first  into  the  general  system  could  not  be  dispensed  with  in 
any  of  the  subsequent  stages  or  parts  of  the  manifestation,  with¬ 
out  defeating  the  design  of  their  introduction  at  all. 

2.  We  have  seen  that  the  order  in  which  the  great  physical 
laws  came  into  operation  is  the  mechanical,  the  chemical,  &c. 
Now,  as  far  as  we  can  affirm  anything  on  the  subject,  it  would 
appear*  that  in  that  process  by  which  man  subjects  all-pre-exist- 


ORDER. 


227 


ing  nature,  as  summed  up  in  the  animal  which  he  devours,  to 
his  own  nourishment,  the  same  order  prevails.  His  food,  when 
broken  down  and  prepared  by  certain  mechanical  operations, 
undergoes  various  chemical  changes,  and  then  presents  an  ap¬ 
pearance  which  has  been  aptly  called  animal  crystalization,  and 
is  afterwards  vitalized,  and  lastly  animalized. 

3.  Whether  the  order  in  which  the  different  senses  are  de¬ 
veloped  and  matured  is  amenable  to  this  law  must  remain  unde¬ 
termined,  owing  to  our  unavoidable  ignorance  of  the  requisite 
data.  It  is,  however,  important  to  remark  that  they  appear  to 
be  perfected  in  man  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  found  in  the 
ascending  ranks  of  animal  existence,  and  that  this  order  is  also 
the  order  of  their  importance  to  man  as  an  intelligent  being. 

4.  The  phenomena  of  intelligence  exhibit  the  same  orderly 
development.  “All  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience.” 
The  mind  begins  by  experiencing  a  sensation,  a  sensation  occa¬ 
sioned  by  that  external  world  which  preceded  its  own  existence ; 
and  from  this  source  comes  its  first  hint  of  knowledge.  This 
is  followed  by  perception,  a  spontaneous  judgment  of  the 
mind  bv  which  the  occasion  of  the  sensation  is  referred  to  a 
cause  external  to  it,  to  an  objective  world.  Beliefs  respecting 
the  objective  exist  anterior  to  our  reflection  upon  them.  The 
mind’s  first  communion  is  not  with  itself,  but  with  things  exter¬ 
nal  to,  and  apart  from,  itself.  Its  earliest  movement  is  direct, 
not  reflex.  Next  comes  the  reflective  understanding  —  com¬ 
paring,  abstracting,  generalizing,  and  combining  objects. 

5.  The  desire  of  knowledge  is  developed  according  to  the 
order  of  our  wants  and  necessities ;  being  confined,  in  the  first 
instance,  exclusively  to  those  properties  of  material  objects,  and 
those  laws  of  the  material  world,  an  acquaintance  with  which 
is  essential  to  the  preservation  of  our  animal  existence.”  From 
this  low  level  of  phenomena,  indeed,  man  rises  to  the  contem¬ 
plation  of  realities ;  passes  the  boundaries  of  the  sensible  into 
the  region  of  the  spiritual  and  the  infinite.  But  his  movement 
is  ever  in  the  order  of  progress  or  importance.  The  manifes¬ 
tation  of  his  instinctive  nature  precedes  that  of  his  intelligent 
nature,  and  indications  of  his  intelligent,  appear  earlier  than 
those  of  his  moral  and  spiritual  nature. 

6.  According  to  Hartley,  as  expounded  by  Mackintosh,*  “  the 
various  principles  of  human  action  rise  in  value  according  to 
the  order  in  which  they  spring  up  after  each  other.  We  can 
then  only  be  in  a  state  of  as  much  enjoyment  as  we  are  evi- 


*  Ethrial  Philosophy,  266. 


228 


MAN. 


dently  capable  of  attaining,  when  we  prefer  interest  to  the  ori¬ 
ginal  gratifications  ;  honor  to  interest ;  the  pleasures  of  imagi¬ 
nation  to  those  of  sense ;  the  dictates  of  conscience  to  pleasure, 
interest,  or  reputation ;  the  well-being  of  fellow-creatures  to  our 
own  indulgences  ;  in  a  word,  when  we  pursue  moral  good  and 
social  happiness  chiefly  and  for  their  own  sake.”  In  Hartley’s 
own  language,  “  theopathy,  or  piety,  although  the  last  result  of 
the  purified  and  exalted  sentiments,  may  at  length  swallow  up 
every  other  principle  and  absorb  the  whole  man.”  These  views 
are  objectionable  inasmuch  as  they  imply  that  one  reason,  at 
least,  why  so  few  men  are  pious  is,  not  owing  to  any  depravity 
of  heart,  but  because  piety,  or  theopathy,  is  “  in  the  order  of 
our  progress,  the  last  of  the  virtues ;  ”  the  “  theopathic  affection 
being  naturally  generated  out  of  the  preceding  virtues.”  Ante¬ 
diluvian  longevity  must  surely  have  afforded  man  time  sufficient 
for  attaining  this  last  of  the  virtues ;  and  yet  then,  if  ever,  im¬ 
piety  triumphed.  Animadverting  on  these  views  of  Hartley, 
as  far  as  they  relate  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  piety,  Dr. 
Wardlaw  justly  remarks,*  “  were  not  human  nature  in  a  fallen 
and  apostate  condition,  a  sense  of  God  would  enter  the  soul 
with  the  first  dawn  of  reason.  With  the  origin  of  piety,  or 
with  the  means  of  its  development,  we  have  not  now  to  do,  but 
simply  with  the  order  of  its  manifestation.  And,  whether  we 
regard  man  as  fallen  or  unfallen,  it  is  obvious  that  love  to 
God  could  not  enter  the  soul  'prior  to  the  dawn  of  reason ; 
that  the  emotions  which  it  involves  are  subsequent  in  the  order 
of  time  to  the  knowledge  of  Him  from  which  they  take  their 
rise. 

7.  Taking  the  individual  man,  it  is  evident  that  conscience 
presupposes  will,  for  it  is  only  with  voluntary  actions  and  de¬ 
sires  that  conscience  has  to  do.  The  will,  again,  presupposes 
emotion,  for  this  is  ever  exciting  to  volition.  And  hence,  doing 
a  thing  for  its  beneficial  consequence,  presupposes  the  power  of 
doing  it  for  its  own  sake,  for  how  else  would  its  consequence 
ever  have  been  known  ?  Obligation  is  antecedent  to  all  calcu- 
lation  of  consequences.  Emotion  supposes  thought  respecting 
the  object  which  has  led  to  the  emotion.  And  thought  points 
ultimately  to  some  sensation  from  without  as  its  occasion.  .  In 
the  order  of  nature,  the  objective  precedes  the  subjective.  And, 
regarding  man  in  his  practical  relations,  it  will  be  found  that  his 
desires  precede  his  dispositions,  his  inclination  to  appropriate, 
that  is,  precedes  his  readiness  to  distribute ;  that  the  proprietary 


*  Christian  Ethics,  403. 


ORDER. 


229 


or  possessory  feeling  is  anterior  to  that  sense  of  duty  which 
prompts  him  to  treat  others  as  he  expects  to  be  treated  by 
them.  And  even  this  sense  of  equity  may  exist  as  man  now 
is,  apart  from  every  sentiment  of  piety  towards  God.  We  have 
seen,  also,  that  external  nature  is  the  chronological  antecedent 
to  the  mind  —  experience  to  reason.  The  argument  a  priori 
supposes  an  a  posteriori  postulate  from  which  to  start.  So  also 
Divine  Revelation  presupposes  natural  religion.  Like  the  re¬ 
vealing  telescope,  it  presupposes  the  eye  which  is  to  look 
through  it.  The  truths  which  it  discloses,  however  new,  must 
harmonize  with  all  pre-existing  truth ;  and  the  evidence  on 
which  it  claims  to  be  believed,  relies  on  man’s  capacity  to  weigh 
and  appreciate  it.  For  its  reasonableness,  it  appeals  to  reason. 

8.  Looking  at  the  introduction  of  the  human  dispensation 
itself,  the  fact  ought  not  here  to  be  omitted  that  the  inorganic, 
the  organic,  and  the  sentient  stages  of  creation,  took  the  order 
of  pre-existing  nature.  According  to  the  inspired  historian, 
the  earliest  creative  arrangements  related  to  an  abyss  of  waters, 
and  then  to  the  formation  of  land.  These  were  followed  by  the 
introduction  of  vegetable  life  —  grasses  and  trees.  To  this  suc¬ 
ceeded  sentient  existence,  in  the  order  of  fishes,  water-fowl  and 
land-animals.  Now,  in  all  these  respects,  this  is  the  order  of 
Palaeontology  —  the  newly-named  science,  which  treats  of  the 
beings  that  lived  in  the  early  ages  of  the  world.*  Last  of  all, 
man,  distinguished  by  a  moral  nature,  was  called  into  being. 
And,  further,  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  an  order  corresponding 
with  the  order  of  nature  in  man’s  development,  was  observed  in 
the  primary  provision  made  for  his  well-being.  As  a  physical, 
organic,  and  sentient  being,  a  place  was  first  prepared  for  his 
reception,  in  which  “  grew  every  tree  that  is  pleasant  to  the 
sight  and  good  for  food.”  Next,  as  an  active  and  intelligent 
being,  he  was  put  “  into  the  garden  of  Eden  to  dress  and  to 
keep  it.”  His  moral  nature  was  next  consulted  in  the  prohibition 
which  taught  him  that  he  was  a  subject  of  the  Divine  government. 
And  thus  the  order  of  the  great  scheme  of  manifestation  was  in 
every  way  maintained.  The  Divine  perfections  appeared  in  the 
orderly  procession  of  power,  wisdom,  goodness,  and  holiness. 


*  This  order  “  is  a  corroboration,  so  far,  of  the  Mosaic  account  of  the 
Creation ;  in  which  (it  may  be  observed  by  the  way)  there  are  several 
points  of  coincidence  with  the  results  of  modern  scientific  investigation, 
not  a  little  remarkable  if  we  are  to  view  the  narrative  merely  as  tradi¬ 
tional  record  of  high  antiquity.”  From  an  Article  on  the  Vatiges  in  the 
“Westminster  Reviem” 


20 


230 


MAN. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

INFLUENCE. 

1.  The  law  of  influence  may  be  thus  expressed:  “everything 
occupies  a  relation  in  the  great  system  of  means,  and  possesses 
a  right  in  relation  to  everything  else,  according  to  its  power  of 
subserving  the  end ;  or,  everything  brings  in  it,  and  with  it,  in 
its  own  capability  of  subserving  the  end,  a  reason  why  all  other 
things  should  be  influenced  by  it,  a  reason  for  the  degree  in 
which  they  should  be  influenced,  and  for  the  degree  in  which  it, 
in  its  turn,  should  be  influenced  by  everything  else.”  For  if 
every  created  thing  necessarily  expresses  some  property  of  the 
Divine  Nature,  if  it  possesses  that  resemblance  on  the  condition 
of  manifesting  it  in  subserviency  to  the  great  end,  and  is  placed 
in  a  system  of  relations  in  order  that  it  might  be  able  to  make 
the  manifestation,  then  everything  will  sustain  an  active  and  a 
passive  relation,  or  will  have  a  right  to  influence  everything  of 
inferior,  and  a  susceptibility  of  being  influenced  by  everything 
of  superior,  subserviency  to  the  great  end  of  the  Divine  mani¬ 
festation. 

2.  In  the  pre-existing  kingdoms  of  nature,  this  law  univer¬ 
sally  prevails.  The  forces  of  inorganic  nature  are  found  to  be 
ranged  according  to  their  activity  and  energy,  or  their  capa¬ 
bility  of  producing  changes  ;  while  the  most  powerful  are  them¬ 
selves  susceptible  of  change.  In  the  midst  of  this  incessant 
play  of  physical  forces,  a  new  force  appears ;  vegetable  life, 
in  an  organized  form,  exercising  the  wonderful  power  of  in¬ 
fluencing  chemical  action,  and  of  thus  preparing  its  own  food, 
and  securing  its  own  growth.  A  higher  order  of  existence 
next  appears  in  the  form  of  sentient  being,  and  draws  its  sup¬ 
port,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  vegetable  life.  Looking  up 
the  scale  of  creation,  the  highest  order  of  being  at  any  par¬ 
ticular  time  existing  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  relative  end  of  all 
the  orders  below  it.  This  is  its  prerogative  by  right  of  the 
superior  power  which  it  possesses  of  answering  the  great  end 
of  creation.  Thus,  the  sentient  kingdom,  besides  illustrating 
the  Divine  power  and  wisdom  in  common  with  the  inorganic 
and  the  vegetable  creations,  displays  the  perfection  of  goodness 
in  addition.  But  now  a  being  superior  to  any  mere  sentient 
nature  has  come.  Looking  up  the  scale  of  creation,  we  behold 


INFLUENCE. 


231 


its  summit  occupied  by  one  capable  of  manifesting,  not  one  or 
two  perfections  merely,  but  the  very  image  of  God.  How 
great  may  we  not  expect  to  find  his  influence ! 

3.  On  inspecting  his  constitution ,  the  first  remarkable  charac¬ 
teristic  which  arrests  our  attention  is,  that  he  has  power  over 
himself.  His  superiority  of  constitution  is  not  produced  by 
leaving  out  of  his  nature  all  pre-existing  elements  —  by  the 
creation  of  a  being  utterly  new.  He  is  a  compendium  of  all 
that  preceded  him  —  physical,  organic,  and  animal.  And  over 
this  condensed  form  of  the  kingdoms  of  nature  lodged  in  hi3 
own  constitution,  he  is  called  to  reign.  To  this  end  he  is 
endowed  with  the  mysterious  power  of  observing  himself,  of 
analyzing  his  own  nature,  ascertaining  its  component  parts, 
measuring  the  comparative  strength  of  each,  and  of  knowing 
and  determining  how  to  apply  them. 

4.  He  is  endowed  with  that  mighty  spiritual  force,  a  free  will. 
In  the  exercise  of  this  regal  power,  he  can  command  away  the 
allurements  of  sense,  hold  in  abeyance  the  lower  propensities, 
and  despise  weariness,  suffering,  and  death.  He  has  the  faculty 
of  attention  ;  and  by  virtue  of  his  will  he  can  fix  his  eye  on 
what  object  he  pleases  in  the  procession  of  his  thoughts,  and 
can  dwell  on  it  until  it  has  shed  a  hue  and  an  influence  over  his 
whole  mind.  He  is  capable  of  belief ;  but  whether  or  not  he  will 
attend  to  the  probable  evidence  on  which  his  belief  of  a  moral 
truth  should  repose,  is  referred  to  his  will.  He  has  come  to  be 
the  centre  of  this  earthly  system  ;  and,  if  he  will,  <he  can  repra 
duce  parts  of  its  plan  in  his  own  mind ;  appropriate  and  revolve 
Divine  thoughts ;  and  thus  intellectually  sympathize  with  the 
Infinite  mind.  As  a  being  of  imagination,  he  can  regale  him¬ 
self  with  the  creations  of  ideal  excellence,  and  excite  himself  to 
energy  and  daring  by  motives  drawn  from  the  invisible  and  the 
unknown.  If  he  will,  he  can  mentally  call  for  objects  which 
shall  make  his  whole  nature  flame  with  emotion.  While  a  sense 
of  duty  can  add  strength  even  to  his  will,  and  give  to  it  the 
power  of  an  elemental  force. 

5.  And  the  longer  he  lives,  the  greater  his  self-regulating 
power  may  become.  In  his  efforts  at  self-development  he  dis¬ 
closes  a  spiritual  energy  unknown  to  all  material  nature,  and 
which  every  effort  tends  to  augment.  The  result  is,  a  distinctive 
character.  To  this  character  everything  henceforth  ministers  and 
adds  consolidation.  Works  refresh  and  reinforce  it.  Memory 
selects  for  it  congenial  facts.  Imagination  surrounds  it  with  a 
congenial  atmosphere.  Conscience  clothes  it  with  sacredness. 


232 


MAN. 


Habit  gives  to  it  the  stability  and  determination  of  a  natural  law. 
The  man  stands  in  awe  of  himself;  looks  into  the  dim  future, 
and  wonders  to  what  mighty  stature  his  nature  will  grow.  That 
he  is  a  cause,  a  distinct  power,  he  feels,  for  every  act  of  self- 
control  demonstrates  it.  That  he  is  a  person,  a  moral  agent, 
having  ends  of  his  own  to  accomplish,  he  is  deeply  conscious, 
for  he  feels  that  they  are  ever  in  progress.  But  where  is  the 
goal  ?  He  can  lay  plans  for  eternity.  His  nature  asks  a  bound¬ 
less  future  in  which  to  expand ;  and  often  will  his  far-reaching 
hope  flash  around  that  distant  and  unlimited  horizon,  and  show 
him,  as  by  momentary  coruscations,  the  indefinite  vastness  of 
the  realms  which  expect  him. 

6.  Such  is  the  constitution  of  the  being  who  came  to  take  his 
place  at  the  head  of  the  creation.  In  recognition  of  his  right, 
and  in  order  fo  the  development  of  his  powers,  the  kingdoms 
of  nature  were  at  once  given  into  his  hands.  He  was  made  for 
the  sovereignty.  He  could  not,  indeed,  change  the  laws  of 
nature ;  but  he  could  discover,  combine,  and  arm  himself  with 
their  powers.  They  were  all  ready  to  co-operate  with  him. 
He  could  not  divest  the  objects  of  nature  of  their  relative  rights; 
but  they  were  all  ready  to  adjust  and  subordinate  themselves  to 
his  superior  right.  By  cultivation,  he  gave  flavor  to  the  fruit, 
and  a  new  perfume  to  the  flower.  By  domestication,  he  trained 
the  noblest  animals  to  his  service,  and  yoked  them  to  his  car. 
The  law  had  gone  forth,  “the  fear  of  you  and  the  dread  of  you 
shall  be  upon  every  beast  of  the  earth and  everywhere  the 
law  took  effect.  Gradually  he  placed  himself  in  actual  relation 
to  all  things  around  him.  He  conformed  himself  to  them,  only 
that  he  might  bend  them  to  his  own  purpose. 

He  is  a  moral  being,  an  individual,  complete  in  himself,  and 
cannot  allow  himself  to  be  absorbed  in  the  undefined  generality 
of  nature.  His  constitution  forbids  it.  His  every  voluntary 
act  is  an  assertion  of  his  individuality.  It  is  this  idea  of  his 
individuality  which  is  ever  present  to  his  own  mind  as  the 
spring  of  his  activity.  It  is  this  which  places  him  in  friendly 
opposition  to  everything  which  is  not  himself,  with  an  effort 
to  attach  it  to  himself,  and  to  conform  it  to  himself.  It  is  this 
which  places  him  in  hostile  antagonism  to  every  obstacle 
which  impedes  the  proper  assertion  of  his  will,  and  renders 
him  restless  till  it  is  subdued.  He  is  not  satisfied  with  being 
himself  conscious  of  his  own  individuality.  Nature  must  record 
it.  He  must  have  it  acknowledged,  a  thing  settled.  This  high 
prerogative  of  his  must  be  imprinted  on,  and  reflected  from, 


INFLUENCE. 


233 


the  external  world.  Property  is  simply  the  outward  assertion 
of  this  inward  consciousness.  An  individual  himself,  he  essays 
to  individualize  other  things,  to  detach  them  from  their  previous 
vague  generality,  to  put  some  signature  of  his  own  upon  them, 
and  to  make  them  his  own  property.  He  must  cultivate,  fashion, 
produce,  utter  himself  in  acts  which  imprint  themselves  on 
objects.  And  the  nobler  his  mind,  the  loftier  the  order  of  the 
proofs  necessary  to  satisfy  his  own  sense  of  his  individuality. 
He  must  see  the  garden  of  Eden  itself  improve  under  his  hand. 
If  he  paint,  it  must  be  ideal  forms.  If  he  sculpture,  the  shape¬ 
less  marble  must  burn  as  with  a  god-like  life  within,  a  multi¬ 
plication  or  diffusion  of  his  own  existence.  If  he  build,  it  must 
be  a  temple,  the  shrine  at  once  of  his  own  thoughts,  and  of  the 
Deity.  Others  may  purchase  or  inherit  his  works,  still  they  can 
never  pass  from  him  —  never  cease  to  be  his  in  a  sense  superior 
to  that  in  which  they  can  ever  become  another’s — the  memorial 
of  his  individuality,  which  would  make  itself  be  heard,  and  could 
in  no  other  way  be  adequately  expressed.  He  and  they  are 
identified  for  all  time.  You  cannot  say,  he  and  they.  More 
properly,  you  point  to  them  and  say,  there  you  see  him.  And 
the  more  completely  he  surrounds  himself  with  his  own  works, 
multiplies  his  own  likeness,  the  more  is  his  individuality  demon¬ 
strated  to  his  own  satisfaction.  Were  not  his  efforts  constitution¬ 
ally  limited,  the  tendency  of  his  energy  would  be  to  establish 
himself  in  the  earth  as  the  sole  fact,  to  be  recognized  as  the 
only  power.  God  has  manifested  Himself  in  him,  and  he  labors 
to  externalize  himself  in  all  nature.  And  in  every  high  resolve, 
in  every  well-regulated  endeavor,  there  takes  place  in  the  midst 
of  nature  that  which  raises  and  ennobles  it,  and  which  manifests 
at  the  same  time  both  man  and  his  Divine  Maker. 

7.  Still  more  apparent  is  man’s  influence  on  his  fellow  man. 
When  we  come  to  examine  the  constitution  of  societv,  we  shall 
find  ourselves  surrounded  by  an  atmosphere  of  influence  in 
which  every  element  is  in  constant  and  vigorous  action  and  re¬ 
action.  Here,  man  speaks,  and  eloquence  is  born.  He  sings, 
and  poetry  melts  and  entrances.  He  desires,  and  art  becomes 
his  handmaid.  He  defines  and  resolves,  and  law  reigns.  He 
reasons,  and  philosophy  ascends  her  throne.  He  unites  his  will 
with  the  will  of  his  fellow  men,  and  a  world  of  his  own  appears. 
Here,  every  word  projects  an  influence,  and  acquires  a  history. 
Every  action  draws  after  it  a  train  of  influence.  Every  relation 
sustained,  is  a  line  along  which  is  unceasingly  transmitted  a 
vital  influence.  Every  individual  is  a  centre  constantly  radiating 

20* 


234 


MAN. 


streams  of  moral  influence.  From  the  first  moment  of  his 
active  existence,  his  character  goes  on  daily  and  hourly  stream¬ 
ing  with  more  than  electric  fluid,  with  a  subtle,  penetrating, 
element  of  moral  influence.  A  power  this  which  operates  in¬ 
voluntarily  ;  for  though  he  can  choose,  in  any  given  instance, 
what  he  will  do,  yet  having  done  it,  he  cannot  choose  what  in¬ 
fluence  it  shall  have.  It  operates  universally,  never  terminating 
on  himself,  but,  extending  to  all  within  his  circle,  emanates  from 
each  of  these  again  as  from  a  fresh  centre,  and  is  thus  transmit¬ 
ted  on  in  silent,  but  certain  effect,  to  the  outermost  circle  of  so¬ 
cial  existence.  It  is  indestructible  ;  not  a  particle  is  ever  lost, 
but  the  whole  of  it,  taken  up  into  the  general  system,  is  always 
in  operation  somewhere.  And  the  influence  which  thus  blends 
and  binds  him  up  with  his  race,  invisible  and  impalpable  as  it  is, 
is  yet  the  mightiest  element  of  society. 

8.  Superior  still  is  the  influence  which  man  possesses,  both 
over  himself  and  over  others,  in  “  having  power  with  God  ”  in 
prayer.  This,  indeed,  is  a  power,  not  resulting  from  natural 
law,  or  from  superior  might,  but  graciously  accorded  by  sove¬ 
reign  Goodness.  By  placing  himself  in  harmony  with  physical 
laws,  he  arms  himself  with  their  powers.  By  voluntarily  con¬ 
forming  himself  to  moral  laws,  he  clothes  himself  with  their 
sacredness.  But  by  placing  himself  in  harmonious  and  direct 
communication  with  God,  he  becomes  a  divine  realitv.  As  the 
magnet  arranges  itself  with  the  pole,  he  places  himself  in  a  line 
with  the  Highest,  and  becomes  a  medium  of  the  mightiest  in¬ 
fluence.  However  influential  other  means  may  be,  the  amount 
of  their  influence  is  calculable,  bearing  a  proportion  to  the 
power  employed  ;  but  prayer,  by  engaging  a  Divine  power,  sets 
all  calculation  at  defiance.  But  man’s  moral  and  spiritual  in¬ 
fluence  will  appear  more  conspicuously  at  the  close  of  the  next 
chapter. 

9.  Man,  however,  while  thus  capable  of  influencing  himself 
and  every  object  around  him,  is  himself  influenced  by  the  veiy 
objects  which  he  affects.  The  earth  and  a  gossamer  mutually 
attract  each  other,  in  the  proportion  of  the  mass  of  the  earth  to 
the  mass  of  the  gossamer,  but  only  in  that  proportion.  The 
plant,  while  acting  on  the  surrounding  atmosphere,  is  also  mod¬ 
ified  by  the  properties  which  it  changes.  And  the  human  char¬ 
acter  is  at  once  a  constitution  and  a  formation,  a  subjective 
power,  both  modifying  and  modified  by  objective  influences. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  his  subordinating  power,  because  it 
is  supreme,  is  therefore  absolute.  When  he  sinks  into  barba- 


SUBORDINATION. 


235 


rism,  external  nature  tyrannizes  over  him,  just  because  lie  him¬ 
self  is  then  in  an  unnatural  state.  And  in  the  case  of  every 
infant,  the  primary  object  of  parental  solicitude  is  to  save  it  from 
climatic  and  other  material  influences.  Nor  does  man  ever 
attain  an  earthly  condition  in  which  he  is  entirely  exempt  from 
their  power.  For  man  to  annihilate  or  absorb  them  is  as  im¬ 
possible  as  it  is  unnatural  for  him  to  be  absorbed  by  them.  The 
flat  which  made  man  sovereign  over  the  kingdoms  of  nature, 
recognized  their  claims,  as  well  as  proclaimed  his  power.  Sov¬ 
ereign  and  subjects,  supremacy  and  subordination,  are  terms 
which  imply  each  other. 


CHAPTER  X. 

SUBORDINATION. 

1.  In  harmony  with  the  preceding  law,  we  are  led  by 
another  of  our  principles  to  expect  “  that  everything  subordi¬ 
nate  in  rank,  though  it  may  have  been  prior  in  its  origin,  will 
be  subject  to  each  higher  object,  or  law,  of  creation.”  This  is 
only  saying,  in  effect,  that  in  no  case  shall  the  means  be  put  in 
the  place  of  the  end. 

2.  This  law  of  subordination  applies  to  the  different  parts  of 
the  human  constitution.  The  various  parts  of  this  constitution 
we  have  already  designated ;  have  shown  that  they  are  all  re- 
lated ;  and  that  they  observe  an  order  of  dependence  and  de¬ 
velopment.  Now,  whether  we  consider  the  great  end  for 
which  the  whole  exists,  the  manifestation  of  God  ;  or  the  coin¬ 
cident,  but  subordinate  end,  the  well-being  of  the  creature,  it 
it  cannot  be  a  matter  of  indifference  which  part  of  his  constitu¬ 
tion  is  appointed  or  allowed  to  control  the  rest.  No  part,  in¬ 
deed,  is  to  be  extinguished ;  for  each  of  its  laws  is,  in  one 
degree  or  another,  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the  whole 
But  the  ends  to  be  answered  by  the  whole,  require  the  gradu 
ated  subordination  of  the  parts,  as  much  in  the  constitution  of 
man  as  in  the  movements  of  the  solar  system.  Now  this  sub 
ordination  exists. 

3.  For  example,  in  common  with  the  mere  animal,  man  is  u 
creature  of  appetites  and  instinctive  desires.  And,  v  ere  he 


236 


MAN. 


nothing  more,  he  would  be  innocent  in  abandoning  himself  to 
their  gratification  —  in  acting  the  brute.  It  is  obvious,  however, 
that  they  cannot  be  left  uncontrolled  without  endangering  him 
who  indulges,  and  the  objects  which  excite  them. 

4.  Self-interest,  or  self-love,  is  a  higher  principle  of  action 
still.  It  is  appetite,  or  passion,  regulated  by  reason.  Passion 
prompts  to  instant  revenge ;  self-love  defers  it  till  it  can  be 
more  advantageously  taken.  Appetite  impels  the  man  to  eat ; 
self-love  directs  him  to  eat  only  so  as  to  conduce  to  his  health 
and  to  his  happiness  upon  the  whole.  Self-love,  then,  which 
is  al  ivays  looking  beyond  the  present  moment,  and  making  its 
calculations  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  requires  the  subordi¬ 
nation  of  the  appetites  and  the  passions  which  are  impelling  the 
man  to  immediate  indulgence.  But  self-love  itself  requires  sub¬ 
ordination  ;  for,  as  its  name  implies,  its  object  is  solely  the  pro¬ 
duction  of  our  own  happiness,  not  the  happiness  of  others,  nor 
the  attainment  of  the  great  end.  It  must  not,  however,  be  con¬ 
founded  with  selfishness,  which  viciously  seeks  for  gratification 
at  the  expense  of  the  rights  of  others,  or  in  objects  which  do 
not  properly  belong  to  us. 

5.  The  disinterested  and  social  affections  of  our  nature  rank 
higher  still.  They  hold  self-love  itself  in  subjection,  and  are 
superior  to  its  personal  calculations.  Paley,  indeed,  has  said, 
“  I  hold  that  pleasures  differ  in  nothing  but  in  continuance  and 
in  intensity.”  “  If  we  could  use  such  a  term  without  an  unbe¬ 
coming  disrespect  towards  a  virtuous  and  useful  writer  (re¬ 
marks  Dr.  Whewell)  this  opinion  •  might  properly  be  called 
brutish,  since  it  recognizes  no  differences  between  the  pleasures 
of  man  and  those  of  the  lowest  animals.  If  the  pleasures  of 
sense  differ  only  in  intensity  and  duration  from  the  pleasures  of 
filial  and  parental  affection ;  we  ought  to  know  how  many  days 
of  luxurious  living  are  equivalent  to  the  pleasure  of  saving  a 
father’s  life,  that  we  may  decide  rightly  when  these  claims 
happen  to  come  into  competition.”  Every  act  of  self-devotion 
recognizes  the  superior  value  of  the  benevolent  affections,  and 
the  admiration  which  it  excites  is  so  much  homage  rendered 
to  them. 

6.  The  principle  to  which  supremacy  is  assigned  in  the 
human  constitution  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  sense  of  duty, 
or  conscience,  including,  of  course,  that  love  to  God  which  is 
inseparable  from  love  to  goodness  for  its  own  sake.  To  man’s 
appetites  and  instinctive  desires  it  is  permitted  to  subordinate 
pre-existing  laws  and  objects  calculated  to  gratify  them.  But, 


SUBORDINATION. 


237 


if  unrestrained,  their  language  is,  We  must  be  gratified  to-day, 
even  at  the  risk  of  being  destroyed  to-morrow.  To  his  self-love 
it  is  given  to  subordinate  his  appetites'.  But,  if  uncontrolled, 
its  language  is,  I  know  of  no  end  greater  than  that  of  my  own 
happiness.  To  the  benevolent  affections  is  accorded  the  right 
of  subordinating  self-love.  But  to  conscience,  as  previously 
understood,  is  assigned  the  office  of  regulating  all  these  prin¬ 
ciples  of  action  ;  so  that  our  appetites  shall  not  injuriously 
affect  our  own  interests,  nor  our  own  interests  prejudice  those 
of  others,  nor  these  affect  the  claims  of  God ;  but  the  whole  be 
subordinated  to  an  end  greater  than  that  of  any  created  being. 
And  while  engaged  in  the  exercise  of  its  supremacy,  its  author¬ 
itative  language  is,  “  this  ought,  or  this  ought  not  to  be.”  In 
accordance  with  these  views,  Butler  represents  the.  brute  crea¬ 
tion  as  having  various  instincts  and  principles  of  action  ;  and 
as  obeying  these,  according  to  the  constitution  of  their  body, 
and  the  objects  around  them.  In  acting  according  to  these, 
brutes  “  act  suitably  to  their  whole  nature.”  Man,  too,  “  has 
various  instincts  and  principles  of  action  as  brute  creatures 
have  ;  ”  but  he  has  also  “  several  which  brutes  have  not  —  par¬ 
ticularly  conscience.”  “  And  this,”  he  adds,  “  compared  with 
the  rest,  as  they  all  stand  together  in  the  nature  of  man,  plainly 
bears  upon  it  marks  of  authority  over  all  the  rest,  and  claims 
the  absolute  direction  of  them  all,  to  allow  or  forbid  their  grati¬ 
fication.” 

7.  It  would  avail  little  for  the  attainment  of  the  great  end, 
that  this  law  of  subordination  existed  in  the  subjective  man,  if  a 
corresponding  arrangement  did  not  exist  in  the  objective  uni¬ 
verse  ;  if  each  part  of  man’s  constitution,  that  is,  had  not  its 
own  world  of  motives  ;  and  each  of  these  worlds  or  classes  of 
motives  had  not  been  invested  with  a  value  graduated  according 
to  their  importance  in  the  great  system  of  Divine  manifestation. 
Now  this  arrangement  actually  exists. 

8.  The  appetites  have  their  objects.  And,  though  they  are 
not  all  on  the  same  low  level,  yet,  as  a  class,  they  place  man  in 
a  relation  to  inferior  natures,  and  are  themselves  as  limited  and 
perishable  as  the  desires  which  they  excite.  Self-love  selects 
its  objects  as  the  result  of  reflection  ;  and  is  consequently  “  man¬ 
ifestly  superior  to  any  mere  propension.”  While  the  appetites 
seize  the  present,  and  are  appeased,  self-love  measures  the  dis¬ 
tant,  and  visits  the  unseen.  It  weighs  the  whole  of  my  happi¬ 
ness  against  the  gratification  of  any  single  moment.  It  visits 
my  future  self:  and,  on  the  principle,  that  the  longer  I  exist, 


238 


MAN. 


the  greater  will  be  my  capacity  for  excellence  and  happiness, 
and  that  the  whole  of  my  happiness  must  be  more  important 
than  any  passing  moment  of  it,  it  employs  the  present  in  the 
interests  of  that  more  important  future.  The  benevolent  affec¬ 
tions  have  their  objects  multiplied  indefinitely.  Self-love  obeys 
the  command,  “  Thou  shalt  love  thyself.”  Benevolence  is  un¬ 
der  the  wider  law,  “  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.” 
In  common  with  self-love,  it  contemplates  the  distant  future  ; 
but,  forgetful  of  self,  it  opens  its  arms  to  embrace  the  interests 
of  that  vast  whole,  of  which  it  forms  a  self-oblivious  part 
While  conscience,  having  to  recognize  the  rightness  of  objects, 
has  an  especial  affinity  for  everything  bearing  the  impress  of 
the  Divine  will.  The  appetites,  indeed,  and  self-love,  and  the 
benevolent  affections,  are  as  much  Divinely-originated  parts  of 
our  nature  as  conscience  itself.  And,  therefore,  it  is,  that  con¬ 
science  can  unite  with  and  sanction  them,  within  their  appointed 
limits ;  or  they  can  all  act  together.  But  regarding  a  man  as 
acting  on  only  one  of  these  principles  at  a  time,  the  force  of  con¬ 
science  must  be  admitted  to  be  more  sacred  and  commanding 
than  either  of  the  others,  in  proportion  to  the  loftier  character 
of  the  sphere  which  belongs  to  it. 

9.  Hence,  though  the  same  act  may  be  performed  from  mo¬ 
tives  drawn  from  each  of  these  classes,  there  is  no  comparison 
between  the  rightful  strength  of  the  other  motives,  and  of  that 
drawn  from  the  will  and  character  of  God.  The  sight  of  a 
piece  of  bread,  for  example,  may  awaken  in  a  man  the  sensa¬ 
tion  of  hunger,  and  he  may  eat  it  simply  to  gratify  his  appetite. 
Or,  though  not  hungry,  he  may  take  it,  from  a  prudent  selfdove, 
as  offered  to  him  by  one  whom  he  is  loth  to  disoblige,  because 
he  is  looking  to  him  for  some  future  advantage.  Or  he  may  eat 
it  as  the  means  of  strengthening  himself  for  a  journey  under¬ 
taken  for  some  neighborly  purpose.  Or  he  may  partake  of  it 
preparatory  to  some  great  conflict  in  which  the  authority  of  God, 
and  the  paramount  claims  of  rectitude,  are  at  stake.  Now,  who 
does  not  perceive  that  these  motives  are  drawn  from  an  ascend¬ 
ing  scale  of  importance  ;  and  that  the  last,  based  on  obligation , 
is  so  much  more  authoritative  than  the  others  that  it  ought  to 
be  obeyed,  even  though  it  were  opposed  by  th  combined  force 
of  the  other  three  ? 

10.  In  harmony  with  these  views,  man  exercises  an  influence 
over  the  mind  of  his  fellow-man  proportioned  to  the  rank  of  the 
truth  and  of  the  faculty  which  he  employs,  and  of  the  principle, 
and  the  intensity  of  the  principle,  by  which  he  is  actuated. 


SUBORDINATION. 


239 


Mere  physical  force  effects  little.  The  most  exterminating  per¬ 
secution  defeats  itself.  Any  apparent  exception  to  this  rule 
owes  its  existence  to  the  force  of  public  opinion,  and  not  to  per¬ 
secution  itself,  and  as  such  serves  to  illustrate  the  power  of  that 
opinion.  The  mightiest  machinery  is  moved  by  mind.  Every 
revolution  was  once  a  thought.  The  great  changes  of  society 
are  produced,  not  by  laws,  kings,  or  armies,  as  is  generally  sup¬ 
posed  ;  but  by  the  operation  of  a  power  stronger  than  all  these 
—  a  power  which  no  fires  can  burn,  no  armies  destroy,  but 
which  is  able  itself  to  extinguish  the  one  and  to  annihilate  the 
other  —  the  power  of  thought,  opinion,  principle.  These  are 
the  true  sovereigns  of  the  world.  By  the  constitution  of  the 
Divine  plan,  the  empire  of  time  has  been  given  to  them ;  and 
all  other  forms  of  power  are  only  their  creatures.  In  the  do¬ 
main  of  mind,  metaphysical  ideas  are  supreme.  Their  power 
is  not  limited  to  the  minds  which  conceive  them.  It  extends 
next  to  the  larger  circle  of  minds  which  comprehend  them. 
These  popularize  and  diffuse  them  to  a  wider  circle  beyond. 
Thought  propagates  itself  by  a  law  of  its  own  ;  and  in  propor¬ 
tion  as  it  loses  its  metaphysical  or  scientific  form,  it  becomes  a 
centre  of  feeling  and  force,  and  sains  in  its  influence  on  the 
general  mass.  The  debris  of  the  mountain-range,  though  inac¬ 
cessible  and  useless  in  its  Himalayan  heights,  when  triturated 
and  commingled  by  the  streams  which  bear  it  down  into  the 
valleys,  is  destined  to  form  the  fertile  plains  on  whose  produce 
nations  live.  TThile  the  earth  was  resounding  with  Alexander’s 
exploits,  Aristotle,  his  tutor,  was  silently  achieving  the  mightier 
conquest  of  the  human  mind.  The  Macedonian  empire  was 
soon  dismembered  and  extinct ;  but  the  mental  empire  of  the 
philosopher  continued  vigorous  and  entire  for  more  than  two 
thousand  years,  moulding  opinions,  affecting  creeds,  and  indi¬ 
rectly  guiding  the  popular  intellect  ;  nor  is  it  anything  like 
destroyed  yet. 

11.  It  may  be  expected,  however,'  that  of  all  the  thoughts  or 
theories  which  move  men,  the  mightiest  will  be  those  which 
partake  of  a  moral  nature.  And  it  is  so.  A  moral  truth  is 
greater  than  a  throne,  and  subverts  thrones.  It  has  a  throne 
of  its  own,  “  in  the  spirit  and  souls  of  men.”  Mighty  is  he  to 
whom  such  a  truth  first  comes,  or  by  whom  it  first  speaks  — 
mightier  than  all  men  that  have  it  not.  Based  on  all  that  is 
most  profound  and  central  in  our  nature,  it  draws  to  itself  the 
whole  depth  and  mass  of  our  being.  And  as  it  enlists  in  its 
cause  the  spiritual  and  untiring  part  of  ^ur  nature,  it  needs  no 


240 


MAN. 


pause,  allows  no  truce,  entails  its  quarrel  from  generation  to 
generation.  Hence  religion  is  ever  struggling  for  its  right  place 
and  influence  among  a  people  where  it  has  not  yet  obtained 
them ;  and  where  it  has,  that  place  is  found  to  be  the  centre  and 
summit  of  power,  where  it  becomes  the  bond  of  their  unity  and 
their  strength.  To  the  idea  of  God,  society  is  ever  unconsciously 
aiming  to  adjust  itself,  and  to  be  assimilated. 

12.  We  have  seen  that  man  is  actuated  by  principles  differing 
in  value  and  importance ;  and  we  may  expect,  therefore,  that 
his  influence  on  others  will  be  proportioned  to  the  rank  of  his 
moving  principle.  Accordingly,  we  find  that  the  man  who 
surrenders  himself  to  his  animal  appetites,  passes  on  himself  a 
sentence  of  isolation  and  insignificance ;  and  his  fellow-men  ratify 
the  doom  with  averted  face.  Self-government  is  the  primary 
condition  of  all  relative  influence ;  and  in  proportion  as  a  man 
displays  this,  even  in  the  pursuit  of  his  own  interests,  he  rules 
the  spirits  of  others.  “  Men  will  praise  thee  when  thou  doest 
well  to  thyself.”  The  man  who,  under  the  force  of  a  well-regu¬ 
lated  self-love,  keeps  his  eye  steadily  fixed  on  some  point  in  the 
future,  and  tramples  on  every  present  obstacle  in  the  way  to  it, 
influences  those  around  him  by  his  example  at  every  step  he 
takes.  The  benevolent  affections  tell  more  powerfully  still. 
They  surround  a  man  with  an  atmosphere,  which  whoso  breathes 
becomes  like  him.  The  open  heart  is  a  key  to  open  other 
hearts.  Compassion  melts  and  warms  the  icy  to  its  own  tem¬ 
perature.  Love  begets  love,  and  “is  stronger  than  death.” 
Actuated  by  these  affections,  a  man  goes  out  of  himself  only  to 
find  that  others  are  coming  to  him.  A  sense  of  duty  still  further 
augments  his  power.  The  force  of  a  higher  will  is  then  added 
to  his  own.  He  “  cannot  but  speak  the  things  which  he  has 
seen  and  heard.”  “  Necessity  is  laid  on  him.”  He  is  an  agent 
of  heaven.  Every  great  force  enters  into  his  character ;  sin¬ 
cerity,  which  all  confide  in ;  self-denial,  which  makes  room  in 
his  heart  for  God ;  faith,  which  sees  “  horses  and  chariots  of 
fire,”  and  which  can  hourly  remove  a  mountain ;  and  an  energy 
which  moves  with  face  and  step  direct  towards  its  object ;  qua! 
ities  which  all  hearts  bow  down  before  and  reverence. 

13.  When  the  being  moved  by  such  principles,  proposes  to 
himself  a  lofty  end,  he  still  further  augments  his  power.  He 
can,  we  have  said,  design  for  eternity.  If  the  design  which  he 
sets  before  himself  be  coincident  with  the  great  designs  of  God, 
he  assimilates  his  nature  to  the  Divine  nature,  and  shares  in  its 
greatness.  A  political  necessity  has  sometimes  compelled  the 


SUBORDINATION. 


241 


vicious  to  identify  themselves  for  a  time  with  great  interests ; 
and  the  effect  has  been  to  charm  them  temporarily  from  their 
degradation,  and  to  raise  them  to  an  elevation  of  character  winch 
has  shed  a  dignity  on  our  species.  But  he  who  surrenders 
himself  intelligently  and  voluntarily  to  a  great  object,  lifts  his 
whole  nature  at  once  and  for  ever.  He  no  longer  needs  par¬ 
ticular  rules  and  detailed  prescriptions.  He  is  a  law  to  himself ; 
rather,  he  is  obeying  all  laws  at  once,  without  feeling  that  he  is 
subjected  to  any.  By  aiming  at  the  highest  end,  he  carries  with 
him  the  influence  of  every  object  and  being,  moving  in  the  same 
direction.  He  is  made  free  of  the  universe,  and  admitted  into 
fellowship  with  all  goodness.  Time  yields  up  to  him  her  trea¬ 
sures,  and  eternity  lends  him  her  sanctions.  Already  he  speaks 
as  from  the  distant  future. 

14.  To  be  influential  in  the  highest  degree,  a  man  must  be 
not  only  actuated  by  the  highest  principles,  and  aim  at  the  high¬ 
est  end,  he  must  be  undivided  and  entire.  Just  so  much  friction 
as  takes  place  in  the  internal  working  of  a  piece  of  machinery, 
is  so  much  power  lost  to  the  application  of  the  machine.  Let  it 
be  supposed,  then,  that  the  man  is  internally  united  and  self- 
possessed,  that  his  principles  and  passions  harmoniously  combine, 
that  no  part  of  his  nature  is  wanting,  no  part  exercising  a  coun¬ 
ter-influence,  that  the  whole  man  is  bound  and  braced  up  as  if 
devoted  to  the  grand  experiment  of  seeing  how  much  a  single 
human  agent  can  effect :  let  it  be  supposed  further,  that  this  had 
become  his  fixed  character,  the  growth  and  habit  of  years ;  and 
that  he  had  acquired  it  as  the  result  of  indomitable  perseverance 
in  a  path  filled  with  allurements  to  beguile,  and  with  dangers  to 
deter,  and  in  such  a  man  we  have  a  combination  of  the  noblest 
influences  operating  in  the  most  intense  degree.  He  himself 
may  be  unconscious  of  his  power ,  but  the  evidence,  even  of 
this,  would  only  add  to  it.  He  may  be  great  enough  to  be  mis¬ 
understood  ;  but  his  influence  is  not  to  be  measured  by  moments 
or  miles ;  though  disinherited  of  the  present,  he  will  possess  the 
future.  “  Being  dead,  he  will  yet  speak,”  speak  as  from  heaven ; 
and  even  his  enemies  may  come  to  think  of  his  face  “  as  it  had 
been  the  face  of  an  angel.”  His  weight  is  felt  even  where  he 
is  not  intellectually  comprehended.  The  fearful  trust  in  him ; 
the  doubting  believe  in  him  ;  the  evil  secretly  admire  and  stand 
in  awe  of  him.  His  presence  is  felt  like  nature ;  and  the  mul¬ 
titude  open  and  make  way  for  him,  and  then  fall  into  his  train. 
He  belongs  to  the  party  which  has  ever  ruled  the  race ;  and 
which  has  given  to  the  world  its  sages,  and  martyrs,  and  heroes, 

21 


242 


MAN. 


and  benefactors ;  men  whose  memoirs  are  traditional,  to  whom 
statues  are  erected,  and  whose  names  become  titles.  But  sup¬ 
pose  him  in  favorable  circumstances,  and  among  those  by  whom 
he  is  appreciated  and  beloved,  and  his  life  is  a  perpetual  bene¬ 
faction,  and  a  diffusion  of  real  power.  The  mere  forms  of 
power  humble  themselves  before  him.  Wealth  and  glitter  are 
impoverished  by  his  presence.  Everything  good  tends  to  yield 
up  its  whole  nature  to  him,  and  he  imparts  it  to  others.  The 
last  effort  of  his  own  power  is,  to  bring  them  under  “  the  power 
of  the  Highest.” 

15.  Now,  it  was  as  a  being  charged  with  intellectual  and 
spiritual  influence,  and  capable  of  exercising  it,  that  man  became 
the  subject  of  moral  government.  That  government  did  not 
create  his  superiority ;  it  only  recognized  his  moral  powers,  and 
held  him  responsible  for  their  proper  exercise.  He  came  into 
a  grand  scheme  of  things,  all  the  objects  of  which  were  Divinely 
classified  before  he  came.  Here,  the  Providence  which  “feeds 
the  young  lions,”  notes  the  “  falling  sparrow,”  and  “  taketh  care 
for  oxen,”  had  apportioned  its  regard  according  as  its  object^ 
were  of  lesser  or  of  “  greater  value and  this  value  was  deter¬ 
mined  according  to  the  measure  of  the  capacity  which  an  object 
has  to  receive  and  to  exhibit  the  proofs  of  the  Creator’s  perfec¬ 
tions,  and  so  to  answer  the  end  of  creation.  On  this  principle 
of  classification  it  is  that,  on  man’s  appearance,  he  was  placed 
at  the  head  of  animated  nature.  He  was  “  of  more  value”  than 
all  that  preceded  him,  not  only  as  a  being  of  greater  capacity 
for  exhibiting  the  proofs  of  the  Divine  care,  but  chiefly  as  being 
capable  of  the  Divine  government.  A  new  aspect  of  the  Divine 
character  was  now  brought  to  light ;  and  man,  as  the  being  in 
whose  nature  it  was  to  shine  forth,  took  precedence  of  all  that 
had  gone  before  him,  and  passed  into  the  higher  sphere  of  moral 
government.  His  powers  enabled  him,  to  a  certain  extent,  to 
be  a  providence  to  himself,  and  a  governor  of  himself,  and  for 
this  he  was  to  be  held  responsible.  Every  faculty  within  hini 
estimated  by  the  Divine  scale  of  valuation,  had  a  worth  of  its 
own ;  and  he  was  to  appreciate  and  cultivate  each  accordingly. 
Every  object  without  him,  according  to  the  Divine  classification, 
had  its  own  place.  No  two,  differing  in  character,  occupied  the 
same  rank.  For  the  same  reason,  therefore,  that  God  is  to  be 
the  object  of  his  supreme  regard,  everything  else  is  to  be  re¬ 
garded  by  him  according  to  the  nearness  of  its  relation  to  Him. 
Every  differing  object  in  creation  is  calculated  to  affect  him,  and 
to  affect  him  differently  from  every  other  object ;  but  still  the 


OBLIGATION. 


243 


graduated  principle,  of  which  we  are  speaking,  supplied  the  law 
by  which  he  was  to  make  the  selection  of  objects  under  whose 
influence  he  would  live ;  he  was  to  surrender  himself  up  to 
them  in  proportion  to  their  tendency  to  educate  his  own  nature, 
to  develop  his  powers  of  self-government,  and  thus  to  invest 
him  with  the  greatest  amount  of  improving  influence  over 
others.  The  value  of  every  act  he  performed,  and  of  every 
habit  he  acquired,  was  to  be  estimated  by  the  same  rule ;  from 
the  movement  which  took  him  into  the  immediate  presence  of 
the  Deity  to  the  lowliest  duty  of  ordinary  life. 

16.  And  as  the  race  multiplied,  the  value  and  the  place  of 
every  member  of  it  was  to  be  decided  by  the  same  test.  In  the 
eye  of  God’s  great  principle  of  classification,  no  two  human 
beings  would  stand  in  precisely  the  same  subjective  relation  to 
Him,  or  exercise  precisely  the  same  kind  and  degree  of  hal¬ 
lowing  influence  upon  others.  He  'who  approached  nearest  to 
the  model  of  the  Divine  excellence  would  necessarily  be  the 
object  of  the  greatest  admiration.  And  as  admiration  leads,  by 
a  law  of  our  nature,  to  imitation,  men  were  to  be  always  ad¬ 
vancing  towards  higher  and  higher  degrees  of  perfection.  In¬ 
ferior  excellence,  being  constantly  drawn  upwards  by  the  strong 
moral  attraction  of  that  which  was  above  it,  a  process  of  assim¬ 
ilation  to  the  blessed  God  would  have  been  constantly  going 
on,  which  would  have  rendered  earth  a  copy  of  heaven.  The 
laws  of  influence  and  of  subordination  would  have  universally 
prevailed ;  or  every  one  would  have  occupied  a  relation  in  the 
great  system  of  means,  according  to  his  power  of  subserving  the 
ultimate  end. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

OBLIGATION. 

1.  Relations  give  rise  to  obligations.  “Every  human 
being  exists  under  obligations  to  promote  the  great  end  of  his 
existence,  commensurate  with  his  relations.”  So  that  he  is 
under  at  least  as  many  obligations  as  are  the  relations  which  he 
sustains ;  each  of  his  obligations  differs  with  the  corresponding 
relation  ;  and  every  change  or  increase  of  the  relations  involves 
a  change  and  increase  of  the  obligations.  What,  then,  are  his 
relations?  We  have  seen  that  he  sustains  relations  of  depen- 


244 


MAN. 


dence  and  influence,  of  order  and  subordination.  All  these  he  is 
bound  to  study,  in  order  that  he  may  know  his  obligations.  He 
is  endowed  with  intellect  expressly  that  he  may  know  them. 

2.  Observing  the  same  order  as  that  in  which  we  treated  of 
man’s  relations,  in  the  seventh  chapter,  we  begin  with  the  obli¬ 
gations  which  respect  his  constitution  coexistently  considered. 

There  are  relations  between  the  various  parts  of  his  physical, 
his  organic,  and  his  animal  systems  respectively ;  and  between 
these  three  systems  mutually  and  collectively.  Then,  each  of 
these  relations,  as  far  as  he  has  the  means  of  understanding  it, 
or  the  power  of  influencing  it,  brings  with  it  an  obligation  which 
requires  him  to  preserve  it  in  harmony  with  all  the  rest,  ac¬ 
cording  to  its  rank  in  the  human  constitution.  He  can  neither 
dwarf  nor  develope  either  of  these  parts  of  his  nature  beyond  a 
certain  point,  without  injuriously  affecting  the  claims  of  every 
other  part,  and  proportionally  unfitting  himself  for  answering 
the  end  of  his  being.  Much  less  can  he,  either  by  a  slow  pro¬ 
cess,  or  by  a  violent  act,  extinguish  his  life,  without  doing  vio¬ 
lence  to  every  law  of  obligation  he  is  under.  By  such  an  act, 
he  is  virtually  attempting  to  take  himself  out  of  the  loftiest  sys¬ 
tem  of  relations  the  universe  can  ever  know ;  to  deface  one  of 
the  most  glorious  representations  of  God  the  universe  contains ; 
and  is  doing  all  he  can  to  defeat  the  great  end  for  which  the 
universe  exists. 

3.  As  a  sentient  being,  endowed  with  intelligence,  he  is 
bound  to  do  all  he  can,  consistent  with  other  things,  for  the  pro¬ 
tection,  activity,  and  well-being,  of  the  organs  and  nervous  ap¬ 
paratus  placed  at  his  disposal.  The  impressions  received 
through  the  medium  of  one  sense,  are  to  be  compared  with, 
and  corrected  by,  those  received  through  another,  and  the  whole 
to  be  submitted  to  the  judgment,  and  thus  the  organs  of  sense 
are  to  be  —  as,  indeed,  they  must  have  been  with  the  first  man 
—  always  in  a  state  of  education. 

4.  Man  can  reflect ;  and,  as  such,  he  is  under  obligation  to 
bend  over,  look  in  upon,  and  ascertain  the  properties  and  laws 
and  ever- varying  manifestations  of  that  mental  and  moral  world, 
unknown  to  external  nature,  which  exists  within  him.  He  is 
to  mark  the  distinction  between  thought  and  its  products,  be¬ 
tween  the  mind  and  the  truths  which  the  mind  excogitates.  He 
is  to  study  the  legitimate  process  of  the  mind  in  reasoning,  or 
the  logical  connection  traceable  between  one  state  of  mind  and 
another ;  to  mark  the  causes  most  likely  to  disturb  that  con¬ 
nection,  and  to  avoid  them ;  and  to  observe  that  the  truth  of 


OBLIGATION. 


245 


his  own  consciousness  is  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all 
his  knowledge. 

5.  As  a  being  of  reason,  he  is  bound  to  remark  that  every 
act  of  reasoning  points  to  a  fact  out  of  himself,  and  in  which  it 
rests ;  that  the  particular  presupposes  the  universal ;  the  con¬ 
tingent,  the  necessary ;  the  subjective,  the  objective ;  and  that, 
in  reference  to  these  ultimate  facts,  his  intellectual  life  is  a  con¬ 
tinual  series  of  beliefs.  To  stop  short  of  the  perception  of 
these  ultimate  facts,  is  to  terminate  a  voyage  in  the  middle  of 
the  Atlantic.  By  pursuing  any  truth  either  to  its  origin  or  its 
end,  the  mind  logically  arrives  at  the  infinite  —  God.  Hence 
the  language  of  the  Apostle,  “  because  that  which  may  be  known 
of  God  is  manifest  in  them,  for  God  hath  showed  it  unto  them ; 
so  that  they  are  without  excuse.” 

6.  Imagination  imposes  another  obligation.  Its  sphere  is  the 
possible,  and  its  office  to  create.  If  it  exist  in  excess,  man  is 
in  danger  of  surrounding  himself  with  objects  and  worlds  at 
variance  with  the  interests  of  the  present,  of  surrendering  him¬ 
self  to  the  ideal  to  the  neglect  of  the  actual.  If  it  be  deficient, 
another  class  of  dangers  are  incurred ;  the  mind  is  liable  to  be 
so  absorbed  by  the  actual  and  the  present,  as  to  be  insensible  to 
the  possible  and  the  future,  insensible  even  to  those  suggestions 
respecting  the  invisible  to  which  the  visible  was  intended  to 
lead.  Man  is  under  obligation,  therefore,  to  acquaint  himself 
with  the  mediating  faculty  of  his  nature,  and  to  direct,  repress, 
or  encourage  it,  according  as  its  tendency  and  the  measure  of 
its  activity  may  require. 

7.  The  power  of  employing  language,  with  which  man  is 
endowed,  increases  his  obligations.  For  although  we  are  not 
now  speaking  of  the  use  which  he  makes  of  it  in  his  commu¬ 
nication  with  others,  his  obligations  respecting  it  are  logically 
prior  to  his  actual  employment  of  it  in  speech.  There  is  an 
internal  discourse  ( sermo  interims)  as  well  as  an  external  dis¬ 
course.  Language  is  an  instrument  of  thought,  as  well  as  a 
means  of  imparting  our  thoughts.  And  there  is  a  tendency  in 
words  to  become  “  incantations.”  “  Like  the  Tartar’s  bow,  they 
direct  their  attack  backward  on  the  intellect,  whence  they  have 
had  their  origin.”  Or,  if  a  man  breathe  the  softest  whisper  in 
soliloquy,  it  reacts  with  certain  effect  upon  himself.  His  own 
mind  is  a  whispering-gallery  in  which  the  lightest  utterance 
reverberates  for  ever. 

8.  As  a  being  capable  of  motives,  he  is  bound  to  mark  what 
fart  of  his  nature  is  most  easily  moved  —  his  appetites,  his  self- 

21* 


246 


MAN. 


love,  his  affections,  or  his  sense  of  duty ;  what  view  of  an  ob¬ 
ject  most  easily  moves  it ;  and  what  the  degree  is  to  which  it  is 
moved.  It  is  only  in  this  way  that  he  can  become  acquainted 
with  that  natural  character  imparted  by  physical  temperament, 
which,  however  susceptible  of  modification  and  direction,  always 
gives  a  complexion  to  the  moral  character  of  its  possessor,  and 
distinguishes  him  from  every  other  human  being.  The  dis¬ 
covery  of  the  precise  locality  of  the  poles,  would  be  as  nothing 
to  him,  compared  with  the  knowledge  of  his  own  character. 

9.  Man  is  a  voluntary  being,  and  is  bound  to  remember  the 
high  and  solemn  office  of  his  will ;  that  to  will  is  to  act ;  that 
his  will  is  the  executive  power  of  the  kingdom  within  him.  He 
is  to  mark  its  individual  character,  whether  it  be  hasty  or  delib¬ 
erate  in  its  decisions,  feeble  or  energetic  in  carrying  them  into 
effect  —  that  it  may  receive  the  appropriate  treatment. 

10.  But  each  volition  sustains  a  relation  to  his  conscience, 
as  a  movement  which  ought,  or  ought  not,  to  be.  Then  he  is 
bound,  before  he  wills  or  resolves  on  an  action,  to  be  satisfied 
that  it  is  morally  right ;  to  pause  if  he  even  doubts  respecting 
its  rectitude ;  to  respect  the  softest  whisper,  the  least  move¬ 
ment,  of  conscience  ;  and  thus  to  “  make  conscience  ”  of  every¬ 
thing.  When  he  has  performed  it,  he  ought  to  examine  the 
intention  with  which  he  acted ;  to  live  in  the  salutary  dread  of 
violating  conscience ;  and  thus  to  recognize  its  sacredness  and 
supremacy.  As  he  is  a  voluntary  being,  he  is  not  to  expect 
that  conscience  will  speak  in  thunder  and  lightning  except  in 
extreme  cases  ;  but  is  to  act  on  the  remembrance  that  the  per¬ 
fection  of  conscience  is  that  it  speaks  loud  enough  to  be  heard 
by  the  attentive  ear,  but  not  so  loud  as  to  affright  or  force  the 
voluntary  part  of  his  nature. 

11.  Not  only  does  every  part  of  man’s  nature  bring  with  it 
a  corresponding  obligation,  but  every  moment  in  which  it  exists 
continues,  and  even  increases,  each  of  these  obligations.  His 
internal  nature  has  a  history  no  less  than  his  external  proceed¬ 
ings.  Let  it  be  conceived  that  each  faculty  and  function  of  his 
intellectual  constitution  has  been  bestowed  on  him  separately 
and  in  slow  succession,  and  the  profound  interest  which  would 
have  been  attached  to  his  internal  history  may  be  easily  imag¬ 
ined.  But  that  interest  is  not  really  less  because  they  all  co¬ 
exist  potentially  from  the  first.  For  their  actual  awakening 
takes  place  gradually.  They  become  adjusted  and  related  to 
their  proper  objects  in  slow  succession.  And  as  this  awakening 
of  the  internal  relations  is  from  the  less  to  the  greater,  the  change 


OBLIGATION. 


247 


of  the  man’s  obligations  is  from  the  less  to  the  more  numerous 
and  imperative.  It  is  impossible  for  him  to  do  what  he  is 
bound  to  do  in  reference  to  the  different  parts  of  his  constitu¬ 
tion,  without  becoming  more  and  more  capable  of  virtue ;  and 
for  this  progressive  capacity  he  is  held  responsible.  He  cannot 
legitimately  exercise  his  intellectual  powers,  for  instance,  with¬ 
out  obtaining  an  increase  of  knowledge :  his  memory  retains 
the  past ;  his  attention  acquires  a  command  over  the  present ; 
and  habit  facilitates  his  acquisition  for  the  future.  He  cannot 
rightly  cultivate  the  emotional  part  of  his  nature,  without  find¬ 
ing  himself  increasingly  moved  by  objects  according  to  their  real 
worth.  The  appropriate  exercise  of  conscience,  every  time  it 
is  called  into  action,  cannot  fail  to  increase  the  promptitude  and 
authority  of  its  decisions.  While  the  habit  of  thus  knowing, 
appreciating,  and  morally  discriminating,  which  these  voluntary 
acts  tend  to  form,  increases  his  means  of  improvement  for  all 
time  to  come. 

12.  Besides  this,  the  different  parts  of  his  nature  are  mutu¬ 
ally  related  and  as  their  progressive  enlargement  depends  on  the 
harmonious  combination  of  the  whole,  he  is  answerable  for  that. 
They  range  in  a  graduated  scale  in  which  each  has  its  place,  so 
that  the  lowest  cannot  be  disparaged  nor  the  highest  overrated, 
without  injury  to  the  whole.  At  every  moment  of  his  existence, 
he  is  responsible  for  such  a  capacity  for  virtue  as  he  would  have 
acquired  by  the  perfect  cultivation,  through  every  previous 
moment  of  his  being,  of  all  his  powers  in  harmonious  combina¬ 
tion  ;  such  a  capacity  for  virtue  being  the  only  capacity 
“adapted  to  the  responsibilities  of  that  particular  moment.” 
Mere  sinlessness,  even  for  a  moment,  is  impossible.  The  nature 
of  a  moral  being  involves  the  necessity,  at  every  moment,  of 
actual  compliance  with  every  known  claim  of  law,  or  else  the 
actual  refusal  of  such  compliance.  He  is  held  responsible, 
from  moment  to  moment,  not  merely  for  sinlessness,  but  also 
for  all  the  positive  excellence  which  it  had  been  in  his  power  to 
attain.  “  That  is  to  say,  under  the  present  moral  constitution, 
every  man  is  justly  held  responsible,  at  every  period  of  his  ex¬ 
istence,  for  that  degree  of  virtue  of  which  he  would  have  been 
capable,  had  he,  from  the  first  moment  of  his  existence,  im¬ 
proved  his  moral  nature,  in  every  respect,  just  as  he  ought  to 
have  done.”  *  It  can  hardly  be  necessary  to  repeat,  that,  in 
order  to  justify  this  ever-increasing  responsibility,  man  is  sup- 


*  Waylancl’s  Moral  Science,  c.  iii.  §  2. 


248 


MAN. 


posed  to  be  endowed  with  the  intelligence  necessary  to  perceive 
his  relations,  and  with  a  moral  nature  for  making  him  conscious 
of  the  corresponding  obligations. 

13.  But  all  those  obligations  answering  to  man’s  internal 
relations,  presuppose  the  existence  of  a  corresponding  objective 
system.  His  relations  to  the  external  world  require,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  that,  in  order  to  the  preservation  of  health,  a  certain 
portion  of  every  day  should  be  given  to  the  reception  of  food, 
to  the  exercise  of  the  nervous  and  muscular  systems,  and  to 
rest ;  for  the  preservation  of  health  is  essential  to  his  answering 
the  end  of  his  existence.  “  Every  one  that  striveth  for  the 
mastery  is  temperate  in  all  things” — goes  through  the  physical 
discipline  necessary  to  attain  the  best  condition  for  ensuring 
success.  And  even  the  attainment  of  a  spiritual  end  will  not 
exempt  a  man  from  the  necessity  of  employing  the  appropriate 
physical  means. 

14.  If  every  organ  of  sense  is  improved  by  exercise,  he  is 
bound  to  seek  that  improvement.  If  each  bears  a  special  rela¬ 
tion  to  certain  external  properties  and  objects,  on  all  these 
objects  he  is  bound  to  exercise  them.  If  the  brain  as  well  as 
the  senses  requires  education  in  order  to  secure  its  best  action, 
and  if  the  condition  of  his  physique  operates  in  modifying  the 
manifestations  of  his  morale,  he  is  bound  to  subject  his  nervous 
system  to  a  certain  degree  of  excitement,  and  thus  gradually 
to  conduct  it  to  its  highest  powers  of  natural  action. 

15.  As  a  reflective  being,  capable  of  tracing  the  relations  of 
external  nature,  he  is  bound  to  study  the  qualities  of  objects, 
and  their  relations  of  causation,  succession,  and  resemblance, 
and  his  own  relations  to  them ;  to  mark  the  analogy  of  each 
with  all ;  to  trace  the  plan  which  comprehends  and  unites  the 
whole ;  to  ascertain  the  best  method  or  methods,  of  arriving  at 
these  results ;  to  observe  that  nothing  can  be  studied  entirely 
apart  and  in  isolation  from  other  things,  without  erroneous 
conclusions ;  to  mark  his  own  position  at  the  head  of  creation ; 
and  to  regard  himself  as  placed  there  to  learn  the  power,  the 
wisdom,  and  the  goodness  of  God  which  creation  displays. 
“  For  the  works  of  the  Lord  are  great,  sought  out  of  all  them 
that  have  pleasure  therein not  that  the  pursuit  of  this  divine 
knowledge  is  optional  for  those  that  have  no  pleasure  therein. 
For,  “  because  they  regard  not  the  works  of  the  Lord,  nor  the 
operation  of  his  hands,  therefore  shall  he  destroy  them,  and  not 
build  them  up.” 

16.  As  a  creature  endowed  with  reason ,  he  is  under  obligation 


OBLIGATION. 


249 


to  mark  that  different  kinds  of  truth  require  different  kinds  of 
evidence,  and  that  proof,  as  a  process,  is  not  universally 
necessary  nor  possible,  owing  to  the  subject,  not  to  the  object. 
He  is  bound  to  distinguish  the  truths  of  reason  from  those  of 
induction ;  truths  necessary  from  those  which  are  contingent ; 
truths  without  which  the  understanding  could  not  take  its  first 
step,  and  induction  would  be  impossible ;  truths  which  the 
understanding  presupposes  in  its  every  movement.  He  is  to 
remark  that  he  comes  into  a  vast  circle  of  pre-existing  objective 
truth,  —  truth  which  he  is  preconfigured  to  recognize  and 
believe,  and  on  the  instinctive  belief  of  which  his  safety  and 
welfare  depend;  that  even  physically  he  is  “saved  by  faith”  in 
these  truths,  and  that  in  this  intuitive  belief  of  objective  truth 
consists  the  union  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective. 

17.  As  a  rational  being  capable  of  articulate  speech ,  he  is 
bound  to  study  the  laws  of  language  as  the  means  of  communi- 
cation  with  his  fellow  men.  Words  are  “  notionum  tesserae,” 
and  he  is  under  an  obligation  to  call  things  by  their  right  names, 
and  to  communicate  nothing  but  what  he  believes  to  be  truth. 
He  is  bound  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  laws  of  argumentation, 
or  logic  as  an  art,  for  the  jmrpose  of  informing  and  convincing 
the  judgment  ;  of  persuasion,  or  rhetoric,  for  the  purpose  of 
moving  the  passions ;  of  verbal  evidence,  or  testimony,  for  the 
purpose  of  inducing  belief  and  respect  for  authority  ;  as  well  as 
to  observe  that  all  evidence,  not  demonstrative,  admits  of 
degrees ;  and  to  remember  that  every  word  he  utters  is  a  seed 
which  germinates  for  eternity. 

18.  He  is  susceptible  of  emotion,  and,  as  such,  he  is  bound  to 
acquaint  himself  with  all  the  phenomena  calculated  to  move 
him  ;  to  classify  them  according  as  they  appeal  to  his  passions, 
his  self-love,  his  affections,  or  his  conscience ;  to  rank  them 
according  to  their  importance  ;  to  yield  himself  most  to  the 
highest  and  the  best ;  and  to  carry  out  his  emotions  to  their 
final  objects  in  appropriate  external  action.  That  is  to  say, 
there  is  a  state  or  affection  of  the  mind  appropriate  to  every 
external  object,  which  every  object  when  brought  before  the 
mind  is  adapted  to  produce,  and  which  every  mind,  when  the 
object  is  beff  re  it,  is  susceptible  of  experiencing ;  and  a  state 
or  affection  of  the  mind  which  every  voluntary  being,  therefore, 
is  bound  to  exhibit.  The  external  action  corresponding  to  that 
state  of  the  mind  may  or  may  not  be  performed.  If  it  cannot 
be  performed,  still  the  feeling  was  due  to  the  objects,  and  the 
language  of  Scripture  then  is,  “  It  was  well  that  it  was  in  thine 


250 


MAN. 


heart.”  But  even  though  the  appropriate  action  be  performed, 
if  the  corresponding  feeling  be  absent,  the  obligation  is  violated, 
for  the  action  is  performed  from  a  wrong  motive.  Thus,  when 
God  enjoins  certain  actions  —  such,  for  example,  as  the  imparta- 
tion  of  our  substance  to  the  needy — it  is  not  that  he  requires 
the  mere  external  act  of  almsgiving,  for  his  word  expressly 
declares,  that  though  a  man  “  bestow  all  his  goods  to  feed  the 
poor,”  yet  “  if  he  have  not  charity  it  profiteth  him  nothing.” 
The  meaning  is,  then,  that  there  is  a  certain  state  of  mind  to¬ 
wards  our  indigent  fellow-creatures  which  we  are  bound  to 
cultivate,  and  which  would  certainly  impel  us  to  act  for  their 
relief.  And  the  same  view  explains  the  fact  that  we  are  held 
responsible  for  the  formation  of  our  opinions  and  our  belief,  as 
well  as  for  our  outward  conduct,  and  justifies  the  style  of 
injunction  and  command  in  which  the  Bible  imperatively  de¬ 
mands  this  belief.  There  is  a  state  of  the  affections  appropriate 
to  every  truth  which  can  be  brought  before  the  mind,  to  every 
kind  and  degree  of  evidence  by  which  its  claim  to  our  belief 
can  be  supported,  and  to  every  being  that  can  present  and  en¬ 
force  it.  In  commanding  our  belief  of  Divine  revelation,  we  are 
supposed  to  have  uniformly  cultivated  such  a  state  of  mind  to¬ 
wards  the  infinite  excellence  of  God  as  would  produce  a  supreme 
regard  for  his  will,  as  soon  as  ever  the  appropriate  evidence  of 
His  will  was  laid  before  us.  This  state  of  mind  we  are  bound 
to  maintain.  But  if,  failing  to  maintain  it,  we  pass  into  a  state  of 
mind  in  which  the  convincing  power  of  the  appropriate  evidence 
is  lost,  this,  so  far  from  excusing,  aggravates  the  guilt  of  our 
unbelief. 

19.  But  this  supposes  that  man  is  able  to  direct,  or,  in  some 
sense,  to  control  his  emotions.  As  a  voluntary  being,  he  pos¬ 
sesses  this  power.  In  saying  that,  as  a  sentient,  reflective,  ra¬ 
tional,  and  speaking  being,  he  is  placed  in  certain  definite  rela¬ 
tions  to  every  object  and  event  without  him,  his  emotional  nature 
is  supposed ;  for  unless  he  had  the  capability  of  being  moved 
by  them,  such  relations  would  be  impossible.  And  in  saying  that, 
as  a  being  placed  in  these  emotional  relations  to  the  objective 
universe,  he  is  held  responsible  for  maintaining  them  unimpaired, 
his  voluntary  nature  is  presupposed  ;  for,  as  his  emotions  follow 
his  perceptions  of  objects  necessarily ,  unless  he  had  the  power 
of  directing  his  perceptions  to  objects,  or  of  withdrawing  it  from 
them,  respor  sibility  for  the  consequent  emotions  and  affections 
of  his  mind  would  be  impossible.  This  voluntary  power  we 
have  shown  that  he  possesses.  Hence  he  is  responsible  for  his 


OBLIGATION. 


251 


external  conduct  only  as  that  conduct  is  the  expression  of  the 
state  of  his  mind,  just  because  that  state  of  mind  depends  on  the 
attention  given  to  certain  objects,  and  that  attention  is  voluntary. 

So  also,  he  is  responsible  for  his  opi?iio7is,  not  directly,  (for  the 
same  opinions  may  be  adopted  under  the  influence  of  very 
widely  different  feelings,)  but  only  as  they  are  significant  of 
those  dispositions  which  led  to  their  adoption ;  just  because 
those  dispositions  are,  in  the  way  which  we  have  described, 
subjected  to  his  will.  In  forming  an  opinion  of  an  object  there¬ 
fore —  say  of  its  size,  color,  and  figure  —  he  is  bound  to  place 
himself  at  the  right  distance,  and  in  the  right  position,  for  the 
examination.  IVould  that  this  obligation  were  recognized  in 
ethics  as  it  is  in  physics  !  In  forming  his  estimate  of  character, 
say  of  the  character  of  the  infinitely  blessed  God — he  is  bound 
to  regard  it  in  its  different  relations  and  excellences,  to  place  it 
in  comparison  with  that  of  others,  and  so  to  keep  it  before  his 
mind  that  he  may  be  filled  with  holy  admiration  of  it.  And  in 
adopting  his  views  of  the  Gospel,  he  is  bound  not  merely  to 
weigh  its  divine  evidences,  but  to  bring  to  that  exercise  such 
predispositions  for  truth,  and  such  susceptibilities  of  conviction, 
as  could  only  result  from  having  fulfilled  every  moral  obligation 
through  every  preceding  moment  of  life.  In  the  conduct  of  his 
will,  therefore,  he  is  bound  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  whole 
range  of  his  moral  obligations ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  will  of 
God  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  eternal  right,  and  is,  as  far 
as  it  has  been  made  known,  the  expression  of  that  right,  he  is 
bound  to  acquaint  himself  with  all  the  manifestations  of  that 
will,  and  to  keep  his  own  in  entire  accordance  with  it. 

20.  As  a  moral  being,  capable  of  recognizing  all  his  relations, 
and  aware  that  everv  relation  involves  an  obligation,  he  is  bound 
to  live  under  an  habitual  sense  of  duty,  and  especially  of  duty 
as  enjoined  on  him  by  the  will  of  God ,  which  is  the  exposition  of 
His  character.  Duties  would  be  due  from  one  moral  creature  to 
another,  even  supposing  them,  if  it  be  possible,  to  exist  without 
a  Creator.  But  (in  the  language  of  Dr.  Wayland),  “as  every 
creature  is  the  creature  of  God ,  He  has  made  the  duties  which 
they  owe  to  each  other,  a  part  of  their  duty  to  Him.  The  duties, 
therefore,  which  are  required  of  us  to  our  fellow  creatures,  are 
required  of  us  under  a  twofold  obligation,  —  First,  that  arising 
from  our  relation  to  God ;  and,  secondly,  that  arising  from  our 
relation  to  our  tellows.  And,  hence,  there  is  not  a  single  act 
which  we  are  under  obligation  to  perform,  which  we  are  not  also 
under  obligation  to  perform  from  the  principle  of  obedience  to 


252 


MAN. 


God.  Thus  the  obligation  to  act  religiously  or  piously,  extends 
to  the  minutest  action  of  our  lives.  And  no  action  of  any  kind 
whatever  can  be,  in  the  full  acceptation  of  the  term,  virtuous  — 
that  is,  be  entitled  to  the  Divine  commendation,  which  does  not 
involve  in  its  motives  the  temper  of  filial  obedience  to  the  Deity. 
And  still  more,  as  this  obligation  is  infinitely  superior  to  any 
other  that  can  be  conceived,  an  action  performed  from  the  force 
of  any  motive,  to  the  omission  of  this  superior  obligation,  fails, 
in  infinitely  the  most  important  respect ;  and  must,  by  the  whole 
amount  of  this  deficiency,  expose  us  to  the  condemnation  of  the 
law  of  God,  whatever  that  condemnation  may  be.” 

21.  All  this,  of  course,  supposes  the  existence  of  a  subjective 
morality  and  of  an  objective  morality — of  the  laws  of  conscience 
within,  and  of  a  moral  Lawgiver  on  high ;  and  it  supposes  also 
the  relation  of  the  two.  In  a  preceding  chapter,  we  have  shown 
that  these  relations  exist.  God  has  made  man  capable  of  knowing 
His  will,  and  has  placed  him  in  the  midst  of  a  system  in  which 
he  is  constantly  solicited  to  inquire  after  him.  Hence  he  is 
bound  to  watch  for  every  intimation,  however  expressed ,  and  to 
treasure  up  every  fact,  relative  to  the  Divine  will,  which  his 
powers  and  opportunities  permit.  God  has  made  man  capable 
of  appreciating  moral  excellence,  and  has  revealed  himself  as  a 
being  of  unlimited  power,  and  wisdom,  and  goodness,  and  holi¬ 
ness  ;  then  man  is  under  obligation,  from  the  moment  his  mind 
perceives,  or  is  capable  of  perceiving,  this  objective  excellence, 
to  love  it  with  unlimited  affection,  or  with  affection  limited  only 
by  the  capacity  of  his  nature.  God  has  created  man  capable  of 
voluntarily  serving  Him ,  and  of  promoting  the  great  end  of  crea¬ 
tion,  and  has  furnished  him  with  the  requisite  laws  to  regulate 
his  conduct.  Then  man  is  to  obey  them.  His  conscience  is  so 
configured  to  the  relations  of  the  system  into  which  he  is  intro¬ 
duced,  that  there  is  not  one  of  his  voluntary  movements  which 
does  not  violate,  or  harmonize  with,  the  constitution  and  course 
of  external  nature,  and  with  his  own  relations  to  it.  The  whole 
world  is  a  Sinai  whence  the  great  Lawgiver  is  perpetually  issu¬ 
ing  His  commands.  And  God  has  made  man  capable  of  deriving 
happiness  from  every  act  of  voluntary  obedience,  and  represents 
Himself  as  glorified  by  it.  In  other  words,  God  has  been  pleased 
to  identify  man’s  happiness  with  his  own  glory — the  ultimate 
end  of  creation  with  man’s  proximate  end,  his  own  vrell-being. 
A  supreme  regard,  then,  for  the  will  and  character  of  God  is, 
under  such  a  constitution  of  things,  the  only  principle  of  action 
suited  to  our  nature. 


OBLIGATION. 


253 


22.  For,  as  to  ourselves ,  since  each  of  all  our  actions  is 
amenable  to  law,  and  since  to  each  is  appended  results  deter¬ 
mined  by  omnipotence,  it  is  clear  that  our  happiness  can  be 
secured  only  by  the  harmony  of  our  conduct  with  the  law. 
And  as  we  are  voluntary  beings,  we  cannot  be  happy  unless 
we  act  as  we  choose.  In  order  to  our  happiness,  then,  we  must 
obey,  and  obey  because  we  love  or  choose  to  obey.  Perfect 
obedience  to  God,  and  obedience  emanating  from  love,  are,  by 
the  very  make  of  our  nature,  essential  to  our  happiness.  As  to 
others ,  we  have  seen  that  every  man  is  endowed  with  the  power 
of  exercising  considerable  influence  over  others,  for  good  or  for 
evil.  But  this  influence  has  a  tendency  to  propagate  itself  in 
every  direction,  and  for  ever.  Evidently,  then,  it  is  of  the  first 
importance  that  it  should  be  under  the  direction  of  Him  who 
seeth  the  end  from  the  beginning ;  and  man  is  under  obligation 
to  exercise  only  such  influence,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  He 
shall  prescribe.  As  to  the  Divine  Being ,  our  relations  to  whom, 
as  to  the  Being  who  has  made  us  what  we  are,  lay  us  under  an 
unlimited  obligation  to  obey  Him.  Even  if  we  owed  our  exist¬ 
ence  to  another,  we  could  not  become  acquainted  with  the  infi¬ 
nite  excellence  of  the  blessed  God,  .without  being  bound  to 
render  it  unlimited  homage.  But  the  fact  that  we  owe  our 
creation  to  Him,  adds  the  strongest  motive  to  the  prior  obliga¬ 
tion.  Our  obligation  to  love  and  obey  him,  then,  is  twofold,  — 
first,  as  arising  from  His  inherent  excellence,  or  His  character 
absolutely  considered ;  and,  secondly,  from  His  relative  excel¬ 
lence,  or  conduct  towards  us.  And  such  are  his  benevolent 
arrangements  in  this  latter  respect,  that  the  very  gratitude  which 
His  conduct  demands,  adds  to  our  enjoyment,  and  still  further 
increases  our  obligations. 

23.  If  man’s  co-existent  relations  oblige  him  to  know  and 
love  to  serve  and  enjoy  God  to  the  utmost,  the  obligation  is 
continuous.  The  duty  of  any  one  moment  is  the  duty  of  every 
moment.  If  there  is  no  moment  in  which  his  relation  to  God 
terminates  —  in  which  he  can  say,  for  example,  “  during  this 
moment  I  am  entirely,  and  in  every  sense,  independent  of  God” 
—  there  is  no  moment  in  which  he  is  not  under  obligation  to 
God.  If  there  is  no  moment  in  which  his  dependence  on  God 
is  less  than  absolute,  there  is  none  in  which  his  obligation  to 
God  is  not  supreme.  During  every  successive  moment  of  his 
existence,  his  creation  is,  in  effect,  repeated,  so  that  whatever 
his  obligation  was,  as  creature  to  Creator,  during  the  first 
moment  of  his  being,  that  amount  of  obligation  has  gone  on 


254 


MAN. 


repeating  itself  during  every  moment  since.  In  fine,  if  there 
be  no  moment  in  which  he  is  not  receiving,  to  some  extent,  the 
results  of  all  the  Divine  perfections,  and  thus  sustaining  a 
relation  to  each  and  all  of  them ;  and  if  there  is  not  a  moment 
in  which  God  is  not  infinitely  more  excellent  than  all  the  uni¬ 
verse  besides,  then  must  his  obligations  to  know,  love,  serve, 
and  enjoy  God  be  continuous. 

24.  His  obligations  are  ever-increasing.  How  early  they 
begin  it  is  impossible  to  say.  For  though  indications  of  moral 
character  are  early  discoverable,  these  indications  presuppose 
the  character  itself,  and  leave  us  ignorant  how  much  earlier  it 
begins  to  come  into  existence.  But  however  early  it  may  be, 
it  is  evident,  that  as  from  that  moment  our  moral  relations  go 
on  increasing  without  intermission,  our  obligations  go  on  increas¬ 
ing  in  precisely  the  same  ratio.  Every  dav  finds  us  entirely 
dependent  upon  God,  and  adds  to  pre-existing  obligations  new 
ties  arising  from  the  new  favors  of  the  dav.  Every  dav  brings 
with  it  additional  opportunities  of  knowing  and  serving  God. 
and  the  corresponding  obligation  to  improve  them.  And  the 
effect  of  this  improvement  of  them  would  be.  that  every  day 
would  leave  us,  as  progressive  beings,  with  an  increased  capacity 
for  virtue,  and  consequently  under  a  greater  obligation  to  virtue. 
How  palpable,  then,  is  the  error  which  teaches,  in  effect,  that 
incapacity  for  faith  or  obedience,  even  when  produced  by  a 
man’s  own  previous  acts  and  habits,  diminishes  the  obligation 
to  faith  and  obedience ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  every  man  is 
bound  to  be  always  prepared  to  meet  every  Divine  requirement 
with  all  that  capacity  for  obedience  which  he  would  have  pos¬ 
sessed  had  his  capacity  at  each  preceding  moment  been  the 
ever-enlarging  result  of  constant  improvement  to  the  utmost, 
Now  as  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  that  any  limit  can 
ever  be  placed  to  the  relations  in  which  we  stand  to  God.  it 
follows  that  no  limit  can  be  assigned  to  the  progress  of  man's 
capacity  for  excellence.  He  contains  the  elements  of  indefinite 
improvement. 

25.  Man’s  obligations  are  ever  varying.  Not  only  do  his 
relations  change  through  every  stage  of  life  from  less  to  greater, 
and,  consequently,  Ins  obligations  change  from  less  to  more 
numerous  and  imperative,  but  hi?  obligations  of  to-day  are 
modified  by  those  of  all  the  past,  as  these  again  will  enter  into 
and  modify  his  obligations  for  all  the  future.  An  obligation 
once  incurred  is  never  entirely,  and  in  every  sense,  dissolved 
(such,  for  instance,  as  that  arising  from  the  bestowment  of  a 


OBLIGATION. 


255 


benefit  subsequently  withdrawn)  ;  but,  after  ceasing  to  exist  in 
its  original  and  specific  form,  continues  in  a  general  manner  to 
enter  into  and  strengthen  every  other  obligation  forever. 

26.  His  obligations  are  universal  and  unlimited.  No  part  or 
property  of  his  nature  can  be  named  which  is  not  under  obliga¬ 
tion,  for  no  part  or  property  can  be  named  which  is  not  related 
to  the  Divine  Nature,  and  which  has  not  been  placed  in  that 
relation  ultimately  for  the  highest  end.  God  is;  and,  as  a 
creature  of  intellect,  man  is  bound  to  know  him.  God  loves ; 
and,  as  a  creature  of  affection,  man  is  bound  to  love  Him  su¬ 
premely,  and  to  place  all  he  has,  as  the  gifts  of  Divine  love,  at 
his  disposal.  God  wills ;  and,  as  a  voluntary  creature,  man  is 
bound  to  will  in  harmony  with  Him.  In  all  this  God  reveals 
Himself  to  man,  and,  in  effect,  addresses  him ;  and,  as  a  crea¬ 
ture  capable  of  speech,  man  is  bound  to  respond  —  to  “  call 
upon  his  soul  and  all  that  is  within  him  to  bless  His  holy  name.” 
And  when  he  has  consecrated  speech,  property,  influence,  his 
all,  by  his  own  voluntary  act,  to  the  glory  of  God,  and  has  pre¬ 
sented  himself  as  a  living  sacrifice,  he  has  only  performed  a 
reasonable  service.  He  is  still  an  unprofitable  servant,  and  has 
only  done  what  it  was  his  duty  to  do.  To  exceed  his  obligations 
is  impossible. 

27.  From  which  it  follows,  that  if  man  fail  in  duty  in  any 
respect,  he  can  never  supply  the  deficiency  by  any  amount  of 
subsequent  obedience ;  for  the  utmost  amount  of  obedience  he 
can  render  would  have  been  due  at  every  subsequent  moment, 
even  if  no  such  previous  deficiency  had  occurred.  And  this 
alone  shows  the  remediless  nature  of  disobedience  under  a 
system  in  which  universal  and  unlimited  obedience  is  at  every 
moment  due.  But  this  is  not  all ;  for  while  no  act  of  obedience 
can  exercise  a  compensative  effect  retrospectively,  disobedience 
can  and  does  project  a  disqualifying  influence  on  a  man’s  future 
conduct.  Sin  impairs  the  moral  nature.  Each  failure  has  a 
tendency  to  repeat  itself,  and  to  render  him  less  capable  of 
virtue,  forever  after.  What,  then,  it  might  have  been  said  on 
the  creation  of  the  first  man  —  what  if  a  wrong  affection,  or  an 
act  of  violated  duty,  and  a  tendency  to  perpetuate  the  violation, 
should  obtain  in  an  early  stage  of  his  history  !  Who  can  foresee 
the  tremendous  consequences?  What  if  the  evil  thus  early 
introduced  into  the  constitution  of  the  first  man  should  propagate 
itself,  generation  after  generation,  through  all  his  posterity! 
Either  the  race  will  reach  a  point  in  which  it  will  render  its 
own  progress  impossible,  or  else  a  remedial  process  will  be 


256 


MAN. 


in  dispensable.  And,  looking  at  the  extent  of  man’s  obligation, 
or  at  the  innumerable  points  at  which  duty  may  possibly  be 
violated,  who  must  not  have  anxiously  awaited  the  result  of  his 
probation ! 

28.  From  this  survey  of  human  obligation,  we  see  also  that 
the  cultivation  of  a  devotional  spirit,  and  the  habit  of  prayer, 
and  the  stated  worship  of  God,  would  have  been  the  duty  of 
the  first  man,  even  apart  from  all  direct  or  verbal  intimation 
from  God  to  that  effect.  The  system  into  which  he  had  been 
brought  was  entirely  dependent  upon  God,  and  expressive  of 
certain  perfections  of  the  Divine  nature ;  and  a  devout  state  of 
mind  is  simply  the  intellectual  recognition  of  this  fact  with  the 
accompanying  moral  emotions.  Man  himself,  with  his  capacity 
for  knowing  and  loving,  serving  and  enjoying  God,  sustains  the 
same  relations  of  entire  dependence  on  God ;  and  a  devotional 
temper  consists  simply  in  having  this  fact  present  in  the  con¬ 
sciousness.  But  such  is  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  that  the 
continuance  and  growth  of  a  devotional  spirit  depend,  like  any 
other  temper  of  mind,  on  its  utterance  or  appropriate  outward 
expression.  Now,  prayer  is  one  of  the  means  for  evincing  its 
existence,  and  promoting  its  increase.  If  man  is  dependent  on 
God  and  under  obligation  to  him,  prayer  is  simply  the  recogni¬ 
tion  and  avowal  of  the  fact,  and  must  therefore  form  a  part  of 
his  obligation.  If  man  is  so  constituted  that  he  cannot  commune 
with  excellence,  and  admire  it,  without  being  assimilated  to  it, 
and  thus  having  his  capacity  for  excellence  increased,  then 
prayer  is  a  duty,  for  it  brings  man  into  ennobling  communion 
with  infinite  excellence ;  and  the  highest  possible  increase  in 
moral  excellence  is  a  part  of  man’s  obligation.  If  a  Divine 
intimation  be  given  that  such  communion  with  the  Deity  shall 
be  positively  rewarded  with  direct  impartations  over  and  above 
its  natural  or  constitutional  results,  the  obligation  to  prayer  is 
still  further  increased.  And  if,  beyond  this,  the  Divine  will 
should  distinctly  appoint  a  place,  or  a  time,  or  both,  for  man’s 
more  special  worship,  his  obligation  to  “  draw  near  to  God,” 
would  be  greater  than  ever ;  and  each  act  of  obedience  to  this 
appointment,  would  cultivate  the  spirit,  and  confirm  the  habit, 
of  obedience,  and  thus  increase  his  capacity  for  it  for  all  the 
future.  Such  were  the  obligations  of  unfallen  man  to  the  wor¬ 
ship  of  God ;  arising  from  the  constitution  of  his  nature,  from 
the  appointment  of  a  sabbath,  and  probably  from  certain  oral 
intimations  of  the  Divine  will. 

Experience  has  shown,  indeed,  that  these  obligations,  great 


OBLIGATION. 


257 


as  they  are,  were  susceptible  of  increase;  and  man  himself 
might  possibly  have  conjectured  it.  What  (he  might  have  said) 
if  it  should  ever  come  to  pass  that  man  should  violate  his  obli¬ 
gation,  and  need  a  special  intervention  of  God  to  save  him  from 
self-intlicted  ruin ;  and  what  if  God  should,  in  some  way,  gra¬ 
ciously  interpose  for  his  rescue ;  here  would  be  a  new  relation 
established  between  God  and  man,  and  a  new  obligation  resulting 
of  surpassing  cogency.  This  possibility,  we  know,  has  become 
a  reality.  And  penitence  is  the  feeling  which  springs  from  the 
perception  of  violated  obligation.  And  prayer  now  includes  the 
new  elements  of  deprecation,  and  gratitude  for  deliverance,  and 

rests  on  obligations  unknown  to  innocent  man. 

©  *  , 

29.  In  relation  to  primitive  man,  then,  the  law  of  obligation 
is  clear.  Every  created  thing  necessarily  expresses  something 
of  the  Divine  Nature.  It  receives  existence  on  the  condition 
of  manifesting  that  resemblance,  and  thus  contributing  towards 
the  great  end  of  creation.  It  is  placed  in  a  system  of  relation 
to  other  things  and  beings  in  order  that  such  manifestation  might 
be  possible.  So  that  every  relation  has  its  corresponding  obli¬ 
gation  ;  and,  therefore,  the  first  man,  as  well  as  each  of  all  his 
posterity,  exists  under  an  obligation  to  promote  the  great  end 
of  creation  commensurate  with  his  means  and  relations. 

If  the  question  be  still  asked,  Why  is  such  obedience  due  ? 
or,  what  is  the  ground  of  this  obligation  ?  I  must  refer  to  the 
answer  implied  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  and  which  is  involved 
in  the  whole  of  our  theory  —  namely,  that,  while  the  ground  of 
moral  obligation  consists,  proximately,  of  the  purpose  or  will  of 
God,  it  consists  ultimately  of  that  great  Reason  on  which  that 
will  itself  is  based.  For  unless  it  be  absurdly  supposed  that 
the  will  which  determined  the  present  condition  of  things  acted 
without  reason,  then,  the  reason  which  led  to  it,  and  of  which 
the  Divine  will  itself  is  the  expression,  is  the  ultimate  basis  of 
the  existing  constitution  of  moral  obligation.  And,  then,  as  the 
actual  reason  of  that  obligation  must  have  been,  an  original  and 
necessary  difference  in  the  actions  and  dispositions  required, 
from  their  opposites,  or  an  intrinsic  propriety  and  excellence  in 
them,  it  follows  that  the  reason  of  the  obligation  is  eternal  and 
immutable.  And  if  the  reason  be  unchangeable,  then  the  obli¬ 
gation  which  rests  on  it  must  be  unchangeable  also.  That  is,  it 
is  the  necessary  and  unalterable  duty  of  every  accountable  being 
to  be  perfectly  conformed  to  all  the  relations  in  which  he  has 
been  placed.  So  that  virtue,  or  holiness,  which  is  virtue  in  its 
highest  and  most  comprehensive  meaning,  is,  as  it  regards  man, 

22* 


258 


MAN. 


the  entire  accordance  of  his  affections  and  actions  with  all  the 
relations  in  which  he  has  been  placed,  of  which  accordance  the 
perfect  will  of  God  is  the  rule ,  and  the  intrinsic  excellence  of 
holiness  as  summed  up  in  the  unlimited  perfection  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  is  the  primary  and  ultimate  ground  or  reason.  Beauti¬ 
fully  and  truly  has  Hooker  said,*  “  Of  Law  there  can  be  no 
less  acknowledged,  than  that  her  seat  is  the  bosom  of  God,  her 
voice  the  harmony  of  the  world.  All  things  in  heaven  and 
earth  do  her  homage,  the  very  least  as  feeling  her  care,  and  the 
greatest  as  not  exempted  from  her  power  ;  both  angels  and  men, 
and  creatures  of  what  condition  soever,  though  each  in  different 
sort  and  manner,  yet  all,  with  uniform  consent,  admiring  her  as 
the  mother  of  their  peace  and  joy.” 


.  CHAPTER  XH. 

UNIFORMITY;  OR,  GENERAL  LAWS. 

1.  The  subject  of  the  preceding  chapter  —  Obligation  —  pre¬ 
supposes  the  operation  of  general  laws.  For,  apart  from  the 
uniformity  arising  from  the  existence  and  maintenance  of  even 
physical  laws,  there  could  be  no  happiness,  no  safety,  to  the 
creature ;  and,  consequently,  nothing  could  ever  be  known  of 
the  perfections  of  the  Creator,  nor  could  man  be  under  obliga¬ 
tion  to  obey  Him. 

2.  Now  we  have  seen  that  such  laws  have  existed  from  the 
beginning.  The  plant  had  a  constitution  suited  to  the  pre-es¬ 
tablished  constitution  of  the  material  universe ;  and  its  growth 
depended  on  the  harmonious  co-operation  of  its  own  laws  with 
the  laws  of  that  pre-existing  economy.  The  animal  had  a 
constitution  given  to  it  suited  to  the  laws  of  the  pre-existing 
universe,  including  the  vegetable  kingdom ;  and  its  well-being 
depended  on  its  constant  conformity  to  these  pre-existing  laws. 
And  in  relation  to  the  constitution  of  that  universe  into  which  it 
was  introduced,  its  every  motion  was  physically  right  or  wrong ; 
and,  as  a  consequence,  was  beneficial  or  injurious  to  itself.  If 
an  animal,  for  example,  ventured  to  the  side  of  a  cliff  where  its 


*  Eccles.  Polity,  B.  I.,  §  10. 


UNIFORMITY. 


259 


foot  was  not  adapted  to  sustain  it,  and  fell,  it  had  placed  itself 
in  a  wrong  relation  to  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  it  suffered  the 
consequence  of  violating  that  law.  That  is,  there  was  a  right 
kind  of  place  for  it  in  creation  ;  and  it  was  under  physical  obli¬ 
gation  or  necessity  to  remain  there. 

3.  Let  it  not  be  supposed  that  I  am  claiming  for  the  laws  of 
the  physical  world  the  same  necessary  and  immutable  basis  as 
for  the  laws  of  the  moral  constitution.  The  laws  of  nature  are 
not  to  be  confounded  with  causes.  There  can  be  no  laws  of  a 
thing  until  the  thing  itself  is  caused,  or  made.  They  pre¬ 
suppose  such  causes,  or  volitions,  of  which  they  are  the  effects 
or  manifestations.  Li  other  words,  they  are  the  rules  by  which 
God  is  pleased  to  regulate  the  phenomena  of  nature.  The  ex¬ 
isting  form  of  the  physical  constitution,  therefore,  is  entirely 
dependent  on  the  will  of  God.  Every  one  of  its  laws,  when 
creation  is  viewed  on  a  comprehensive  scale,  is,  for  anything  we 
know,  as  strictly  provisional  as  any  of  the  temporary  enact¬ 
ments  of  the  Jewish  ritual.  The  regularity  of  nature,  for  un¬ 
numbered  ages,  is  quite  compatible  with  subsequent  changes 
in  its  constitution.  Its  present  uniformity  is  only  conditional. 
Indeed,  every  destructive  earthquake,  though  itself  the  result  of 
general  laws,  is,  in  so  far  as  it  is  destructive,  a  breach  of  that 
uniformity  and  stability  of  nature,  for  which  the  animal  is  made, 
and  shows  that  such  uniformity  is  not  inviolable.  While  the 
successive  appearance  of  races  of  animals,  entirely  unknown  to 
pre-existing  nature,  shows  that  it  is  a  uniformity  as  compatible 
with  the  addition  of  new  creations  as  with  the  destruction  of 
old  ones.  Still  the  order  of  sequence,  which  each  law  implies,  . 
being  established,  the  animal  is  under  physical  obligation  or 
necessity  to  respect  it ;  and  inevitably  suffers  if  found  in  a 
wrong  relation  to  it. 

4.  Suppose,  then,  that  having  suffered  from  a  violation  of  one 
of  these  laws  —  from  ignorance  of  the  sequence,  for  example, 
between  contact  with  fire  and  the  injury  of  the  limb  burnt  — 
suppose  that,  immediately  on  that  injury,  an  animal  had  been 
endowed  with  intelligence  and  conscience,  so  as  to  recognize 
in  that  sequence  a  Divine  appointment,  forbidding  it  to  repeat 
the  act  on  pain  of  certainly  repeating  the  injury,  it  would  then 
be  under  a  moral  obligation  to  respect  it ;  and  its  not  doing  so 
'would  be  guilty  as  well  as  wrong.  And  then,  besides  the  pain 
inevitably  following  the  violation  of  a  physical  law,  the  viola¬ 
tion  of  a  moral  law  might  be  expected  to  be  followed  by  an  in¬ 
dependent  penalty  of  its  own. 


260 


MAN. 


Now,  man  comes  into  a  system  of  fixed  relations  and  con 
sequent  obligations  —  a  system  of  which  physical  laws  are  only 
the  exponents  and  means  ;  and,  unlike  the  instance  of  the  ani¬ 
mal  which  we  have  just  supposed,  he  brings  with  him  the  ele¬ 
ments  of  a  moral  as  well  as  of  a  physical  constitution.  And 
there  may  be  a  right  and  a  wrong  in  his  every  movement  in 
respect  to  the  constitution  into  which  he  comes,  moral  as  well 
as  physical ;  and  he  may  enjoy  or  may  suffer  the  consequences, 
quite  apart  from  all  considerations  of  innocence  or  guilt. 
Temperance,  purity,  and  truth,  are  right,  and  the  opposite 
qualities  are  wrong;  but  if  he  practise  temperance  without 
knowing  it  to  be  right,  there  is  no  merit,  yet  he  enjoys  the 
benefit  of  having  thus  acted  in  harmony  with  the  constitution 
into  which  he  has  come  ;  and  if  he  practise  impurity,  without 
knowing,  or  the  means  of  knowing,  that  it  is  wrong,  though 
there  is  no  demerit,  he  suffers  the  consequences  of  the  act. 
“  An  action,  by  which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified  (says 
Butler)  procures  delight  or  advantage,  abstracted  from  all  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  morality  of  such  action ;  consequently  the 
pleasure  or  advantage  in  this  case  is  gained  by  the  action 
itself,  not  by  the  morality  of  it.”  *  The  same  is  true  of  culti¬ 
vating  right  or  wrong  states  of  mind  in  relation  to  God  or  man. 
There  is,  as  we  have  before  remarked,  a  right  state  of  mind 
towards  every  external  object ;  and  such  is  the  nature  of  the 
constitution  into  which  we  come,  that  we  cannot  cultivate  the 
right  state  of  mind,  even  though  ignorant  that  it  is  right,  with¬ 
out  advantage ;  nor  indulge  the  wrong  affections,  even  igno¬ 
rantly,  without  disadvantage. 

5.  If,  however,  a  man  cherish  a  wrong  state  of  mind,  knowing 
it  to  be  wrong,  and,  therefore,  contrary  to  the  will  of  God,  he 
becomes  guilty  as  well  as  wrong.  Before,  he  was  wrong  only 
as  to  his  condition ,  now  he  shows  himself  wrong  as  to  his  char¬ 
acter.  Before,  he  was  wrong  in  reference  to  that  constitution 
of  relations  and  obligations  into  which  he  had  come  ;  now,  he  is 
wrong  in  respect  to  that  Divine  Being  whose  will  that  constitu¬ 
tion  is  meant  to  embody  and  express ;  so  that  even  if  that  con¬ 
stitution  could  be  changed  to  suit  the  wrong  state  of  his  mind, 
unless  the  divine  will  could  be  changed  also,  he  would  still  be 
subjectively  wrong  as  to  infinitely  the  greatest  of  all  relations. 
Wrong,  then,  respects  his  objective  relations ;  guilt,  his  sub¬ 
jective  state,  also.  All  guilt  implies  wrong,  but  all  wrong  does 


*  Analogy,  Part  I.  c.  iii. 


UNIFORMITY. 


261 


not  necessarily  imply  guilt.  Right  and  wrong  respect  his  hap¬ 
piness  only ;  innocence  and  guilt  respect  his  virtue  also.  The 
former  contemplate  him  as  an  involuntary  part  of  that  consti¬ 
tution  whose  relations  and  consequent  obligations  are  as  immu¬ 
table  as  the  great  reason  on  which  they  repose  ;  while  the  lat¬ 
ter  contemplate  him  as  that  moral  and  accountable  part  of  the 
constitution  by  and  to  whom  the  Divine  manifestation  is  made, 
and  who  is  capable  of  appreciating  and  voluntarily  subserving 
it.  Right  and  wrong  respect  his  objective  relations,  and  as  such 
are  fixed  and  unalterable  ;  guilt  and  innocence  are  subjective, 
and  vary  according  to  the  knowledge,  powers,  and  opportunities 
of  the  subject  himself. 

6.  Now,  if  mere  wrong,  or  the  ignorant  violation  of  any  of 

the  laws  of  the  constitution  under  which  man  has  been  formed, 
and  which  he  is  supposed  never  to  have  had  the  means  of 
knowing,  be  attended  with  an  evil  in  the  uniform  sequence  of 
cause  and  effect,  how  much  more  may  an  additional  evil  be  ex¬ 
pected  to  follow,  if  he  violate  the  law,  knowing  it  to  exist,  and  to 
exist  as  an  expression  of  the  Divine  will !  “  The  consequences 

of  any  action,  then,  are  to  be  regarded  in  a  twofold  light :  first, 
the  consequences  which  follow  the  action  as  right  or  wrong,  and 
which  depend  on  the  present  constitution  of  things  ;  and,  sec¬ 
ondly,  those  which  follow  the  action  as  innocent  or  guilty,  — 
that  is,  as  violating  or  not  violating  our  obligations  to  our  Crea¬ 
tor.”  The  former  may  be  estimated,  but,  unless  we  could 
measure  our  obligations  to  God,  the  latter  must  exceed  all  our 
conceptions.  Hence,  it  is  of  the  highest  possible  importance 
that  we  should  both  know  our  duty,  and  be  furnished  with  all 
suitable  inducements  to  perform  it. 

7.  What,  then,  are  the  means  which  the  twofold  exigence  of 
the  case  requires  ?  Evidently,  the  operation  of  laws  of  a  two¬ 
fold  nature.  First,  that  man  should  possess  intelligence  to  per¬ 
ceive  that  the  universe  of  which  he  forms  a  part  has  a  constitu¬ 
tion,  or  is  governed  by  laws.  Unless  it  possessed  such  a  consti¬ 
tution,  in  vain  would  it  be  for  man  to  be  endowed  with  a  capa¬ 
city  for  recognizing  it.  And  just  as  useless  for  man  would  it 
be  for  such  a  constitution  to  exist,  unless  he  were  endowed  with 
the  power  of  recognizing  its  laws. 

(1.)  If  both  these  conditions,  however,  exist:  if  man  finds, 
for  instance,  that  he  is  created  with  certain  capacities  for  enjoy¬ 
ment,  and  that  certain  objects  are  created  and  placed  around 
him,  precisely  adapted  to  these  capacities,  it  is  an  evident  indi¬ 
cation  that  the  one  should  be  exercised  on  the  other,  so  as  to 
render  man  happy. 


262 


MAN. 


(2.)  If,  again,  it  be  found  that  he  cannot  gratify  any  particu¬ 
lar  capacity  for  enjoyment  beyond  a  certain  degree,  without 
inducing  pain,  and  impairing  that  capacity  for  subsequent  enjoy 
ment,  it  is  then  as  clear  an  indication  that  such  desire  is  to  be 
gratified  only  within  certain  limits,  as  that  it  should  be  gratified 
at  all. 

(o.)  But  man  is  capable  of  various  kinds  of  enjoyment.  If 
the  indulgence  of  one  kind — say,  that  arising  from  food  beyond 
a  certain  degree  —  is  found  inimical  to  his  enjoyment  of  another 
kind — say,  that  arising  from  the  pursuit  of  knowledge — the 
necessity  of  that  limitation  is  still  more  authoritatively  ex¬ 
pressed. 

(4.)  When  it  is  found,  further,  that  certain  actions  and  habits 
are  not  only  attended  with  happiness,  but  that  the  very  exercise, 
within  the  assigned  limits,  of  those  parts  of  his  nature  which  the 
happiness  supposes,  is  itself  essential  to  his  well-being,  and  even 
to  his  continued  existence,  the  measured  employment  of  those 
powers  is  made  still  more  imperative. 

(5.)  And  the  case  is  rendered  still  stronger  if  it  appear  that 
the  same  course  of  conduct  which  is,  on  the  whole,  injurious  or 
beneficial  to  himself,  is  also  injurious  or  beneficial  to  society. 
History  then  adds  its  voice  to  that  of  his  own  individual  expe¬ 
rience.  And  although  the  conclusions  thus  arrived  at  are,  by 
supposition,  quite  irrespective  of  conscious  guilt  or  innocence, 
and  result  solely  from  the  consequences  of  conduct ,  he  knows 
the  right  course  concerning  such  conduct  as  much  as  if  it  had 
been  proclaimed  to  him  by  a  voice  from  heaven.  And  thus  the 
first  part  of  the  exigence  is  met,  by  which  we  are  to  be  kept 
from  wrong ,  in  relation  to  the  constitution  under  which  we  have 
been  formed, 

8.  But  if  this  constitution  be  an  announcement  of  the  will  of 
God  concerning  us,  we  sustain  a  relation  to  Him  in  every  ac¬ 
tion  we  perform  which  involves  peculiar  obligations.  Hence, 
secondly,  the  necessity  for  that  moral  part  of  our  nature  which 
makes  us  aware  of  our  obligations.  The  rightness  of  an  act, 
and  our  obligation  to  perform  it,  are  entirely  distinct.  Having 
ascertained  the  will  of  God  respecting  an  action,  or  perceived 
its  rightness,  it  is  important  that  we  should,  in  addition,  be 
conscious  of  our  obligation  to  do  it.  For,  as  it  would  be  useless 
tor  man  to  be  made  capable  of  recognizing  obligation  to  obey 
the  Divine  will  in  a  world  which  contained  no  expression  of  that 
will,  so  it  would  be  useless  for  such  a  constitution  as  that  which 
is  extant  to  exist,  unless  man  were  endowed  with  the  capacity 


UNIFORMITY. 


263 


of  recosriizing;  the  obligation  in  which  it  involves  him  to  the 
Divine  Creator.  Unless,  then,  it  should  be  affirmed  that  man’s 
obligations  do  not  differ  in  a  universe  with  a  God,  when  that 
God,  too,  is  its  Creator,  from  what  they  would  be  in  a  universe 
without  a  God  (were  such  a  thing  possible)  ;  or,  that  man’s  rela¬ 
tions  to  the  Infinite  Maker  of  the  whole  are  not  so  important  as 
his  relations  to  the  thing  made,  and  which  he  is  endowed  with 
intellect  to  recognize,  he  may  be  expected  to  be  endowed  with 
a  power  of  recognizing  his  obligations  to  God. 

(1.)  If,  then,  on  ascertaining  the  will  of  God  in  reference  to 
any  course  of  action,  we  are  conscious  of  a  sense  of  obligation 
to  obey  it,  (an  obligation  distinct  from  the  motive  relating  to 
mere  advantage,)  this  is  the  voice  of  a  law  within  us — the  law 
of  conscience.  The  perceived  tendency  of  our  conduct  is  one 
thing,  its  relation  to  the  Divine  will  is  felt  to  be  another.  While 
the  former  is  seen  to  be  only  advantageous,  the  latter  is  felt  to 
involve  an  element  of  morality. 

(2.)  If,  again,  this  discrimination  of  the  morality  of  an  action 
be  felt  to  carry  with  it  a  reason  for  its  performance  superior  to 
every  other  consideration,  this  also  is  the  voice  of  a  deep-seated 
law  of  our  nature.  It  is  an  impulsive  sense  of  obligation  added 
to  mere  motives  of  interest,  and  irrespective  of  them.  It  is  the 
imperative  within  responding  to  the  imperative  on  high,  and  ut¬ 
tering  its  mandates  in  behalf  of  truth  and  justice,  even  when  the 
relations  of  a  particular  line  of  conduct  to  our  ease  and  advantage 
are  unknown  to  us. 

(3.)  But,  more,  if  it  is  found  that  obedience  to  this  sense  of 
obligation,  even  when  it  relates  to  actions  apparently  trivial, 
and  when  the  customs  of  society  run  in  a  contrary  direction,  is 
attended  with  more  exquisite  enjoyment  than  any  other  source 
can  yield,  the  highest  evidence  is  afforded  of  the  existence  of 
the  law  of  conscience  within  us. 

(4.)  And  when  it  is  found  that  obedience  to  this  law,  attended 
with  so  much  moral  enjoyment,  is  also  coincident  with,  and 
essential  to,  our  highest  well-being,  we  cannot  fail  to  recognize 
the  provision  by  which  the  second  part  of  the  exigence  is  met, 
and  by  which  we  are  restrained  from  guilt  in  relation  to  the  will 
of  God.  If  the  manner  in  which  the  first  part  of  the  necessity 
is  met  discloses  the  right  or  wrong  tendency  of  actions,  the  man¬ 
ner  in  which  the  second  is  met  respects  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  agents.  If  the  former  supplies  facts,  the  latter  develops 
ideas.  If,  by  the  one,  we  gradually  form  convictions,  and  arrive 
at  conclusions,  by  the  other,  we  are  mqde  conscious  of  implanted 


264 


MAN. 


sentiments  and  immutable  obligations.  If  the  former  teaches  ns 
the  propriety  of  subordinating  appetite  to  self-love,  and  self-love 
to  the  benevolent  affections,  the  latter  commands  us  to  subordi¬ 
nate  the  whole  to  conscience. 

9.  Now,  in  a  perfectly  constituted  intellectual  and  moral 
being,  it  is  evident  that  there  would  be  a  perfect  adjustment 
between  every  external  being  and  quality,  and  the  internal 
faculties.  “  A  perfectly  constituted  intellect  would,  under  the 
proper  conditions,  discern  the  relations  in  which  the  being 
stood  to  other  beings ;  and  a  perfectly  constituted  conscience 
would,  at  the  same  time,  become  conscious  of  all  the  obligations 
which  arose  from  such  relations,  and  would  impel  us  to  the 
corresponding  courses  of  conduct.”*  We  say,  under  the  proper 
conditions,  for  even  with  intellectual  and  moral  powers  suited 
to  his  station,  man  would  still  be  dependent  on  his  Maker  for 
direct  information.  This  will  appear  if  it  be  remembered  that 
there  are  many  laws,  the  transgression  of  which  entails  suffer¬ 
ing,  which  cannot  appear  except  in  the  more  advanced  stages 
of  life,  and  even  of  society ;  and  that,  as  the  mode  of  teaching 
natural  religion  is  by  experience,  “  we  cannot  certainly  know 
what  the  law  is,  except  by  first  breaking  it.”  Hence,  though 
the  first  man  was  endowed  with  a  perfect  moral  constitution,  it 
was  necessary  that  God  should  make  to  him  a  special  revelation 
respecting  a  certain  portion  of  His  will.  And  it  might  have 
been  expected,  d  priori,  that,  in  the  event  of  man’s  nature  be¬ 
coming  disordered,  the  aid  which  he  would  require  "would  neces¬ 
sarily  include,  first,  additional  light  to  perceive  his  relations ; 
or,  secondly,  greater  moral  discrimination  to  perceive  the  result¬ 
ing  obligations ;  or,  thirdly,  additional  motives  to  obey  them,  or 
all  three  conjoined. 

10.  But,  deferring  this  subject  to  the  close  of  the  next  chap¬ 
ter,  the  two-fold  generalization  of  all  human  actions  into  those 
which  are  right  or  wrong  as  related  to  the  constitution  of  things, 
and  those  which  are  innocent  or  guilty  as  related  to  our  obliga¬ 
tions  to  Him  who  has  placed  us  under  this  constitution,  brings 
us  to  the  following  conclusions :  —  that  however  disordered  man’s 
nature  may  become,  and  however  much  he  may  come  to  need 
the  aid  we  have  referred  to,  he  is  still,  and  ever  must  be,  under 
the  relations  and  obligations  of  moral  government.  Ignorant 
though  he  may  be  of  the  facts,  the  indulgence  of  revenge  will 
not  the  less  torment,  nor  impurity  the  less  debase  him.  And  if, 

*  Wayland’s  Moral  Science,  c.iii.  §  2. 


UNIFORMITY. 


265 


knowing  that  such  are  the  penalties  attached  by  God  to  these 
acts  and  tempers,  he  yet  persist  in  them,  he  incurs  the  additional 
pain  attending  a  consciousness  of  guilt.  “  Duty  obliges  us,  though 
it  does  not  force  us ;  and  even  at  the  time  we  violate  it,  we  can¬ 
not  deny  it.”  To  suppose  that  man’s  violation  of  the  law  would 
be  an  adequate  reason  for  its  modification,  would  be  to  make 
failure  and  wrong  the  law  of  the  constitution,  and  depravity  give 
law  to  virtue. 

Ik  It  follows,  also,  that  an  action  may  be  right  without  being 
virtuous  —  right  in  relation  to  the  constitution  of  things  to  which 
we  belong,  but  destitute  of  all  reference  to  the  wall  of  Him  who 
has  called  us  into  it.  F rom  which  it  results,  also,  that  an  action 
may  be  right  in  the  former  respect,  while,  in  the  latter  respect, 
it  may  be  not  only  destitute  of  virtue,  but  absolutely  sinful. 
For  if,  knowing  it  to  be  required  by  the  will  of  God,  he  yet  per¬ 
forms  it  without  any  regard  to  that  requirement,  but  solely  from 
some  inferior  motive,  he  is  guilty  of  violating  the  highest  obli¬ 
gation  of  which  he  can  be  conscious.  On  the  other  hand,  an 
action  may  be  wrong  and  yet  innocent,  for  the  man  may  have 
neither  known  the  will  of  God  concerning  it,  nor  have  had  the 
means  of  knowing  it.  Then,  further,  a  man’s  non-consciousness 
of  guilt  is  no  proof  of  virtue.  It  may  be  owing  entirely  to  his 
ignorance  of  duty.  And,  further,  such  non-consciousness  of 
guilt,  if  the  ignorance  to  which  it  is  owing  be  voluntary,  may 
involve  sin  of  the  greatest  aggravation.  If,  by  his  own  conduct, 
he  has  disqualified  himself  for  apprehending  his  obligations,  his 
ignorance  may  be  the  greatest  enhancement  of  his  guilt,  for  it 
may  denote  the  advanced  stage  to  which  his  moral  disqualifica¬ 
tion  has  reached. 

12.  This  view  of  man’s  twofold  relation  imparts  an  entirely 
new  aspect  to  creation.  The  physical  constitution  of  the  world 
becomes  the  means  of  moral  government.  With  the  coming  of 
man,  the  earth  became  the  seat  of  a  Divine  monarchy.  The 
constancy  of  nature,  which,  under  the  previous  or  animal  dis¬ 
pensation,  had  been  essential  merely  to  animal  well-being,  was 
now  promoted  into  an  instrument  of  moral  rule.  Now  first, 
law  prevailed  in  the  true  and  proper  meaning  of  the  term. 
Hitherto,  laws  were  the  mere  modes  of  the  Divine  operation  in 
nature,  and,  as  such,  existed  only  in  the  mind  of  God.  But  now 
they  existed  in  the  mind  of  man  also.  He  had  ideas  answering 
to  them.  Each  of  them  announced  itself  to  him  with  the  author¬ 
ity  of  a  Divine  appointment.  His  intellectual  nature  enabled 
him  to  perceive  its  inevitable  tendency.  His  moral  nature  intro- 

23 


266 


MAN. 


duced  him  to  its  Author,  and  made  him  conscious  that  he  ought 
to  conform  to  it.  However  conditional  on  the  will  of  God  its 
particular  form  might  be,  yet  coming  to  him  as  an  expression  of 
that  will,  it  placed  him  in  a  relation  to  God,  involving  an  obli¬ 
gation  which  he  could  not  disregard  without  guilt.  For  as  that 
will  is  based  on  perfect  and  immutable  reason,  every  relation 
which  man  sustains  to  it,  and  every  obligation  resulting  from 
such  relation,  must  be  immutable  also. 

13.  Let  it  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  because  God  gov¬ 
erns  according  to  natural  laws,  there  is  therefore  no  room  left 
for  his  providential  superintendence.*  That  he  operates  by  means 
of  these,  does  not  imply  that  he  is  confined  to  them.  They  an¬ 
nounce,  but  do  not  limit,  His  operations.  If  by  laws  of  nature , 
are  meant  the  sequences  of  causes  and  effects  which  existed 
prior  to  man’s  creation,  his  introduction  must  surely  be  regarded 
as  involving  the  addition  of  laws  entirely  novel  and  unique. 
His  moral  nature  made  him  capable,  as  we  have  seen,  of  moral 
government.  Here  was  a  demonstration  that  the  pre-existing 
laws  had  not  been  the  measure  of  the  Divine  operations ;  for 
here,  without  disturbing  them,  God  was  pleased  to  add  to  them. 
But  if  by  laws  of  nature  are  meant  those  additional  laws  also — 
both  the  laws  which  had  regulated  the  course  of  nature  prior  to 
man’s  creation  and  to  which  man  is  configured,  and  also  the 
new  laws  which  are  proper  to  his  moral  nature — among  these 
latter  there  may  be  laws  which  leave  room  for  Providential  in¬ 
terposition  and  spiritual  operation,  though  without  disturbing  the 
former  laws  any  more  than  his  creation  did.  Both  may  be  com¬ 
prehended  in  the  same  great  plan,  and  the  latter  may  be  even 
the  supplement  and  complement  of  the  former.  So  that  if  one 
party  should  ascribe  a  disease  or  an  untimely  end  which  a  man 
had  brought  on  by  his  own  misconduct,  to  a  violation  of  the  laws 
of  nature,  and  if  another  should  regard  it  as  a  dispensation  of 
Providence,  they  need  not  be  regarded  as  opposed  to  each  other. 
Both  are,  in  reality,  equally  correct.  The  former  errs  only  on 
the  supposition  that  he  views  the  laws  of  nature  as  real  exist¬ 
ences,  not  as  mere  modes  of  Divine  operation,  but  as  exclusive, 
independent,  and  unconditional ;  the  latter  errs  only  on  the  sup¬ 
position  that  he  views  the  evil  as  traceable  to  the  Divine  sove- 

*  Many  of  the  natural  laws  are  forcibly  illustrated  in  Mr.  Combe’s 
“  Constitution  of  Man.”  It  were  to  be  wished,  however,  that  while  suc¬ 
cessfully  rescuing  these  laws  from  the  hands  of  ignorance  and  superstition, 
he  had  not,  at  the  same  time,  apparently  ignored  the  providential  superin¬ 
tendence  of  the  Law-giver. 


WELL-BEING. 


267 


reignty,  rather  than  to  the  Divine  equity  —  as  an  arbitrary 
infliction,  rather  than  as  the  natural  and  righteous  result  of  the  in¬ 
fraction  of  laws  by  which  God  governs  the  world.  Proximately, 
the  evil  results  from  the  violation  of  natural  laws ;  ultimately 
and  efficiently  it  results  from  that  omnipresent  Being  in  whose 
will  the  entire  scheme  of  things  at  first  originated,  by  whom  it  is 
maintained  in  constant  operation,  and  to  whom  it  is  always  com¬ 
petent  to  touch  the  springs  of  human  volition  by  influences 
unknown  to  material  laws,  though  perfectly  compatible  with 
them,  as  well  as  with  the  moral  freedom  of  the  man,  and  even 
in  order  to  it.  Viewed  as  flowing  from  the  operation  of  natural 
law,  it  is  opposed  to  the  ideas  of  chance  and  caprice ;  viewed  as 
resulting  from  natural  law,  under  the  administration  of  a  super¬ 
intending  Providence,  it  is  equally  opposed  to  blind  necessity 
or  fate. 


CHAPTER  XHI. 

WELL-BEING. 

1.  The  ideas  of  obligation  and  law,  developed  in  the  two 
chapters  immediately  preceding,  prepare  us  to  expect,  in  har¬ 
mony  with  another  of  our  laws,  “  that  man  will  be  found  to 
enjoy  an  amount  of  good  or  well-being  proportioned  to  the  dis¬ 
charge  of  his  obligations.”  His  nature  necessarily  expresses 
something  of  the  Divine  Nature.  He  is  brought  into  existence 
in  order  to  express  it.  He  sustains  relations  adapted  to  elicit 
and  receive  the  manifestation.  And  he  is  held  under  obligation 
to  this  effect.  He  cannot,  therefore,  fulfil  the  law  of  his  being, 
without  enjoying  well-being.  For,  to  manifest  whatever  his  na¬ 
ture  is  calculated  to  exhibit  of  God,  is  to  stand  related,  on  one 
side,  to  the  greatest  of  Beings,  and  on  the  other  to  the  greatest 
of  ends.  Nor  could  he  be  supposed  to  be  in  any  way  deprived 
of  his  right  to  happiness  while  thus  fulfilling  the  highest  end  of 
his  existence,  without  the  great  end  itself  being,  in  so  far,  de¬ 
feated.  And  if  the  nature  of  God  be  infinitely  holy  and  happy, 
and  His  will  be  the  dictate  of  His  nature,  then  in  proportion  as 
man  conforms  to  that  will,  his  well-being  rests  on  the  immutable 
basis  of  the  Divine  nature. 


268 


MAN. 


A  regard  to  his  own  well-being,  indeed,  is  not  to  be  the  su¬ 
preme  motive  of  man’s  obedience.  His  highest  incentive  is,  as 
we  have  seen,  to  be  derived  from  the  highest  object — a  regard 
to  the  character  and  will  of  God.  But  it  might  be  expected  an¬ 
tecedent  to  experience,  that,  in  the  government  of  a  perfect  Being, 
the  greatest  good  of  the  creature  would  be  made  coincident  with 
the  highest  glory  of  the  Creator.  And  as  far  as  we  know,  or, 
according  to  the  most  enlarged  views  we  can  form  of  the  Divine 
administration,  it  is  so. 

2.  Viewing  man’s  nature  apart  from  his  external  relations, 
we  may  remark  generally,  that  his  well-being  at  any  given  mo¬ 
ment,  depends  on  the  actual  presence,  the  orderly  development, 
and  the  due  activity,  of  every  essential  part  of  his  constitution. 
Let  either  of  these  conditions  be  wanting,  and  the  derangement, 
or  defective  state  of  the  whole,  must  be  the  inevitable  conse¬ 
quence.  Let  the  appetites  be  indulged  beyond  the  appointed 
limits,  and  the  higher  faculties  will  exist  comparatively  in  vain ; 
every  such  indulgence  brings  him  nearer  to  the  level  of  the  ani¬ 
mal.  Let  them  be  restrained  beyond  a  certain  limit,  and,  even 
though  the  occasion  be  devotion  itself,  his  moral  and  mental 
powers  will  share  in  the  evil  consequences,  as  well  as  his  physi¬ 
cal.  Let  his  intellectual  powers  fail  to  be  duly  exercised,  and 
in  vain  will  the  laws  of  the  external  universe  exist,  and  even 
execute  themselves  upon  him  ;  they  will  convey  no  information 
to  his  mind ;  and,  consequently,  every  other  part  of  his  nature 
will  suffer.  Let  his  sense  of  duty  fail  to  be  adequately  exer¬ 
cised,  and  in  vain  will  his  relations  to  the  external  universe 
testify  to  him  of  the  will  of  God.  And  thus  every  physical  de¬ 
fect  is  an  intellectual  injury;  and  every  intellectual  injury  a 
moral  evil.  On  the  other  hand,  let  all  the  parts  of  his  constitu¬ 
tion  be  present,  and,  even  if  at  any  given  moment,  his  subjective 
nature  should  be  wrong,  as  to  any  of  his  objective  relations,  he 
will  only  need  to  perceive  these  relations  in  order  to  harmonize 
his  affections  and  conduct  •with  them ;  just  as  on  awaking  in  the 
morning,  the  presence  of  light  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  prepare 
him  to  adjust  his  movements  to  the  surrounding  objects.  That 
is  to  say,  no  change  of  his  constitution  will  be  necessary. 

3.  Regarding  his  nature  as  successively  existent,  let  all  the 
conditions  to  which  I  have  referred,  be  present  from  the  first, 
and  let  them  be  subsequently  maintained  in  due  subordination, 
each  would  be  found  to  keep  pace  with  all  the  rest  in  a  course 
of  constant  progression,  to  minister  to  their  well-being,  and  to 
the  happiness  of  the  whole  man.  But  let  any  of  these  conditions 


WELL-BEING. 

I 


269 


he  wanting,  and  a  new  view  of  the  consequences  appear.  Man’s 
nature,  as  we  have  seen,  is  continuous  and  accumulative ;  his 
character,  at  any  one  period  of  his  existence,  being  the  exact 
result  of  all  that  it  has  been  through  every  preceding  period. 
“  Many  men  fancy  that  the  slight  injuries  done  by  each  single 
act  of  intemperance  are  like  the  glomeration  of  moonbeams 
upon  moonbeams  —  myriads  will  not  amount  to  a  positive  value. 
Perhaps  they  are  wrong,  possibly  every  act  —  nay,  every  separate 
pulse  or  throb  of  intemperate  sensation  —  is  numbered  in  our 
own  after  actions ;  reproduces  itself  in  some  future  perplexity  ; 
comes  back  in  some  revisionary  shape  that  injures  the  freedom 
of  action  for  all  men,  and  makes  good  men  afflicted.  At  all 
events,  it  is  an  undeniable  fact,  that  many  a  case  of  difficulty, 
which  in  apology  for  ourselves  we  very  truly  plead  to  be  insur¬ 
mountable  by  our  existing  energies,  has  borrowed  its  sting  from 
previous  acts  or  omissions  of  our  own :  it  might  not  have  been 
insurmountable,  had  we  better  cherished  our  physical  resources.”. 
We  accept  this  view  as  more  than  a  speculation.  “  Physiology,” 
says  Liebig,*  “  has  sufficiently  decisive  grounds  for  the  opinion, 
that  every  conception,  every  mental  affection,  is  followed  by 
changes  in  the  chemical  nature  of  the  secreted  fluid ;  that  ecery 
thought,  every  sensation,  is  accompanied  by  a  change  in  the 
composition  of  the  substance  of  the  brain.”  Whether  we  receive 
this  statement  as  physiologically  true  or  not,  it  is  certain  that, 
in  the  account  of  psychology,  every  mental  movement  has  a 
real  value.  As  a  creature  of  memory,  every  thought  which 
man  voluntarily  entertains  will  abide  with  him  forever.  If  it 
be  a  thought  in  harmony  with  the  Divine  will,  and  he  has  acted 
in  harmony  with  it,  it  will  never  cease  to  yield  him  good ;  if  he 
have  not  so  acted,  it  will  never  cease  to  reproach  and  condemn 
him.  If  it  be  an  evil  thought,  and  he  have  repented  of  it,  and 
have  not  carried  it  out  into  action,  it  can  yet  never  cease  to  be 
an  occasion  of  regret.  If  he  have  not  repented  of  it,  it  remains 
with  him,  in  effect,  as  an  ever-running  fountain  of  pollution. 
How  terrible  the  ordeal  of  having  to  meet  the  sinful  thoughts 
of  a  long  life  of  guilt !  How  fearful  the  prospect  of  having  to 
confront  them,  not  for  an  age,  merely,  or  a  million  of  ages,  but 
to  have  the  ordeal  repeated  through  every  point  of  endless 
duration ! 

4.  Man’s  nature  is  progressive  also.  As  a  creature  of  habit, 
the  repetition  of  a  voluntary  act  produces  a  tendency  to  con- 


*  Animal  Chemistry,  p.  9. 

23* 


270 


MAN. 


tinued  repetition  and  diffusion.  By  the  repetition  of  a  virtuous 
act,  moral  power  is  gained ;  but  as  less  moral  power  is  required 
to  perform  that  particular  act,  there  is  (as  Dr.  TT ayland  happily 
expresses  it)  a  surplus  to  be  expended  in  the  performance  of 
other  virtuous  acts.  By  the  repetition  of  a  vicious  act,  moral 
power  is  diminished ;  but  as  more  moral  power  is  required  to 
resist  the  augmented  power  of  the  passions  which  prompt  to 
the  repetition  of  that  particular  act,  the  likelihood  that  it  will 
be  repeated  is  increased,  as  well  as  that  the  surplus  force  of  the 
passions  will  be  expended  in  the  performance  of  other  vicious 
acts.  Thus,  like  an  error  admitted  into  the  early  stage  of  a 
calculation  conducted  by  geometrical  progression,  and  which 
goes  on  repeating  and  enlarging  itself  at  every  step  of  the 
reckoning,  till  the  unit  soon  swells  into  millions,  there  is  not 
merely  a  tendency  in  evil  to  perpetuate  itself,  and  so  to  become 
unalterable,  but  to  multiply  itself  with  a  rapidity  which  defies 
calculation.  In  estimating  a  virtuous  action,  then,  we  must  not 
merely  look  at  its  immediate  consequences  —  these  may  be  the 
smallest  part  of  the  advantage  —  but  at  the  tendency  to  virtuous 
action  ever  after,  which  it  includes  and  promotes.  And  in  esti¬ 
mating  a  vicious  action,  we  must  look  not  merely  at  its  direct 
effects,  but  (what  may  be  much  greater)  at  the  tendency  to  vice 
which  it  brings  with  it.  The  immediate  effects  of  an  act  of 
inebriety  may  be  calculable ;  but  if  the  act  lead  to  the  habit, 
the  reckoning  must  include  all  the  vicious  courses  which  that 
act  began  to  prepane  the  drunkard  for.  So  that  even  if  he  be 
less  answerable  for  the  particular  acts  committed  when  intoxi¬ 
cated  than  he  would  have  been  had  he  been  sober,  the  sum-total 
of  his  guilt  is  not  thus  diminished ;  there  is  only  a  transfer  made 
of  it  to  a  different  column  of  the  reckoning  —  namely,  to  the 
course  of  immoderate  indulgence,  by  which  he  placed  himself 
in  a  state  of  moral  defencelessness,  and  thus  qualified  himself 
for  the  perpetration  of  evil.  In  the  same  way,  a  man  may 
pervert  his  judgment,  and  thus  disqualify  himself  for  believing 
the  testimony  of  the  gospel  at  the  close  of  life,  by  having  begun 
to  yield  to  the  force  of  his  passions  early  in  life.  Now,  even  if 
he  is  less  guilty  for  his  disbelief  under  these  circumstances  than 
he  would  have  been  had  he  never  so  vielded,  this  does  not  lessen 

J  J 

the  sum-total  of  his  guilt.  He  is  still  responsible,  and  ever  will 
be,  for  the  process  by  which  he  disqualified  himself  for  receiving 
the  testimony  of  his  Maker. 

5.  From  habit  results  character  and  its  consolidation.  B  7 
character  is  not  to  be  understood  original  temperament,  or  con- 


WELL-BEING. 


271 


stitutional  tendency.  Such  idiosyncracy  may  be  closely  related 
to  it,  but  does  not  constitute  it.  On  the  contrary,  character  may 
overbea"  it,  and  be  even  formed  in  defiance  of  it.  Character  is 
the  slow  and  conscious  product  of  man’s  voluntary  nature.  “  As 
a  man  thinketh  in  his  heart  so  is  he.”  It  is  that  which  identifies 
him  with  his  moral  self  at  different  stages  of  his  being ;  and 
hence,  it  is  only  on  the  supposition  that  his  character  is  changed 
that  he  is  said  to  lose  his  moral  identity,  and  to  become  a  “  new 
creature.”  It  discriminates  him  from  all  his  fellow-beings,  as 
one  having  “his  own  way.”  It  places  him  in  a  distinctive 
relation  to  the  government  of  God.  And,  as  such,  it  asks  for 
him  finally  “  his  own  place.”  However  much  he  may  have 
first  apparently  resembled  others,  his  character  gradually  be¬ 
comes  more  and  more  unique.  Like  the  organs  of  embryotic 
life,  as  soon  as  character  becomes  distinguishable,  it  is  found  to 
be  specific.  And  this  difference  is  not  merely  constant,  but 
ever  evolving.  Like  the  slow  deposit  of  an  ever-flowing 
mountain  stream,  character  is  always  acquiring  a  bolder  outline, 
and  firmer  consistency.  As  a  medium  of  mental  vision,  it  sheds 
a  more  decided  color  on  every  object  on  which  the  mind  looks. 
As  a  power  of  assimilation,  it  gradually  ceases  to  be  affected  by 
outward  things,  but  converts  them  more  easily  to  its  own  nature, 
and  appropriates  them  more  entirely  to  its  own  purposes.  It 
is  subjective ;  “  the  hidden  man  of  the  heart,”  subordinating  the 
outer  man,  and  the  outer  world,  to  itself.  Its  purposes  act 
independently  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  from  which 
they  first  took  their  rise.  It  is  the  oracle  and  earnest  of  his 
future  destiny.  If  its  aim  be  to  harmonize  with  the  will  of  God, 
it  is  constantly  approaching  the  unchangeable  without ,  as  well 
as  within.  At  every  upward  step  it  is  emerging  from  the  un¬ 
certainty  of  probation,  into  the  region  of  stability  and  repose. 
Its  path  “  shineth  more  and  more every  sweep  of  its  wing 
bearing  it  nearer  to  the  uncreated  light,  and  more  within  the 
circle  in  which  every  object  feels  the  ever-growing  attraction 
of  the  Divine  Centre. 

6.  This  course  of  remark  clearly  presupposes  man’s  objective 
relations.  That  he  sustains  such  relations  we  have  already 
seen ;  we  have  now  to  show  that  there  is  no  obligation  resulting 
from  these,  obedience  to  which  is  not  essential  to  his  well-bein^ 
as  an  integral  portion  of  the  great  system,  and  as  a  subject  of 
the  Divine  government.  For  example:  as  a  creature,  physical, 
organic,  and  animal,  there  is  an  appropriate  locality  for  him  on 
.he  surface  of  the  globe,  as  well  as  a  state  of  the  atmosphere,  a 


272 


MAN. 


kind  and  a  quantity  of  food,  and  a  degree  of  muscular  activity ; 
and  his  bodily  welfare  depends  on  the  constant  and  perfect 
adjustment  of  this  part  of  his  system  to  the  corresponding  parts 
of  external  nature,  or,  on  the  entire  coincidence  of  the  two. 
Every  element  is  constantly  saying  to  him,  in  effect,  “  I  am  the 
servant  of  God ;  use  me  in  harmony  with  His  appointment,  and 
I  will  minister  to  your  welfare.”  Every  physical  law  is  saying 
to  him,  “  Adjust  yourself  to  me ;  and  be  strong,  secure,  and 
happy.”  And  religion,  so  far  from  exempting  him  from  obedi¬ 
ence  to  these  laws  even  for  religious  purposes,  except  on  the 
special  authority  of  the  Lawgiver,  adds  its  own  solemn  sanction 
to  enforce  compliance. 

As  a  sentient  being,  every  object  is  saying  to  him,  “  Stand  at 
such  a  distance  from  me,  and  you  shall  perceive  my  color,  pro¬ 
portions,  and  all  that  can  be  seen  of  my  physical  properties. 
View  me  from  any  other  point,  and  you  shall  *be  the  victim  of 
optical  illusion.  Listen,  and  you  shall  hear  a  thousand  melo¬ 
dious  sounds  and  warning  voices.  Be  inattentive ;  and,  for 
you,  creation  shall  be  silent.”  As  a  reflective  being,  let  him 
examine,  remember,  and  compare ;  and  he  will  daily  increase 
his  knowledge.  Let  him  hold  intercourse  wifh  others,  and  he 
will  correct  his  knowledge.  Let  him  believe  the  credible  testi- 
mony  of  another,  and  he  will  double  it,  adding  to  it  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  another  mind.  As  a  rational  bein£,  he  cannot  refer 
facts  to  their  first  principles  without  becoming  conversant  with 
the  infinite  and  the  absolute.  And  thus  the  most  simple  objects 
and  events  would  remind  him  of  the  invisible  and  the  sublime ; 
and  'earth  become  the  porch  of  a  temple  containing  the  holiest 
of  all.  By  his  imagination  he  might  enter  that  temple,  and 
even  pass  reverently  within  its  awful  veil.  Being  endowed 
with  the  powers  of  speech ,  he  is  capable  of  adding  to  his  own 
not  merely  the  knowledge,  but  the  power,  of  another  mind. 
Falsehood,  by  begetting  distrust,  cuts  off  this  communication, 
and  leaves  the  subject  of  it  in  a  state  of  unwilling  isolation  from 
all  around.  While  scepticism  and  unbelief  place  a  man  in  vol- 
untary  isolation  from  all  that  could  instruct  and  benefit  him  in 
the  reciprocity  of  confidence  and  faith.  Mutual  truthfulness 
and  confidence  are  essential  to  human  happiness ;  and,  in  pro¬ 
portion  as  these  qualities  exist,  (other  things  being  equal.)  hap¬ 
piness  exists. 

If  he  carry  out  his  emotions  to  their  appropriate  objects,  and 
proportion  them  to  the  value  of  those  objects,  his  life  will  be 
one  of  enjoyment.  On  the  other  hand,  let  them  fall  short  of 


WELL-BEING. 


273 


•  these  objects,  and  he  himself  will  fall  short  of  the  end  of  his 
being.  In  that  case,  his  desire  of  property,  if  gratified,  will, 
instead  of  bringing  him  the  pleasures  of  charity,  torture  him 
with  the  fever  of  covetousness.  Desiring  power  for  its  own 
sake,  he  will  find  himself  involved  in  the  cares  and  jealousies  of 
a  petty  despotism.  Desiring  emotion  of  any  kind  for  its  own 
sake,  he  will  go  through  life,  as  thousands  do,  crying,  “  Give, 
give  !  ”  and  never  be  satisfied.  As  a  voluntary  being,  the  per¬ 
formance  of  a  wrong  action  involuntarily  (only  let  him  not 
deceive  himself  on  this  vital  point)  will  not  diminish  his  moral 
self-approbation,  nor  will  the  involuntary  performance  of  the 
best  action  add  to  his  moral  enjoyment.  Hence  the  folly  of  the 
indevout  in  expecting  happiness  from  the  scenes  and  services  of 
Heaven.  While  the  conscious  and  voluntary  coincidence  of  the 
mind  with  the  Divine  will  can  make  it  familiar  with  heavenly 
pleasures  even  while  here  upon  earth.  As  a  being  endowed 
with  the  power  of  conscience ,  he  is  happy  in  exact  proportion  as 
he  yields  to  its  enlightened  dictates,  and  becomes  the  subject  of 
moral  approbation.  And  all  this,  just  because  everything  cre¬ 
ated  which  co-exists  with  him,  has  been  called  into  existence 
and  activity  for  the  same  end  as  himself.  The  laws  of  his  being 
therefore,  so  far  from  running  counter  to  the  laws,  physical  and 
moral,  of  the  objective  universe,  must  perfectly  coincide  with 
them.  Both  form  parts  of  one  great  whole,  and  have  their 
basis  in  the  Divine  Nature. 

7.  In  these  remarks,  however,  we  may  appear  to  suppose 
that  the  various  parts  of  our  nature  are  of  equal  importance ; 
whereas  we  have  found  that,  in  harmony  with  the  law  of  subor¬ 
dination  which  prevails  in  the  objective  universe,  a  law  of  cor¬ 
responding  subordination  exists  also  in  the  constitution  of  man. 
Every  part  of  our  nature  occupies  a  place  in  the  human  con¬ 
stitution,  and  possesses  a  right  in  relation  to  every  other  part, 
according  to  its  power  of  subserving  the  end  of  creation.  Thus, 
we  have  seen  that  the  laws  of  appetite  must  be  obeyed ;  that 
the  obedience  is  attended  with  present  gratification  ;  that  it 
strengthens  and  prepares  the  man  for  the  pursuit  of  higher  grat¬ 
ifications  ;  and  is  essential  to  the  continuance  of  the  race. 

Pleasures  of  sense,  however,  as  Paley  remarks,  continue  but 
a  little  while  at  a  time  ;  soon  lose  their  relish  by  repetition  ; 
soon  arrive  at  a  limit  from  which  they  ever  afterwards  decline. 
Besides  which,  if  I  indulge  my  appetites  to  excess,  I  may  de¬ 
stroy  their  power  of  ever  after  affording  me  enjoyment.  Still 
more  ;  as  I  am  capable  of  deriving  gratification  from  knowledge, 


274 


MAN. 


as  knowledge  is  necessary  to  my  well-being,  and  as  it  yields  me 
purer  and  more  permanent  satisfaction  than  the  gratification  of 
my  appetite,  I  must  not  indulge  my  appetite  so  as  to  incapaci¬ 
tate  myself  for  study.  True  it  is,  that  neither  must  I  study  so 
as  to  be  disabled  from  partaking  of  my  necessary  food.  Each 
gratification  is  right  within  certain  limits.  The  unlimited  allow¬ 
ance  of  either  would  be  destructive  to  the  man,  and  to  the  race. 
But  if  one  is  to  be  subordinated  to  the  other,  if  the  question  be 
whether  the  pleasures  of  appetite  or  of  intellect  rank  higher, 
there  can  be  no  hesitation  respecting  the  answer. 

But  man  is  to  inhabit  the  future,  and  the  future,  on  various 
accounts,  ranks  higher  in  importance  than  the  present ;  higher 
in  point  of  duration;  and  higher  in  this  important  respect,  that 
it  will  find  him  more  capable  of  happiness  or  of  misery  than  he 
is  at  present.  Accordingly,  Self-love,  or  a  regal'd  for  his  well¬ 
being  on  the  whole,  requires  him  to  subordinate  even  his  present 
thirst  for  knowledge ;  and  in  proportion  as  he  practises  a  wise 
self-denial  for  this  end,  he  is  benefited  and  happy. 

But  I  am  made  chiefly  to  subserve  the  great  end ;  to  know, 
love,  voluntarily  serve,  and  subordinate  myself  to,  the  will  of 
God  in  the  manifestation  of  His  glory.  This  is  the  true  and 
ultimate  reason  of  my  existence.  Only  let  my  self-love  itself, 
then,  take  the  form  of  love  to  God  and  obedience  to  Him,  and 
it  becomes  coincident  with  His  highest  glory;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  my  regard  for  His  glory  is  coincident  with  my 
highest  well-being.  And  this  is  the  only  motive  which  is  so. 
Thus,  if  an  act  which  conscience  had  often  dictated,  is  performed 
by  me,  at  length,  to  gratify  my  passions,  I  lose  the  pleasure  of 
virtue,  and  lay  myself  open  to  the  pains  of  remorse.  If  I  per¬ 
form  it  from  self-love,  though  I  gain  whatever  advantage 
belongs  to  the  action  according  to  the  constitution  under  which 
I  am  placed,  still  I  lose  the  pleasure  of  rectitude.  “  Verily,  I 
have  my  reward.”  If  I  perform  it  from  a  benevolent  impulse, 
a  yet  higher  gratification  is  enjoyed,  and  one  including  the  prior 
kind  of  advantage,  in  another  form,  also ;  but  still  the  pleasure 
of  conscious  obedience  is  wanting.  But  if  I  perform  it  from 
affectionate  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  I  secure,  in  other 
forms,  all  the  advantages  flowing  from  the  other  classes  of  mo¬ 
tives,  and  the  nobler  rewards  of  conscious  conformity  to  the 
Divine  will,  in  addition.  The  stream  cannot  rise  higher  than 
its  source ;  nor  can  the  reward  of  an  action  transcend  the  level 
of  the  actuating  motive.  If,  like  the  pure  river,  clear  as  crys¬ 
tal,  it  “  proceed  from  the  throne  of  God,”  thither  it  will  conduct 


WELL-BEING. 


275 


me  to  “  see  His  face.”  A  supreme  regard  for  His  will,  I  re¬ 
peat,  is  coincident  with  my  highest  well-being.  How  can  it  be 
otherwise  ?  My  nature  has  been  made  to  manifest  his  nature, 
and  my  will  to  serve  his  will.  To  love  and  serve  Him,  then,  is 
to  keep  every  separate  part  of  my  nature  in  harmony  with 
every  other  part,  and  the  whole  in  harmony  with  Him.  To  be 
like  Him,  is  to  share  his  happiness.  To  sympathize  with  Him, 
is  to  find  perfection.  Every  part  of  man’s  nature,  then,  was 
meant  to  be  perpetually  crying  out  for  the  living  God.  And, 
still,  the  highest  distinction  we  can  think  of  is  expressed  when 
we  sav,  “We  shall  be  like  Him “we  shall  be  satisfied  when 
we  awake  up  in  His  likeness.” 

8.  But  man  sustains  also  external  relations  successively  ex¬ 
istent.  And  there  is  no  obligation  of  this  class,  obedience  to 
which  is  not  essential  to  his  well-being.  While  everything 
within  him  and  without  him  points,  as  we  have  seen,  to  an  end¬ 
less  duration  of  being,  in  which  all  the  results  of  past  conduct 
and  character  pass  into  every  present  moment,  and  so  on¬ 
wards  to  all  the  future.  Here  the  field  widens  into  a  bound¬ 
less  prospect !  For  if  no  holy  thought  or  emotion  is  ever  to  be 
entirely  lost  out  of  my  nature ;  if  it  be  the  tendency  of  every 
virtuous  emotion  and  action  to  reproduce  itself  and  to  produce 
others  like  it ;  if  every  virtuous  movement  thus  tends  to  en¬ 
large  my  capacity  for  virtue ;  and  if  God,  to  whom  I  sustain 
the  most  intimate  objective  relation,  be  infinite,  and  my  own 
duration  be  unending,  then,  “  it  doth  not  yet  appear  what  we 
shall  be  !  ” 

9.  Here,  then,  as  Butler  remarks,  is  “  the  proper  formal 
notion  of  gove?nment;  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions 
and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  no¬ 
tice  beforehand  to  those  whom  it  concerns.”  Here  is  Obliga¬ 
tion,  together  with  the  Laws  which  it  presupposes,  and  the 
Sanctions  which  they  imply  in  the  known  results  of  obedience 
and  disobedience.  The  fact  that  there  is  no  formal  arraign¬ 
ment,  no  jury,  no  public  trial,  no  judicial  pageant  and  parade, 
often  no  lapse  of  time  between  the  transgressic  n  and  the  pen¬ 
alty,  forms  no  objection  to  this  view.  What  civil  magistrate 
would  not  gladly  see  his  laws  taking  sure  and  silent  effect  in  a 
similar  manner,  executing  themselves  upon  the  offender,  without 
any  magisterial  interposition,  or  the  formalities  of  a  judicial  pro¬ 
cess  ?  His  noise  and  pomp  are  only  the  concealments  of  his 
weakness.  His  intrusive  inquisitions  and  balancing  of  evi¬ 
dence  betray  his  self-distrust.  His  elaborate  objective  arrange- 


276 


MAN. 


ments  and  appeals  confess  his  conscious  impotence  over  the 
subjective.. 

10.  Nor  is  it  any  valid  objection  to  this  view,  as  some  sup¬ 
pose,  that  pain  is  not  necessarily  punitive,  but  may  be  only 
monitory.  The  true  explanation  appears  to  be  that  it  may  be 
both ;  that  it  may  be  made  either  by  the  subject  of  it ;  and  was 
designed  by  the  Moral  Governor  to  be  what  the  subject  made 
it.  That  is  to  say,  that,  in  the  case  of  involuntary  wrong,  it  is 
meant  to  warn ;  that  in  the  case  of  voluntary  wrong,  or  guilt, 
it  is  meant  to  warn  and  also  to  punish ;  and  that  when,  owing 
to  circumstances,  it  can  operate  only  as  a  punishment  on  the 
transgressor  himself  —  as  when  it  proves  fatal  to  him,  or  when 
it  consists  partly  in  indisposing  him  to  amendment  —  it  is  still 
meant  to  act  as  a  warning  to  others. 

11.  Nor  can  it  be  justly  objected  to  this  view  of  moral  gov¬ 
ernment,  that  guilt  and  its  supposed  punishment  are  often  sepa¬ 
rated  by  a  wide  interval,  and  that  in  some  instances  the  punish¬ 
ment  does  not  appeal'  to  follow  at  all.  The  truth  is,  that  the 
system  of  government  under  which  we  are  placed  is  not  en¬ 
tirely  developed  in  the  present  state.  Even  where  vice  appeal’s 
to  be  instantly  punished,  it  is  only  the  commencement  of  the 
punishment  that  is  seen.  No  one  has  ever  seen  the  full  result 
of  any  act  either  of  virtue  or  vice  in  this  world.  Death  inter¬ 
rupts  or  suspends  it,  as  far  as  the  present  life  is  concerned.  If, 
however,  the  existing  state  could  be  perpetuated,  the  penal  con¬ 
sequences  of  every  sin  would  sooner  or  later  be  found  taking  full 
effect.  Every  man  would  have  a  day  of  judgment  in  his  his¬ 
tory.  And  it  is  the  ineradicable  conviction  of  the  human  mind 
that  those  consequences,  interrupted  or  suspended  here,  are  cer¬ 
tainly  resumed  and  developed  elsewhere.  Often,  indeed,  the 
consequences  of  a  guilty  act  appear  and  infix  themselves  on  the 
doer  at  the  distance  of  half  the  globe  from  the  scene  of  the 
transaction,  and  after  the  apparent  slumber  of  years ;  showing 
that  he  has  never  been  really  out  of  the  hand  of  justice.  And 
this  reminds  us  that  the  true  reply  to  the  objection  is  that  the 
separation  between  guilt  and  punishment  is  only  apparent ;  that 
the  first  element  of  punishment  consists  in  the  depraving  ten¬ 
dency  of  the  guilty  deed  itself ;  so  that  the  sin  infolds  its  own 
punishment ;  from  the  same  root  grow  the  tempting  fruit  and 
the  rod  that  chastises.  The  punishment  of  which  the  objector 
speaks  is  only  one  of  the  visible  results  of  the  transgression. 
The  invisible  consequence  may  be  incomparably  greater ;  and 
this,  we  repeat,  begins  with  the  very  act  of  transgression.  They 


•WELL-BEING. 


277 


are  a  twin  birth.  The  transgressor  is  “a  sinner  against  his 
own  soul.”  Sin  arms  him  against  himself.  It  is  his  own  nature 
which  he  violates.  The  blow  aimed  at  the  law  falls  on  himself, 
not  by  rebound,  but  directly ;  for  he  enshrines  the  law.  “  His 
sin  is  ever  before  him.”  Amidst  the  silence  and  solitude  of  the 
desert  there  is  a  voice  accusing  him  ;  and  during  the  midnight 
slumbers  of  all  around  him,  there  is  an  eye  sternly  upbraiding 
him.  Or  it  may  be  that  he  sins  with  little  compunction.  But 
can  this  be  considered  a  felicity  ?  It  only  proves  that  his  moral 
disease  has  reached  an  advanced  stage.  He  is  “  past  feeling.” 
The  outward  man  may  be  unscathed,  but  the  lightning  has  dis¬ 
charged  its  stroke  on  the  spirit.  His  “  conscience  is  seared.” 
And  this  punishment  which  denaturalizes  and  destroys  waited 
not  even  for  the  first  act  of  sin ;  with  the  first  thought  of  evil 
A  had  already  bernm  to  take  effect. 

12.  Now  of  such  government  the  first  man  wras  a  subject. 
With  him,  probably,  it  commenced  on  earth.  From  the  mo¬ 
ment  of  his  creation  he  enclosed  within  himself  a  wdiole  system 
of  moral  government  —  laws,  and  judge,  and  prison,  and  instru¬ 
ments  of  torture,  if  he  disobeyed ;  rewards,  and  happiness,  and 
conscious  improvement,  if  he  obeyed.  The  law  was  in  him 
and  around  him.  Nowhere  wras  he  beyond  its  jurisdiction. 
Nothing  escaped  its  unslumbering  eye.  Never  was  he  dis¬ 
missed  from  its  presence.  Every  object  and  event  offered 
itself  as  its  exponent  and  instrument.  Pure,  calm,  and  uniform, 
as  omnipotent  holiness,  it  saw  no  difficulty,  bent  to  no  indul¬ 
gence.  Man’s  own  nature  was  its  judgment  hall ;  his  capacity 
for  holiness  its  medium  of  reward ;  his  power  of  sinning  its  in¬ 
strument  of  punishment.  This  was  truly  the  majesty  of  law, 
and  the  perfection  of  government. 

13.  As  the  subject  of  this  government,  man  possesses  the 
requisites  of  natural  religion.  Its  sources  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  constitution  of  the  mind,  the  light  derivable  from  the  laws 
of  external  nature,  and  from  the  administration  of  Providence. 
And  these  means  of  religious  knowledge  exist  for  the  human 
mind  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  here  stated.  The  prov¬ 
idential  administration  presupposes  the  laws  of  nature,  for 
these  are  the  laws  administered.  A  governor  supposes  laws  by 
which  his  government  is  conducted.  And  these  natural  laws, 
again,  presuppose  man’s  intellectual  and  moral  constitution, 
for  to  that  constitution  they  appeal,  and  by  it  they  are  interpre¬ 
ted.  Apart  from  that  constitution,  these  laws  have  no  intel¬ 
lectual  nor  moral  meaning.  Strictly  speaking,  they  are  only 


278 


MAN. 


manifestations  of  laws,  the  ideas  of  which  exist  in  the  mind  oi 
God,  and  the  corresponding  ideas  to  which  they  are  designed 
to  awaken  in  the  mind  of  man.  They  stand  face  to  face  with 
him,  therefore,  assured  that  he  is  constituted  to  recognize  their 
origin  and  import.  Susceptible  of  a  religious  application,  they 
appeal  to  him  as  already,  in  capacity  and  tendency,  a  religious 
being.  Written  in  sympathic  ink,  they  seem  to  explain  him  to 
himself,  though  it  is  only  by  the  light  of  his  own  mind  that  their 
characters  are  brought  out.  “  Reason  (says  Locke)  is  natural 
revelation.”  “  F or  the  invisible  things  of  God  from  the  founda¬ 
tion  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the  things 
which  are  made,  even  his  eternal  power  and  Godhead.”*  They 
proclaim  the  Godhead  only  as  they  are  iinderstood.  They 
teach  man  only  as  he  is  constituted  to  inform  and  mentally  con¬ 
strue  them.  “  The  things  which  are  made”  could  convey  to  him 
no  knowledge  of  the  Maker,  did  not  his  constitution  place  him 
under  the  subjective  necessity  of  giving  them  a  religious  inter¬ 
pretation,  and  if  that  interpretation  could  not  be  relied  on  by 
him  as  valid.  The  subjective  and  the  objective  then,  the  physi¬ 
cal  and  the  moral,  form  strictly  but  one  system.  They  are  not 
two  worlds ;  but,  viewed  in  the  light  of  natural  religion,  they 
constitute  one  whole. 

14.  Now,  assuming  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  Creator,  of 
a  pervading  design  in  creation,  of  man’s  capability  of  under¬ 
standing  that  design,  and  especially  of  understanding  it  as  an 
expression  of  the  Divine  will  concerning  us,  it  is  the  office  of 
natural  religion  to  ascertain  and  arrange  our  consequent  duties. 
Here,  conscience  is  of  primary  and  supreme  importance.  As  a 
rational  being,  man  might  perceive  that  he  had  come  into  a 
world  animate  and  inanimate,  possessed  of  a  fixed  constitution  ; 
that  some  things  were  right  for  it,  and  other  things  wrong,  in 
relation  to  that  constitution ;  that  its  laws,  if  disturbed,  were 
ever  vindicating  their  authority,  recovering  their  place,  and 
publishing  themselves  anew.  As  a  being  sentient  as  well  as 
rational,  capable  of  pleasure  and  pain,  he  might  perceive  that 
some  things  were  right  for  him,  in  reference  to  the  constitution 
to  which  he  belonged,  and  that  other  things  were  wrong ;  that 
do  whatever  he  might,  he  was  either  benefiting  or  injuring 
himself ;  that  even  the  vibration  of  pleasure,  if  continued  beyond 
a  certain  point,  ended  in  a  shock  of  pain.  But  all  this  is  only 
a  benevolent  arrangement,  which  preceded  his  coming.  It  is  a 


*  Bom.  i.  20. 


WELL-BEING-. 


270 


protection  from  danger,  and  a  source  of  advantage,  which  the 
animal  enjoys  in  common  with  himself.  But  as  a  moral  being, 
recomiizina  in  this  arrangement  the  will  of  God  concerning  his 
conduct,  the  entire  aspect  of  the  economy  is  changed.  The 
phvsieal  constitution  becomes  a  moral  government.  His  relations 
to  that  constitution  land  him  in  corresponding  obligations  to  its 
Author.  From  the  region  of  mere  physical  right  and  wrong,  he 
emerges  into  the  sphere  of  guilt  and  innocence,  merit  and 
demerit.  Here  God  reigns  ;  and  every  part  of  man’s  nature  is 
under  law  to  Him  :  law  differing  according  to  the  part.  His 
appetites,  his  self-love,  his  benevolent  affections,  his  religious 
capabilities :  each  is  to  be  respected,  but  only  within  pre¬ 
scribed  limits.  The  domain  of  each  differs  in  extent  and 
value  ;  and  the  regard  for  the  Divine  will  is  supreme.  And  the 
__  more  the  light  of  Nature  is  consulted,  the  more  is  the  domain 
of  conscience  enlarged,  and  its  authority  illustrated.  In  this 
light,  the  results  of  actions  are  seen,  the  doctrine  of  general 
consequences  comes  into  being.  That  which  is  apparently 
harmless  to-day,  is  seen  “bringing  forth  fruit  unto  death.’* 
years  afterwards.  An  act  which  appeared  to  leave  the  indi¬ 
vidual  uninjured,  circulates  poison  through  the  social  system. 
Moral  problems  are  analyzed  and  solved.  Relations  come  to 
light  in  the  most  unexpected  quarters.  And  motives  to  conse¬ 
quent  duty  collect  and  combine  their  influence  from  times  and 
places  the  most  distant.  Now,  the  orderly  distribution  of  the 
relations  and  obligations  thus  arrived  at,  forms  the  system  of 
natural  religion.  "What  man  ought  to  have  done  in  this  depart¬ 
ment,  and  what  he  has  accomplished,  form,  alas !  a  humiliating 
contrast. 

Id.  The  knowledge  of  Nature  is,  as  far  as  it  goes,  the 
knowledge  of  God.  And  the  more  its  laws  are  understood,  the 
more  do  they  “  declare  His  glory.”  But  the  same  light  which 
reveals  His  excellence,  discloses  man’s  comparative  want  of  it. 
And  this  alone  should  be  enough  to  awaken  our  doubts  respect¬ 
ing  the  sufficiency  of  natural  religion :  at  least,  for  fallen  man. 
But,  on  consideration,  we  perceive  that  its  insufficiency  even  for 
unfallen  man  is  inherent.  He  could  not  at  any  time  be  certain 
that  he  was  acquainted  with  all  the  relations  which  bound  up 
his  present  conduct  with  his  future  welfare,  and  with  the  welfare 
of  distant  ages.  Nor  could  he  be  certain  that  he  knew  either 
all  the  obligations  resulting  from  the  relations  with  which  he 
was  acquainted,  nor  the  manner  in  which  all  his  known  obliga¬ 
tions  should  be  discharged.  While,  in  the  event  of  voluntarily 


280 


MAN. 


breaking  a  Divine  obligation  —  but  this  was  a  crisis  which  natu¬ 
ral  religion  had  not  even  cont  emplated.  Other  reasons  of  this  in¬ 
sufficiency  are  evident.  Many  laws  would  have  to  be  ascertained 
by  induction.  Man  must  experiment  on  his  nature,  interpret  law 
by  the  violation  of  it.  The  meaning  of  some  laws  would  be 
an  entailed  question,  requiring  the  experience  of  generations. 
While  all  the  certain  motives  to  obedience  supplied  by  natural 
religion  would  be  derived  from  the  present  state.  Highly  prob¬ 
able  as  it  can  render  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life  —  probable  to 
a  degree  which  renders  the  rejection  of  it  inexcusable  —  it  can¬ 
not  speak  of  it  as  a  fact.  It  can  “  testify  only  to  that  which  it 
hath  seen.”  While  experience  proves  that  even  the  full  expec¬ 
tation  of  future  retribution  as  a  revealed  certainty,  often  fails 
to  operate  with  adequate  force. 

16.  In  the  event,  then,  of  natural  religion  being  reinforced 
and  enlarged  by  direct  revelation,  we  can  foresee  the  points  to 
which  it  will  be  probably  directed.  It  may  be  expected  to  in¬ 
crease  man’s  knowledge  of  his  relations ,  and  to  make  him  more 
deeply  conscious  of  the  extent  of  his  obligations ,  as  well  as  to 
increase  his  motives  to  obedience  ;  while,  on  the  supposition  of  his 
falling  into  sin,  revelation  will  have  a  reserved  domain,  unshared 
by  nature,  peculiarly  and  entirely  its  own.  Now,  in  the  instance 
of  unfallen  man,  the  departments  we  have  named  were  precisely 
those  in  which  the  insufficiency  of  nature  was  supplemented  by 
immediate  revelation.  The  exigency  of  the  case  demanded  it. 
It  did  not  so  much  forestal  his  own  discoveries,  as  save  his  life. 
Its  object  was  not  to  exempt  him  from  labor,  but  to  encourage 
him  to  it.  In  a  manner  which  called  his  bodily  and  mental 
powers  into  exercise,  it  apprised  him  of  his  relations  to  the  king¬ 
doms  of  nature ;  thus  inevitably  inspiring  him  with  gratitude  to 
the  God  of  nature.  But,  in  order  that  his  moral  standing  might  be 
placed  beyond  question,  a  distinct  prohibition,  guarded  by  awful 
sanctions,  informed  him  of  his  responsible  relation  to  God,  and 
supplied  the  adequate  motives  to  obedience.  In  a  word,  it  dis¬ 
closed  to  him  without  loss  of  time,  the  twofold  fact  that  he  had 
come  into  a  fixed  moral  constitution,  and  that  his  own  constitu¬ 
tion  corresponded  with  it.  It  presupposed  his  responsible  nature, 
and  developed  it. 

17.  From  this  point  we  see  the  error  of  the  fatalistic  materi¬ 
alism  which  teaches  that  our  characters  necessarily  follow  from 
our  organization  at  birth,  combined  with  the  effects  of  subsequent 
external  influences  over  which  we  have  no  control.  If,  by  this, 
it  were  only  meant  that  character  is  the  result  of  man’s  subjec- 


WELL-BEEKG. 


281 


tive  constitution,  and  of  the  objective  world  acting  upon  it,  we 
could  say  nothing  against  it,  except  that  it  is  an  obvious  truism. 
From  what  could  character  result  but  from  the  world  within 
and  the  world  without  ?  The  question  is,  however,  whether  that 
internal  constitution  does  not  contain  a  faculty  which  gives  man 
a  controlling  power  over  external  circumstances.  Even  the 
plant  and  the  animal  have  a  constitution  which  enables  them  to 
appropriate  and  assimilate  external  elements  to  their  own  nature. 
It  is  not  until  that  constitution  ceases  to  act,  that  these  elements 
begin  to  assimilate  and  appropriate  them.  But  they  are  not 
held  responsible  for  the  manner  in  which  their  constitution  acts, 
simply  because  the  power  which  it  manifests,  operates,  as  far  as 
they  are  concerned,  mechanically.  The  human  being  also  acts 
according  to  his  constitution ;  but  his  constitution  includes  a 
power  which  is,  not  mechanical,  but  consciously  his  own.  His 
constitution  comes  from  God  ;  his  character  from  himself.  “  But 
if  he  receive  his  feelings  and  convictions  constitutionally,  is  not 
that  the  same  as  receiving  them  independently  of  his  will  ?” 
By  no  means.  He  is  constituted  to  believe  truth  on  evidence, 
and  to  draw  conclusions  from  premises,  and  so  forth.  Assuredly, 
he  does  not  deem  this  a  hardship.  But  the  world  contains  suf¬ 
ficient  proof,  that,  if  he  ivill,  he  can  decline  looking  at  the  evi¬ 
dence,  or  disqualify  himself  for  feeling  its  force,  or  train  himself 
for  drawing  wrong  conclusions  as  well  as  right  ones.  “  Yes,  if 
he  will  —  but  is  not  his  will  at  the  mercy  of  external  causes, 
and  formed  by  them  ?”  -Influenced  by  them  it  is  ;  and  herein, 
partly,  consists  its  excellence ;  for  surely  it  would  say  little  for 
the  constitution  of  a  being,  that  he  was  alike  indifferent  to  a 
world  of  objects  present  or  absent.  But,  controlled  by  them,  it 
is  not.  A  light  introduced  into  the  room  of  a  man  asleep,  may 
awaken  him  ;  but  in  disturbing  him,  it  awakens  a  power  vThich 
may  will  its  extinction.  Or,  if  it  be  said  that  the  influence  exer¬ 
cised  over  him  by  his  fellow-men  cannot  be  thus  dealt  with  ;  the 
answer  is,  that  the  power  of  their  will  implies  the  power  of  his ; 
and  that  they  cannot  touch  his  character  except  by  first  obtaining 
the  consent  of  his  will.  However  numerous  and  powerful  the 
agents,  then,  which  co-operate  in  the  formation  of  my  character, 
it  must  be  allowed  that  I  am,  at  least,  one  of  the  agents  ;  that  if 
it  is  made  partly  for  me,  it  is  also  made  partly  by  me.  But  in¬ 
asmuch  as  my  constitution  includes  a  power  by  which  I  can  will 
to  influence  them,  and  can,  therefore,  choose  whether  or  not  I 
will  be  influenced  so  as  to  be  determined  by  them,  I  am  more 
than  an  agent  in  the  formation  of  my  own  character — I  am  the 

24* 


282 


MAN. 


principal ;  and,  as  such,  I  am  held  responsible  to  the  Authoi  of 
my  constitution.  And  all  the  agencies  which  approach  me  pre¬ 
suppose  that  I  am  thus  in  my  own  power ;  they  seek  to  gain  the 
consent  of  my  will. 

18.  Thus,  primitive  man  was  brought  into  a  constitution  of 
things  in  which  every  object  was  calculated  and  designed  to  in¬ 
fluence  him,  and  each  to  influence  him  differently  from  all  the 
rest.  But  then  he  himself  was  endowed  with  a  constitution 
capable  of  classifying  these  objects  according  to  their  real  impor¬ 
tance,  and  of  regulating  their  power  over  himself  accordingly. 
Hence  the  spirit  and  design  of  the  primal  prohibition.  It  told 
him,  in  effect,  that  he  possessed  a  fixed  constitution,  including 
the  power  of  self-government,  that  he  stood  at  the  head  of  cre¬ 
ated  things,  and  was  capable  of  governing  them ;  that  he  must 
not,  therefore,  allow  himself  to  be  governed  by  them  ;  and  that 
his  security,  happiness,  duty,  required  that  his  will  should  har¬ 
monize  with  the  Supreme  Will ;  in  a  word,  that  his  constitution 
was  formed  in  harmony  with  the  Divine  constitution,  and  could 
find  perfection  only  by  voluntary  conformity  to  it. 

19.  And  here,  again,  we  are  reminded  of  the  ideal  perfection 
to  which  reference  was  made  in  the  corresponding  chapters  of 
the  preceding  Treatise.  In  the  present  instance,  however,  the 
subject  acquires  indefinite  interest.  For  if  man  have  a  moral 
constitution  answering  to  the  immutable  constitution  of  the 
Divine  Being,  and  if  his  character  is  to  be  the  intermediate 
growth  and  filling  up  —  the  conscious  and  voluntary  expansion 
of  finite  excellence  yearning  towards  the  infinite  —  it  follows 
that  he  will  ever  have  an  idea  of  excellence  present  to  his  mind 
which  he  may  be  constantly  approaching  without  ever  being  able 
fully  to  realize,  and  that  to  that  ideal  standard  no  two  human 
beings  will  be  ever  found  sustaining  precisely  the  same  measure 
of  conformity.  Even  the  flower  has  a  type, —  that  is,  the  human 
mind  conceives  of  a  type,  or  ideal  standard,  with  which  to  com¬ 
pare  it ;  but,  according  to  which,  no  specimen  is  absolutely  per¬ 
fect,  nor  any  two  precisely  equal.  Every  kind  of  animal  has 
a  type ;  and  here,  the  chances,  so  to  speak,  that  no  animal  has 
ever  reached  the  standard  of  absolute  animal  perfection,.  and  that 
no  two  of  the  same  kind  have  ever  stood  in  exactly  the  same 
relations  to  it,  are  still  greater ;  for  they  are  to  be  multiplied  by 
all  the  additional  laws,  and  all  their  possible  combinations,  which 
characterize  the  animal  as  compared  with  the  vegetable  econo¬ 
my.  Man  also  has  a  type,  but  that  type  is  Divine,  not  merely, 
as  in  the  preceding  instances,  a  supposed  idea  in  the  Divine 


WELL -BEEN  G-. 


283 


mind,  but  the  very  idea  itself  of  the  Divine  character.  For 
“  God  said.  Let  us  make  man  in  our  image ,  after  our  likeness.” 

Not  only  can  man  conceive  of  that  image ;  by  the  laws  which 
his  God-like  constitution  involves  he  can  conceive  of  his  own 
closer  resemblance  to  it,  and  is  impelled  perpetually  to  approach 
it.  In  philosophy,  he  conceives  of  truths  insusceptible  of  proof ; 
themselves  the  foundation  of  all  evidence.  In  science,  he  can 
conceive  of  forms  incapable  of  taking  sensible  representation. 
The  pure  and  absolute  geometry  of  his  mind  is  nowhere  realized 
in  space.  In  poetry,  and  in  the  tine  arts  generally,  however 
much  of  beauty  or  perfection  he  may  succeed  in  expressing,  his 
pure  idea  of  it  remains  unexpressed  —  a  vision  which  he  cannot 
reveal  to  others.  His  conception  even  of  the  “human  face 
divine”  is  more  exalted  than  any  known  to  have  existed  in 
nature.*  What  painter  or  sculptor,  for  example,  has  ever  yet 
given  a  head  of  “  the  Man  of  Sorrows”  with  which  we  can  rest 
satisfied  ?  But  all  these  conceptions  of  ideal  excellence  are  only 
consequences  of  our  being  formed  in  that  likeness  which  com¬ 
prehends  spiritual  perfection.  And  the  moral  government  under 
which  man  exists  is  but  the  ever-present  requirement  of  the 
Infinite,  calling,  by  its  laws,  on  every  part  of  the  nature  of  the 
finite  to  come  nearer  to  it.  His  other  conceptions  of  excellence 
he  mav  often  feel  as  if  he  were  close  on  the  verge  of  realizing ; 
but  though  he  can  never  feel  thus  in  relation  to  excellence  of 
the  highest  kind  —  though  the  call  of  that  spiritual  government 
of  which  his  nature  makes  him  a  subject,  will  be  ever  becoming 
louder  and  more  urgent  —  this  fact,  so  far  from  depressing,  ex¬ 
hilarates  and  delights  him.  The  conditions  of  his  nature  set 

- 

limits  to  the  rapidity  of  his  progress.  And  so  long  as  he  does 
not  voluntarily  fall  below  these  limits  —  which  would  be  sin  — 
he  leaves  no  occasion  for  sorrow  behind  him ;  while  every  on¬ 
ward  step  adds  to  his  satisfaction,  opens  before  him  a  wider 
prospect  filled  with  incentives  to  advance,  and  inspires  him  with 
the  ardor  of  ever-accelerating  progress. 

Thus  constantly  approaching  the  standard  of  infinite  Perfec 
tion.  he  would  never  sustain,  for  anv  measurable  length  of  time 
precisely  the  same  relation  to  it.  And,  for  the  same  reason  — 


*  The  facial  angle  is  80°.  The  ancient  artists  not  only  made  it  a  right 
angle,  the  Romans  went  up  to  96°,  and  the  Greeks  even  to  100° ;  yet  the 
latter  is  accounted  the  more  beautiful  and  impressive.  The  forehead  of 
their  Jupiter  Tonans  c  verhung  the  face,  denoting  grandeur  and  sovereignty 
of  mind. 


284 


MAN. 


on  the  supposition  that  his  race  had  remained  in  unsinning 
obedience  and  yet  had  multiplied  —  no  two  of  them  all  would 
have  borne,  in  every  respect,  the  same  degree  of  resemblance 
to  it.  Every  one  would  come  into  existence,  or  would  find 
himself  placed,  in  circumstances  somewhat  differing  from  those 
of  every  other  member  of  the  human  family.  This  difference, 
looking  at  the  innumerable  relations  of  man’s  nature,  internal 
arid  external,  and  the  inexhaustible  combinations  of  which  they 
are  susceptible,  admits  of  interminable  variety.  And  as,  from 
the  first  moment  of  responsible  existence,  the  capacity  of  each 
would  be  put  in  stress  up  to  the  measure  of  his  capacity  for 
obedience,  every  such  difference  would  continue  to  be  exhibited 
in  its  relation  to  the  standard  of  absolute  perfection.  Not  one 
of  them  all  would  be  insusceptible  of  being  characterized.  Each 
would  be  seen  in  his  way  to  the  goal,  but  in  a  different  part  of 
the  course ;  and  would  feel  that  with  a  slight  difference  in  his 
previous  condition,  a  corresponding  difference  in  his  relative 
position  would  also  have  been  apparent. 

20.  But  if  by  the  laws  of  his  nature  unfallen  man  could  con¬ 
ceive  of  an  ever-growing  resemblance  to  God,  he  could  also 
conceive  of  an  ever-diminishing  resemblance  to  the  Divine  Image. 
Such  a  state  of  retrogression  —  even  the  first  step  in  it  —  would 
be  sin.  And  if  even  the  holy  nature  of  the  race  would  have 
admitted  of  endless  diversity,  what  number  of  ages,  what  pro¬ 
cession  of  generations,  could  be  supposed  capable  of  exhausting 
the  diversity  of  character  made  possible  by  sin  ?  “  When  man 

had  once  fallen  from  virtue,  no  determinable  limit  could  be 
assigned  to  his  degradation,  nor  how  far  he  might  descend  by 
degrees,  and  approximate  even  to  the  level  of  the  brute  ;  for  as, 
from  his  origin,  he  was  a  being  essentially  free,  he  was,  in  con¬ 
sequence,  capable  of  change,  and  even  in  his  organic  powers 
most  flexible.”*  If  even  his  likeness  to  the  norma,  or  Divine 
original,  allowed  scope  for  unlimited  variety  of  character,  what 
but  boundless  enormity  could  be  expected  to  appear  when  man 
had  lost  the  very  model  of  excellence,  and  copied  only  from  the 
suggestions  of  his  own  mind.  Spiritually,  he  will  need  to  be 
“  created  anew,”  to  be  brought  back  again  to  the  original  type, 
to  “  the  image  of  him  that  created  him.”  And  in  this  renewed 
condition,  and  in  all  the  incalculable  variety  of  stages  of  which 
it  admits,  it  will  be  found  that  restoration  to  God,  and  self-resto¬ 
ration,  are  identical.  Man’s  resemblance  to  the  standard  of  all 


*  F.  Schlegel’s  Phil,  of  History,  i.  p.  48. 


DEPENDENCE. 


285 


excellence  is  in  exact  proportion  to  his  conformity  to  the  laws 
of  his  being ;  and  this  conformity  is  the  measure  of  his  real 
happiness. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONTINGENCE  OR  DEPENDENCE. 

1.  We  have  seen  moral  law  in  its  obligation,  stability,  and 
essential  conduciveness  to  well-being.  Before  proceeding  to 
remark  further  on  its  immutableness,  let  us  take  a  survey  of  the 
dependent  character  of  the  system  to  which  we  belong.  For 
“  everything  created  will  be  found  to  involve  the  existence  of 
contingent  truth”  —  truth,  that  is,  of  which  the  existence  is  not 
necessary,  but  conditional ;  truth  dependent  on  something  prior. 
We  are  not  the  iron-bound  victims  of  Fate.  A  free  Being  of 
infinite  aetivitv  has  chosen  to  create,  and  to  make  us  at  once  the 
representatives  and  the  sharers  of  His  own  activity.  The  wide 
realms  of  space  confess  His  creating  presence.  He  hath  sown 
it  with  worlds.  Here,  his  energy  hath  expatiated  at  large,  and 
hath  called  forth  a  measureless  extent  of  rejoicing  activity.  The 
cosmical  arrangements,  in  all  their  masses,  distances,  collocations, 
and  motions  ;  the  terrestrial  adaptations  to  these  arrangements  ; 
and  the  physiological  adjustments  to  these  adaptations,  all  confess 
“  the  good  pleasure  of  His  will.”  And  man,  by  his  very  power 
of  interpreting  this  confession,  receives  an  intimation  that  he, 
too,  belongs  to  the  same  dependent  system,  and  is  invited  to 
survey  the  particulars  of  his  dependence.  That  he  should  be 
dependent,  indeed,  is  not  an  optional,  but  a  necessary  condition 
of  his  existence ;  that  he  should  be  capable  of  knowing  it,  is  his 
distinction  and  glory. 

2.  Why  was  man  created  when  he  was  neither  earlier  noi 
later  ?  According  to  the  hypothesis  of  necessary  development, 
life  invariably  follows  its  physical  conditions.  The  connection 
is  supposed  to  be  fixed,  for  these  natural  conditions  are  regarded 
as  causes,  and  the  only  causes  necessary  to  the  production  of 
life,  so  that  if  the  new  form  of  life  did  not  follow  the  new  con¬ 
dition,  this  law  of  natural  development  would  prove  a  fiction. 
Elsewhere,  however,  we  have  shown  that  such  apparent  irregu- 


286 


MAN. 


larities  abound  both  in  the  vegetable  and  the  animal  kingdoms. 
Neither  did  the  physical  conditions  of  the  earth  determine  the 
moment  of  man’s  creation.  The  fact  that  his  race  has  continued 
to  exist  for  thousands  of  years,  proves  that,  as  far  as  physical 
conditions  are  concerned,  he  might  have  safely  come  into  exist¬ 
ence  later ;  and  there  is  every  reason  to  conclude  that  the  same 
conditions  were  sufficiently  prepared  for  his  earlier  existence. 
True,  there  was  a  period  prior  to  which  he  could  not  have  been 
sustained.  Geology  shows  that  during  the  earlier  formations, 
the  physical  conditions  of  the  globe,  and  the  nature  of  the  ani¬ 
mals  which  existed  on  it,  would  have  been  incompatible  with 
the  existence  of  the  human  race.  But  the  same  science  demon¬ 
strates  that  between  that  period  and  the  time  of  man’s  actual 
creation,  there  was  an  immeasurable  interval,  extending  over, 
at  least,  the  greater  part  of  the  tertiary  periods,  during  which 
there  were  no  such  reasons  why  man  might  not  have  existed. 
Species  existed  then  which  are  existing  still ;  and  the  only  reason 
which  can  be  assigned  why  man’s  first  appearance  was  not  coeval 
with  theirs,  must  be  sought  for  in  the  mind  of  the  Creator.  One 
of  the  lessons  taught  by  the  time  of  his  creation  is,  that  it  was 
dependent  on  more  than  physical  conditions.  His  “  times  are 
in  Thy  hand.” 

3.  The  same  is  true  also  respecting  man’s  earliest  locality. 
He  could  not  have  selected  it  for  himself.  Nor  is  it  to  be  sup¬ 
posed  that  the  Being  who  prepared  it  for  him  was  restricted  in 
his  choice.  “  It  does  not  appear  that  Nature  has  everywhere 
called  organized  beings  into  existence,  where  the  physical  con¬ 
ditions  requisite  for  their  life  and  growth  are  to  be  found.”* 
Plants,  for  example,  which  would  have  had  no  existence  in  a 
country  but  for  human  agency,  often  find  the  new  climate  and 
conditions  into  which  they  are  transported,  so  congenial  to  their 
nature,  that  they  rapidly  take  possession  of  extensive  regions, 
and  may  even  supplant  indigenous  tribes.  The  trees  of  Para¬ 
dise  would  doubtless  have  flourished  in  many  other  places  besides 
“  eastward  in  Eden.”  While  experience  shows  that  the  human 
constitution  has  a  world-wide  adaptation.  Indeed,  what  is  the 
globe  at  large  but  an  Eden  prepared  for  the  race  ?  The  relative 
distribution  of  land  and  water,  and  the  figure  of  continents,  have 
doubtless  influenced  the  course  of  the  great  migrations  of  the 
human  family,  and  the  progress  of  civilization.  But  all  that 
occasions  change  in  the  surface  of  the  planet  —  the  mountain 


*  Dr.  Prichard's  Researches,  &c.,  p.  96. 


DEPENDENCE. 


287 


chains  which  divide  climates,  determine  the  course  of  rivers, 
and  sustain  vegetable  worlds  of  their  own ;  oceanic  currents 
affecting  the  intercourse  of  nations  and  developing  their  intelli¬ 
gence  ;  and  volcanic  forces  changing  the  superficial  aspect  of 
the  globe  and  strangely  mingling  its  component  parts  —  all  these 
are  selected  and  appointed  agencies.  For  even  if  they  are 
referred  to  a  number  of  permanent  causes  which  have  been  in 
operation  from  the  beginning ;  we  can  give,  scientifically  speak¬ 
ing,  no  account  of  the  origin  of  the  permanent  causes  themselves. 
Why  these  particular  natural  agents  existed  originally  and  no 
others,  or  why  they  are  commingled  in  such  and  such  propor¬ 
tions,  and  distributed  in  such  and  such  a  manner  throughout 
space,  is  a  question  we  cannot  answer.  More  than  this :  we 
can  discover  nothing  regular  in  the  distribution  itself ;  we  can 
reduce  it  to  no  uniformity,  to  no  law.  There  are  no  means  by 
which,  from  the  distribution  of  these  causes  or  agents  in  one 
part  of  space,  we  could  conjecture  whether  a  similar  distribution 
prevails  in  another.”*  This  witness  is  true.  As  long  as  the 
present  constitution  and  distribution  of  bodies  remain,  all  their 
relations  and  sequences  will  remain.  But  both  their  origin  and 
their  continuance  are  alike  resolvable  into  the  will  of  Omnipo¬ 
tence.  And  He  who  selected  the  planet  which  should  become 
the  dwelling-place  of  the  human  family,  selected  also  the  par¬ 
ticular  spot  which  the  newly-created  parent  of  the  race  should 
occupy. 

4.  Proofs  of  contingency  pervade  the  constitution  of  man. 
His  bodily  configuration  is  specific.  No  theory  of  development 
from  pre-existing  species  accounts  for  it.  That  it  should  neither 
more  nor  less  resemble  any  of  the  myriads  of  animal  bodies  by 
which  it  is  surrounded  than  it  does,  is  owing  solely  to  the  choice 
of  the  Creator.  W e  say  choice ;  for,  doubtless,  the  Divine  de¬ 
cision  is  regulated  by  reasons  worthy  of  infinite  wisdom ;  and, 
as  such,  equally  removed  from  caprice  on  the  one  hand,  and 
from  a  blind  necessity  on  the  other.  The  pleasures  of  appetite 
also  have  been  the  subject  of  the  appointing  will  of  God. 
Herbs  and  water  might  have  been  the  only  articles  of  human 
food,  as  they  are  of  some  of  the  animal  tribes.  But  in  appoint¬ 
ing  otherwise,  what  complicated  foresight  and  invention  were 
necessary  in  the  construction  of  all  those  substances  we  use  for 
food ;  and  what  exquisite  workmanship,  not  merely  in  those 
parts  of  our  body  destined  to  receive  pleasure  from  them,  but  in 


*  Mill’s  Logic,  i.  417  ;  ii.  45. 


288 


MAN. 


the  whole  system  to  he  supported  by  them.  So  also  respecting 
the  nerves  of  sense ;  each  is  endowed  with  a  different  kind  of 
sensibility,  demonstrating  that  this  property  does  not  inhere  in 
them  necessarily.  Xor  can  physiology  discoyer  any  difference 
between  them  to  account  for  the  difference  of  function ;  leaying 
us  to  infer  that  the  arrangement,  as  far  as  the  properties  of  ner¬ 
vous  matter  are  concerned,  is  purely  arbitrary,  and  for  a  defi¬ 
nite  purpose.  But  further,  the  sentient  faculties,  thus  specially 
constituted,  are  susceptible  only  within  certain  limits.  The  air 
did  not  produce  the  ear,  nor  the  light  the  eye ;  any  more  than 
the  ear  and  the  eye  produced  the  air  and  the  light.  For  the 
vibrations  of  the  air,  which  seem  in  themselves  no  more  calcu¬ 
lated  to  produce  sound  than  to  produce  smell,  do  not  operate 
universally ;  if  the  vibrations  either  exceed  or  fall  below  a  cer¬ 
tain  number  in  a  second,  they  do  not  produce  sound.  And  how 
remarkable  that  the  rate  of  vibration  to  which  the  human  ear  is 
adapted,  should  be  that  which  the  human  voice  is  calculated  to 
produce  !  If  light  is  produced  by  the  vibrations  of  ether,  it  is 
only  within  certain  narrow  limits  that  they  effect  the  eye  with 
the  sense  of  color.  In  all  this  we  have  the  results  of  compli¬ 
cated  and  refined  contrivance  ;  certainly  nothing  like  a  material 
necessity.  To  say  that  the  nerves  must  needs  have  a  constitu¬ 
tion  of  some  kind,  leaves  the  cause  of  their  actual  constitution 
unexplained.  To  say  that  the  prior  constitution  of  the  globe 
required  that  man  should  be  adapted  to  it,  only  presents  us  with 
two  systems  of  contrivances  to  be  accounted  for  instead  of  one. 
The  former,  so  far  from  explaining  the  latter,  only  doubles  the 
mystery.  The  prior  conditions  of  the  globe  were  them^lves 
contingent,  and  require  to  be  accounted  for.  Their  continuance 
cannot  change  them  into  causes ;  they  are  mere  conditions  still. 
The  body  of  the  first  man  took  them  up,  and  employed  them  in 
a  manner  which  showed  that  the  Designer  of  the  one  was  the 
Former  of  the  other.  TTitli  how  solemn  an  emphasis  might  he 
have  said,  “  A  body  hast  Thou  prepared  me.”  “  In  Thy  book 
all  mv  members  were  delineated,  when  as  yet  there  was  none 
of  them.” 

Equally  dependent  on  the  choice  of  the  Creator  is  the  consti¬ 
tution  of  the  world  in  which  He  has  placed  us.  According  to  the 
ablest  reports  of  astronomy,  neither  of  the  planets  appeal's 
strictly  to  resemble  it.  Earth  is  a  specific  place  for  a  specific 
race  of  beings.  A  slight  change  in  our  constitution  would 
make  us  unfit  for  this  world,  for  we  should  be  receiving  from  it 
impressions  which  it  was  not  meant  to  impart.  A  slight  change 


DEPENDENCE. 


289 


in  the  constitution  of  the  world  would  be  unsuited  to  us ;  for  it 
would  be  producing  impressions  which  we  were  not  designed  to 
receive.  Our  nature,  and  the  world  which  surrounds  it,  are  ar¬ 
tificially  adapted  to  each  other. 

And  thus  the  kind  of  knowledge  we  are  to  receive,  as  far  as  it 
depends  on  external  nature,  was  appointed  by  God  before  we 
were  called  into  existence ;  for  the  world  was  arranged  and 
awaited  our  arrival,  and  our  constitution  was  configured  to  it. 
Every  object  around  us  expresses  a  divine  idea  ;  and  has  been 
devised  and  placed  before  us  to  awaken  a  similar  idea  in  our 
minds.  Everything  in  creation  is  a  material  sign,  by  which  He 
seeks  to  convey  the  thing  signified  into  our  minds ;  so  that  our 
natural  knowledge  is  just  the  acquisition  of  such  ideas  as  he  has 
deemed  fit  for  us,  and  has  then  chosen  that  external  nature 
should  represent  and  suggest  to  us. 

7.  Equally  does  the  maximum  of  our  knowledge  depend  on 
the  Divine  predetermination.  That  is  to  say,  the  same  hand 
which  has  selected  the  hind,  has  also  limited  the  number  of  ob¬ 
jects  by  which  we  should  be  surrounded ;  limited  the  avenues 
of  sensation  to  five ;  and  lias  thus  restricted  our  natural  know¬ 
ledge  to  the  results  of  the  mind  operating  on  these  sensations. 
True  it  is,  that  even  within  these  limitations,  the  means  of 
knowledge  are  inexhaustible.  But  still  the  restriction  is  spe¬ 
cial  ;  and  entirely  an  object  of  the  Divine  choice.  Had  the 
Creator  seen  fit,  the  materials  of  knowledge  might  have  been 
indefinitely  increased.  The  members  of  the  human  race,  if 
obedient,  might  have  been  successively  introduced  into  new 
worlds,  where  such  increase  actually  existed.  Restored  man 
will  probably  become  the  inhabitant  of  such  enlarged  spheres. 
But  probationary  man  is  located  where  everything  is  adapted  to 
his  probationary  state.  The  means  are  chosen  for  a  chosen 
end.  We  might  call  attention  to  the  regularity  of  external  na¬ 
ture,  and  to  the  confident  expectation  of  the  mind  respecting  it. 
What  would  that  natural  constancy  avail  unless  it  were  re¬ 
sponded  to  by  an  anticipation  previously  in  our  minds  ?  It  is 
“  the  concurrence,  the  contingent  harmony  of  these  two  elements, 
the  exquisite  adaptation  of  the  objective  to  the  subjective,”  which 
reveals  the  dependence  of  both  on  the  will  of  the  Creator. 

8.  The  entire  economy  of  the  world  without  was  the  special 
arrangement  of  the  Supreme  Will  to  suit  the  freedom  of  a  created 
will,  under  obligation  to  obey  it ;  and  all  the  other  functions  of 
the  human  mind  were  made  to  harmonize  with  the  same  special 
characteristic  of  man.  A  slight  change  in  either  the  subjective 


290 


MAN. 


or  the  objective  economy  —  the  depression  of  a  single  power 
within,  or  the  withdrawal  of  certain  classes  of  objects  without  — 
might  leave  the  will  to  act  without  adequate  motives ;  while  the 
exaltation  of  one  of  our  mental  faculties,  or  the  introduction  to 
our  notice  of  a  new  class  of  objects,  might  have  the  effect  of  de¬ 
throning  or  overbearing  the  will,  and  of  thus  impairing  or  de¬ 
stroying  our  accountability.  Now  all  the  creative  operations 
were  arranged  with  a  special  view  to  that  balance  of  influence 
from  without,  and  of  powers  and  susceptibilities  within,  which 
is  essential  to  a  being  destined  to  illustrate  and  appreciate  the 
Divine  character.  All  those  contrivances  and  collocations  of 
means,  which  we  have  elsewhere  traced  to  the  Divine  Wisdom, 
are  special  inventions  for  this  end.  All  the  illustrations  of 
Goodness  are  rich  and  varied  donations  designed  for  the  same 
purpose.  And  all  the  laws  and  moral  arrangements,  to  which 
we  have  pointed  in  illustration  of  Holiness,  here  find  their 
issue.  - 

9.  We  have  already  spoken  of  man  as  a  dependent  immortal. 
Necessarily  immortal  he  cannot  be  ;  the  conditions  of  his  nature 
forbid  it,  for  he  is  a  creature.  Physically  immortal  he  is,  for 
he  is  a  responsible  creature,  and  accountableness  implies  a  per¬ 
petuity  of  existence.  This  supposes  that  the  Creator  might 
have  withheld  the  mighty  boon ;  but  he  has  been  pleased  to 
make  the  gift  of  existence  irreversible.  No  length  of  possess¬ 
ion,  however,  will  ever  change  its  dependent  character,  or  ren¬ 
der  it  an  independent  power.  Through  every  point  of  duration 
it  will  require  to  be  upheld  by  Him  “  who  only  hath  immortal¬ 
ity”  as  a  self-existence. 

10.  Such  is  a  glance  at  the  multitudinous  contingencies,  sub¬ 
jective  and  objective,  which  met  in  the  first  man,  considered 
co-existently.  Let  us  look  at  the  same  classes  of  contingencies 
and  arrangements  as  successively  existent.  In  doing  this,  we 
quit  creation  considered  as  a  Divine  act,  and  we  enter  the  do¬ 
main  of  Providence.  Creation  is  the  universe  considered  only 
in  its  relation  to  space ;  Providence  regards  it  as  related  to  time 
also.  The  moment  creation  ended  in  reference  to  man,  the 
reign  of  Providence  commenced.  Providence  selected  the  lo- 
cality  of  Paradise.  And,  when  the  creating  hand  had  fashion¬ 
ed  him,  Providence  led  him  into  the  garden  of  Eden,  where, 
before,  it  had  planted  every  tree  that  was  good  for  food,  and 
had  brought  together  every  object  which  was  proper  to  meet 
his  sense.  None  but  works  from  the  Divine  hand  were  to  meet 
his  eye ;  and,  that  he  might  certainly  know  his  dependence  on 


DEPENDENCE. 


291 


God,  he  was  to  receive  some  of  his  blessings  from  that  hand 
direct.  Such,  especially,  was  the  divine  arrangement  in  the 
method  selected  for  the  creation  of  one  who  should  be  a  help¬ 
meet  for  him.  And  such  appears  to  have  been  the  special  de¬ 
sign,  both  of  the  divine  grant,  and  the  divine  prohibition,  in  re¬ 
lation  to  the  fruits  of  the  trees  of  the  garden.  All  the  phe¬ 
nomena  of  the  universe,  from  the  first  creative  volition  to  the 
moment  which  beheld  the  first  man  standing  in  the  shade  of  the 
tree  of  life,  presented  a  collection  of  appointed  objects  and 
events,  the  wisely  and  benevolently  arranged  production  of 
“  Him  who  worketh  all  things  after  the  counsel  of  his  own  will.” 
The  entire  series  depended  from  the  throne  of  God. 

11.  Of  this  dependence,  man  could  not  be  allowed  to  remain 
ignorant,  nor  to  lose  sight,  without  in  so  far  frustrating  the  de¬ 
sign  of  creation,  and  therefore  of  his  own  existence.  And  yet 
this  point,  which  it  was  so  important  to  secure,  was  the  point  at 
which  danger  was  to  be  the  most  apprehended ;  and  simply  and 
obviously  for  this  reason,  that  it  was  the  point  of  coincidence 
between  the  human  will  and  the  Divine.  God  had  willed  that 
man  should  be  a  free  agent,  but  this  very  freedom  of  man’s 
will  involved  the  possibility  that  he  would  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  the  entire  arrangement  depended  on  another  will.  The 
consciousness  that  he  himself  was  a  subordinate  cause,  was  the 
very  thing  which,  while  it  called  for  his  deepest  gratitude  as 
constituting  his  chief  glory,  was  in  danger  of  veiling  the  Prime 
cause  of  the  whole  from  his  view.  His  consciousness  of  sub¬ 
jective  independence  as  a  free  agent,  which  was  yet  essential 
to  his  freedom,  was  in  danger  of  concealing  from  his  view  his 
objective  dependence,  the  conviction  of  which  was  yet  essential 
to  his  virtue,  for  it  was  simply  the  perception  of  the  relation  in 
which  he  stood  to  God,  accompanied  with  the  corresponding  af¬ 
fection  of  the  mind.  Now,  in  no  respect,  perhaps,  was  danger 
to  be  apprehended  from  this  quarter  more  than  in  the  question 
of  man’s  regular  sustenance.  The  constant  recurrence  of  ap¬ 
petite,  connected  with  the  constant  presence  of  the  food  which 
was  to  gratify  it,  was  in  imminent  danger  of  concealing  the 
benevolence  which  originated  both,  especially,  too,  when  it  is 
considered  that  the  only  link  in  the  chain  of  causation  which 
man  saw  was  one  consciously  supplied  by  himself,  —  namely, 
the  volition  by  which  he  put  forth  his  hand  and  appropriated 
the  food  to  himself. 

12.  Now,  as  if  to  keep  constantly  alive  man’s  sense  of  de¬ 
pendence,  the  Creator  gave  him  to  understand  that  he  held 


292 


MAN. 


everything  that  was  good  for  food  by  a  special  grant  from  the 
Divine  Bounty.  And  as  if  to  intimate  the  quarter  from  which 
the  danger  was  to  be  chiefly  apprehended,  He  laid  a  prohibition 
on  one  particular  tree.  The  grant  of  all  the  rest  was  only  in 
harmony  with  other  acts  by  which  God  had  signified  to  man 
the  great  lesson  of  his  dependence.  The  solemn  prohibition 
of  this,  was  as  if  the  Creator  aimed  to  concentrate  the  whole 
doctrine  of  dependence  in  a  single  sentence,  and  to  give  it  a 
locality  and  a  visible  form.  It  was  as  if  He  had  said  to  his 
creature,  (i  I  give  you  the  wide  scope  of  paradise  as  the  theatre 
of  your  will.  But,  then,  you  are  to  remember  that  I  give  it 
you  ;  that  this  is  the  arrangement  of  my  Sovereign  will.  Not 
only  is  it  important  that  you  should  bear  this  in  mind  as  a  fact, 
the  knowledge  of  which  (as  mere  knowledge)  is  as  important 
as  the  knowledge  of  any  other  fact :  it  is  important  as  a  fact,  of 
which  you  cannot  lose  sight,  without  your  losing  the  most  pre¬ 
cious  part  of  your  happiness,  and  my  losing  the  glory  which  is 
due  unto  my  name.  Such  is  the  constitution  of  your  nature  ; 
and  it  is  the  only  constitution  which  I  could  give  you ;  for  it  is 
not  within  the  compass,  even  of  omnipotence,  to  erect  you  into 
absolute  independence.  By  necessity  of  nature  you  are  a  de¬ 
pendent  creature  ;  nor  could  I  connive  at  your  ignorance  or 
forgetfulness  of  this  essential  truth  without  patronizing  the  most 
prolific  of  all  falsehoods.  While  your  will,  then,  is  allowed  to 
range  through  the  wide  circumference  of  paradise  at  pleasure, 
I  give  you  to  understand  that  my  will  shall  occupy  a  central 
spot — shall  be  enthroned  in  the  midst.  To  attempt  to  occupy 
that  spot,  therefore,  will  be  to  bring  your  will  into  collision  with 
my  will.  To  violate  my  will  in  that  only  particular  in  which 
I  propose  to  take  from  you  a  formal  acknowledgment  of  your 
dependence,  will  be  an  overt  attempt  at  independence.  In  that 
case,  it  is  consistent  with  justice  that  you  should  be  made  to 
know  that  your  well-being  is  in  my  hands.  Hear,  therefore,  my 
ordination,  “  In  the  day  that  thou  eatest  thereof  thou  shalt  surely 
die.”  Thus,  a  twofold  object  was  secured,  the  supremacy  of 
the  Divine  will  was  asserted,  and  the  freedom  of  man’s  will  was 
respected.  Man  was  taught  his  dependence  on  the  will  of  God 
by  the  very  means  which  informed  him  of  the  power  of  his  own 
will. 

13.  But  all  this  relates  only  to  man’s  objective  dependence. 
Was  his  subjective  nature  equally  dependent  on  the  will  of  God 
for  its  successive  existence  and  operations  ?  It  can  be  easily 
conceived  that  the  selection  of  a  particular  object  for  prohibi- 


DEPENDENCE. 


293 


tion,  and  even  the  possible  change  of  that  one  object  for  another, 
was  an  arrangement  entirely  contingent  on  the  will  of  God  ;  but 
in  what  sense  can  constant  dependence  be  predicated  of  man’s 
subjective  constitution?  First,  is  he  entirely  passive  in  the 
hand  of  God  ?  This  would  represent  the  Creator  as  the  only 
agent  in  the  universe,  and  the  creation  of  man  as  only  the  pro¬ 
duction  of  an  additional  machine.  Is  he,  then,  secondly,  to  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  an  instrument  rendered  independent  of 
the  Divine  agency,  except  after  the  lapse  of  particular  intervals, 
when  he  may  need  rectification  ?  Still,  this  would  only  seem  to 
represent  him  as  a  machine  somewhat  superior  to  that  which  he 
appears  to  be  in  the  preceding  theory.  The  third,  and  the  true, 
theory,  appears  to  be  that  which  regards  the  Almighty  as  main¬ 
taining,  by  constant  volition,  the  laws  which  his  will  originally 
gave  to  created  objects.  According  to  this  view,  a  distinction 
is  made  between  the  physical  power  of  willing  and  acting,  and 
the  uses  which  man  makes  of  that  power.  For  the  power  it¬ 
self,  he  is  always  dependent  on  the  continuance  of  the  Divine 
will  to  that  effect.  That  is  to  say,  the  Creator  willed  in  our 
creation  that  such  and  such  operations  of  our  mind  should  inva¬ 
riably  show  us  things  as  they  are,  harmonize  with  those  things, 
and  conduce  to  our  happiness.  The  fact  that  they  did  so  at 
first,  proves  that  He  willed  it ;  and  the  fact  that  they  continue 
to  do  so,  proves  that  He  continues  to  will  to  that  effect.  In 
the  same  way,  events  disclosed  that  in  the  constitution  of  the 
first  man  the  Creator  had  willed  that  under  given  circum¬ 
stances  his  sensations,  thoughts,  emotions,  conscience,  will, 
should  all  tend  to  right  action ;  that  in  certain  other  circum¬ 
stances  they  would  end  in  wrong  action ;  and  that  God  contin¬ 
ued  to  will  this  physical  power  of  man’s  nature  irrespective  of 
the  consequences  likely  to  ensue ;  or,  without  interfering  with 
man’s  free  agency.  The  same  will  which  originated  the  laws 
of  man’s  constitution  continued  to  maintain  them  in  operation. 
So  that  man  was  as  immediately  dependent  on  the  Divine  will 
for  the  second  moment  of  his  existence  as  he  was  for  the  first, 
or.  as  he  was  dependent  for  the  Volition  to  which  he  owed  his 
origination.  Nor  did  his  dependence  at  all  diminish  with  the 
continued  operation  of  the  laws  of  his  nature.  They  could  not 
exist  by  habit.  They  had  momently  to  be  renewed.  That  he 
was  at  all,  and  that  he  was  naturally,  what  he  was,  was,  at  every 
point  of  time,  dependent  on  the  will  of  God.  In  Him,  he  lived, 

and  moved,  and  had  Iris  being-. 

© 

14.  It  is  only  consistent  with  this  view,  or  explanatory  of  it, 

25* 


294 


MAN. 


to  add,  tliat  the  influence  of  the  Divine  volition  in  sustaining 
man’s  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  constitution  in  being, 
would  doubtless  correspond  with  the  particular  nature  of  these 
respective  parts.  That  is  to  say,  the  agency  which  sustained 
the  physical  part  would  differ  from  that  which  sustained  the 
moral,  as  much  as  these  parts  themselves  differ  from  each  other. 
Now  the  voluntary  state  of  man’s  mind  answering  to  this 
constant  physical  dependence,  was  that  of  grateful  moral  or 
spiritual  obligation  to  God.  Man  could  not  recognize  the  fact 
that  everything  within  him  was  dependent  for  its  susceptibilities 
and  powers  on  the  will  of  God ;  and  that  everything  without 
him  was  dependent  for  its  existence,  and  for  its  adaptation  to 
his  powers  and  susceptibilities,  on  the  same  will,  without  being 
conscious  of  constant  and  entire  physical  dependence  on  God ; 
and  this  is  a  devotional  spirit,  the  essence  of  prayer.  And, 
then,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  acts  and  affections  of  the 
mind  flowing  from  this  state,  (leading  to,  and  consisting  of 
communion  with  God,)  would  tend  to  increase  the  creature’s 
sense  of  dependence  on  God.  By  the  mere  physical  or  natural 
arrangement  of  man’s  constitution,  he  was  made  to  be  more 
affected  by  the  character  and  presence  of  God,  than  by  the 
presence  of  any  other  external  object;  and  to  be  the  more 
affected  by  them,  the  more  they  engaged  his  attention.  By  a 
providential  arrangement,  many  things  were  appointed  to  remind 
him  of  God,  and  of  his  own  dependence  on  Him  —  such  as  the 
appointment  of  the  sabbath,  the  creation  of  woman,  and  the 
prohibition  of  a  particular  act.  But  if,  besides,  there  existed 
then,  as  now,  (and  there  did  exist)  a  distinct  moral  arrange¬ 
ment,  by  which  God  and  the  creature  mutually  approached  in 
communion,  the  one  to  acknowledge  his  dependence  in  acts  of 
gratitude  and  adoration,  the  other  to  return  these  acts  in  dona¬ 
tions  of  sustaining  and  ennobling  spiritual  influence,  man  was  per¬ 
vaded  and  surrounded  by  means  and  motives  for  living  a  life  of 
faith  in  his  Creator  and  Preserver. 

15.  Thus  the  constitution  of  man  was  completed,  and  the 
human  dispensation  commenced.  Every  line  of  it  was  held  in 
the  hand  of  the  Creator,  and  dependent  for  its  continuance  in 
being  on  his  will.  Whatever  modifications  his  providence  might 
see  fit  to  introduce,  were  as  contingent  on  the  good  pleasure  of 
his  will  as  the  modification  of  the  preceding  animal  economy 
was  by  the  introduction  of  the  present.  By  instituting  the  new 
laws,  he  had  not  parted  with  the  prerogative  of  legislation,  but 
had  rather  proclaimed  it.  He  will  not  impeach  his  equity  in 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


295 


the  administration  of  the  new  economy ;  He  cannot  forfeit  his 
sovereignty  —  that  is,  his  eternal  and  unalienable  right  to  main¬ 
tain  his  equity,  or  to  illustrate  it  by  whatever  new  manifestations 
He  please.  For  the  present,  however,  the  great  mediatorial 
work  of  creation  is  completed ;  and  He,  by  whom  all  things  had 
been  made,  beheld  in  his  creature,  man,  the  manifestation,  so 
far,  of  the  Divine  All-sufficiency. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

ULTIMATE  FACTS. 

1.  From  the  contingent  let  us  ascend  to  the  ultimate.  For 
if  man  be  thus  directly  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  Creator, 
we  may  expect  to  find  that  his  constitution  discloses  ultimate 
facts.  As  it  is  made  up  of  parts  mutually  dependent,  we  may 
be  able  to  trace  signs  of  the  connection  through  two  or  three 
finks  of  the  chain.  But  presently  we  come  to  a  fact  which,  for 
us,  is  ultimate  ;  a  point  where  each  part  passes  out  of  view,  and 
merges  in  the  will  of  the  Creator.  Even  the  manner  in  which 
these  two  or  three  finks  are  connected,  is  itself  an  ultimate 
fact  —  is  not  derivable  from,  nor  explicable  by,  anything  of  the 
same  kind  —  admits  of  no  physical  solution. 

2.  It  is  here  important  to  remark  that  the  term  law  itself,  as 

applied  to  the  processes  of  nature,  denotes  properly  an  ultimate 
fact.  So  far  from  explaining  phenomena,  it  is  only  a  name  for 
the  thing  to  be  explained.  “  A  laic  of  nature  is  a  thing  con¬ 
ceived,  and  not  a  thing  that  [objectively]  exists  ;  and,  therefore, 
can  neither  act,  nor  be  acted  upon.”  *  “  It  has  relation  to  us 

as  understanding,  rather  than  to  the  materials  of  which  the 
universe  consists  as  obeying,  certain  rules.”  J  It  implies  a  Law¬ 
giver,  and  denotes  his  purpose  to  act  according  to  a  certain 
rule.  All  that  we  see  are  its  mere  manifestations. 

3.  The  misapplication  of  the  word,  then,  is  still  greater  when 
it  is  employed  as  equivalent  to  cause.  In  this  case,  there  is 
more  than  the  concealment  of  a  difficulty;  there  is  also  the 


*  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s  Edition  of  Reid’s  Works,  p.  66, 
t  Sir  J.  Herschell’s  Nat.  Phil.,  §  27. 


296 


MAN. 


interpolation  of  an  error.  “  What  is  called  explaining  one  law 
of  nature  by  another,  is  but  substituting  one  mystery  for 
another ;  and  does  nothing  to  render  the  course  of  nature  other 
than  mysterious.  We  can  no  more  assign  a  why  for  the  more 
extensive  laws  than  for  the  partial  ones.  The  explanation  may 
substitute  a  mystery  which  has  become  familiar,  and  has  grown 
to  seem  not  mysterious,  for  one  which  is  still  strange.  And  this 
is  the  meaning  of  explanation  in  common  parlance.  The  laws 
thus  explained,  or  resolved,  are  sometimes  said  to  be  accounted 
for  ;  but  the  expression  is  incorrect,  if  taken  to  mean  anything 
more  than  what  has  been  already  stated.”  *  Yet  the  ordinary  fal¬ 
lacy  is,  that  to  discover  the  law  of  a  sequence  —  the  mere  fact 
that  one  thing  precedes  another  —  is  to  discover  its  efficient 
cause ;  and  that,  having  discovered  this  proximate  antecedent, 
no  other  antecedent  need  be  thought  of ;  that  the  discoverer  has 
taken  it  out  of  the  hand  of  God,  and  of  mystery,  at  the  same 
time  ;  whereas,  not  only  is  the  law  where  it  was  before  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  Lawgiver,  but  the  mystery  is  often  numerically 
doubled  —  the  discovery  being  the  unveiling  of  a  new  mystery. 
Sometimes  we  even  hear  of  “  an  explanation  of  the  laws  which 
govern  the  phenomena  of  nature.”  But  as,  strictly  speaking, 
the  laws  of  nature  is  a  phrase  which,  taken  objectively,  denotes 
only  the  uniformities  existing  among  natural  phenomena,  so  to 
speak  of  these  uniformities  as  if  they  were  producing,  regula¬ 
ting,  or  governing  powers  —  governing,  that  is,  anything  more 
than  our  anticipations  —  is  obviously  absurd.  They  simply 
presuppose  such  powers,  and  are  their  manifestations.  They 
are  only  according  to  law,  and  therefore  are  not  produced  by  it. 
Laws  are  not  causes,  but  their  consequences. 

4.  In  treating  on  the  facts  of  nature,  then,  there  are  at  least 
three  courses  open  in  relation  to  their  laws  and  causes ;  to 
admit  the  hypothetical  existence  of  an  original  cause,  a  primor¬ 
dial  necessity,  which,  as  it  has  no  longer  anything  to  do  with 
the  universe,  is  to  be  studiously  kept  out  of  view,  and  nothing 
to  be  spoken  of  but  inherent  forces,  and  their  effects ;  or  to  dis¬ 
miss  this  hypothesis  of  a  primordial  necessity  as  a  relic  of  su¬ 
perstition,  and  to  sink  all  idea  even  of  abstract  forces  as  causes 
of  phenomena,  attending  only  to  the  observation  of  facts,  and 
the  laws  of  their  development;  or  to  admit  that  the  same 
intelligent  Will  which  originated  the  universe,  maintains  it  in 
opeiation,  not,  indeed,  by  unconnected  acts  of  power,  but  by  a 


*  Mill’s  Logic,  i.  pp.  559,  560. 


ULTIMATE  Facts. 


297 


constant  regular  volition,  acting  according  to  conditionally  estab¬ 
lished  laws. 

o.  Of  the  first  course,  the  distinguished  author  of  “  Kosmos” 
may  be  regarded  as  a  representative.  In  his  hands,  “  physical 
science  limits  itself  to  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
material  world  by  the  properties  of  matter  ”  —  that  is,  by  forces 
inherent  in  matter  according  to  an  occult  primordial  necessity. 
The  moral,  as  well  as  the  material  systems,  according  to  this 
view,  compose  one  piece  of  iron  mechanism,  wound  up  from 
time  to  time,  to  go  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  but  all  moral 
freedom  is  denied  to  the  subjects  of  it ;  nor  is  any  recognized 
even  in  the  occult  Necessity  which  puts  it  into  motion.  What 
the  author  would  think  of  the  moral  honesty  of  a  number  of 
reviewers  who  should  analyze  his  work,  and  should  descant  on 
its  vivid  pictures  of  nature,  command  of  language,  and  richness 
of  illustration,  without  a  sino-le  distinct  recognition  of  its  author- 
ship,  we  know  not.  But  here  is  a  method  of  philosophizing 
which  virtually  and  complacently  ignores  the  Author  of  the 
*  universe.  Effects  are  resolved  into  the  forces  of  nature ;  and 
the  mind,  thus  put  off  with  a  word,  in  the  stead  of  a  thing,  is  to 
suppose  that  it  has  received  an  adequate  explanation,  and  trains 
itself  to  rest  satisfied  with  it.  Mind  alone,  the  mind  of  a 
Humboldt,  can  trace  the  laws  of  these  forces,  but  no  reference 
whatever  is  to  be  made  to  any  Mind  as  creating  and  superin¬ 
tending  them  ;  in  other  words,  merely  to  •perceive  them  is  a  proof 
of  mind  sufficient  to  make  the  world  resound  with  its  fame,  but 
to  make  them  has  so  little  to  do  with  Mind  that  the  world  is  to 
preserve  a  death-like  silence  respecting  it.  The  mind  of  the 
observer,  too,  is  conscious  of  moral  freedom,  conscious  that  he 
is  the  regulating  power  of  his  own  actions,  but  the  system 
assures  him  that  this  is  false,  that  he  is  a  compelled  portion  of 
a  vast  machine  without  choice  or  option :  that  is  to  say,  he  is  to 
confide  in  his  senses,  but  not  in  his  consciousness  ;  or,  he  is  to 
rely  on  the  truth  of  what  consciousness  attests  respecting  the 
external  world,  but  to  disbelieve  its  testimony  respecting  the 
world  within  :  its  affirmations  respecting  that  which  is  nc  t  itself, 
matter,  are  to  be  accepted ;  but  those  which  relate  to  itself, 
and  on  which  the  truth  of  the  others  depend,  are  to  be  discred¬ 
ited. 

6.  Of  the  second  method,  M.  Comte  is,  at  present,  the  great 
advocate.  According  to  him,  philosophy,  dismissing  all  theolog¬ 
ical  and  metaphysical  ideas,  all  thought  of  supernatural  powers 
and  of  natural  forces,  must  confine  itself  simply  to  the  outward 


298 


MAN. 


observation  of  facts  and  their  laws.  All  notion  of  causation  is  to 
be  repudiated  not  merely  as  hopeless,  but  absurd,  and  the  only 
kind  of  explanation  to  be  thought  of  is  that  which  resolves  phe¬ 
nomena  into  laws  more  and  more  general,  till  the  whole  shall 
attain  the  unity  of  a  single  fact.  Such  is  the  materialism  of  the 
so-called  positive  philosophy.  Now  this  method  is  open  to  all 
the  objections  just  stated  (for  the  idea  of  some  mechanical  cause 
or  power,  is,  in  reality,  concealed  under  the  word  law),  and  to 
additional  objections  of  its  own.  According  to  this  view,  it  is 
hopeless  to  ascertain  causes,  and  therefore  they  are  to  be  treated 
as  non-existent ;  as  if  the  human  mind  were  the  measure  of  truth 
and  existence ;  or  as  if  the  existence  of  causation  depended  on 
our  ability  to  explain  it.  Let  it  be  supposed,  however,  that  the 
positive  philosophy  should  go  on  enlarging  its  domain  of  law, 
until  it  has  reduced  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  by  one 
vast  generalization,  to  the  operation  of  a  single  fact.  What  then  ? 
When  a  second  Newton  shall  have  succeeded  in  elaborating  and 
including  all  the  results  of  experimental  philosophy  in  a  single 
proposition,  what  is  to  follow?  Will  the  mind  have  lost  its 
occupation  ?  Will  it  henceforth  be  doomed  to  inactivity  as  a 
reward  ?  It  will  have  reached  “  its  pride  of  place”  simply  by 
persevering  inquiry.  Each  new  generalization  in  succession 
will  have  appeared  in  answer  to  the  question,  What  law  is  the 
antecedent  to  this  ?  and  what  to  this  ?  and  so  on  till  the  last 
emerges.  And  what  is  to  stop  the  inquirer  from  then  looking 
over  the  boundary-line  of  the  physical  into  the  region  of  the 
spiritual,  and  asking  for  the  next  antecedent  there  ?  A  law  of  his 
nature,  a  necessity  of  his  being,  has  impelled  him  to  repeat  the 
question  hitherto,  and,  unless  his  constitution  be  unmade,  he  will 
continue  to  repeat  the  question  —  for  it  is  not  an  affair  subject 
to  his  will  —  until  an  intelligent  First  Cause  be  recognized,  or 
nature  demonstrates  that  it  is  self-made.  And  most  worthy  of 
remembrance  it  is,  as  an  “  assured  truth,  and  a  conclusion  of 
experience  (says  Bacon)  that,  in  the  entrance  of  philosophy, 
when  the  second  causes,  which  are  next  unto  the  senses,  do 
offer  themselves  to  the  mind  of  man.  if  it  dwell  and  stay  there, 
it  may  induce  some  oblivion  of  the  Highest  cause ;  but  when  a 
man  passeth  on  further,  and  seeth  the  dependence  of  causes, 
md  the  works  of  Providence ;  then,  according  to  the  allegory 
the  poets,  he  will  easily  believe  that  the  highest  link  of  Na¬ 
ture’s  chain  must  needs  bs  tied  to  the  foot  of  Jupiter’s  chair.”* 

*  Advancement  of  Learning,  B.  I.  This  sagacious  truth  is  admi¬ 
rably  developed  and  illustrated  in  Dr.  Whewell’s  Bridgewater  Treatise, 
B  III  c.  vi. 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


299 


The  positive  philosophy,  occupying  itself  in  the  observation  of 
facts,  and  in  the  verification  of  laws  already  known,  resembles  a 
person  so  completely  engrossed  in  deciphering  the  letters  of  an 
ancient  inscription,  as  to  be  quite  oblivious  of  the  agency  which 
originally  produced  it ;  but  he  who  succeeds  in  interpreting 
word  after  word  till  the  meaning  of  the  entire  sentence  flashes 
on  his  mind,  feels  at  that  moment  as  if  brought  into  close  com¬ 
munion  with  the  mind  which  first  conceived  it. 

7.  In  harmony  with  the  third  method  which  we  have  indicated, 
we  have  elsewhere  shown*  (beginning  with  matter ),  that,  in 
answer  to  the  question,  “  What  is  its  nature  ?”  we  may  exhibit 
it  chemically  resolved  into  elements  beyond  which  we  cannot 
decompose  it.  But  not  even  in  the  last  analysis  can  we  dis¬ 
cover  in  it  anything  which  accounts  for  its  own  origination.  By 
a  law  of  our  nature,  we  feel  as  deeply  convinced  that  we  are 
examining  a  thing  which  has  been  caused,  as  if  we  had  been 
permitted  to  look  on  it  in  the  first  moment  of  its  existence.  We 
have  spoken  of  it  not  merely  as  being,  but  as  continuing :  not 
merely  as  related  to  space,  or  co-existent,  but  also  as  related  to 
time,  or  successively  existent.  All  its  parts  are  in  motion.  At¬ 
traction,  repulsion,  transformation,  change  of  physical  relations, 
are  constant  and  universal.  But  when  we  have  traced  back 
these  changes  in  any  particular  class  of  natural  phenomena,  in 
the  order  in  which  they  occur,  to  the  highest  and  earliest  in  the 
series,  we  find  that  it  includes  nothing  to  account  for  its  own 
existence.  A  primary  conviction  assures  us  that  the  continu¬ 
ance  of  the  world,  no  less  than  its  origination,  has  its  ground  in 
a  cause  external  to  itself. 

8.  Ascending  from  the  chemistry  and  mechanics  of  inorganic 
nature  to  the  vegetable  kingdom,  we  next  inquired,  What  is  life  ? 
or,  What  is  the  principle  which  unites  all  the  functions  of  an 
organized  body  in  the  single  result  called  life  ?  The  physiologist 
may  be  able  to  describe  the  organization  in  which  life  is  devel¬ 
oped,  may  trace  the  organization  to  the  seed,  and  search  the 
very  elements  of  the  seed  itself,  but  he  can  find  nothing  there 
to  account  for  the  origination  of  a  living  organific  power. 
Even  if  he  could  artificially  imitate  the  cells  or  globules  of 
organic  life,  still  they  themselves  would  be  inorganic  globules. 
The  very  absence  of  the  vital  power  shows  that  it  is  something 
distinct  from  form,  as  well  as  from  mere  elementary  composi 
tion,  though  it  may  employ  and  subordinate  both.  He  sees  thf 


*  Pre- Adamite  Earth,  pp.  77,  168,  246. 


300 


MAX. 


phenomena  of  life  only  after  it  has  begun  to  work.  Life  it¬ 
self  is  presupposed  and  ultimate.  But  besides  existing  as  an 
object,  in  relation  to  space,  life  is  manifested  in  an  orderly 
series  of  processes,  or  in  relation  to  time.  In  tracing  these 
sequences,  we  find  a  series  of  laws,  each  of  which  is  related  to 
all  the  rest,  and  all  of  which  refer  us  to  a  cause  of  which  they 
are  only  the  results,  and  the  means  of  manifestation.  One  of 
the  first  discoveries  made  by  those  who  vainly  attempt  to 
resolve  the  phenomena  of  life  into  the  operation  of  physical 
agents  is,  that  they  must  be  allowed  to  indulge  in  the  incon¬ 
sistency  of  supposing  a  principle  not  physical,  in  order  even  to 
begin  to  work  out  their  theory.  For  a  time,  the  vital  principle 
was  the  popular  hypothesis ;  but  this  was  a  principle  which,  as 
it  did  not  belong  to  the  domain  of  physiology,  was  the  very 
phenomenon  which  required  explanation.  The  only  conclusion 
warranted  is,  that  the  origination  of  life,  and  its  continuance, 
alike  point  to  a  Life-giving  Cause. 

The  regularity  of  the  organic  functions,  so  far  from  denoting 
the  absence  of  the  Great  Agent,  is  the  very  circumstance  which 
indicates  his  presence.  Order  is  natural  to  Him.  We  cannot 
conceive  of  His  agency  apart  from  it.  Nor  do  the  organic 
processes  grow  less  dependent  by  continuance ,  as  if  they  could 
acquire  self-sufficiency  by  the  lapse  of  time.  They  can  never 
become  other  than  the  mere  means  of  the  manifestation  of  an 
independent  and  anterior  power.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  do  not 
the  structural  malformations  winch  we  occasionally  witness 
seem  to  intimate  that  the  organic  laws  are  left  to  themselves? 
The  sutficient  answer  is,  that,  in  such  instances,  we  only  behold 
the  arrest  or  displacement  of  one  law  by  another ;  or,  according 
to  Divine  appointment.  Not  this  departure  from  a  type,  there¬ 
fore,  but  the  non-departure  from  it,  would,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances,  be  a  sign  that  the  organic  laws  were  abandoned  to 
themselves.  And  then,  also,  the  theory  which  assumes  the  of¬ 
fice  of  relieving  the  Divine  Being  from  the  seeming  discredit  of 
a  partial  failure  of  his  laws  in  his  own  presence,  and  from  the 
supposed  indignity  of  having  to  perform  certain  creating  and  sus¬ 
taining  acts  of  an  inferior  description,  only  disguises  or  adjourns 
the  imaginary  difficulty.  For,  by  saying  that  the  universe  is 
evolved  and  upheld  by  general  laws  appointed  at  first,  and  never 
afterwards  interfered  with,  the  supposed  difficulty  is  left  to  press 
against  the  original  appointment.  Unless  it  be  supposed  that,  in 
originating  the  law,  the  Deity  was  putting  a  power  into  opera¬ 
tion  of  which  He  knew  not  the  effects,  all  the  results  actually 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


301 


flowing  from  it  must  have  been  originally  contemplated  by  Him ; 
so  that  the  hypothesis  which  presumes  to  save  the  dignity  of  the 
God  of  Providence,  does  it  at  the  expense  of  the  honor  of  the 
God  of  Creation. 

9.  Crossing  the  gulf  between  organic  life  and  sentient  exist- 
ence,  we  have  also  inquired  into  the  mystery  of  sensation .  What 
is  the  principle  .of  a  sense  ?  How  is  it  that,  by  the  aid  of  its 
nervous  system,  the  animal  can  become  acquainted  apparently 
not  only  with  impressions,  but  with  things ;  with  the  forms,  and 
qualities,  and  motions  of  objects?  “We  know  exactly  the 
mechanism  of  the  eye  (remarks  Liebig),  but  neither  anatomy 
nor  chemistry  will  ever  explain  how  the  rays  of  light  act  on  con¬ 
sciousness,  so  as  to  produce  vision.”  Nor  will  physiology  or 
acoustics  ever  explain  why  the  vibration  of  the  air,  acting  on  the 
drum  of  the  ear,  should  produce  the  sensation  of  hearing.  And 
the  same  is  true  of  every  class  of  sensations.  The  organ  of 
sense  contains  nothing  to  explain  the  sensation.  They  are  two 
things  essentially  distinct.  In  every  attempt  at  explanation,  we 
have  to  presuppose  a  principle,  to  introduce  the  idea  of  some 
antecedent  capable  of  sensation. 

10.  Our  examination  of  instinct  introduces  us  to  another  ulti¬ 
mate  fact.  However  the  various  classes  of  animal  actions  may 
be  distributed,  there  is  one  class  —  including,  for  example,  the 
beautiful  nest-building  of  birds,  and  the  mathematical  cell-build¬ 
ing  of  bees  —  which  is  allowed  on  almost  all  hands,  to  be  strictly 
instinctive.  Now  their  organization  does  not  determine  their 
instincts  ;  for,  with  the  same  organs,  we  see  very  different,  and 
even  opposite,  instincts  in  different  species  of  animals.  Neither 
do  their  instincts  nor  propensities  determine  their  organization, 
for  their  structure  is  prospective :  the  bird  has  wings  while  yet 
in  the  egg.  Instinct,  then,  as  far  as  the  animal  structure  is  con¬ 
cerned,  is  an  ultimate  fact.  The  bee  itself,  while  working 
geometrically,  has  no  knowledge  of  geometry ;  “  somewhat  like 
a  child,  who,  by  turning  the  handle  of  an  organ,  makes  good 
music  without  any  knowledge  of  music.  The  art  is  not  in  the 
child,  but  in  him  who  made  the  organ.  In  like  manner,  the 
geometry  is  not  in  the  bee,  but  in  that  great  Geometrician  who 
made  the  bee,  and  who  ‘  maketh  all  things  in  number,  weight, 
and  measure.’  ” 

11.  What  is  mind'l  We  have  seen  that  organized  matter  is 

© 

only  the  condition  or  means  of  its  manifestation.*  The  phe- 


*  Chap.  VI.,  supra. 
26 


302 


MAN. 


nomena  of  matter  are  all  learned  by  outward  observation , 
those  of  the  mind  by  consciousness  alone.  The  material  phe¬ 
nomena  which  observation  brings  to  light  are  only,  at  most, 
instruments  and  organs,  while  consciousness  reveals  a  force  or 
cause  capable  of  controlling  some  of  these  organs.  Material 
properties  and  processes  can  be  conceived  of  only  as  related  to 
space ;  the  utter  absurdity  of  conceiving  of  the  mind  as  sus¬ 
taining  any  such  relation  is  felt  as  soon  as  it  is  attempted. 
Matter  is  divisible ;  even  the  brain,  the  instrument  of  mind,  is 
made  up  of  parts ;  the  mind  itself  is  consciously  indivisible, 
one.  The  brain  is  constantly  wasting  and  renewing ;  the 
mind  is  ever  identical ;  the  man  is  ever  conscious  that  he  is 
the  same  being.  The  material  organ  grows  weary,  and  asks 
for  rest ;  the  untiring  will  pities  the  infirmity  while  yielding  to 
the  demand,  and  often  pictures  what  it  could  accomplish  with 
boundless  scope  for  its  designs,  and  an  organization  incapable 
of  fatigue  with  which  to  carry  them  out.  The  relation  of  mind 
to  matter  is  of  a  nature  still  further  to  illustrate  the  essential 
distinction  between  the  two.  For  we  have  seen  abundant 
evidence  to  conclude  that  the  brain,  besides  being  nothing 
more  than  the  condition  of  the  mind’s  action,  is  only  the  in¬ 
adequate  instrument  of  that  activity,  and  not  its  standard : 
that  while  certain  functions  of  the  body  constantly  proceed 
without  the  mind  being  at  all  conscious  of  them,  the  mind  also 
has  certain  properties  and  activities  quite  independent  of  all 
cerebral  sympathy :  and  that  as  matter  is  independent  of  any 
specific  organized  form,  so  mind  is  capable  of  existing  apart 
from  its  present  material  instrument,  and  is,  by"  the  will  of  God, 
indestructible.  The  mind,  then,  is  a  distinct  entity,  and  its 
constitution  is  an  ultimate  fact,  or,  rather,  a  revelation  of  many 
such  facts. 

12.  What  is  the  ground  of  our  belief  in  the  existence  of  the 
material  universe?  Both  the  sceptic  and  the  idealist  very 
readily  admit  the  fact ,  that  our  consciousness  testifies  to  an  ex¬ 
ternal  world.  But  how  do  we  know  the  truth  of  this  testimony  ? 
Why  do  we  believe  that  what  we  apprehend  as  an  external  ob¬ 
ject  is  not  a  state  or  mode  of  our  own  mind,  illusively  presenting 
itself  as  a  mode  of  matter?  We  believe  it  on  the  authority  of 
consciousness.  This  is  our  ultimate  appeal.  We  have  the 
same  kind  of  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  external  object  as  we 
have  of  the  thinking  and  percipient  subject  —  that  of  conscious¬ 
ness.  Deny  its  authority  for  the  object,  and  it  cannot  be  relied 
on  for  the  subject.  Question  the  truth  of  its  testimony,  and  even 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


303 


the  fact  that  it  testifies  must  be  doubted.  And  to  doubt  this,  is 
to  subvert  doubt  itself.  In  a  word,  our  inability  to  test  the  truth 
of  our  consciousness  is  owing;  to  its  ultimate  authority.  Did  it 
admit  of  proof,  we  might  then  require  to  test  the  validity  of  that 
which  proved  it,  and  so  on  in  infinite  regression.  To  reason  on 
the  ultimate  reason  is  felo-de-se ,  or  makes  reasoning  itself  impos¬ 
sible  ;  for,  as  Aristotle  often  repeats,  the  elements  of  demonstra¬ 
tion  must  be  themselves  indemonstrable. 

13.  How  is  man’s  existence,  or  that  of  the  world  which  he 
inhabits,  to  be  accounted  for  ?  or  what  is  causation  ?  That  he 
could  not  begin  to  exist  without  a  cause,  we  regard  as  a  neces¬ 
sary  truth.  That  causation  includes  something  more  than  an¬ 
tecedence  and  consequence,  a  mere  relation  of  time,  we  are 
conscious,  by  the  effort  we  put  forth  in  merely  effecting  the 
movement  of  our  limbs.  And  then  as  the  very  idea  of  sequence 
refers  us  back  from  effect  to  cause  till  we  reach  the  first  link  in 
the  physical  chain,  the  mind  feels  with  the  force  of  an  intellectual 
necessity,  that  the  pre-existing  cause  of  the  whole  must  have 
been  of  a  nature  corresponding  with  the  effects,  and  must  there¬ 
fore  include  more  than  mere  antecedence.  Causality  itself,  indeed, 
cannot  be  detected.  It  is  not  a  thing  to  be  seen.  The  things 
observed  do  not  obtrude  it.  It  is  not  in  them  except  as  an  in¬ 
visible  energy  or  presence.  Gravitation  itself  is  not  a  cause, 
but  a  law.  The  highest  aim  of  natural  philosophy  is  to  ascend 
from  one  antecedent  to  another,  until  it  has  reached  the  last  or 
most  general  phenomenon.  But  even  if  this  last  were  reached, 
and  natural  philosophy  were  complete,  we  could  not  lay  our 
finger  on  an  efficient  cause,  although  we  had  been  tacitly  pre¬ 
supposing  it  at  every  step  of  the  inquiry.  In  muscular  action 
we  are  conscious  of  making  an  effort ;  and  here,  if  anywhere, 
we  might  expect  to  be  able  to  explain  the  connection  between 
the  two ;  but  how  our  will  affects  our  muscles  is  a  secret  hidden 
from  us.  Still  the  fact  of  causation  remains.  And  the  only 
and  ultimate  fact  upon  which  the  mind  reposes  respecting  the 
causation  of  man,  and  of  every  phenomenon  of  nature,  is  that 
of  the  Divine  volition.* 

14.  That  man  himself  is  a  cause,  and  his  character,  conse¬ 
quently  a  self-formation,  is,  in  the  same  sense,  an  ultimate  fact. 
We  have  seen  that  he  is  dependent  upon  God  in  a  two-fold 
respect ;  both  as  having  derived  his  existence  from  Him,  and 
as  being  maintained  in  existence  by  His  pervading  physical 


*  Tappan’s  Elements  of  Logic,  Part  III.,  b.  ii.  $  8. 


304 


MAN. 


agency,  or  ever-present  volition  to  that  effect.  This  dependence 
is  neither  optional  nor  avoidable.  It  is  not  the  mere  consequence 
cf  Divine  omnipotence.  If  man  exists,  dependence  is  the  in¬ 
separable  condition  of  his  existence.  Even  his  power  to  sin, 
physically  considered,  is  a  dependent  power.  His  created  con¬ 
stitution  can  never  become  physically  independent  of  its  Creator. 

This  dependence  of  spirit  on  spirit,  however,  does  not  appear 
to  lie  so  incompatible  with  the  liberty  of  the  will  as  the  fact  that 
man  is  subject  also  to  the  laws  of  matter.  His  life,  as  far  as  it 
is  material,  has  its  root  in  mechanical  arrangements.  But  the 
mechanism  of  nature,  we  have  seen,  is  not  inherently  hostile  to 
spiritual  freedom.  It  is  not  the  product  of  a  power  alien  to 
God  and  man.  It  is  made  by  the  Maker  of  man,  and  is  to  move 
in  subordination  to  Him.  If,  indeed,  the  question  were,  How 
is  unlimited  or  unconditioned  freedom  compatible  with  the 
mechanism  of  material  nature  ?  no  reply  could  be  given.  To 
reconcile  law  with  lawlessness  is  impossible.  But  such  freedom 
is  utterly  inconceivable.  Law  is  the  correlative  of  liberty,  not 
its  antithesis.  The  freedom  of  a  finite  being  such  as  man,  is 
confined  within  the  bounds  of  a  limited  circle.  Within  this 
space,  at  l  as  long  as  he  continues  to  will  in  harmony  with  the 
true  fref  (orn  of  his  constitution,  his  liberty  and  his  well-being 
are  one.  The  objective  laws  which  surround  his  will  do  but 
expound,  defend,  and  enlarge  his  liberty.  They  influence  his 
will  only  owing  to  their  “  own  exceeding  lawfulness.”  If  he 
will,  however,  he  is  free  to  resist  law ;  but  then  he  surrenders  a 
portion  of  liberty  with  each  violation.  Just  as  he  possesses  the 
power  to  amputate  one  of  his  limbs  after  another,  only  he  must 
expect  to  find  that  he  has  abridged  that  power  by  every  such 
unnatural  act.  If  man  wills  to  assert  his  freedom,  his  power 
.  over  himself,  by  selling  himself  into  slavery,  he  can  do  so.  And 
if  he  choose  to  convince  himself  of  his  liberty  by  resisting  law, 
the  first  law  which  he  arms  against  himself,  is  the  law  of  liberty ; 
he  comes  into  collision  with  his  own  nature  at  the  first  step.  By 
resisting;  the  highest  class  of  motives,  he  excludes  from  his  circle 
of  freedom  the  whole  domain  of  piety.  The  violation  of  the 
law  of  the  benevolent  affections,  still  further  contracts  the  circle. 
By  disregarding  his  own  well-being,  and  thus  violating  the  law 
of  self-love,  he  reduces  the  circle  to  a  still  smaller  compass. 
He  surrenders  himself  to  the  sensitive  gratification  of  the  present 
moment.  He  no  longer  gives  law  to  the  objective  ;  the  objective 
gives  law  to  him.  He  has  approached,  as  nearly  as  his  consti¬ 
tution  will  permit,  to  the  condition  of  a  machine.  And  in  pro- 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


305 


portion  as  he  has  descended  to  this  point,  his  very  reduced  range 
of  actions  has  become  more  and  more  calculable  and  fixed.  He 
is  then  fallaciously  pointed  at  as  a  triumphant  proof  of  a  fatalistic 
materialism.  And  if  a  number  of  such  herd  together  in  a  state 
of  society  fayorable  to  sensuality,  exposing  a  wide  surface  to 
objectiye  influences,  the  statistics  of  crime  will  be  found  to  be  so 
calculable,  and  susceptible  of  classification,  as  to  tempt  the  ma¬ 
terialist  to  belieye  that  his  argument  is  complete.  He  has  made 
the  mistake  of  going  to  the  hospital  for  the  statistics  of  health. 
Yet  such  is  the  peryading  error  of  more  than  one  popular  pub¬ 
lication  on  the  condition  and  prospects  of  man. 

We  haye  remarked,  however,  that  all  law,  whether  express¬ 
ed  directly  by  the  Divine  Being,  or  indirectly  in  the  mechanism 
of  nature,  is  really  and  truly  one  with  the  law  of  man’s  freedom. 
“  But  is  he  not  even  in  his  holiest  and  freest  condition,  influ¬ 
enced  by  motives  ?”  Doubtless,  it  is  this  fact,  partly,  which  dis¬ 
tinguishes  him  from  a  machine.  Motives,  however,  are  not  ob¬ 
jective  existences,  or  realities.  They  are  subjective  influences, 
deriving  their  power  from  passing  through  the  character ;  in 
truth,  expressions  of  character  formed  in  the  past,  and  modify¬ 
ing  character  at  the  present.  “  But  there  has  been  no  moment 
in  his  past  history,  when  he  has  not  been  influenced  by  exter¬ 
nal  circumstances.”  True ;  the  amount  and  the  kind  of  influ¬ 
ence  on  his  character,  however,  was  determined  ultimately  by 
that  character  itself.  And  there  never  was  a  moment  when  he 
did  not  feel  that  he  could  modify  it.  if  he  willed  to  that  ef- 

V  ' 

feet.  Thus,  without  overlooking  the  influence  of  either  his  ex¬ 
ternal  circumstances,  or  his  physical  organization,  the  modified 
result  of  both  presupposes  a  modifying  power,  the  power  of  the 
will.  And,  if  asked,  how  this  is  possible,  we  can  only  appeal 
to  consciousness  that  it  is  a  fact.  As  an  ultimate  fact,  “  no  man 
can  give  its  proof  to  another,  yet  every  man  may  find  it  for 
himself.”  And,  having  this  fact  of  consciousness  in  our  pos¬ 
session,  to  reason  as  if  it  were  non-existent,  is  for  reason  to  act 
irrationally.  As  to  the  mystery  which  the  subject  involves, 
the  human  will  is  only  in  this,  as  in  other  respects,  an  image  of 
the  Divine ;  it  is  the  mystery  of  a  caused  cause  representing 
the  greater  mystery  of  an  uncaused  cause.  But  “  there  is 
nothing  the  absolute  ground  of  which  is  not  a  mystery.  The 
contrary  were  indeed  a  contradiction  in  terms ;  for  how  can 
that,  which  is  to  explain  all  things,  be  susceptible  of  an  expla¬ 
nation  ?  It  would  be  to  suppose  the  same  thing  first  and  sec¬ 
ond  st  the  same  time.” 


26* 


306 


MAN. 


S 


15.  What  is  the  principle  of  prayer  by  which  man  “has 
power  with  God  ?”  In  this  exercise  we  see  the  human  will 
essaying  to  put  itself  in  communication  with  the  Divine  will : 
and  the  question  arises,  how  God  can  answer  prayer  without  in¬ 
fringing  on  his  own  immutability,  or  altering  the  course  and 
constitution  of  nature  ?  In  submission  to  this  difficulty,  some 
have  regarded  the  advantage  of  prayer  as  limited  to  the  salu¬ 
tary  effect  produced  by  the  re-action  of  the  exercise  on  the  mind 
of  the  suppliant.  But  this  is  only  to  shift  the  difficulty.  And 
the  man  who,  perceiving  this,  philosophically  argues  against 
prayer  altogether,  is  only  shifting  it  again.  For  the  real  diffi¬ 
culty  is  only  one  of  the  many  forms  of  the  great  mystery  of 
causation ;  and  if  he  will  explain  how  his  argument  is  to  move 
my  mind  (a  fact  the  possibility  of  which  he  takes  for  granted), 
I  may  be  able  to  explain  how  prayer  moves  the  Divine  mind — 
a  fact  the  possibility  of  which  I  take  for  granted.  The  appar¬ 
ent  difficulty  arising  from  the  Divine  immutability  is  owing 
chiefly,  I  apprehend,  to  a  misconception.  Immutability  is  con¬ 
founded  with  immobility ;  whereas,  it  must  be  of  a  nature  to 
consist  with  universal  activity,  with  the  creation  of  the  first  sup¬ 
pliant,  and  with  the  conservation  of  the  created  universe.  This 
activity  is  not  merely  in  accordance  with  Divine  immutability ; 
it  is  its  consequence  and  manifestation.  The  longer  the  activ¬ 
ity  continues,  the  more  apparent  will  be  the  unchangeableness 
of  the  Divine  character.  That  character  is  a  prediction  or  an¬ 
ticipation  of  all  the  wants  of  the  objective  universe.  Before 
man  was  made,  it  contained  a  phase  for  every  relation  which 
he  might  sustain.  If  God  is  pleased,  therefore,  to  appoint  that 
man  shall  come  to  him  as  a  suppliant,  the  arrangement  discloses 
an  unchangeable  part  of  the  Divine  nature.  For  man  not  to 
be  heard  and  answered,  when  he  complies  with  the  conditions 
of  acceptable  prayer,  could  only  arise  from  the  termination  of 
Divine  immutability.  As  to  the  constitution  of  Nature,  daily 
experience  shows  that  its  adaptation  to  our  wants,  in  an  indefi¬ 
nite  variety  of  ways,  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  stability 
of  its  laws ;  that  the  blessing  of  rain,  for  example,  in  answer  to 
prayer,  need  not  disturb  its  regular  course  any  more  than  the 
artificial  conversion  of  air  into  water  in  the  laboratory  of  the 
chemist. 

The  great  sphere  of  Divine  operation,  however,  in  answer  to 
prayer,  is  to  be  regarded  as  hung  in  the  mind  itself.  He  wlio 
has  been  pleased  to  invest  us  with  influence  over  each  other’s 
spirits,  cannot  surely  be  regarded  as  having  voluntarily  shut 


ULTIMATE  FACTS. 


./\)7 


Himself  out  from  all  access  to  them.  And,  as  with  the  influ¬ 
ence  which  one  human  mind  exercises  over  another,  so  the  Di¬ 
vine-operation  is  to  be  regarded  as  taking  place  in  enthe  har¬ 
mony  with  the  laws  of  our  mental  and  moral  freedom.  The 
supreme  design,  indeed,  of  all  the  spiritual  aid  sought  and  im¬ 
parted  in  prayer,  is  to  restore  and  enlarge  that  freedom.  In  a 
word,  all  Nature,  rightly  understood,  is  in  prayer.  “  The  eyes 
of  all  wait  upon  Thee.”  Every  earnest  supplication  which  is 
uttered  illustrates,  and  harmonizes  with,  all  the  laws  of  man’s 
nature.  Every  such  prayer  answered,  illustrates  all  the  per¬ 
fections  of  the  Divine  nature.  Is  it  wonderful,  then,  that  the 
feeling  of  the  necessity  of  prayer  should  be  absolutely  universal ; 
that  man’s  “  heart  and  flesh  should  cry  out  for  the  living  God  ?” 
The  great  mystery  of  goodness  lies  in  the  appointment  or  prin¬ 
ciple  of  the  efficacy  of  prayer :  the  existence  of  the  appointment 
itself  is  a  fact,  an  ultimate  fact. 

16.  Whence  arises  our  idea  of  a  moral  quality  in  actions  ? 
We  can  trace  the  diversified  relations  in  which  we  stand  to 
each  other,  and  to  God.  We  may  be  able  to  show  that  certain 
lines  of  virtuous  conduct  towards  the  different  beings  to  whom 
we  are  related,  are  more  advantageous  than  any  others.  And 
from  this  perception  we  may  derive  a  powerful  motive  to  pur¬ 
sue  such  conduct.  But  quite  distinct  from  this  motive  of  advan¬ 
tage,  and  prior  to  it,  there  arises  in  the  mind  a  feeling  of  obliga¬ 
tion  that  certain  states  of  mind  in  relation  to  them  are  right ,  and 
ought  to  be  manifested.  And  this  feeling,  springing  up  unbid¬ 
den,  and  antecedent  to  all  knowledge  of  consequences,  we  can 
only  regard  as  an  ultimate  fact  of  our  moral  constitution. 

17.  Our  idea  of  immortality  possesses  the  same  ultimate  char¬ 
acter.  Arguments,  metaphysical  and  moral,  are  adducible  in 
its  support.  But  the  belief  of  it  exists  prior  to  the  argument, 
and  independently  of  it.  The  conception  of  it  seems  easy  and 
inevitable.  The  yearning  expectation  comes  up  from  the  depth 
and  ground  of  our  nature.  The  bare  imagination  of  its  op¬ 
posite  produces  a  sense  of  sudden  recoil.  Everything  within 
and  around  us  appears  to  presuppose  the  fact,  and  to  take  it  for 
granted. 

18.  Moral  evil,  also,  viewed  subjectively,  must  be  regarded 
as  an  ultimate  fact.  Made  possible  by  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
it  became  actual  by  the  determination  of  the  will.  No  outward 
influence  can  account  for  its  origination.  The  tempter  himself 
is  a  tempter  only,  furnishing  merely  the  occasions  of  evil.  Evil 
has  its  seat  and  strength  in  the  will.  It  is,  as  we  shall  hereaf- 


308 


MAN. 


ter  have  occasion  to  show,  an  act  of  the  will,  which  was  meant 
to  subsist  in  harmony  with  the  will  of  God,  but  which  aims  at 
self-subsistence  in  opposition  to  Him. 

19.  And  thus  we  find  that  every  part  of  our  constitution,  from 
the  elementary  atom  to  the  sense  of  moral  obligation,  points  di¬ 
rectly  to  an  ultimate  fact.  Take  whatever  branch  of  inquiry 
we  may,  and  begin  with  whatever  part  of  it  we  will,  we  soon 
find  ourselves  verging  on  the  region  of  metaphysical  research. 
A  single  question,  on  the  most  familiar  subject,  may  land  us  in 
it.  We  are  always  moving  near  the  point  where,  if  explana¬ 
tion  be  sought,  a  principle  has  to  be  presupposed.  The  con¬ 
tingent  asks  for  the  necessary  —  the  conditioned  for  the  uncon¬ 
ditioned.  Matter  and  motion,  organization  and  life,  nerves  and 
sensation,  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  both  of  these  and 
their  cause,  physical  dependence  and  moral  freedom,  prayer 
and  its  power,  an  action  and  its  obligation,  contingent  existence 
and  immortality,  a  conditioned  nature  and  sin  —  each  of  the 
two  members  in  these  successive  steps  (and  others  might  be 
named*)  can  be  shown  to  be  reasonable ;  but  the  nexus  which 
binds  them  in  harmony  together,  baffles  our  perception  in  every 
instance.  Yet  all  these  ultimate  facts  were  involved  in  the  con¬ 
stitution  of  the  first  human  being.  Most  of  them,  as  far  as  the 
earth  is  concerned,  came  into  existence  with  him,  or  were  origi¬ 
nated  in  his  person.  The  great  mysteries  already  involved  in 
the  conjunction  of  Freedom  and  Purpose  in  the  Divine  mind, 
and  of  Creative  mind  with  created  matter  in  the  Divine  con¬ 
duct,  were  now  made  manifest  in  a  being  whose  constitution 
combined  matter  and  spirit,  and  whose  conduct  reconciled  lib¬ 
erty  and  law ;  and  who,  in  this  new  and  lofty  sense,  was  the 
image  of  God. 


*  Such  as  thought,  in  its  relation  to  language ;  the  power  of  belief 
which  evidence  presupposes  but  cannot  create ;  and  the  ideal  beauty  which 
nature  suggests  but  does  not  realize. 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS. 


309 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

NECESSARY  TRUTHS. 

1.  From  the  ultimate  facts  of  man’s  nature  and  condition, 
let  us  ascend  to  the  necessary  truths  on  -which  they  repose,  and 
in  which  they  have  their  ground ;  from  the  contingent  expres¬ 
sions  of  the  Divine  will,  to  the  Infinite  Nature  of  which  that 
will  itself  is  the  expression.  Considered  as  mere  phenomena, 
the  existence  of  all  the  objects  and  events  in  the  created  uni¬ 
verse  is  entirely  contingent  on  the  sovereign  will  of  God.  Con¬ 
sidered  as  ultimate  facts,  they  are  contingently  necessary; 
necessary  on  the  supposition  of  the  phenomena  having  been  called 
into  existence,  but  only  on  that  supposition.  While  these  ulti¬ 
mate  facts  themselves  presuppose  truths,  or  principles,  which 
are  purely  and  absolutely  necessary. 

2.  We  have  already  remarked  on  the  nature  of  necessary 
truth,*  as  that  which  is,  and  must  be  true,  and  the  opposite  of 
which  is  metaphysically  inconceivable.  We  say  metaphysically 
inconceivable  as  distinguished  from  that  educational  inconceiva¬ 
bleness  of  a  thing  which  has  sometimes  pronounced  a  truth  im¬ 
possible  in  one  age,  and  its  reverse  inconceivable  in  a  succeed¬ 
ing  age  of  better  information.  By  the  former,  we  mean  that 
inconceivableness  which  arises  from  the  constitution  of  the 
mind ;  by  the  latter,  that  which  is  derived  from  the  mere 
strength  of  the  opposite  associations,  and  the  modification  of 
which  is  always  conceivable  and  possible. 

3.  “  Even  those  philosophers  who  profess  to  derive  all  our 
knowledge  from  experience,  and  who  admit  no  universal  truths 
of  intelligence  but  such  as  are  generalized  from  individual 
truths  of  fact  —  even  these  philosophers  are  forced  virtually  to 
acknowledge,  at  the  root  of  the  several  acts  of  observation  from 
which  their  generalization  starts,  some  law  or  principle  to  which 
they  can  appeal  as  guaranteeing  the  procedure,  should  the  va¬ 
lidity  of  these  primordial  acts  themselves  be  called  in  question.”f 
When  Mill,  for  example,  inquires,  “  How  can  we  imagine  an 
end  to  space  or  time  ?”  and  endeavors  to  account  for  its  incon- 
ceivableness  by  stating,  that  as  “  we  never  saw  any  object  with 
out  something  beyond  it,  nor  experienced  any  feeling  without 

*  Supra,  p.  55. 


t  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s  Diss.  on  Reid,  p.  743. 


310 


MAN. 


something  following  it ;  therefore,  when  we  atttmot  to  conceive 
.  the  last  point  "of  space,  we  have  the  idea  irresistibly  raised  of 
other  points  beyond  it ;  and  when  we  try  to  imagine  the  last  in¬ 
stant  of  time,  we  cannot  help  conceiving  another  instant  after 
it,”*  he  is,  in  effect,  surrendering  the  all-sufficiency  of  experience. 
The  “  irresistible  idea,”  and  the  conception  which  we  “  cannot 
help,”  are  laws  of  intellect.  Far  as  experience  may  carry  us, 
these  laws  go  “beyond,”  and  transcend  it.  Experience  only 
suggests  the  existence  of  space  by  revealing  the  existence  of  the 
objects  contained  in  it ;  but  from  the  instant  the  idea  of  space  is 
awakened,  the  intellect  cannot  think  it  non-existent.  The  ob¬ 
jects  contained  in  it  we  can,  in  thought,  annihilate ;  but  who 
can  think  of  space  except  as  existent?  We  feel  that  it  exists 
independently  of  the  mode  in  which  we  conceive  of  it ;  inde¬ 
pendently  even  of  there  having  been  any  created  minds  to  con¬ 
ceive  of  it  at  all ;  that  it  exists  necessarily. 

4.  It  may  be  proper  to  repeat  here,  that  every  necessary 
truth  is  characterized  by  universality  ;  which  is  only  saying  that 
a  truth  which  could  be  shown  to  be  not  necessary  for  one  mind, 
would,  by  that  very  fact,  be  proved  to  be  not  necessary  for  any 
mind.  As  necessary,  also,  a  truth  is  primary  or  original ;  nei¬ 
ther  dependent  on,  nor  derived  from,  any  anterior  truth.  And, 
therefore,  inexplicable  ;  for  if  we  could  explain  why  or  how  it  is, 
that  explanation  itself  would  be  the  prior  and  primary  truth. 
While  its  certainty  is  such,  that  the  certainty  of  every  subordi¬ 
nate  truth  of  the  same  class  depends  on  it. 

5.  But  what  are  the  metaphysical  principles  which  possess 
these  characteristics  of  necessary  truth  ?  Without  proposing  to 
give  a  full  enumeration  of  them,  we  have  already  specified  four ; 
and  have  stated  the  ground  of  our  selection  —  namely,  that  they 
are  such  as  are  presupposed  by  the  very  possibility  of  a  Divine 
manifestation  —  such  as  must  have  been  present  to  the  mind  of 
the  Creator  as  the  absolute  conditions  of  a  creation.  All  body 
must  be  in  space  :  then  the  creation  of  the  universe  presupposes 
the  space  in  which  it  exists  ;  and  although  no  eye  had  ever 
opened  in  it,  no  atom  ever  floated  through  it,  the  non-existence 
of  space  is  inconceivable.  Every  succession  must  be  in  time ; 
then,  for  the  same  reason,  duration  must  have  existed  prior  to, 
and  independently  of,  the  creation,  for  it  is  an  indispensable 
condition  of  its  existence.  Everything  which  begins  to  exist 
must  have  an  efficient  cause :  the  contrarv  is  inconceivable. 


*  System  of  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  317. 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS. 


311 


Even  Hume  did  not  deny  that  the  notion  of  Cause  was  in¬ 
dispensable  in  relation  to  all  natural  knowledge.  The  bare 
conception  of  a  creation  presupposes  the  power  adequate  to 
cause  it ;  and  a  power,  therefore,  which  must  have  existed  even 
apart  from  the  actual  causation  of  the  material  universe. 
Every  substance  implies  attributes  or  properties,  and  every 
property  implies  a  substance.  The  one  cannot  be  thought  of 
without  implying  the  other.  The  properties  of  the  objective 
universe  imply  a  subjective,  of  which  they  are  the  manifestation. 
Matter  presupposes  spirit.  And  thus  we  ascend  from  that 
causative  Will  of  which  creation  is  the  effect,  to  that  Divine 
Nature  of  which  the  properties  or  characteristics  of  creation  are 
the  revelation. 

6.  This  leads  us  to  speak  of  other  truths  as  necessary,  truths 
which,  as  presupposed  by  the  very  possibility  of  a  Divine 
manifestation,  are  independent  of  it.  Every  contingent  de¬ 
termination  implies  moral  freedom ,  and  freedom  implies  the 
power  of  contingent  determination.  The  Divine  determination 
to  create  man,  presupposes  the  power  of  abstaining  from  such 
a  purpose ;  otherwise  the  determination  would  result  from  a 
necessity  or  fate,  the  very  opposite  of  freedom ;  or,  rather  there 
could  be  no  room  for  any  determination  on  the  subject.  Then, 
the  freedom  which  this  purpose  implies  would  have  existed,  and 
could  not  but  exist,  even  if  man  —  at  once  its  proof  and  its 
image  — -  had  never  been  called  into  being.  How  this  freedom 
is  compatible  with  that  moral  necessity  or  certainty  which  the 
Divine  Perfection  is  under,  of  choosing  always  that  which  is 
best,  is  not  the  point  before  us.  Both  the  freedom  and  the  cer¬ 
tainty  are  primary  and  necessary  truths  each  in  its  own  pecu¬ 
liar  sphere ;  and,  if  primary,  they  cannot  admit  of  demonstra¬ 
tion,  since  there  can  be  nothing  by  which  to  demonstrate  them. 
The  only  point  of  their  coincidence  is  in  that  Personal  perfec¬ 
tion  which  makes  them  both  equally  necessary. 

7.  The  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  is  another  im¬ 
mutable  truth.  Men  may  differ  slightly  respecting  the  appli¬ 
cation  of  the  terms,  but  the  antithesis  between  the  ideas  is  a 
universal  conception.  They  may  neglect  to  apply  it  to  certain 
classes  of  actions  and  affections  ;  but  the  oracle  from  on  high  no 
sooner  commands  it  than  the  voice  within  repeats  the  command. 
Its  realitv  is  recognized  in  the  structure  of  all  lano-uages.  So 
far  from  being  created  by  law,  it  is  itself  a  lawgiver.  Laws 
presuppose  it,  and  are  good  only  as  they  utter  its  mandates.  Its 
llirone  is  higher  and  older  than  Sinai  itself,  to  which  it  has  to 


312 


MAN. 


descend  when  it  speaks  to  men.  It  cannot  be  confounded  with 
interest  and  utility.  These  may  excite  desire,  but  rectitude  im¬ 
poses  a  sense  of  obligation.  Its  smiles  and  frowns  are  too  quick 
for  a  selfish  calculation,  and  the  sacrifices  which  it  commands 
are  made  for  its  own  sake,  apart  from  all  consideration  of  con¬ 
sequences.  Its  emotions  are  specific;  disdaining  every  other 
occasion  as  inferior,  they  reserve  themselves  for  the  presence 
of  those  qualities  alone  which  are  to  form  the  subject  of  the 
final  investigation.  It  has  an  origin  logically  anterior  even  to 
the  will  of  the  ever-blessed  God.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  not  ex- 
cellent  because  He  wills  it,  but  He  wills  it  because  it  is  excel¬ 
lent  ;  so  excellent  as  to  constitute  his  Nature.  Every  volition 
of  the  Divine  mind,  therefore,  presupposes  it,  and  is  its  expres¬ 
sion.  “  The  righteous  Lord  loveth  righteousness.”  When  it 
speaks  or  wills,  it  wills  with  the  authority  of  His  infinite  nature. 
It  is  independent  of  all  created  existence.  Like  the  mathemat¬ 
ical  truths  of  which  the  material  universe  is  His  chosen  diagram, 
but  which  would  have  been  truths  had  no  created  forms  or  mo¬ 
tions  ever  existed  to  exemplify  them,  the  distinction  between 
truth  and  falsehood,  good  and  evil,  is  perfectly  irrespective  of 
human  conscience,  or  created  apprehension.  It  is  “  from  eter¬ 
nity  to  eternity.”  As  well  might  we  conceive  of  a  past  period 
when  the  radii  of  a  circle  were  not  necessarily  equal,  or  of  some 
future  time  when  a  circle  shall  have  two  centres,  as  of  a  period 
when  right  and  wrong  shall  be  converted  or  commuted.  Kec- 
titude  is  as  immutable  as  the  infinite  excellence  which  enshrines 
it ;  and  “  He  cannot  deny  himself.” 

8.  To  these  necessary  beliefs  we  may  add  the  idea  of  per¬ 
fection.  An  archetype  of  order,  harmony,  fitness,  and  beauty, 
inhabits  the  mind,  which  nothing  external  has  ever  realized. 
The  comparison  of  one  degree  of  excellence  with  another  may 
have  at  first  awakened  the  idea,  but  could  not  have  created  it ; 
for  how  can  the  relative  give  birth  to  the  absolute,  the  effect 
transcend  its  cause  ?  Actual  experience  gives  us  nothing  but 
the  variable,  the  limited,  the  incomplete.  Yet  not  only  does 
every  new  grace  unveil  its  face  to  us  as  that  of  a  well-remem¬ 
bered  friend,  it  assures  us  of  an  excellence  of  infinite  perfec¬ 
tion,  and  of  which  all  created  beauty  is  only  an  emanation.  No 
conception  of  excellence  short  of  this  standard  is,  or  can  be, 
final.  Passing  beyond  all  the  realities  of  finite  being,  the  mind 
beholds  in  the  Infinite  himself  the  only  greatness  and  beauty 
which  can  satisfy  its  conceptions,  an  object  which  “  borrows 
splendor  from  all  that  is  fail’,  subordinates  to  itself  all  that  is 


NECESSARY  TRUTHS. 


313 


$ 

great,  and  sits  enthroned  on  the  riches  of  the  universe.”  But 
the  existence  of  that  perfection  depends  not  on  the  ability  of 
any  created  intelligence  to  conceive  of  it.  From  eternity  it 
must  have  been  the  ever-present  subject  of  the  Divine  contem¬ 
plation,  because  the  ever-conscious  character  of  the  Divine 
nature. 

9.  The  idea  of  law  is  as  necessary  for  the  reason  as  the  idea 
of  cause ;  so  that,  if  every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause,  it 
is  a  truth  equally  necessary  that  it  must  have  a  law.  Holding 
its  eternal  seat  in  the  mind  of  God,  it  made  all  the  sequences 
and  uniformities  of  the  objective  universe  possible,  when  as  yet 
the  first  of  them  had  to  be  created.  The  same  is  true  of  the 
idea  of  Design,  of  Personality,  of  Immortality,  and  of  some 
others.  These  truths  are  all  primitive,  necessary,  universal. 
The  mind  cannot  act  without  them.  They  belong  to  its  struc¬ 
ture.  Whatever  external  influence  may  be  necessary  in  order 
to  awaken  them,  they  have  an  a  priori  existence  of  their  own, 
and  claim  immediate  kindred  with  the  mind  of  the  Creator. 

10.  Here,  then,  we  find  ourselves  brought  into  the  awful 
presence  of  primordial  truth.  We  can  conceive  of  a  period  in 
past  duration  when  the  Infinite  Being  dwelt  alone  in  his  own 
immensity.  But,  even  then,  a  creation  was  possible ;  and  here 
are  the  deep  foundations,  the  very  grounds  on  which  that  pos¬ 
sibility  rested.  Even  then  a  creation  was  purposed  ;  and  here 
are  the  first  truths,  the  primary  ideas,  which  that  purpose  pre¬ 
supposed  ;  here,  dimly  looking  forth  from  the  depths  of  eternity, 
are  solemn  and  profound  aspects  of  the  incomprehensible  na¬ 
ture  of  which  the  creating  will  is  to  be  the  utterance,  and  of 
which  created  objects  are  to  be  the  manifestation  ?  But  what 
must  be  the  constitution  of  the  creature  who  shall  be  capable  of 
receiving  the  manifestation?  For  some  of  these  awful  aspects 
and  eternal  truths  are  not  susceptible  of  material  forms  ;  ideas 
of  obligation  cannot  be  set  forth  by  color  or  diagram.  Even 
in  relation  to  such  ideas  as  admit  of  material  representation, 
the  actual  must  ever  fall  infinitely  below  the  possible ;  the 
worlds  which  will  be  are  outnumbered  by  the  archetypes  ever 
present  to  the  mind  of  God  of  works  which  might  be.  And 
now  that  the  silence  of  eternity  has  been  broken,  and  creation 
has  advanced  through  the  successive  stages  of  matter,  and  life, 
and  sensation,  the  mind  capable  of  apprehending  these  neces¬ 
sary  and  eternal  truths  is  still  wanting.  They  are  not,  cannot 
be,  in  these  created  objects,  any  more  than  the  face  is  in  the 
mirror  which  reflects  it.  They  do  not  admit  even  of  being 

27 


314 


MAN. 


observed  in  them.  As  they  were  presupposed  by  tne  Eternal 
mind,  so  must  they  be  by  the  mind  of  the  being  who  shall  infer 
;he  character  of  the  Creator  from  his  works.  Such  a  creature 
appears  in  the  person  of  man.  Endowed  ■with  a  designing 
mind,  he  recognizes  marks  of  design  in  every  department  of 
creation.  Having  the  foundations  of  law,  and  the  principles 
of  science,  inlaid  in  his  constitution,  he  finds  himself  in  a  world 
perpetually  appealing  to  those  principles,  and  referring  him  to 
these  laws.  Creation  is  ever  remanding  him  to  its  Maker,  and 
thus  reminding  him  that  he  is  connatural  with  the  Divine.  The 
observation  of  phenomena  soon  brings  him  to  a  fact  which,  as 
far  as  nature  is  concerned,  is  ultimate ;  if  he  would  advance 
beyond,  he  finds  himself  in  the  presence  of  the  Supernatural. 
Penetrating  beyond  the  contingent  and  the  sensible,  he  lifts  the 
veil  to  find  himself  standing  face  to  face  with  truths  which  were 
ever  present  to  the  Eternal  mind  as  the  necessary  conditions 
of  its  objective  manifestation.  What  close  and  ineffable  com¬ 
munion  with  the  Deity  is  this ;  not  with  His  will  merely,  but 
even  with  His  eternal  nature ! 


CHAPTER  XVH. 

ANALOGY. 

1.  In  the  evolution  of  a  Divine  system  it  may  be  expected 
that  every  part  will  be  in  harmony  and  analogy  with  every  other 
part.  For  if  the  whole  is  to  be,  in  some  respect,  an  analogue 
of  the  Divine  Being,  every  separate  portion  of  it  must  be  sim¬ 
ilarly  related  to  every  other  part,  otherwise  the  whole  will  not 
resemble  Him.  Accordingly,  we  find  that  the  entire  constitu¬ 
tion  of  man  is  arranged  on  a  plan  which  harmonizes  all  its 
parts  into  one  whole,  and  that  whole  with  the  universe.  The 
full  illustration  of  this  fact  would  require  an  analysis  of  all  the 
preceding  chapters.  We  shall,  however,  only  glance  at  two 
or  three  of  the  more  general  indications  of  such  a  plan  in  the 
human  being,  point  out  certain  analogies  between  the  human 
dispensation  and  those  which  preceded  it,  and  the  rules  and 
means  of  classification  which  the  subject  suggests  and  provides. 

2.  Viewing  man  apart  from  the  universe  which  surrounds 


ANALOGY. 


315 


him,  he  exhibits  in  his  own  person  an  all-related  system  of 
means  and  forces.  Even  the  lowest  and  minutest  part  of  this 
system  has  a  constitution  of  its  own.  A  single  hair  is  an  organi¬ 
zation,  a  world.  But  all  the  infinitely  diversified  parts  of  the 
system,  physiological,  mental,  and  moral,  are  elaborated  into  a 
single  constitution.  These  characteristic  parts  are  not  developed 
capriciously  and  without  order,  but  according  to  a  law  wThich 
regulates  their  succession.  Supposing  them  to  be  all  present, 
and  in  their  appointed  order,  we  have  seen  that  it  is  not  optional 
or  immaterial  to  man  which  part  prevails  and  which  submits. 
Their  rank  and  office  are  fixed.  Sensation  is  the  servant  of 
thought ;  thought  subserves  emotion ;  emotion  can,  through  the 
medium  of  thought,  be  diverted  or  be  held  in  abeyance  by  the 
will,  while  conscience  is,  in  the  sense  previously  stated,  the 
supreme  authority  for  the  will. 

As  a  being  who  is  capable  not  only  of  understanding  the  great 
process  into  which  he  has  come,  but  of  actually  subserving  it, 
the  rank  and  office  of  his  motives  are  commanded.  His  self-love 
is  designed  to  regulate  his  appetites,  his  affections  to  control  his 
self-love,  and  his  regard  for  the  will  and  character  of  God  to 
direct  the  whole.  And  who  does  not  perceive  that  this  order  is 
according  to  an  ascending  scale  of  importance  ?  that,  while  the 
appetites  ask  but  a  small  range  of  objects,  self-love  contemplates 
the  good  of  the  entire  being,  and  for  all  the  future  ;  the  affections 
embrace  the  similar  well-being  of  others ;  and  a  sense  of  duty, 
by  leading  him  into  the  presence,  and  placing  him  under  the 
government  of  God,  surrounds  and  unites  him  with  the  origin 
and  end  of  all  tilings.  No  derangement  of  this  all-compacted 
constitution  can  take  place  with  impunity.  The  higher  parts 
are  not  independent  of  the  lower ;  the  least  is  essential  to  the 
integrity  and  the  well-working  of  the  entire  man.  No  property, 
function,  or  power,  is  isolated.  “  All  the  parts  are  mutually 
ends  and  means.”  Nor,  viewed  in  relation  to  time,  is  the  iden¬ 
tity  of  his  nature  ever  lost,  or  the  progress  of  his  character  ever 
discontinued.  Memory,  association,  and  habit,  present  the  record 
of  his  history.  The  past,  in  its  effects,  is  ever  present  with  him. 
His  character,  though  always  undergoing  modification,  is  always 
whole. 

3.  ^Regarding  man  in  his  objective  relations,  we  find  all  the  pre¬ 
existing  laws,  physical,  organic,  and  animal,  brought  forwards, 
and  assumed  in  the  corresponding  parts  of  his  constitution. 
His  structure  and  physiology  point  to  a  type,  and  are  suggestive 
of  the  great  scheme  of  organization  in  which  he  finds  his  appro- 


316 


MAN. 


priate  place.  Many  things  which  were  only  begun  in  the  pre¬ 
ceding  stages  of  creation  are  resumed,  more  fully  developed, 
and  completed,  in  him ;  and  some  things  which,  before,  were 
shadowy  and  vague,  are  interpreted,  and  even  become  the  in¬ 
terpreters  of  other  things. 

Man  is  to  understand  creation,  and,  by  this  means,  to  know 
his  Creator.  Accordingly,  he  is  placed  in  sensible  communi¬ 
cation  with  the  external  world ;  or,  is  made  susceptible  of  a 
sensible  change,  or  mental  impression,  answering  to  each  of  all 
the  phenomena  of  external  nature.  These  phenomena  are  all 
related  by  certain  general  laws,  or  in  a  uniform  manner ;  and 
he  is  capable  of  recognizing  these  uniformities,  confidently 
calculates  on  them,  and  generalizes  them  all  into  groups  and 
classes  according  as  they  more  or  less  resemble  each  other. 
These  phenomena,  besides  being  related  to  each  other,  are 
related  also  to  that  which  contains  them,  and  which  accounts 
for  their  existence ;  and  man  is  made  susceptible  of  having  the 
ideas  which  these  relations  presuppose,  awakened  in  his  mind 
—  ideas  which  conduct  him  directly  to  the  infinite  and  eternal 
Being  for  whose  manifestation  the  creation  exists.  But  the 
phenomena  actually  created  do  not  exhaust  the  Divine  resources, 
for  God  is  infinite ;  and  man  is  able  to  imagine,  not  only  the 
archetypes  of  existing  realities,  but  of  objects  unknown  to  the 
actual  universe.  In  other  words,  he  can  ascend  from  the  visible 
and  contingent  to  those  laws  and  facts  which,  to  nature,  are 
ultimate,  and  from  these  again  to  the  necessary  truths  which 
these  contingent  objects  and  ultimate  facts  presuppose,  as  well 
as  imagine  a  vast  range  of  unrealized  conceptions  which  these 
necessary  truths  make  possible.  Thus  constituted,  it  might  be 
expected  that  he  would  be  capable  of  learning  more  from  his 
intelligent  fellow  man  than  from  any  other  object  of  external 
nature ;  and,  accordingly,  he  is  endowed  with  the  power  of 
interchanging  thoughts,  of  bearing  credible  testimony  to  the 
truth  of  his  statements,  and  of  believing  testimony  so  rendered. 
Language,  the  great  medium  of  his  mental  communications,  is 
an  ever-growing  illustration  of  the  analogy  existing  between  the 
operations  of  the  world  within  and  all  that  exists  around  it. 
Indefinitely  varied  as  are  the  relations  which  he  sustains  to 
external  objects,  and  the  points  from  which  he  views  them,  four 
or  five  classes  of  verbs  at  most,  employed  in  four  or  five  moods, 
are  made  to  supply  all  his  purposes,  owing  to  the  resemblance 
af  which  he  is  conscious  between  his  different  states  of  mind. 
Innumerable  as  are  the  kinds  of  relations  existing  between 


ANALOGY. 


317 


external  things,  five  or  six  eases  of  nouns  (speaking  generally) 
express  them  all  for  him,  for  he  traces  so  many  classes  of  simili¬ 
tude  among  them.  While  every  word,  expressing  as  it  doe*s  at 
first  the  relation  of  some  one  thing,  comes  to  denote  the  analo¬ 
gous  relations  of  a  number  of  other  things ;  and  even  his  own 
faculties  and  mental  phenomena  derive  their  names  mostly  from 
the  sensible  properties  of  matter.  Whatever  the  subject  which 
may  occupy  his  thoughts,  he  finds  that,  as  a  poet,  a  world  of  im¬ 
pressive  images  lies  around  him ;  as  a  reasoner,  comparisons 
surround  him ;  as  a  scientific  theorist,  wherever  he  looks  pro¬ 
lific  suggestions  meet  his  eye,  offering  to  lead  him  from  the 
known  to  the  unknown ;  as  a  religious  being,  all  the  finite  and 
the  visible  refer  him  to  the  Infinite  invisible.  Language,  which, 
by  its  analogical  character,  is  the  living  record  of  this  fact,  is 
thus  ever  memorializing  him  that  his  own  mind  is  a  system 
capable  of  tracing  its  relations  to  the  great  system  to  which  it 
belongs  ;  and  that  it  enjoys  this  high  prerogative  in  virtue  of 
its  being  the  analogue  and  image  of  Him  who  is  the  Creator  of 
both. 

4.  But  if  man  is  constituted  to  know,  it  is  in  order  that  he 
may  appreciate  that  which  he  knows  according  to  its  rank  and 
•  office  in  the  great  scheme.  Everything  around  him  is  meant  to 
move  ;  to  move  him  ;  to  move  him  towards  God.  But  every¬ 
thing  is  meant  to  affect  him  differently.  As  objects  occupy 
different  ranks  in  the  scale  of  creation,  and  display  different 
aspects  of  the  Divine  character,  man  is  endowed  with  the 
susceptibility  of  being  moved  by  them  accordingly.  He  finds 
himself  in  a  temple  filled  with  “  figures  of  the  true.”  Here,  the 
most  lovely  objects  are  only  the  emblems,  to  him,  of  a  beauty 
and  an  excellence  which  no  material  form  can  embody.  Emo¬ 
tions  of  awe  and  majesty  are  awakened  in  his  mind  by  objects 
in  proportion  as  they  seem  to  bring  him  near  to  the  presence  of 
Divine  Greatness.  The  purest  elements  and  objects  are  only 
symbols  of  the  Divine  Holiness ;  and,  like  the  cherubim  figured 
on  the  temple-vail,  acquire  a  sanctity,  and  inspire  reverence,  by 
their  proximity  to  “  the  holiest  of  all.”  The  tree  in  the  midst 
of  the  garden  was  the  symbol  and  instrument  of  moral  govern¬ 
ment  ;  other  trees  might  speak  to  unfallen  man  of  Goodness, 
but  that  proclaimed  Divine  Equity ;  and  every  step  which 
brought  him  nearer  to  that  central  object  seemed  to  bring  him 
on  more  hallowed  ground.  “  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God 
with  all  thy  heart ;  supreme  excellence  challenges  supreme  love. 
In  virtue  of  this  original  appointment,  all  inferior  excellence 

27* 


318 


MAN. 


takes  a  subordinate  position,  and  measures  its  claim  to  our  re¬ 
gard  by  the  degree  of  its  resemblance  to  the  Divine  Archetype. 

'5.  Man’s  power  of  choosing,  according  to  his  appreciation  of 
objects,  and  of  corresponding  voluntary  action,  discloses  other 
objective  relations.  He  is  a  creature  of  animal  appetites ;  and 
external  nature  presents  them  with  appropriate  objects.  He  is 
capable  of  self-love  —  it  is  essential  to  his  continued  existence 
that  he  should  be  —  and  he,  the  subject  of  this  regard,  can, 
indirectly,  become  his  own  object.  From  the  present,  he  can 
view  himself  objectively  in  the  future,  and  can  act  from  a  regard 
to  that  future  self.  “  Prudence  is  an  active  principle,  and  im¬ 
plies  a  sacrifice  of  self,  though  only  to  the  same  self  projected 
as  it  were  to  a  distance.”  He  is  susceptible  of  affections ;  and 
the  external  world  presents  him  with  objects  calculated  to  keep 
them  in  perpetual  play.  He  is  capable  of  a  sense  of  duty; 
and  to  this  principle  of  action,  the  will  of  God,  as  the  interpreter 
and  enforcer  of  unalterable  right,  authoritatively  appeals.  Thus 
every  part  of  his  constitution  finds  its  counterpart  in  the  objec¬ 
tive  universe ;  from  his  appetites  which  stoop  to  gather  up  their 
objects  from  the  dust,  to  his  sense  of  duty  which  bears  him  away 
in  homage  to  the  throne  of  the  Invisible.  But  how  is  the  will  of 
God,  in  the  constitution  of  nature,  ascertainable  by  man?  We 
have  found  that  it  is  expressed  in  the  operation  of  general  laws, 
that,  in  relation  to  these  laws,  he  finds  himself  right  or  wrong 
in  his  every  movement ;  and  that  having  learned  from  experi¬ 
ence  what  these  laws  are,  he  has  learned  the  will  of  God 
respecting  his  conduct  towards  them ;  and,  then,  as  a  being 
made  capable  of  voluntarily  obeying  that  will,  he  is  held  respon¬ 
sible  for  pursuing  that  conduct,  and  is  guilty  or  not  guilty 
accordingly.  And  thus  even  when  allowably  gratifying  appe¬ 
tite,  or  when  rightly  influenced  by  self-love,  or  by  the  affections, 
the  fact  that  he  is  acting  according  to  the  will  of  God,  is  still  to 
be  the  controlling  and  supreme  consideration.  Of  course,  if  the 
Divine  will  be  vocally  and  directly  addressed  to  him.  as  in  the 
instance  of  the  primal  prohibition,  he  can  apprehend  and  yield 
to  it  at  once.  But  even  as  far  as  he  is  referred  for  his  know¬ 
ledge  of  that  will  to  the  open  volume  of  nature,  so  legibly  is  it 
written  for  the  eye  of  conscience,  that  he  may  read  that  runs. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  part  of  his  nature,  and  no  moment  of  his 
existence,  which  is  not  met  by  the  claims  of  duty.  And  the 
only  condition  on  which  he  can  be  prepared  to  discharge  the 
duty  of  any  given  moment  is,  that  of  his  having  fulfilled  the 
obligation  peculiar  to  every  previous  moment  of  his  being. 


ANALOGY. 


319 


6.  Furt)  er,  as  man’s  powers  of  knowing,  appreciating,  and 
voluntarily  acting  in,  the  external  world,  bring  him  under  obli¬ 
gation  resp  acting  the  course  and  character  of  his  action,  we  have 
found  that  he  enjoys  an  amount  of  good,  or  well-being,  propor¬ 
tioned  to  the  discharge  of  his  obligations.  If  the  phenomena, 
mental  and  moral,  which  man  exhibits,  are  not  unconnected  and 
capricious,  but  arranged  in  an  orderly  constitution,  it  follows  that 
that  constitution  has  a  tendency  and  an  end ;  that  is,  that  its 
well-being  is  not  only  more  apparent  when  it  acts  according  to 
a  certain  plan,  than  when  it  is  acting  according  to  any  other, 
but  that  its  well-being  entirely  depends  on  its  so  acting.  That 
end  we  believe  to  be  the  end  for  which  everything  else  exists, 
and  for  which  God  himself  wills  and  acts  —  the  manifestation 
of  the  Divine  excellence.  Accordingly,  as  a  part  of  the  mani¬ 
festation,  man  enjoys  the  advantage  and  pleasure  of  being  in 
harmony  with  his  relations  to  the  great  plan,  even  though  acting 
in  ignorance  of  them.  As  that  distinguished  part  to  whom  the 
manifestation  is  made,  his  advantage  is  proportioned  to  the  rank 
of  the  motive  from  which  he  acts.  If  he  act  rightly  from  any 
motive, verily,  he  has  his  reward.”  But  he  is  capable  of  doing 
everything  from  the  highest  motive,  from  a  regard  to  the  same 
end  for  which  God  is  conducting  the  great  process  of  Divine 
manifestation  ;  and,  in  proportion  as  he  thus  acts,  he  gains  every 
inferior  end.  and  shares  with  the  Divine  Being  the  happiness  of 
realizing  the  highest  end.  Perhaps  there  is  nothing  which  more 
convincingly  shdws  that  the  nature  of  man  is  arranged  on  a  plan, 
and  that  that  plan  harmonizes  with  the  great  objective  plan 
which  includes  everything,  than  the  various  grounds  assigned 
bv  different  writers  as  the  basis  of  moral  obligation.  If  one 
affirms,  for  instance,  that  morality  is  founded  on  the  emotions,  it 
indicates  the  fact  that  the  whole  of  our  emotional  nature  is  har¬ 
monized  with  all  the  requirements  of  morality.  If  another  con¬ 
tends  that  it  is  obligatory  because  it  is  agreeable  to  reason  and 

O  J  o 

the  nature  of  things,  this  only  shows  that  our  intellectual  nature 
is  made  to  harmonize  with  it  as  well  as  our  emotional.  If  the 
the  selfist  contends  that  the  good  of  self  is  the  only  principle  of 
virtue,  this,  at  least,  indicates  that  our  sensitive  nature  has  been 
made  coincident  with  the  laws  of  morality.  If  the  utilitarian 
contends  that  only  the  useful  is  virtuous,  this  implies  that  we  are 
under  the  economy  of  a  Being  who  has  made  our  duty  and  our 
welfare  to  coincide.  Or,  if  it  be  affirmed  that  the  will  of  God 
is  the  Ultimate  foundation  of  right,  this  obviously  implies  that 


320 


MAN. 


obedience  and  happiness  are  relative  terms.*  We  have  seen, 
indeed,  that  the  true  basis  of  morality  is  distinct  from  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  mere  will ;  that  it  has  an  independent  existence  anterior 
to  law,  and  of  which  law  is  only  the  proclamation ;  that  it  had 
an  eternal  pre-existence  in  the  character  of  the  Godhead.  But 
all  these  ditfering  views  conspire  to  show,  at  least,  how  essen¬ 
tially  the  laws  of  morality  are  inwrought  into  man’s  nature,  into 
every  part  of  it ;  how  entirely  “  the  man  in  the  breast,”  answers 
to  the  objective  economy  on  high ;  and  how  truly  the  human 
character  is  formed  on  the  model  of  the  Divine,  and  in  order  to 
its  manifestation.  God  and  man  are,  in  this  sense,  relative 
terms. 

7.  Hypothetically  speaking,  man  might  have  been  constituted 
precisely  as  he  now  is,  before  the  world  for  which  he  is  made 
was  called  into  existence.  And,  then,  a  being,  adequately  en¬ 
dowed  might  have  inferred,  had  man’s  slumbering  faculties  and 
susceptibilites  been  disclosed  to  him,  the  constitution  of  the 
world  he  was  destined  to  inhabit.  Just  as,  perhaps,  angelic  be¬ 
ings,  on  the  other  hand,  did  vaguely  infer,  from  an  inspection 
of  that  world,  the  constitution  of  the  being  for  whom  it  was 
designed.  Not  only,  therefore,  is  every  part  of  man’s  nature  re¬ 
lated  to,  and  in  analogy  with,  every  other  part,  but  the  whole  is 
in  correspondence  with  the  objective  universe.  He  stands  in 
the  centre  of  the  whole,  with  every  law  and  influence  meeting 
in  him,  every  object  and  event  leaving  an  impression  on  him. 
A  celestial  globe,  on  which  every  constellation  and  star  has  its 
place,  and  which  is  rectified  for  taking  astronomical  observa¬ 
tions,  is  but  an  imperfect  image  of  man’s  correspondence  with 
the  objective  universe.  He  lives  as  within  an  illuminated 
globe  —  his  own  mind  the  flame  which  illuminates  it,  the  light 
by  which  he  reads  it.  Every  object  and  event  which  he  wit¬ 
nesses,  and  every  law  which  he  traces,  writes  the  fact  of  its  ex¬ 
istence  on  his  mind.  So  that  if  a  supernatural  being,  as  we  just 
now  remarked,  could  have  synthetically  conjectured  what  kind 
of  a  world  the  earth  would  be  from  looking  at  his  powers  and 
susceptibilities,  just  as  well  could  such  a  being  now  infer,  analy¬ 
tically,  what  kind  of  an  economy,  physical,  intellectual,  and 
spiritual,  he  has  inhabited,  by  examining  the  prints  and  traces 
which  it  leaves  upon  the  mind. 

8.  We  have  now  to  glance  at  certain  analogies  between  the 


*  Dr.  Chalmers’s  Biidgewater  Treatise,  v.  ii.,  p.  93 ;  Warburton’s  Dr 
vine  Legation,  B.  I.,  §§  iv.  v. 


ANALOGY. 


321 


con  -men  cement  of  the  human  dispensation  and  those  which  pre¬ 
ceded  it.  The  creation  of  man  interrupted  the  course  of  nature 
neither  more  nor  less  than  it  had  been  interrupted  by  prior 
creations.  If  there  be  one  conclusion  in  philosophy  more  cer¬ 
tain  than  another,  it  is  that  the  material  universe  must  have 
had  a  beginning.  Equally  evident  is  it,  not  only  to  reason  but 
to  sense,  that  since  the  period  of  that  primary  miracle  —  when 
first  the  possible  became  actual,  and  law  became  objective  —  a 
succession  of  changes  and  additions  have  taken  place,  each  of  a 
kind  entirely  unknown  to  all  that  had  gone  before.  Great  cos- 
mical  changes  have  occurred.  Stars  have  appeared  and  disap¬ 
peared.*  On  the  globe  which  we  inhabit,  geology  shows  that 
changes  such  as  man’s  limited  experience  has  never  witnessed, 
have  occurred,  times  without  number.  To  say  nothing  of  the 
eventful  moment  when  the  great  mystery  of  Life  first  appeared 
on  the  earth,  and  of  the  equally-marked  occasion  when  a  sense 
of  animal  enjoyment  was  first  added  to  life,  whole  races  of  ani¬ 
mals  have,  since  then,  appeared  and  disappeared,  and  have  been 
replaced  by  others  in  turn.  Four  times,  at  least,  did  these 
changes  take  place  in  the  course  of  the  tertiary  era ;  and,  to  an 
extent  which  leaves  hardly  a  species  of  the  first  period  extant 
among  the  species  now  living.  Now  the  present  laws  of  nature, 
as  known  to  man,  will  not  account  for  the  origination  of  these 
species.  These  laws  announce  themselves  only  as  regulating 
the  succession  of  species  already  originated  —  the  production 
of  similar  beings  from  their  parent  stock.  Something,  there¬ 
fore,  must  have  taken  place  at  the  first  appearance  of  these  be¬ 
ings  to  which  the  laws  of  nature,  as  we  see  them  in  operation, 
are  not  adequate.  The  new  consequent  implies  a  new  antece¬ 
dent.  The  new  effect  to  which  nature  is  inadequate,  implies  a 
cause  which  is  sz^er-natural.  The  inference  is,  that  every  such 
effect  is  directly  originated  by  the  same  Cause  as  that  to  which 
nature  itself  owes  its  origin.  And  this  is,  substantially,  the 
Biblical  statement  respecting  the  origin  of  man.  He  takes  his 
place  on  the  earth  as  one  in  a  progressive  series  of  creations. 
An  intelligent  being  of  another  order  —  the  Cuvier  of  a  differ¬ 
ent  world  —  if  permitted  to  examine  the  animal  remains  in  our 
earth’s  crust,  could  only  infer  that,  at  widely-separated  periods, 
new  classes  of  organized  beings  had  been  created,  and  that 
among  tne  newest  of  such  creations  was  one  answering  to  the 
description  of  man. 


*  Hersehel’s  Astronomy,  p.  383 ;  Proc.  R.  Ast.  Soc.,  No.  iii.,  Jan.  1840. 


322 


MAN. 


9.  In  prior  creations,  respect  had  been  had  to  the  physical 
fitness  of  the  earth’s  condition  to  the  peculiar  constitution  of  the 
new-made  beings.  If,  indeed,  the  theory  of  creation  or  devel¬ 
opment  by  natural  law  be  adopted,  it  would  follow  that  as  soon 
as  ever  certain  natural  conditions  were  present,  certain  crea¬ 
tures  would  start  into  life  by  inevitable  necessity.  But  condi¬ 
tions  are  not  causes ;  nor  does  the  evidence  adduced  in  support 
of  the  theory,  prove  anything  more  than  the  ease  with  which 
uniform  conjunction  may  be  mistaken  for  necessary  connection. 
The  uniform  conjunction  of  which  we  speak  is,  not  that  the 
animal  invariably  follows  the  physical  condition,  but  that  the 
existence  of  certain  forms  of  animal  life  uniformly  presuppose 
certain  adapted  states  of  the  element  they  inhabit.  Though 
water  did  not  create  fish,  the  existence  of  marine  tribes  pre¬ 
supposes,  not  the  sea  merely,  but  the  existence  of  a  marine  tem¬ 
perature  and  condition  suited  to  their  sustenance.  Similarly, 
the  period  of  man’s  creation  was  related  to  the  physical  condi¬ 
tion  of  the  earth.  The  probability  is,  indeed,  that,  as  far  as 
these  conditions  are  concerned,  he  might  have  been  created 
earlier  or  later,  had  the  Creating  will  so  determined ;  that  is, 
that  during,  at  least,  the  latter  part  of  the  tertiary  period,  the 
state  of  the  earth  was  not  unfitted  for  his  existence.  There 
was,  however,  a  prior  period  when,  with  his  present  constitu¬ 
tion,  existence  wrould  have  been  impossible.  And  not  until 
that  condition  of  the  earth  had  passed  away,  was  man  brought 
into  being.  The  Mosaic  account  of  the  Adamic  creation  is,  in 
one  view,  an  exposition  of  the  fitness  of  the  earth  for  man’s 
habitation. 

10.  But  (it  may  be  asked)  is  it  not  contrary  to  all  analogy, 
and  enough  to  shake  our  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  Na¬ 
ture,  that,  after  the  course  of  things  had  proceeded  regularly 
for  an  indefinite  series  of  ages,  a  being  so  unique  as  man  should 
at  length  appear  on  the  earth?  Doubtless,  we  reply,  his  crea¬ 
tion  demonstrates  how  dangerous  it  is  for  a  being  who  has  only 
the  experience  of  a  thousand  ages,  to  indulge  in  confident  spec¬ 
ulations  respecting  what  contingencies  will  take  place  in  the 
empire  of  an  infinite  and  eternal  Being.  An  intelligent  crea¬ 
ture  who  had  observed  the  order  of  events  during  all  those  ages, 
and  who  had  presumed  dogmatically  to  predict  the  same  order 
for  all  the  future,  would  have  felt  Divinely  rebuked  by  this  un¬ 
expected  innovation  on  his  views,  and  might  have  derived  from 
it  the  salutary  lesson  that  his  limited  knowledge  was  hardly  a 
fitting  standard  with  which  to  measure  beforehand  the  contents 


ANALOGY. 


323 


of  an  unlimited  scheme.*  But  a  being  who  had  either  known 
the  earth  prior  to  the  appearance  of  vegetable  life  and  animal 
enjoyment,  or  who  ascribed  these  events  to  Divine  interposition, 
could  not  have  regarded  man’s  creation  as  an  event  incompati¬ 
ble  with  his  views  of  the  permanency  of  the  laws  of  Nature. 
Those  prior  events  would  have  prepared  him  for  it.  By  the 
law  of  analogy,  he  would  have  looked  out  for  the  coming  of  a 
wonder  transcending  all  the  past.  His  views  being  taken,  not 
from  a  bounded  interval  of  strict  uniformity,  however  long  its 
duration,  but  from  a  height  commanding  a  survey  of  the  suc¬ 
cessive  changes  which  the  earth  had  already  witnessed,  would 
have  led  him  to  anticipate  another  change,  not  as  an  exception 
to  the  true  economy  of  the  universe,  but  as  proper  to  it.  True, 
the  new-made  race  were  to  be  armed  with  unusual  powers ; 
but  when  he  saw  that  the  great  distinction  of  human  nature  lay, 
not  in  its  physical,  but  in  its  intellectual  and  moral  endowments  ; 
that  these  would  enable  it,  not  to  subvert  a  single  pre-existing 
law,  but  only  to  comprehend  and  employ  creation,  animate  and 
inanimate,  his  confidence  in  the  conditional  stability  of  Nature 
would  be  confirmed  rather  than  impaired.  Accordingly,  this 
very  stability  was  one  of  the  first  truths  which  man  himself  re¬ 
cognized,  and  on  which  he  reposed.  His  movements  assumed 
every  previous  law  of  Nature,  and  confirmed  it.  He  ascended 
his  throne  to  find  that  his  empire  admitted  of  no  re-construction 
or  change,  that  its  constitution  was  fixed,  and  that  if  he  would 
reign,  it  could  only  be  in  harmony  with  its  laws,  of  which  his 
own  nature  might  be  regarded  as  the  statute-book. 

11.  The  commencement  of  moral  government  upon  earth, 
then  —  of  the  government  by  motives  of  a  free  being  conscious¬ 
ly  accountable  for  his  actions  —  was  no  violation  of  the  great 
scheme  of  Nature.  To  say  that  nothing  identical  with  it  had 
pre-existed  on  earth,  is  only  to  object  that  the  same  thing  can¬ 
not  be  first  and  second  at  the  same  time,  or  that  a  thing  is  con¬ 
trary  to  experience  till  it  has  been  experienced.  If  this  were  an 
objection,  it  would  lie  equally  against  organic  life  and  animal  en¬ 
joyment,  for  these  also  had  to  begin.  And  as  these  repealed  no 
prior  laws,  but  were  superinduced  upon,  and  employed  them,  so 
moral  government  is  only  a  step  further  in  advance  of  a  yet  un¬ 
folding  plan.  Accordingly,  in  the  person  of  every  infant  human 
being,  these  three  stages  —  the  organic,  the  sentient,  and  the 
moral  —  may  be  seen  to  evolve  in  succession,  yet  the  third,  so 


*  Lyell’s  Geology,  ch.  ix. 


324 


MAN. 


far  from  being  regarded  as  an  innovation,  is  looked  for  as  es¬ 
sential  to  the  completion  of  the  constitution  which  includes  the 
other  two. 

12.  For  the  same  reason,  the  mere  fact  that  man  was  placed 
in  a  state  of  'probation ,  which  implies  the  presence  of  possible 
incitements  to  evil,  as  well  as  of  inducements  to  good,  was  no 
infraction  of  the  ancient  scheme  into  which  he  came.  Rather, 
as  that  plan  was  progressive,  and  exhibited  already  distinct  and 
successive  stages,  it  was  in  analogy  with  it.  Allowing,  then, 
that  moral  government  and  probation,  regarded  as  mere  addi¬ 
tions  to  a  progressive  scheme,  cannot  be  objected  to  without  in¬ 
volving  the  preceding  stages  of  creation  in  the  same  objection, 
let  us  see  whether  the  great  truths  which  they  include  are  not 
also  in  analogy  with  creation. 

13.  The  probationary  form  of  moral  government  under  which 
primeval  man  was  placed,  implied  the  perpetuity  of  his  existence. 

There  is  in  every  case  a  probability  that  all  things  will  con¬ 
tinue  as  we  experience  they  are,  in  all  respects,  except  those  in 
which  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.”* 
Now,  all  Nature  is  vocal  with  this  truth,  for  it  is  only  another 
mode  of  stating  the  uniformity  of  its  laws.  On  the  faith  of  this 
persevering  constancy,  the  first  man  tilled  the  ground.  While 
philosophy  assumes  it  as  axiomatically  true  of  motion,  that  a 
body  at  rest  will  continue  at  rest,  or  if  in  motion,  will  continue 
in  motion.  The  punishment  with  which  man  was  threatened 
affected  only  the  form  or  mode  of  his  continued  existence,  not 
its  reality.  The  sentence  which  remanded  his  body  to  the  dust, 
implies  that  all  the  rest  of  his  nature  would  survive.  The  fact 
that  a  part  existed  before  death,  and  was  untouched  by  death, 
afforded  a  presumption  that  it  would  continue  to  live  after  that 
event.  Its  changed  condition  has  its  analogies  in  Nature.  For 
it  is  a  general  law,  that  creatures  should  be  found  “  in  one  pe¬ 
riod  of  their  being  greatly  different  from  those  appointed  them 
in  another  period  of  it.”  Thus,  man’s  first  sleep  suspended  for 
awhile  his  existence,  more,  possibly,  than  it  was  in  the  power 
of  death  to  do,  and  yet  he  lived  on,  and  awoke  to  a  new  day. 
The  insect,  once  crawling  in  the  dust,  might  be  seen  emerging 
from  its  grave  and  its  shroud,  winged  to  soar  at  pleasure  into  a 
new  element.  And  the  embryo  in  the  womb,  after  passing 
through  a  succession  of  singular  transitions,  came  forth,  at 
length,  to  an  independent  existence,  in  what  was,  to  it,  the  fu- 


*  Butler,  Part  I.,  c.  i. 


ANALOGY. 


325 


tnre  state  of  this  world.  Now,  here  were  facts  more  ancient 
than  human  nature :  not,  indeed,  indicating  the  mode  of  man’s 
perpetuated  existence  • —  not  even  proving  the  certainty  of  it  — 
but  indicating  its  possibility,  and  showing  that  if  it  should  be 
proved  on  its  own  independent  evidence,  creation  abounds  with 
striking  coincidences  with  it. 

14.  Man’s  probationary  state  implied  that  his  well-being  de¬ 
pended,  in  some  measure,  at  least,  on  his  present  conduct;  and 
that,  in  relation  to  that  conduct,  he  was  endowed  with  a  self¬ 
regulating  power.  The  first  part  of  this  proposition  is  as  true 
of  the  animal  kingdom  as  it  is  of  the  human  dispensation ;  so 
that  man’s  introduction  was,  in  this  respect,  productive  of  no 
novelty.  The  second  part  of  the  proposition,  however  —  that 
man  is,  in  some  degree,  a  self-controlling  force  points  to  that 
part  of  his  constitution  which  places  him  at  the  farthest  remove 
from  Nature.  Of  the  fact  itself  there  is  no  question,  for  con¬ 
sciousness  is  ever  attesting  it.  And  our  own  constitution,  as 
subjects  of  God’s  natural  government,  teems  with  analogies  to  it. 
Youth  prepares  for  manhood,  and  manhood  for  old  age.  We 
propose  ends,  and  devise  means  for  attaining  them.  To-day  is 
a  prophecy  of  to-morrow.  Life  is  a  calculation.*  But  the 
point  of  view  which  we  occupy  does  not  allow  us  to  avail  our¬ 
selves  of  this  store  of  coincidences.  For  they  all  alike  imply 
that  self-regulating  power  which  is  the  very  property  we  have 
to  illustrate  as  being  in  harmony  with  Nature. 

Now  that  man’s  possession  of  a  causative  will  did  not  con¬ 
stitute  him  an  alien  in  creation,  or  indicate  a  departure  from  its 
plan,  appears  from  this,  that  he  can  move  only  in  a  line  with 
its  laws.  Every  infraction  of  them  is  a  self-infliction.  To 
violate  them  demonstrates,  not  their  weakness,  but  his  own  ; 
while,  to  develop  them,  is  self-development,  Further,  Nature, 
if  interrogated,  will  be  found  to  have  uttered  her  “  dark  sayings  ” 
respecting  the  antecedent  possibility  of  such  a  power.  The 
balancing  of  two  opposing  forces  —  the  centripetal  and  the  cen¬ 
trifugal  —  so  as  to  produce  a  planetary  orbit  nearly  circular, 
is  suggestive,  at  least,  of  the  possibility  of  harmonizing  depend¬ 
ence  with  freedom.  Organic  life  is  an  arrangement  of  means 
and  ends.  The  plant  has  a  constitution.  Though  dependent 
on  its  parent  seed  for  existence,  its  after-life  is  independent  of 
it.  Though  dependent  on  the  earth  for  the  maintenance  of  that 
after-life,  its  specific  individuality  is  independent.  Li  the 


*  Butler,  Part  I.,  cc.  ii.  iii.  iv.  v. 
28 


326 


MAN. 


instinctive  movements,  and  constrained  volitions,  of  animal  life, 
this  individuality  reaches  a  still  higher  point  of  development. 
If,  however,  it  be  objected  that  this  self-subsistent  individuality 
of  the  plant  and  the  animal  is  only  relative ;  that  even  in  the 
animal  there  is  no  self-consciousness,  no  freedom ;  that  the  Will, 
which  gives  it  law,  and  which  necessitates  its  obedience,  is  not 
its  own,  but  lies  without  it,  we  reply  that,  in  that  case,  we  may 
well  desist  from  looking  for  analogies  to  the  human  will,  for  we 
have  found  its  archetype.  In  seeking  for  a  copy,  we  have  dis¬ 
covered  the  Original.  And  if  the  unity  of  creation,  before  man 
came,  was  not  merely  compatible  with  the  pervading  activity  of 
the  great  originating  Will,  but  really  and  truly  dependent  on 
it,  the  introduction  by  that  will  of  its  own  image,  acting  freely 
in  harmony  with  it,  could  not  be  regarded  as  destructive  of 
that  unity.  Indeed,  in  the  human  constitution  itself  we  behold 
the  noblest  type  and  compendium  of  that  unity  —  a  free  spir¬ 
itual  power  co-existing  with  a  bodily  nature,  material,  organic, 
and  instinctive. 

15.  Man’s  probationary  state  implied  the  possibility  of  failure. 
And  the  world  into  which  he  came  contained  innumerable  anal¬ 
ogies  of  things  open  to  a  similar  possibility,  and  not  fulfilling 
the  apparent  design  of  their  being.  Thus,  there  are  few  organ¬ 
ized  beings  placed  in  such  correlation  with  every  element  and 
substance  around  them,  as  to  be  absolutely  secured  from  dis¬ 
turbance  and  destruction.  Hence,  the  multitudes  of  seeds 
which  perish  annually  without  being  sown,  and  of  embryotic 
animals,  which  never  see  the  light ;  and  of  both  plants  and  sen¬ 
tient  beings,  which  are  cut  off  before  they  reach  maturity.  It 
avails  nothing  to  say  that  the  kind  of  failure  in  the  two  cases 
is  very  different ;  for  we  are  not  seeking  identical,  but  analogous 
instances.  Neither  is  it  pertinent  to  object  that  all  the  disturb¬ 
ances  of  nature  are  the  result  of  law  ;  that  the  storm  and  the 
volcano  are  only  the  solemn  bass  of  a  universal  harmony  — 
the  destructive  earthquake,  avalanche,  and  flood,  only  the  throes 
of  forces  giving  birth  to  useful  changes,  and  working  out  bene¬ 
ficial  designs.  So,  also,  moral  changes,  though  not  necessitated, 
may  be  benignly  employed  according  to  a  plan,  and  for  the  lof¬ 
tiest  purposes.  We  are  not  now  speaking,  however,  of  the 
ultimate  ends,  or  possible  designs,  of  the  Infinite  Mind,  but  of 
the  possibilities  involved  in  the  constitution  and  condition  of  the 
creature.  And  as  the  world  into  whieh  man  came,  we  repeat, 
contained  no  life  that  was  invulnerable,  no  race  that  was  secure 
of  its  own  individual  ends ;  as  he  stood,  even  in  Paradise,  on 


ANALOGY. 


327 


the  grave  of  perished  germs,  and  destroyed  races,  and  as  all  na¬ 
ture  sympathizes  not  less  with  his  sorrows  than  with  his  joys, 
the  implied  fact  of  his  own  possibility  of  failure  found  ample 
analogical  illustration. 

16.  That  God  should  disclose  his  will  to  probationary  man  in 
a  direct  manner,  is  not  an  event  so  antecedently  improbable  as 
to  disturb  or  destroy  the  unity  of  the  system  into  which  man 
came.  Unless  the  Divine  Energy  be  supposed  to  have  ex¬ 
hausted  itself  in  the  creation  of  man,  the  Power  which  pro¬ 
duced  such  a  result  cannot  be  regarded  as  incapable  of  perform¬ 
ing  other  miraculous  acts.  Unless  it  be  supposed  that  man  was 
created  without  any  design,  that  design  may  require  that  other 
miracles  should  subsequently  be  wrought  in  harmony  with  that 
primary  miracle,  and  tending  to  the  same  result.  This  would 
certainly  appear  to  be  the  part  of  Wisdom.  And,  unless  it 
could  be  shown  that  no  beneficent  provision  whatever  was  origi¬ 
nally  made  for  human  happiness,  the  existence  of  such  provi¬ 
sion  would  seem  to  warrant  the  conclusion,  that  if  it  would  be 
more  for  the  well-being  of  man  subsequently  to  enlarge  that 
provision  than  not  to  do  so,  it  would  be  worthy  of  Goodness  so 
to  enlarge  it.  If  it  be  objected  that  the  direct  communication 
of  the  Divine  will  was  miraculous,  we  reply  that,  in  the  same 
sense,  every  other  provision  for  man’s  welfare  had  been,  at  the 
time  of  its  origination,  miraculous  also ;  that  is,  it  had  been  un¬ 
known  to  the  previous  course  of  nature.  So  that,  as  to  its 
miraculous  character,  the  first  revelation  was  in  strict  analogy 
with  every  prior  arrangement  for  man’s  well-being.  The  truth 
is,  however,  as  Butler  well  remarks,  that  “  there  is  no  such 
presumption  against  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world, 
as  is  supposed  to  be  implied  in  the  word  miraculous.  For  a 
miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course  of  nature,  and 
implies  somewhat  different  from  it.  Now,  either  there  was  no 
course  of  nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of,  or,  if 
there  were,  we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is 
upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore,  the  question 
whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to  them  at  that  time  is 
to  be  considered,  not  as  a  question  concerning  a  miracle,  but 
as  a  common  question  of  fact.”  *  Moreover,  the  tendency  of 
the  revelation  was  in  perfect  analogy  with  the  design  of  the 
entire  system  of  animal  instincts.  The  office  of  these  is  to 
place  and  maintain  the  different  parts  and  powers  of  the  animal 


*  Analogy,  Part  II.,  c.  ii. 


328 


MAN. 


in  harmonious  relation  with  all  their  appropriate  external  ob¬ 
jects  ;  and  the  tendency  of  the  first  command  was  to  apprise 
man’s  will  that  its  only  proper  object  was  the  Divine  Will,  and 
to  preserve  its  happy  subordination.  The  truth  which  they 
both  taught  was  essentially  the  same  —  that  the  will  of  God  is 
supreme. 

17.  Even  the  difficulties  involved  in  man’s  moral  probation 
are  not  without  their  analogies  in  nature.  The  very  fact  that 
he  encounters  mystery  at  almost  every  step  in  the  domain  of 
nature,  prepares  him  to  expect  mystery  in  the  department  of 
moral  government  also.  However  welcome  to  him,  therefore, 
the  assurance  might  be  that  this  government  was  of  a  kind  to 
involve  no  mystery  whatever,  he  could  not  receive  such  an 
assurance  without  strong  suspicion.  It  would  be  out  of  analogy 
with  nature. 

Further,  the  difficulties  in  the  tw^o  departments  are  very  sim¬ 
ilar  in  kind.  In  both,  we  find  effects  resulting  from  means  ap¬ 
parently  inadequate.  Consequences  unspeakably  momentous 
to  the  first  man  are  made  to  depend  on  his  obedience  to  a  sim¬ 
ple  law  ;  and  who  would  have  supposed,  a  'priori ,  that  an  insig¬ 
nificant  coral  insect  would  be  the  means  of  building  up  large 
islands  from  the  bottom  of  the  ocean,  which  may  not  unlikely 
be  hereafter  united  into  one  vast  continent,  affecting  the  oceanic 
and  climatic  influences  of  half  the  globe,  and  modifying  the 
character  of  nations  ?  In  both,  ends  the  most  desirable  are 
brought  about  by  means  in  themselves  undesirable :  for  if  it 
would  have  appeared  antecedently  objectionable  that  the  trial 
and  failure  of  man’s  virtue  should  be  made  the  occasion  of  sub¬ 
sequently  advancing  his  well-being,  it  seems  also  antecedently 
undesirable  that  a  succession  of  natural  convulsions  should  be 
employed  to  ameliorate  the  earth’s  surface  for  man’s  arrival ; 
that  deadly  poisons  should  be  inserted  among  the  treasures  of 
nature,  and  yet  they  are  convertible  into  powerful  antidotes ; 
that  the  death  of  the  vegetable  should  be  the  means  of  life  to 
the  animal ;  and  that  the  inferior  animal  should  form  the  neces¬ 
sary  support  of  the  superior  animal. 

Or,  if  it  be  said  that  mystery  was  not  to  have  been  expected 
in  the  department  of  moral  government,  we  reply,  that  such  a 
notion  may  only  show  our  incompetency,  to  form  antecedent 
expectations  respecting  it ;  for  that,  in  the  same  way,  no  one 
could  have  anticipated  the  planetary  perturbations,  and  yet  they 
are  found  to  correct  themselves ;  or  that  mathematics,  the  sci¬ 
ence  of  demonstration  would  teem  with  mysteries  and  contra- 


ANALOGY. 


329 


dictions ;  *  that  the  arguments  for  the  infinite  divisibility  of 
matter,  and  for  its  not  being  infinitely  divisible,  would  be  both 
unanswerable  taken  apart,  and  yet  would  answer  one  another  ; 
or  that  if  we  are  to  see  objects  erect  they  would  be  inverted  on 
the  retina ;  or  that  if  man  is  to  be  superior  to  the  brute,  his 
intellect  should  yet  be,  in  some  respects,  inferior  to  instinct ;  or 
that  a  capacity  for  pleasure  should  be  in  the  same  degree  a  ca¬ 
pacity  for  pain.f  Or,  if  it  be  objected  that  the  difficulties  in  the 
moral  department  exceed  those  of  any  prior  stage  of  creation, 
we  reply,  that  the  law  of  analogy  requires  it ;  for  the  sentient 
creation  presents  greater  mysteries  than  the  vegetable,  and  the 
vegetable  than  the  inorganic.  Each  new  stage  presupposes  all 
the  difficulties  which  preceded  it,  and  adds  others  peculiar  to 
itself.  Besides,  that  moral  truths  “  should  exhibit  greater 
eccentricity  from  the  orbit  which  reason  would  mark  out  for 
them,  and  that  they  should  more  peremqfforily  disclaim  to  be 
measured  by  the  rules  of  arbitrary  hypothesis,  is  what  may 
reasonably  be  attributed  to  the  illimitable  regions  in  which  they 
expatiate.”  j 

And  the  occasion  of  the  difficulties  in  the  two  departments 
appears  to  be  analogous  also.  In  our  examination  of  the  pre- 
adamite  earth  we  saw  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  a  scheme 
too  vast  for  our  comprehension.  “  The  subtilty  of  nature  (re¬ 
marks  Bacon)  far  surpasses  the  subtilty  of  either  sense  or 
intellect.”  Everything  is  related  to  everything.  But  if  we  take 
any  one  event  as  central,  and  look  back  in  the  direction  from 
which  it  came,  we  soon  arrive  at  a  point  which  compels  us  to 
stop,  but  where  something  invisible  and  unknown  must  be  pre¬ 
supposed,  in  order  to  account  for  its  existence  ;  if,  then,  we  look 
forwards  in  the  direction  in  which  it  is  travelling,  we  see  that 
there  is  no  end  to  its  effects,  though  it  soon  passes  into  a  domain, 
where  we  have  no  power  to  follow  it ;  while,  in  both  directions, 
we  see  it,  in  its  progress,  touching  innumerable  other  things  on 
the  right  hand  and  on  the  left,  or  touched  by  them,  all  of  which 
are  similarly  charged  with  influences  interminable.  Now,  it  is 
highly  credible  that,  in  a  similar  manner,  the  difficulties  and 
mysteries  we  encounter  in  our  contemplation  of  man  as  a  sub¬ 
ject  of  moral  government,  are  owing  to  our  imperfect  compre¬ 
hension  of  it.  We  never  see  more  than  a  small  portion  of  it. 

*  See  Dr.  Henry  More’s  t;  Antidote  to  Atheism,”  pp.  13  — 151. 

t  Platon.  Phsedon,  136. 

X  Dr.  Hampden’s  Essay  on  the  Phil.  Evid.  of  Christianity,  p.  109. 

*  28* 


330 


MAN. 


Th '  perplexities  belong  to  the  subject,  not  to  the  object ;  to  the 
necessary  limitation  of  the  creature,  and  not  to  anything  inhe¬ 
rently  inexplicable  in  the  acts  of  the  Creator.  This  appears 
still  more  credible  when  it  is  remembered,  that  the  two  classes 
of  difficulties  are,  as  we  have  seen,  in  various  respects,  akin ; 
and,  especially,  that  the  moral  scheme  transcends  the  natural 
constitution,  and  takes  us  far  beyond  it.  And  so,  also,  from  the 
fact  that,  in  the  natural  scheme,  means  apparently  undesirable 
are  found,  by  experience,  conducive  to  ends  productive  of  a 
large  overbalance  of  happiness,  it  is  highly  credible  that  the  same 
is  true,  of  means  and  ends  in  the  moral  scheme.  The  vindica¬ 
tion  of  this  scheme,  however,  is  not,  at  present,  our  object,  but 
only  to  point  out  such  analogies  between  it  and  the  natural 
scheme  as  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  they  are  only  connected 
parts  of  the  same  great  plan. 

This  is  the  principle  of  Butler’s  immortal  Analogy.  “  Origen 
(he  remarks)  has,  with  singular  sagacity,  observed,  that  ‘he 
who  believes  the  Scriptures  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who  is 
the  Author  of  nature,  may  well  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of 
difficulties  in  it  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of  nature.’  And, 
in  a  like  way  of  reflection,  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who  denies 
the  Scripture  to  have  been  from  God  upon  account  of  these  dif¬ 
ficulties,  may  for  the  very  same  reason  deny  the  world  to  have 
been  formed  by  Him.”  Admitting  then,  the  system  of  nature 
to  be  of  Divine  origination,  the  analogies  which  exist  between 
it  and  the  moral  scheme  to  which  man  belongs,  warrant  the  con¬ 
clusion  that  they  are  more  than  analogically  related,*  that  “  they 
make  up  together  but  one  scheme,”  of  which  the  natural  is  car¬ 
ried  on  in  subserviency  to  the  moral  administration. 

18.  Now,  if  the  distinct  and  successive  parts  of  the  creation 
constitute  one  entire  whole,  the  various  objects  which  it  includes 
must  admit  of  scientific  classification.  But  what  principle  shall 
we  take  as  the  basis  of  our  classification ;  the  objective,  or  the 
objects  which  the  mind  has  to  classify ;  the  subjective,  or  the 
faculties  of  the  classifying  mind  itself ;  the  ideas  which  each 
department  of  knowledge  involves  ;  or  any  other  principle  ? 

*  “  To  him  (says  the  wonderful  Roger  Bacon  —  Doctor  Mirabilis  —  in 
his  Opus  Majus ,  p.  476) — to  him  who  denies  the  truth  of  the  faith  be¬ 
cause  he  is  unable  to  understand  it,  I  will  propose  in  reply  the  course  of 
nature.  .  .  .  For  if,  in  the  meanest  objects  of  creation,  truths  are  found 
before  which  the  mental  pride  of  man  must  bow,  and  which  he  must  be¬ 
lieve  though  he  cannot  understand,  how  much  more  should  man  humble 
his  mind  before  the  glorious  truths  of  God.”  See  also  “  Bishop  Browne’s 
Divine  Analogy.” 


ANALOGY. 


331 


And  having  selected  the  principle,  and  applied  it,  so  as  to  have 
parcelled  out  our  knowledge  into  sciences,  the  order  into  which 
these  parts  shall  be  distributed  has  still  to  be  determined.  The 
basis  does  not  necessarily  disclose  the  dependence,  or  supply 
the  arrangement,  of  the  sciences.  Thus,  Lord  Bacon,  assuming 
the  subjective  basis,  distributed  knowledge  into  branches  an¬ 
swering  to  memory,  imagination,  and  reason ;  but  D’Alembert, 
while  adopting  the  principle  of  Bacon’s  partition,  changes  the 
order  of  the  distribution  by  placing  reason  before  the  imagina¬ 
tion.*  This  order  of  succession  has  been  made  to  depend,,  gen¬ 
erally  speaking,  on  the  fact  whether  the  method  followed  has 
been  that  of  the  order  of  discovery  and  historical  progress,  in 
which  art  usually  precedes  science ;  or  that  of  the  order  of  phi¬ 
losophical  exposition  and  instruction,  in  which  scientific  reasons 
and  principles  precede  their  practical  application. 

19.  The  point  of  view  from  which  we  are  enabled  to  look  at 
the  subject,  presents  us  with  the  basis  and  the  order  of  both 
methods,  shows  them  in  harmonious  combination,  and  accounts 
for  their  existence.  For,  first,  as  to  the  basis  of  classification, 
it  presents  us  with  the  subjective  principle,  according  to  which 
the  Creator  is  seen  proceeding  from  the  logical  to  the  chrono¬ 
logical,  from  ideas  to  laws,  from  the  general  to  the  particular, 
from  the  possible  to  the  actual,  in  the  successively  enlarging 
spheres  of  matter,  life,  sense,  and  reason ;  a  series  in  which  man 
takes  his  place  as  one  of  the  consecutive  means  by  which  the 
Infinite  is  pleased  to  expound  His  own  nature.  Now  this  is  a 
basis  of  arrangement,  it  will  be  observed,  which  prescribes  and 
includes  its  own  order  of  distribution.  God,  nature,  man ;  the 
order  is  settled.  According  to  this  classification,  we  have 

Fundamental  ideas.  Sciences.  Classification. 

Substance  ....  Metaphysics  .  .  Essential  Being. 

Space  and  Time  .  .  Mathematics  .  .  Quantity,  or  conditions  el 


dependent  being. 


Cause,  or  Power  .  . 


(  Phvtonomy  .  .  \  ^  .  ,  ,->  .. 

I  Botany  .  .  .  .  f  Organized  Boies. 


Design,  or  Wisdom  . 
Goodness  .  .  .  . 


Rightness 


*  Disc.  Prelim. 

t  Each  of  these  iivisions  easily  admits  of  subdivision.  The  partial  re- 


332 


MAN. 


20.  Such  arr  the  principle  and  tne  order  according  to  which 
we  conceive  of  science  as  present  to  the  Divine  Mind.  But  in 
first  studying  and  exploring  it  for  himself,  man  has  to  pursue 
the  reverse  course.  As  a  being  to  whom,  as  well  as  by  whom, 
the  Divine  manifestation  is  made,  he  proceeds  from  the  objec¬ 
tive  to  the  subjective,  from  facts  to  principles,  from  the  chrono¬ 
logical  to  the  logical,  which  is,  at  every  step,  presupposed. 
Thus,  if  nature  be  his  study,  starting  from  the  point  where  his 
own  mind  and  nature  touch  —  where  sense-perception  gives  him 
the  knowledge  of  external  existence  —  he  finds  that  these  ex¬ 
ternal  phenomena  presuppose  laws,  and  illustrate  them;  and 
that  these  again  presuppose  certain  principles,  or  ideas,  without 
which  he  feels  that  all  reasoning  would  be  impossible.  We 
say,  he  finds,  and  he  feels ;  and  if  next  he  looks  into  this  find¬ 
ing  and  feeling  being  —  himself  —  the  order  of  his  psychological 
investigation  is  still  the  same.  Proceeding,  that  is,  from  the 
point  where  his  mental  contact  with  the  external  world  awa¬ 
kens  him  to  sensation,  he  finds,  on  turning  back  upon  himself, 
that  his  mental  phenomena  are  amenable  to  inherent  laws,  and 
that,  as  an  intellectual  being,  those  laws  necessarily  presuppose 
certain  fundamental  and  primary  ideas.  This  is  the  order  of 
the  mind’s  progress  in  knowledge,  alike  with  the  unaided  indi¬ 
vidual,  and  with  a  nation  emerging  from  ignorance  to  the  light 
of  philosophy.  And  thus  man  finds  himself  returning  by  induc¬ 
tion  to  the  region  of  deduction ;  ascending  an  intellectual  lad¬ 
der,  which  reaches  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  from  earth  to 
heaven.  And  having  reached  the  domain  of  primary  truth  and 
independent  being,  he  sees  why  it  is  that  we  conceive  of  the 
Divine  mind  as  proceeding  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective, 
or  from  the  logical  to  the  chronological,  in  the  order  spoken  of 
above ;  because  the  human  mind  is  made  in  the  image  of  the 
Divine,  and  is,  when  it  attains  to  that  conception,  simply  re¬ 
uniting  itself  intellectually,  however  imperfectly,  with  the  Di¬ 
vine,  and  viewing  objects  from  the  same  point.  Henceforth, 
(though  his  method  of  learning  and  of  verification  is,  and  must 
be,  from  facts  to  principles)  his  method  of  philosophizing  and 
exhibiting  knowledge  is  one  with  that  of  the  Author  of  nature. 


semblance  of  the- third  column  of  this  tabular  arrangement  to  M.  Comte’s 
Tableau  Synoptique  in  his  Cours  de  Philosophie  positive ,  makes  it  proper 
for  me  to  state  that  it  existed  before  I  had  any  knowledge  of  his  classifi¬ 
cation.  Indeed,  a  moment’s  consideration  will  show  that  it  not  only  flows 
natu  rally  from  the  order  which  my  subject  prescribes,  but  is  absolutely 
required  by  it. 


ANALOGY. 


333 


Hence  Aristotle,  not  less  than  Plato,  regarded  metaphysics  as 
coming  after  physics  in  the  order  of  study,  hut  as  prior  in  the 
order  of  science,  representing  it  as  the  First  Philosophy  arftl 
the  Universal  Science,  common  to  all  the  sciences.*  And  Lord 
Bacon  speaks  of  this  Prima  Philosophia  as  the  root  or  stock 
out  of  which  the  other  parts  of  knowledge  shoot  into  separate 
branches.f  Science  results  from  the  combination  of  the  two 
methods  —  the  analytical,  which  must  guide  our  studies  of  na¬ 
ture,  and  by  which  we  ascend  from  effects  to  causes ;  and  the 
synthetical,  which  appears  in  the  ivories  of  nature,  and  by  which 
God  is  beheld  descending  from  causes  to  effects. 

21.  It  may  now  be  proper  to  call  attention  to  the  character¬ 
istics  of  the  classification  which  we  have  adopted.  First,  start¬ 
ing  with  the  idea  or  belief  of  a  necessarily-existing  and  inde¬ 
pendent  Being,  and  with  the  conditions  of  dependent  being,  we 
have  regarded  the  successive  stages  of  dependent  being  as 
based,  respectively,  on  the  ideas  of  power,  and  wisdom,  and 
goodness,  and  holiness ;  in  other  words,  of  cause,  design,  benev¬ 
olence,  and  rectitude.  Secondly,  these  general  ideas,  which  in¬ 
clude  numerous  subordinate  ones,  proceed  from  the  more  simple 
to  the  less,  or  rather  from  the  most  simple  —  that  of  an  Infinite 
Being  —  to  the  regularly-increasing  complex.  For,  thirdly, 
each  science  in  the  succession  supposes  the  preceding  science  or 
sciences.  Thus  the  mathematical  science  presupposes  a  scien¬ 
tial  mind  —  a  mind  cognizant  of  the  unalterable  relations  of 
space  and  number  which  constitute  the  scientific  conditions  of 
an  actual  creation ;  the  science  of  unorganized  bodies  presup¬ 
poses  the  mathematical  and  metaphysical  sciences ;  the  science 
of  organized  bodies  presupposes  that  of  unorganized  matter; 
and  so  of  the  rest.  Thus,  fourthly,  the  arrangement  is,  in  effect, 
circular ;  the  science  of  mind,  Of  which  the  laws  of  human  de¬ 
velopment  in  families  and  communities  are  but  a  further  un¬ 
folding  or  illustration,  remanding  us  to  “  the  F ather  of  spirits,” 
whose  manifested  and  revealed  relations  give  us  Theology. 
And,  fifthly,  this  arrangement  is  in  harmony  with  that  Revela¬ 
tion  which  is  a  transcript  of  the  Divine  Mind,  and,  as  such,  finds 
its  reason  in  Him  whose  nature  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  all 
things. 

22.  But  we  have  seen  that  man,  besides  being  intelligent,  is 
also  an  emotional,  voluntary,  and  moral  being.  As  intelligent, 


*  Metaph.,  lib.  i.,  c.  2 ;  lib.  iv.,  c.  1 ;  lib.  vi.,  c.  i. 
f  De  Augm.  Scient.  lib.  iii.  c.  1. 


384 


MAN. 


his  sensational  perceptions  place  him  in  relation  to  the  bare 
phenomena  of  the  external  world,  to  the  contingent ,  giving  us 
ifnconnected  facts ;  his  reflective  understanding  gives  him  the 
relations  of  these  phenomena,  as  the  probable ,  in  the  sense  of 
the  inductively  proveable,  or  the  experimental  sciences;  his 
reason  gives  him  their  ultimate  relations,  as  the  necessary,  or 
deductive  philosophy ;  and,  as  the  actual  is  necessarily  limited, 
while  the  ideas  which  it  embodies  are  unlimited,  his  imagina¬ 
tion  gives  him  the  possible,  or  that  which  might  be  :  as  emotion¬ 
al,  he  is  placed  in  relation  to  the  agreeable  and  desirable,  or  that 
which,  in  harmony  with  the  general  constitution  of  things,  should 
be :  as  voluntary,  he  is  related  to  the  practicable,  or  that  which 
can  be ;  these  latter  three  giving  us  the  arts  esthetic  and  use¬ 
ful  :  and,  as  endowed  with  conscience,  he  stands  related  to  the 
moral  in  the  largest  and  highest  sense,  or  that  which,  in  har¬ 
mony  with  immutable  right,  ought  to  be. 

And  here,  first,  again,  the  order  is  from  the  most  simple  to 
the  complex  —  from  thought  to  emotion,  from  emotion  to  volun¬ 
tary  action,  and  from  action,  right  in  the  lower  relation  of  man 
to  the  constitution  of  things,  to  action  right  also  in  its  higher  re¬ 
lation  to  the  Author  of  that  constitution.  For,  secondly,  (as 
we  have  shown  in  the  chapter  on  Order)  the  order  of  succes¬ 
sion  is  the  order  of  dependence  —  the  second  implying  the  first, 
the  third  implying  the  preceding  two,  and  the  fourth  presup¬ 
posing  them  all.  So  also,  regarding  man  as  a  voluntary  being 
influenced  by  motives,  his  instincts  and  jmssions,  which  connect 
him  with  the  irrational  creation,  imply  his  sensational  percep¬ 
tions  merely ;  his  self-love,  winch  individualizes  him  as  a  being 
having  an  end  of  his  own,  implies  his  rational  powers  and  his 
appropriate  emotions;  his  benevolent  affections,  which  place 
him  in  relation  to  the  human  race,  imply  the  preceding,  and  his 
impartative  emotions  also ;  and  his  sense  of  obligation,  which 
places  him  in  relation  to  immutable  Perfection,  implies  all  the 
elements  included  in  the  other  classes  of  motives.  The  same 
order  of  succession  and  dependence  appears,  if  we  look  at  man 
in  his  relation  to  the  great  end.  His  knowledge  of  God  implies 
intelligence,  including  imagination,  to  which  the  infinitude  of  the 
subject  pre-eminently  appeals.  His  appreciation  of  the  Divine 
excellence  implies  his  emotional  nature,  which  looks  back  to  his 
knowledge.  His  acceptable  obedience  implies  freedom  of  will, 
which  looks  back  to  his  emotions.  And  his  holy  enjoyment  of 
God  implies  that  power  of  moral  approbation  which  presup¬ 
poses  all  the  rest,  though  it  i.c  something  added  to  them.  And 


ANALOGY. 


335 


thus,  thirdly,  whether  we  take  man’s  nature  in  its  totality, 
or  in  its  intellectual,  or  its  practical  relations,  or  in  respect 
to  its  final  purpose,  the  same  order  of  succession  and  de¬ 
pendence  invariably  lands  us  at  that  point  where  he  is  seen 
reflecting  the  Divine  image,  and  partaking  of  the  Divine  nature  ; 
and  from  whence  he  is  meant  to  re-act,  armed  with  the  influence 
of  the  Divine  government,  on  all  the  subordinate  parts  of  his 
constitution.  Nor,  fourthly,  is  the  science  of  human  nature  less 
based  on  a  fundamental  idea  than  are  the  sciences  of  external 
nature.  The  idea  of  Perfection  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  our 
psychological  investigations ;  and  of  this  idea,  Law,  Truth  and 
Beauty,  Right  and  Obligation,  Personality  and  Immortality,  are 
only  correlative  forms  modified  according  to  man’s  different  re¬ 
lations.  Ideas  of  Spirit  and  Cause,  Design  and  Happiness,  too, 
are  suggested  by  the  phenomena  of  his  own  nature,  identical 
with  those  suggested  by  his  study  of  the  external  universe ;  for 
man’s  constitution  includes  a  summary  of  nature.  But  as  it  is 
in  man  that  the  Creator  has  been  pleased  to  reflect  his  moral 
image,  the  idea  of  Perfection  underlies  all  his  self-investiga¬ 
tions. 

23.  But  if  this  classification  places  the  first,  or  individual 
man,  at  the  head  of  the  creation,  the  same  theory  applied  to 
collective  man  would  assign  to  every  member  of  the  human 
family  “  his  own  place.”  Here,  indeed,  a  subject  of  immeasu¬ 
rable  compass,  and  of  the  highest  interest,  opens  to  view.  In 
our  application  of  the  principle  to  the  three  stages  of  nature  — 
inorganic,  organic,  and  sentient  —  we  saw  that  it  distributes  the 
phenomena  of  each  stage  according  to  the  order  of  progressive 
nature,  taken  in  connection  with  the  relative  importance  of  the 
progressive  steps ;  and  we  saw  that  each  advancing  stage,  by 
presenting  additional  phenomena,  multiplied  the  points  of  com¬ 
parison,  and  thus  increased  our  means  of  classification,  and  our 
powers  of  testing  the  truth  of  such  classification.  But  the  new 
characteristics  which  the  human  species  presents  augment  the 
points  of  comparison  between  the  different  members  of  the  race 
indefinitely.  If  the  twenty-six  letters  of  the  alphabet  admit  of 
combinations  in  words  and  sentences,  which  all  the  books  writ¬ 
ten,  and  all  the  sounds  hitherto  uttered  by  man,  leave  compara¬ 
tively  undiminished,  how  unimaginable  must  be  the  combina¬ 
tions  of  which  the  alphabet  or  elements  of  human  nature  admit, 
especially  when  these  are  multiplied  by  all  the  possible  varie¬ 
ties  of  man’s  external  condition  !  To  say  that  no  two  men  of 
all  the  myriads  that  have  lived  have  been  precisely  alike,  would 


336 


31  AN. 


amount  to  little.  %  The  possible  diversities  of  which  humanity 
admits  are  hardly  as  yet  numerically  diminished  to  any  sensible 
amount,  and  could  be  exhausted  by  no  conceivable  number  of 
generations,  and  within  no  computable  tract  of  time.  Yet  the 
scientific  distribution  of  the  whole  is  possible. 

24.  According  to  the  method  which  our  theory  prescribes, 
1,  the  classification  of  men  is  to  be  made  from  a  calculation  and 
comparison  of  all  the  elements  which  the  human  constitution  in¬ 
cludes — from  the  lowest  mechanical  law  and  chemical  property 
to  its  highest  moral  perfection.  Not  a  single  property,  organ,  or 
faculty  is  to  be  passed  over  as  unimportant.  2.  It  ranges  the 
characteristic  properties  of  human  nature  on  a  graduated  scale, 
according  to  which  the  value  of  each  property  rises  as  it  ap¬ 
proaches  man’s  highest  distinction.  3.  It  requires  that  each 
group  or  class  of  men  shall  be  formed  of  such  individuals  only  as 
resemble  each  other  more  than  they  resemble  any  other  human 
beings,  or,  as  have  the  greatest  number  of  important  properties 
in  common.  4.  It  provides  not  only  for  the  formation  of  men 
into  classes,  but  also  for  the  arrangement  of  these  classes  in  an 
ascending  series,  ranging  according  to  the  ideal  of  human  per¬ 
fection  ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  it  recognizes  degrees  of  value  or 
intensity  in  the  main  characteristics  of  the  human  economy. 
Consequently,  the  affinity  of  man  to  man  is  to  be  regarded  as 
nearest,  when  the  resemblance  lies  between  those  characteristics 
which  are  of  the  highest  value. 

25.  According  to  this  method,  then,  the  highest  generalization 
of  which  man  admits,  is  that  which  places  him  according  to  his 
moral  character.  For  wre  cannot  here  say,  as  we  did  when 
speaking  of  the  classification  of  mere  organic  bodies,  that  an 
arrangement  correctly  formed  on  one  function  will  harmonize 
with  an  arrangement  correctly  formed  on  another  function. 
This  is  true,  indeed,  of  man  considered  merely  as  an  organic 
being.  But  he  has  more  than  organic  functions ;  and  among 
these  higher  faculties,  disturbance  and  derangement  exist.  If 
we  class  the  members  of  the  human  family  according  to  their 
physiological  relations,  we  obtain  resemblances  of  color,  and 
physical  conformation,  and  adopt  family  and  national  ties.  If 
they  are  classed  according  to  their  knowledge,  or  their  progress 
in  civilization,  the  prior  arrangement  may  have  to  be  almost 
entirely  broken  up,  and  parties  to  be  brought  together  which 
had  before  been  separated ;  and  a  union  is  formed  of  a  higher 
order  still.  If  classed  according  to  their  emotional  nature  — 
their  tastes  and  wishes,  and  affections  —  a  new  arrangement  is 


CHANGE. 


337 


formed,  and  a  stronger  compact  still.  But  if,  now,  those  ’were 
to  be  selected  who,  besides  believing  the  same  truths,  and  ap¬ 
proving  the  same  objects,  were  bent  on  pursuing  them  from  an 
enlightened  sense  of  duty  to  God,  and  from  the  deep  feeling 
that  their  endless  well-being  depended  on  attaining  them,  we 
should  have  formed  a  class  united  together  by  the  closest,  high¬ 
est,  and  most  enduring  affinities  of  which  we  can  conceive. 
This,  we  are  Divinely  assured,  will  form  the  basis  of  the  great, 
the  final,  classification  of  our  race.  Owing,  indeed,  to  the  ele¬ 
ments  of  responsibility  which  our  nature  includes,  no  two  even 
of  this  best  and  highest  class  present  precisely  the  same  aspect 
to  the  Divine  government,  or  stand  in  exactly  the  same  relation 
to  it.  For,  in  order  accurately  to  determine  that  relation,  the 
original  constitution,  physical,  mental,  and  moral,  of  each,  and 
of  all  his  subsequent  external  circumstances,  must  be  taken  into 
account.  And  thus  it  happens  that  the  very  minuteness  and 
multiplicity  of  the  points  of  comparison  by  which  each  man  will 
be  made  to  “  stand  in  his  lot  at  the  end  of  the  days,”  takes  the 
work  of  actual  classification  out  of  our  incompetent  hands  — 
leaving  us  only  to  ‘‘judge  ourselves”  individually  —  and  refers 
the  ultimate  generalization  of  the  race  to  Omniscience.  But  of 
that  “  number  which  no  man  can  number,”  the  first  man  had 
now  appeared — the  model  and  father  of  the  species  ;  and  of  that 
final  judgment  the  first  foreshadowing  was  about  to  appear’  in 
his  Divine  arraignment. 


CHAPTER  XVm. 

CHAN'GE, 

1.  Will  man  fall  ?  From  the  moment  in  which  he  became 
the  subject  of  moral  government,  this  was,  not  unlikely,  the 
great  question  of  the  intelligent  universe.  Consequences  were 
depending  on  it,  the  least  glimpse  of  which  must  have  thrown 
the  mere  physical  disruption  of  a  planet,  or  of  a  system  of  worlds, 
into  the  shade.  Among  the  means  for  forming  an  antecedent 
conjecture  on  the  subject,  one  was,  the  fact  that  man  came  into 
a  system  of  things  which  was  already  subject  to  a  law  of  change. 
His  lot  was  cast  on  the  fine  of  progress  at  a  time  when  succes¬ 
sive  races  of  animal  life  already  belonged  to  the  silence  of  the 

29 


338 


MAN. 


past,  *and  when  even  the  last  trace  of  the  existence  of  many  of 
them  had  perished.  He  had  joined  the  march  of  creation  at  a 
point  when  the  worlds  of  the  dinotherium  and  the  mastodon  had 
passed  away,  and  their  very  sepulchres  had  been  buried.  His 
own  body  came  from  their  dust.  Parts  of  his  physical  structure 
commemorated  theirs.  The  air  he  breathed  had  been  exhaled 
by  the  giant  ferns  and  ancient  palm  forests  then  lying  deep  ana 
fossilized  in  the  crust  of  the  earth.  The  tree  of  life  had  its  roots 
in  a  grave.  The  dew  which  “  watered  the  whole  face  of  the 
ground,”  had  glittered  in  the  light  of  former  worlds.  Traces  of 
a  recent  chaos  and  creation  were  around  him.  His  own  exist¬ 
ence  was  the  latest  illustration  of  the  law  of  change. 

True,  the  planetary  changes  which  had  preceded  his  coming 
were  all  physical  and  progressive ;  whereas  the  change  which 
our  question  contemplates  as  possible  in  man,  is  of  a  moral 
nature,  and  threatens  to  arrest  all  subsequent  progress.  But 
a  second  fact  was,  that  some  members  of  another  race  of 
intelligent  beings,  inhabiting  another  part  of  the  universe,  had 
actually  fallen  from  “  their  first  estate.”  On  the  supposition, 
then,  that  man  and  they  were  both  comprehended  in  one 
scheme,  he  had  come  into  the  more  advanced  part  of  a  system 
subject  to  moral  derangement  as  well  as  to  physical  revolution. 
Thirdly,  we  have  seen  that  the  freedom  with  which  he  is  en¬ 
dowed  implies  the  power  and  possibility  of  sinning.  However 
great  or  little  his  actual  liability  to  sin  may  be,  the  danger  is 
not  metaphysically  impossible.  The  same  fearful  possibility 
is  pointed  at,  fourthly,  by  the  susceptibilities  of  penitence, 
endurance,  and  compassion  which  his  nature  encloses.  Not 
that  sin  was  to  be  looked  for  as  if  for  the  sake  of  developing 
these  remedial  properties;  but  still  they  appeared  to  contemplate 
the  possibility  of  sin,  and  to  form  a  subjective  provision  for 
such  an  alternative.  And,  fifthly,  it  might  have  been  surmised 
that  the  sinful  invasion  of  moral  government  as  newly  set  up  on 
earth,  would  form  a  grand  occasion  for  the  display  of  the  Divine 
all-sufficiency.  Not,  indeed,  that  the  bare  possibility  of  sin 
would  be  converted  into  a  necessity  expressly  to  afford  such  an 
occasion ;  but  that  the  evil  would  not  be  arbitrarily  prevented ; 
and  that  it  might  not  have  been  conceivable  how,  except  on  the 
hypothesis  of  some  such  a  change,  any  new  occasion  would 
arise  for  a  further  development  of  the  Divine  resources.  These 
were  some  of  the  elements  which  might  have  entered  into  an 
antecedent  conjecture  respecting  the  probability  of  human 
defection. 


CHANGE. 


339 


2.  Will  this  stage  of  the  Divine  procedure  be  sooner  or  later 
succeeded  by  another  ?  As  the  previous  question  related  to 
human  conduct,  this  respects  the  plan  of  the  Divine  operations, 
and,  as  such,  reminds  us  that  progression  is  a  law  of  the  plan. 
For,  were  the  scheme  of  the  Divine  procedure  to  terminate  at 
any  given  point,  the  proof  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency  for  un¬ 
limited  manifestation  would  terminate  with  it.  Nor  can  we 
imagine  ourselves  to  have  surveyed  the  advancing  stages  of 
creation  up  to  the  coming  of  man,  without  more  than  suspecting 
that  we  had  been  looking  on  the  successive  steps  of  a  scene 
preparatory  for  a  new  stage  of  the  Divine  procedure.  Whether 
from  an  investigation  of  human  nature,  we  should  have  inferred 
that  the  occasion  for  that  new  stage  would  be  probably  derived 
from  man’s  defection  or  not,  everything  antecedent  in  the  Di¬ 
vine  procedure  would  have  been  seen  combining  to  point  to  a 

coming  enlargement  of  the  manifestation. 

©  © 

3.  Thus  we  come  to  the  great  principle  that  the  law  of  pro¬ 
gression  is  itself  regulated  by  a  law  determining  the  time  and 
manner  of  each  successive  stage  of  the  advancing  process.  Even 
those  who  advocate  the  hypothesis  of  the  creative  progress  by  a 
law  of  natural  development,  cannot  consistently  entertain  any 
valid  objection  against  this  principle.  If  they  admit  that  the 
law  had  a  Lawgiver,  they  must  allow  that  every  stage  of  its 
development  was  prospectively  included  in  his  plan,  and  that, 
for  the  same  reason  that  any  stage  was  designed  to  occur  at  all, 
there  must  have  been  a  right  time  for  its  occurrence,  or  a  reason 
which  made  the  period  of  its  actual  occurrence  the  right  period. 
The  law  with  which  we  have  now  to  do  respects  the  nature  of 
that  reason.  And  whence  can  it  come  but  from  the  creature 
or  the  Creator  ?  In  other  words,  the  reason  which  regulates 
the  progress  of  creation  may  be  one  which  respects  the  well¬ 
being  of  the  creature,  or  the  ultimate  design  of  the  Creator,  or 
both  combined.  On  the  supposition  that  the  whole  scheme  is 
advancing  according  to  laws,  this  advance  and  these  laws  imply 
tendency  and  result ;  if  the  tendency  be  to  secure  the  good  of 
the  creature,  the  law  of  progress  will  be  seen  fulfilling  this  con¬ 
dition,  and  will  be  regulated  by  it ;  and  if  the  tendency  be  also 
to  bring  into  view  the  boundlessness  of  the  Divine  resources, 
the  law  of  progress  will  be  regulated  in  its  movements  by  the 
attainment  of  this  end. 

4.  For  example,  the  primitive  earth  was  to  become  the  scene 
of  organic  life,  but  not  till  it  had  passed  through  such  foreseen 
changes,  and  had  attained  to  such  a  condition  as  adapted  it  to 


340 


MAN. 


the  existence  of  life,  might  the  law  of  progression  be  expected 
to  receive  another  illustration.  But  when  the  well-being  of 

ZD 

this  new  principle' — life  —  had  been  thus  prepared  for,  had  the 
Divine  Omnipotence,  which  the  inorganic  creation  set  forth, 
been  adequately  displayed  ?  The  proximate  end  was  attained, 
was  the  ultimate  end  also  ?  Again,  vegetable  life  prepared  the 
way  for  animal  existence ;  but  when  the  well-being  of  the  ani- 
mal  was  thus  provided  for,  the  question  still  remained,  prior  to 
its  creation,  whether  or  not  the  wisdom  of  God  had  been,  in  any 
sense,  adequately  illustrated.  In  process  of  time,  the  earth  was 
sufficiently  ameliorated  for  man’s  appearance,  but  this  alone 
cannot  be  supposed  to  have  determined  the  time  of  his  creation. 
We  are  aware,  indeed,  that,  according  to  the  advocates  of  devel¬ 
opment  by  natural  law,  as  soon  as  ever  certain  physical  conditions 
were  present,  man  would  emerge  into  being  by  an  inevitable 
necessity ;  that  the  only  reason  for  his  appearance  would  be  the 
concurrence  of  certain  favorable  organic  conditions,  indepen¬ 
dently  of  any  Divine  interposition.  Now,  while  we  freely 
admit  that  the  time  of  man’s  creation  presupposes  the  existence 
of  innumerable  conditions,  organic  and  inorganic,  it  is  most 
illogical  to  conclude,  that  because  a  thing  does  not  exist  without 
such  and  such  conditions,  therefore  it  must  exist  with  them. 
This  is  to  confound  the  possible  with  the  necessary,  and  to  pro¬ 
mote  conditions  into  the  place  of  causes.  We  have  seen  that, 
for  aught  that  geology  can  show  to  the  contrary,  man  might 
have  appeared  much  earlier  than  he  did  had  it  so  pleased  his 
Creator.  But  when  the  proximate  end  of  the  animal  period 
bad  been  attained,  and  the  well-being  of  man  had  been  provided 
tor,  had  the  ultimate  end  of  that  period  been  in  any  degree 
attained  ?  Did  the  long  succession  of  animal  worlds,  including 
those,  also,  to  which  they  looked  forwards,  exhibit  all  the  illus¬ 
trations  of  all-sufficient  benevolence,  which,  under  the  circum 
stances,  might  have  been  expected  ?  Had  the  earth  existed 
long  enough  to  justify  the  inference  that  the  power,  and  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  which  had  shown  themselves  sufficient  for  con 
ducting  it  through  all  the  mighty  and  complicated  changes  of 
which  it  contained  the  evidence,  is  all-sufficient  for  every  similar 
change  of  which  the  earth  admits?  We  believe  that  had  the 
evidence  of  this  all-sufficiency  been  incomplete,  when,  according 
to  the  law  of  progression,  the  earth  had  become  adapted  to 
human  life,  the  law  of  progression  would  have  waited  for  the 
completion.  Hazardous  as  this  sentiment  may  appear,  it  is  only 
affirming  that  the  means  would  have  been  subordinated  to  the 


CHANGE. 


341 


end.  But  when  we  remember  that  we  are  speaking  of  “  God 
only  wise,”  all  appearance  of  hazard  vanishes  ;  for,  “  seeing  the 
end  from  the  beginning,”  He  can  make  all  his  operations  har¬ 
moniously  coincide,  rendering  the  attainment  of  one  part  of  his 
design  the  period  for  commencing  the  attainment  of  another. 

5.  Admitting,  then,  that  the  successive  stages  of  creation, 
including  man’s  introduction  on  earth,  have  not  hitherto  taken 
place  either  accidentally  or  capriciously,  but  according  to  a  rea¬ 
son  which  respects  both  the  well-being  of  the  creature  and  the 
proof  of  the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Creator,  we  have  now  to  ad¬ 
vert  to  this  reason  in  relation  to  the  first  stage  of  the  human 
dispensation,  or  probationary  man  in  paradise.  Here,  indeed, 
we  enter  a  domain,  not  only  in  advance  of  all  that  had  gone 
before,  but  essentially  distinct  from  the  whole  —  the  domain  of 
law  properly  so  called.  Here,  Holiness  reigns  over  a  free  sub¬ 
ject.  The  Divine  Governor  and  the  governed  are  connatural. 
Here  is  a  second  will.  If  the  Creator  has  a  purpose,  so  also 
has  the  creature.  If  God  has  an  ultimate  end  to  be  answered 
by  this  stage  of  creation,  man  also  has  an  end  to  answer  —  an  end 
not  necessitated  and  unconsciously  pursued,  as  with  the  animal, 
but  intelligently  and  voluntarily  self-purposed.  And  yet  the 
very  perfection  of  the  Divine  will  demands  the  entire  coinci¬ 
dence  of  the  human  will  with  it.  To  deviate  from  it,  will  be  to 
deviate  from  perfection.  To  obey  it,  is  the  highest  and  the  only 
freedom.  Evidently,  then,  the  well-being  of  man  depends  on 
the  harmony  of  his  will  with  the  Supreme  will,  and  requires 
that  he  should  be  made  experimentally  acquainted  with  this 
fact.  Not  till  this  proximate  end  has  been  attained  may  any 
change  be  expected  to  take  place  in  man’s  first  or  probationary 
stage ;  for  not  till  then  will  he  be  prepared  to  take  an  onward 
step.  We  know,  indeed  —  for  the  event  declared  it  —  that, 
from  the  moment  accountable  man  began  to  breathe,  a  new  dis¬ 
pensation  impended.  But  if,  with  our  present  knowledge,  we 
could  then  have  been  asked  what  it  was  which  would  make  the 
time  Divinely  selected  for  the  introduction  of  that  new  dispen¬ 
sation,  the  right  time  ?  or,  what  it  was  which  would  fitly  termi¬ 
nate  the  probationary  period  ?  we  should  have  replied,  —  when 
man  has  been  made  to  comprehend  his  relative  position  in  the 
universe,  by  understanding  his  freedom  and  his  dependence,  and 
not  till  then.  How  long  it  may  last  after  that,  or  what  may  be 
the  nature  of  any  new  economy  which  may  be  subsequently- 
introduced,  are  distinct  questions ;  but  the  well-being  of  man 
requires  that  the  Divine  procedure  should  pause  till  he  has 

29* 


342 


MAN. 


learnt  his  relation  to  that  procedure.  This  is  his  primary  les¬ 
son,  and  fundamental  to  his  happiness.  Ignorant  of  this,  he  is 
liable,  unconsciously,  to  come  into  collision  with  the  Divine  will 
at  every  step  he  takes.  This  is  his  great  and  only  danger ; 
and  until  he  is  sensible  of  it,  his  endless  well-being  is  in  jeop¬ 
ardy. 

6.  The  question  arises,  then,  were  the  conditions  of  man’s 
well-being,  as  a  dependent  and  accountable  creature,  fulfilled, 
during  his  probationary  state?  Was  his  freedom  a  reality? 
W  as  he  apprised  of  the  relation  in  which  it  placed  him  to  God  ? 
And  had  he  an  opportunity  of  verifying  both  his  freedom  and 
his  dependence  ?  If  these  questions  can  be  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  man  may  expect  that  a  new  and  distinct  advance  in 
the  Divine  procedure  is  at  hand.  Now,  as  to  the  first  condi¬ 
tion  —  the  reality  of  man’s  freedom  —  we  have  only  to  refer  to 
our  chapter  on  the  Will,  or  to  appeal  to  our  own  consciousness. 
Our  every  volition  proves  it.  Temptation  presupposes  it. 
Everything  around  us  invites  us  to  assert  it.  Its  existence  is 
implied  in  our  very  conception  of  it. 

7.  May  it  not  be  expected,  then,  that  man  will  be  apprised 
of  the  relation  in  which  his  freedom  places  him  to  God,  or  be 
furnished  with  the  means  of  knowing  it  ?  Evidently,  his  free¬ 
dom  exposes  him  to  a  danger  unknown  to  all  pre-existing  na¬ 
ture —  the  danger  of  confounding  freedom  with  independence 
of  God  —  of  identifying  the  idea  of  power  with  the  idea  of  right 
—  of  supposing  that  because  he  can  do  a  thing,  he  may  do  it. 
Because  his  own  will  is  a  law,  he  is  in  danger  of  losing  sight  of 
every  other  law,  and  even  of  the  Divine  Lawgiver.  For  ages, 
his  posterity  imagined  that  their  little  planet  was  the  centre  of 
the  solar  system ;  that  sun  and  stars  existed  for,  and  moved 
around  it.  Had  the  earth  itself  been  a  conscious  being,  and 
indulged  in  the  same  delusion,  indefinite  confusion  and  ruin 
would  almost  necessarily  have  ensued.  Yet  this  is  only  a  pic¬ 
ture  of  the  moral  liability  of  the  first  human  being,  of  supposing 
that  he  is  central  and  supreme  when  he  is  only  subordinate  and 
dependent.  Accordingly,  as  we  have  already  seen,  everything 
around  him  told  him  of  its  dependence.  The  fact  that  he  alone 
had  a  free  will,  left  all  the  rest  of  creation  pointing  him  awa) 
with  a  direct  finger,  to  the  Will  on  which  it  depended.  This 
was  the  great  truth,  which  it  never  ceased  to  reiterate.  His 
consciousness  of  his  own  direct  Divine  Parentage  —  the  ever 
present  fact,  that  he  was  the  newly-created  “son  of  God"  — 
pointed  him  to  the  same  supreme  Will.  Though  a  law  to  him 


CHANGE. 


343 


self,  he  must  have  felt  that  his  constitution  was  an  imperium  in 
imperio.  Divine  communications  guided  him.  Divine  appoint¬ 
ments  surrounded  him.  In  a  sense  more  special  than  that  it 
could  be  said  of  any  of  his  posterity,  “  in  God  he  lived,  and 
moved,  and  had  his  being.” 

8.  But  if,  further,  a  specific  intimation  should  be  given  to 
man  of  the  responsible  character  of  his  freedom,  what  more 
could  his  grave  position  require,  or  Benevolence  itself  dictate  ? 
Such  an  intimation,  we  have  seen,  was  given,  and  given  in  the 
form  likely  to  render  it  most  memorable  and  effective  —  that 
of  law.  Indeed,  the  imperative  is  the  only  language  suited  to 
the  will.  In  the  next  chapter,  we  shall  see  that  it  was  a  law 
—  not  as  is  generally  supposed,  requiring  vindication,  but  that 
it  was  protective  ;  prescribed  by  Paternal  Goodness  ;  combin¬ 
ing  the  minimum  of  trial  with  the  conditional  maximum  of 
advantage  —  that  it  was  probation  made  easy.  Nor  have  we  at 
present  to  inquire  how  disobedience  was  possible  to  a  sinless 
being.  We  have  only  to  do  with  the  fact,  as  a  fact,  that,  in 
every  way  short  of  infringing  his  freedom,  man  was  protected 
from  the  possible  abuse  of  that  freedom.  Tremendous  possi¬ 
bility  ! 

9.  We  have  said  that,  from  the  moment  when  man  became 
the  subject  of  moral  government,  the  question  whether  or  not 
he  would  fall  by  transgression  may  probably  have  been  the 
engrossing  subject  of  the  intelligent  universe.  Marvellous 
transformations  of  matter  may  have  been  taking  place  at  the 
time  in  other  parts  of  the  Divine  dominions,  exhibiting  the 
Creative  Power  to  angelic  eyes  on  a  scale  unknown  before. 
But,  on  the  supposition  that  these  holy  beings  knew  anything 
of  the  immense  interest  depending  on  man’s  probation,  and  re¬ 
membering  the  period  of  their  own  trial,  we  can  conceive  them 
turning  away  from  even  a  new  creation  as  a  spectacle  compara¬ 
tively  devoid  of  interest.  How  long  the  period  of  suspense 
lasted  we  know  not ;  but  during  its  continuance  we  can  well  be¬ 
lieve  that  they  paused  from  many  of  their  accustomed  pursuits ; 
that,  in  their  eyes,  nature  itself  appeared  to  sympathize  in  the 
anxieties  of  the  crisis  ;  that  they  even  felt  as  if  put  on  their  own 
probation  again.  Jealousy  for  the  honor  of  God,  and  profound 
concern  for  man,  may  be  supposed  to  have  divided  and  absorbed 
their  thoughts.  Doubtless,  as  far  as  they  saw,  the  probabilities 
were  all  in  favor  of  a  successful  issue.  What  man  ought  to  be, 
he  already  was  ;  what  he  ought  not  to  be.  was  only  a  possibil¬ 
ity.  But  the  hour  of  trial  came,  and  he  fell.  He  indulged 


344 


MAN. 


desire  at  the  expense  of  right.  A  law  was  given  him,  and  he 
felt  its  force  ;  but,  voluntarily  breaking  away  from  the  sacred 
restraint,  he  deranged  the  harmony  of  his  own  nature,  disturbed 
the  tranquillity  of  the  intelligent  universe,  and  incurred  the 
penalty  of  transgression.  No  sign  which  external  nature  could 
have  given  of  that  crisis  —  her  hoarsest  thunder,  or  most 
wrathful  sky  —  would  have  been  adequate  to  the  magnitude  of 
the  occasion.  It  was  a  sorrow  too  deep  for  her  tears.  Man 
himself  was  not  conscious  of  all  its  import.  A  new  sensation 
filled  his  consciousness  —  a  sense  of  sin.  Now,  first,  he  expe¬ 
rienced  pain.  “  His  eyes  were  opened ;  ”  he  had  come  to  the 
“  knowledge  of  evil.”  The  equilibrium  of  his  powers  was  dis¬ 
turbed;  and  the  trembling  of  the  solid  earth  under  his  feet 
could  not  have  added  to  his  sense  of  insecurity.  The  first 
cloud  shaded  his  brow ;  the  first  arrow  entered  his  soul.  There 
might  have  been  “silence  in  heaven”  —  a  solemn  pause,  an- 
ticipative  of  his  doom.  But  he  was  already  self-doomed.  His 
own  conscience,  quicker  than  any  external  process,  and  dispen¬ 
sing  with  all  the  formalities  of  a  trial,  forestalled  the  sentence 
of  the  Divine  Lawgiver,  and  was  already  carrying  it  into  exe¬ 
cution. 

10.  We  have  not  now  to  speak  of  the  consequences  of  the 
first  sin ;  our  object  is  only  to  show  that  the  human  dispensa¬ 
tion  is  now  open  to  a  new  interposition,  and  awaits  it.  Had  the 
law  of  progress  been  put  into  operation  earlier  —  that  is,  had  a 
new  stage  of  the  Divine  economy  been  introduced  while  the 
probation  of  man  was  yet  pending,  it  would  have  virtually 
repealed  the  probationary  stage,  and  have  defeated  its  design ; 
man  might  never  have  felt  the  extent  of  his  dependence ;  and 
what  the  undisturbed  issue  of  his  trial  would  have  been,  might 
have  for  ever  remained  unknown.  But  his  trial  is  now  over. 
He,  a  dependent  being,  has  aimed  at  independence.  The  cen¬ 
trifugal  power  of  his  will  has  overcome  the  centripetal  law  ot 
dependence,  and  he  has  rushed  into  an  orbit  of  his  own.  He 
has  not  merely  essayed  to  stand  alone,  but  has  forced  his  way 
through  a  law  which  was  meant  to  hold  him  in  allegiance  to  his 
Maker.  The  abuse  of  the  highest  good  can  be  productive  only 
of  the  greatest  evil ;  and  this  evil  man  has  incurred.  His  first 
sin  has  been  committed.  As  a  perfect  being,  his  probation  is 
at  an  end.  He  has  outraged  his  Freedom,  and  increased  his 
Dependence.  From  this  moment,  therefore,  a  new  dipensation 
of  some  kind  may  be,  sooner  or  later,  expected. 

11.  But  although  the  proximate  end  of  man’s  probation  is 


CHANGE. 


345 


attained,  is  the  ultimate  end  of  this  first  dispensation  answered  ? 
That  is  to  say,  admitting  that  its  great  design  was  to  manifest 
the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Divine  Holiness,  is  that  final  purpose, 
in  any  sense,  attained  ?  The  former  end  may  have  been  an¬ 
swered,  but  not  the  latter  ;  for  the  former  falls  far  within  the 
compass  of  the  latter.  In  other  words,  the  two  ends,  though 
inseparably  united,  are  distinct;  for  while  every  condition 
required  by  the  law  of  man’s  well-being  may  have  been  ful¬ 
filled,  the  adequate  illustration  of  the  Divine  Holiness  may 
require  something  more ;  and  the  question  is,  whether  the 
claims  of  this  ultimate  law  are  satisfied.  Have  all  the  illustra¬ 
tions  of  Holiness  been  furnished  which,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances,  might  have  been  expected  ? 

12.  Here,  however,  the  prior  question  arises  —  furnished  to 
whom  ?  for  on  the  answer  to  this  inquiry  will  depend  the  kind 
and  amount  of  illustration  necessary.  If  the  party  contemplated 
be  the  first  man  himself,  doubtless  he  was  ready  to  attest,  from 
the  depths  of  his  inmost  consciousness,  “  Holy,  holy,  holy,  is 
the  Lord  God  Almighty  !  ”  His  own  constitution  had  been  a 
proclamation  of  the  Divine  holiness  to  the  universe.  And  now 
that  he  had  violated  that  constitution,  the  pains  of  conscious 
guilt  were  a  new  proclamation  to  the  same  effect.  We  cannot 
conceive  of  his  requiring  any  additional  evidence,  that  the 
Beinsf  who  had  thus  demonstrated  His  moral  excellence  was 
capable  of  accumulating  the  illustrations  of  it  to  any  amount. 

13.  Or,  if  the  party  to  be  convinced  of  the  all-sufficiency  of 
the  Divine  holiness  be  the  intelligent  beings  afterwards  made 
known  to  man  under  the  denomination  of  angels,  they,  probably, 
were  already  satisfied  on  this  point.  Their  own  natures  had 
been  dedicated  to  this  Perfection.  They  had  passed  through  a 
probationary  state,  in  which  they  had  displayed  and  maintained 
it.  They  had  seen  it  awfully  vindicated  in  the  doom  of  those 
of  their  race  who  had  outraged  it.  They  themselves  were  now 
confirmed  in  it-— lived  in  the  near  and  open  vision  of  it. 
Although,  therefore,  they  rejoiced  in  the  new  aspect  under 
which  it  appeared  in  the  constitution  and  relations  of  man,  it 
may  have  added  nothing  to  their  mere  conviction  of  the  all- 
sufficiency  of  the  Divine  Holiness.  As  evidence  of  this  suffi¬ 
ciency,  their  own  history  'was  enough.  If  proof  only  were 
aimed  at,  that  which  man’s  history  supplied  would  have  been 
in  excess.  Up  to  the  point  of  holiness,  they  saw  in  his  history 
a  recapitulation  of  their  own ;  and  that,  probably,  which  espe¬ 
cially  awakened  their  expectations  related  to  the  coming  econ- 


346 


MAN. 


omy,  which,  according  to  the  law  of  progress,  would  carry  the 
Divine  procedure  beyond  that  point. 

14.  If,  however,  the  party  to  be  satisfied  be  ourselves,  we 
must  be  careful  to  limit  our  expectations  according  to  the  spe¬ 
cial  nature  of  the  case.  In  the  original  statement  of  the  law, 
now  under  consideration,  I  remarked  that  the  time  for  an  ad¬ 
vance  in  any  given  department  of  the  Divine  procedure  would 
of  course  be  determined  in  a  manner,  and  for  a  reason,  differinor 
with  the  particular  nature  and  design  of  the  department  —  first, 
by  each  existing  stage  passing  through  all  the  combinations  and 
changes  of  which  it  admits,  before  another  begins  ;  or,  secondly, 
by  its  existing  long  enough  to  show  that  it  involves  all  the  ne¬ 
cessary  possibilities  for  answering  such  and  such  ends,  if  its  con¬ 
tinuance  were  permitted ;  or,  thirdly,  until  it  has  sufficiently 
taught  the  specific  truth,  and  attained  the  proximate  and  par¬ 
ticular  end,  for  which  it  was  originated.  And  the  obvious 
ground  and  reason  for  this  is,  that  were  any  stage  of  the  Divine 
procedure  to  be  replaced  or  superseded  a  moment  before  it  had, 
in  one  or  other  of  these  ways,  demonstrated  the  all-sufficiency 
of  God  for  that  particular  stage,  the  ultimate  end  would  not  be 
answered. 

15.  Now  as  to  the  first  of  these  conditions,  it  evidently  is  not 
applicable  to  this  opening  stage  of  the  human  dispensation.  The 
only  sense  in  which  it  could  be  supposed  to  apply,  would  be  by 
imagining;  that,  instead  of  one  human  being,  innumerable  men 
might  have  been  put  on  probation  in  every  conceivable  variety 
of  relation  to  success  ;  and  that  they  might  have  been  thus  put  on 
trial  either  contemporaneously  or  successively.  Probably, 
something  analogous  to  the  contemporaneous  method  was  ac¬ 
tually  adopted  in  the  instance  of  angelic  probation.  And,  in 
the  history  of  the  human  race,  both  the  contemporaneous  and 
the  successive  methods  exist  in  the  only  respects  in  which  they 
can  be  conceived  of  in  relation  to  such  a  race.  Every  member 
of  the  human  family,  in  every  generation,  has  a  personal  proba¬ 
tion,  however  different  it  may  be  from  the  trial  of  the  progeni¬ 
tor  of  the  race.  And  our  attention,  in  subsequent  discussions,  will 
have  to  be  very  much  directed  to  the  important  relations  of  this 
individual  and  universal  probation.  But  to  ask  for  either  of 
these  methods  in  an  absolute  form  is,  first,  to  ask  for  an  essen¬ 
tially  different  race  of  beings  ;  a  race  not  successively  produced, 
nor  mutually  influencing  each  other ;  whereas,  we  are  at  present 
asking  for  adequate  illustrations  of  the  Divine  Holiness  in  the 
"onstitutijn  and  original  condition  of  the  actual  man.  And, 


CHANGE. 


347 


secondly,  it  is  to  ask,  in  effect,  for  an  entirely  different  dispen¬ 
sation  ;  a  final,  and  not  a  progressive  one.'  For  in  the  case  sup¬ 
posed,  no  conceivable  variety  of  probation  could  satisfy.  The 
trial  of  innumerable  individuals,  and  innumerable  generations, 
would  still  admit  of  augmentation,  and  so  on  indefinitely. 
Whereas,  we  are  inquiring  whether  or  not  the  probationary 
stage  of  man’s  history,  considered  as  one  of  many  in  a  progres¬ 
sive  scheme,  exhibited  the  holiness  of  God  in  a  light  adequately 
illustrative  of  its  all-sufficiency. 

16.  If,  then,  the  first  of  the  conditions  specified  had  not,  and, 
from  the  nature  of  the  Divine  plan,  could  not  have  been  com* 
plied  with,  during  this  probationary  stage,  had  the  second  con¬ 
dition  been  fulfilled  ?  That  is,  were  the  actual  constitution  and 
the  trial  of  man,  as  a  subject  of  moral  government,  worthy  of  a 
Being  of  perfect  holiness  ? 

Now,  wre  may  point  to  all  the  preceding  portions  of  this  vol¬ 
ume  for  a  reply ;  for  every  part  of  human  nature,  and  every 
law  of  every  part,  terminate  in  man’s  moral  relations.  Could 
we  have  known  the  constitution  of  the  angelic  beings  who  pre¬ 
ceded  man,  as  subjects  of  moral  government,  we  should  proba¬ 
bly  have  regarded  the  question  before  us  as  already,  and  for  ever, 
determined.  Respecting  their  original  state  we  know  but  little  ; 
we  know,  indeed,  that  now,  in  what  is  to  them  their  future ,  or 
final  state,  they  are  spoken  of  as  spiritual,  as  man  himself  is 
destined  to  be  in  his  future  state.  But  the  fact  that  only  some 
of  them  fell  from  their  first  estate,  proves  that  they  sustain  a 
very  different  relation  to  each  other  from  that  which  men  mu¬ 
tually  sustain.  Now  that  a  second  race  of  moral  beings  should 
have  been  made,  differently  constituted  from  the  first,  and  yet 
equally  endowed  with  every  element  of  responsibility,  would 
seem  to  be  at  once  a  test  and  proof  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency 
surpassing  the  requirements  of  the  case.  That  the  constitution 
of  this  being  should  include  matter  and  spirit ;  that  is,  necessity 
and  freedom,  mechanism  and  causality  ;  and  that  in  the  exercise 
of  his  self-government  he  should  recognize  a  right  and  a  wrong 
in  his  every  voluntary  movement,  assimilating  him  to  the  Di¬ 
vine  government,  would  seem  to  exhibit  a  triumph  over  the 
greatest  difficulties,  if  not  even  a  choice  of  the  difficulties,  for 
the  sake  of  triumphing  over  them.  That  this  being,  though 
related  to  time  and  place,  should  be  capable  of  conceiving  of  mo¬ 
ral  distinctions  necessary,  immutable,  and  eternal ;  that  though 
having  to  take  up  some  of  his  pleasures  from  the  dust,  he  should 
be  able  to  reach  for  others,  his  noblest,  to  the  throne  of  God 


348 


MAN. 


and  that,  though  in  his  nature  allied  to  earth,  he  should  feel 
himself  capable  of  immortality,  and  destined  for  it  —  all  these 
are  further  enhancements  of  our  views  of  the  Divine  all-suffi¬ 
ciency.  And  then,  that  the  being  thus  constituted  should  have 
been  placed  in  a  position  in  which,  though  sinless,  his  fall  was 
possible,  and  only  possible  ;  in  which,  that  is,  his  trial  and  his 
power  were  so  nicely  balanced  as  to  leave  him  perfectly  free  ; 
a  position  from  which  he  could  command  a  view  of  endless  life, 
with  the  prospect  of  taking  on  with  him  ever-accumulating 
means  of  enjoyment  as  the  result  of  obedience ;  what  more  can 
be  necessary  to  demonstrate  the  sufficiency  of  which  we  speak  ? 
And,  finally,  when  this  being  had  sinfully  violated  law,  that  it 
should  then  have  come  to  light  that  he  was  so  constituted  as  to 
show  that  sin  is  possible,  and  even  punishable,  without  at  all 
impairing  his  accountability  ;  that  sin  is  self-punishment ;  and 
that,  as  such,  he  could  not  commit  even  his  first  sin  without 
eliciting  at  once  the  hostility  of  Holiness,  and  his  own  vindica¬ 
tion  of  its  claims ;  what  more  could  Holiness  itself  do  in  order 
to  proclaim  its  all-sufficiency  ? 

17.  The  question  relates  not  now  to  the  Benevolence  of  God; 
nor  to  any  possible  displays  of  the  Divine  Holiness  essentially 
different  from  the  actual  one ;  nor  do  we  ask  whether  Holiness 
demonstrated  its  perfection  by  doing  all  that  it  could  do,  by  ex¬ 
hausting  itself,  so  to  speak,  in  the  first  stage  of  the  human  dis¬ 
pensation.  Yet  this  is  the  kind  of  evidence  of  the  Divine  per¬ 
fection  which  some  persons  inconsiderately  look  for.  Whereas 
the  existence  of  such  evidence  is  not  only  inconceivable  in 
itself,  but  would,  if  it  were  possible  for  it  to  be  realized,  defeat 
the  very  end  of  its  existence.  For  the  attainment  of  that  end 
—  the  display  of  all-sufficient  holiness  in  the  eyes  of  finite  in¬ 
telligence  —  requires  that  the  display  be  progressive ;  that  it 
include  displays  other  than  the  creation  and  probation  of  holy 
beings,  and  additional  to  them ;  that  it  prove  itself  equal  to  every 
crisis  that  may  occur  in  the  system  created ;  otherwise,  it  would 
be  justly  objected  that  the  proof  of  its  all-sufficiency  was  want¬ 
ing.  Accordingly,  the  manifestation  of  Holiness  is  still  in  pro¬ 
gress.  The  subsequent  display  of  other  perfections  has  not  ter¬ 
minated  that  of  Holiness  ;  they  co-exist  and  co-operate  together. 
If,  for  a  moment,  we  should  feel,  then,  as  if  that  primary  display 
of  holiness  were  less  ample  and  glorious  than  might  possibly 
have  been  expected,  we  a7*e  to  remember  that  the  very  power 
we  possess  of  forming  such  a  conception  shows  the  folly  of  en¬ 
tertaining  it,  for  the  same  power  must  have  belonged  potentially 


CHANGE. 


349 


to  the  first  man.  And,  further,  if  our  power  of  conceiving  the 
idea  of  all-sufficient  holiness  have  been  developed  by  the  subse¬ 
quent  displays  of  that  perfection,  we  are  to  remember  that  all 
these  sublime  displays  were  made  possible  by  that  primary  il¬ 
lustration  of  it.  In  forming  our  estimate  of  that  illustration, 
therefore,  we  must  be  careful  not  to  measure  it  by  a  scale  of 
subsequent  formation,  and  applicable  only  to  subsequent  dis¬ 
plays  of  holiness ;  for  this  is  to  object,  not  so  much  to  the  suffi¬ 
ciency  of  that  primary  manifestation,  as  to  its  subsequent  pro¬ 
gressiveness  ;  as  well  as  to  forget  that  in  that  earliest  exhibition 
of  holiness  were  contained  the  germ  and  promise  of  all  that  has 
been  since  made  manifest.  Accordingly,  in  the  creation  of  man, 
the  Divine  Being  is  represented  as  proposing  to  produce  an 
Image  of  his  own  Holiness  —  a  being  in  whom  He  should  be¬ 
hold  the  reflection  of  his  own  moral  excellence.  Having  made 
man,  He  is  further  represented  as  pronouncing  this  new  moral 
representation  of  Himself  “good”  —  sufficient  —  satisfactory. 
And  although  that  first  economy  was  not  of  protracted  duration, 
it  lasted  long  enough  to  show  (for  events  of  measureless  magni¬ 
tude  may  take  place  in  a  moment)  that  it  included  infinite  pos¬ 
sibilities.  While  the  result  of  that  economy  showed  that  its 
Author  was  as  able  to  vindicate  holiness  as  He  was  to  make  a 
being  capable  of  it ;  that  He  was  sufficient  for  all  the  emer¬ 
gencies  of  the  dispensation. 

18.  As  to  the  third  of  the  conditions  named  —  that  the  econ¬ 
omy  continue  until  it  has  sufficiently  taught  the  specific  truth, 
and  attained  the  proximate  and  particular  end  for  which  it  was 
originated  —  this  we  have  alreadv  seen  fulfilled  in  the  former 
part  of  this  chapter,  on  the  law  which  determined  the  period  of 
change  in  relation  to  man’s  well-being.  With  every  suitable 
inducement  to  stand,  man  had  fallen.  Not  satisfied  with  free¬ 
dom,  he  had  essayed  independence.  He,  the  limited,  had  at¬ 
tempted  the  unlimited.  Left  exposed  only  at  a  single  point,  he 
had  failed  to  guard  even  that.  His  moral  power,  designed  to 
ennoble  and  raise  his  sensitive  nature  to  its  own  standing,  had 
allowed  itself  to  be  lured  from  its  regal  height  by  that  very  na¬ 
ture,  and  had  debased  itself  to  the  dust.  Man’s  representative 
trial  is  at  an  end.  Each  of  all  his  innumerable  descendants, 
indeed,  will  pass  through  a  personal  trial  suited  to  his  altered 
position ;  and  all  the  circumstances  and  results  of  every  such 
trial  will  be  equitably  adjudged.  But  never  more  can  he  pass 
through  probation  with  the  same  advantages  —  with  a  nature 
derived  immediately  from  God,  specially  protected  by  Him, 

30 


350 


MAN. 


and  exempted  from  all  the  influence  of  evil  example.  In  thvi 
very  act  of  aiming  at  self-sufficiency,  he  has  not  only  proved 
his  natural  and  necessary  insufficiency,  but  has  actually  parted 
with  the  secret  of  his  strength.  And  thus  the  first  great  prac¬ 
tical  lesson  of  man’s  dependence  has  been  written  out  at  length, 
and  deposited  in  the  ark  of  man’s  history.  And  now  also  the 
Holiness  which  had  made  man  in  its  own  image  appears,  as 
Justice,  to  affirm  the  rectitude  of  his  own  self-judgment.  Holi¬ 
ness  encompasses  the  dispensation.  The  moment  which  saw 
man’s  crown  fall,  saw  the  radiance  of  Holiness  at  its  highest. 
The  act  which  made  man  feel  his  insufficiency  called  forth  a 
new  display  of  the  all-sufficiency  of  holiness.  A  new  Perfec¬ 
tion,  indeed,  was  about  to  arise  in  man’s  horizon.  Mercy  was 
on  the  wing ;  but  not  until  the  rectitude  of  the  Divine  govern¬ 
ment  was  adequately  illustrated,  could  u  the  fulness  of  time  ” 
*  for  mercy  have  arrived. 


351 


SECOND  PART. 

THE  REASON  OF  THE  METHOD, 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

Sect.  1.  —  That  part  of  the  reason  which  belongs  to  man’s  con¬ 
stitution,  and  involves  his  well-being . 

1.  All  the  preceding  laws  respect  the  method  of  the  Divine 
procedure  in  relation  to  the  constitution,  the  condition,  and  the 
destiny  of  man.  The  reason  for  this  method  is  now  to  be  con¬ 
sidered.  In  the  original  statement  of  the  law  relating  to  this 
reason,  we  saw  ground  to  expect  that  the  beings  by  whom  the 
Divine  manifestation  is  to  be  understood,  appreciated,  volunta¬ 
rily  promoted,  and  enjoyed,  must  be  constituted  in  harmony  with 
the  laws  of  the  objective  universe,  or  that  these  laws  will  be 
found  to  have  been  established  in  prospective  harmony  with  the 
designed  constitution  and  the  destiny  of  the  subjective  mind 
which  is  to  expound  and  to  profit  by  them.  According  to  our 
theory  of  the  Divine  manifestation,  then,  the  reason  will  be  two¬ 
fold,  the  first  part  being  founded  in  the  constitution  of  the 
creature  by  whom  the  method  is  to  be  studied,  and  involving 
his  well-being ;  and  the  second  part  relating  to  his  destiny,  and 
so  involving,  in  addition,  the  glory  of  the  Divine  Creator. 
Having  considered  each  of  these  in  separate  sections,  we  shall 
occupy  a  third  section  in. applying  both  to  the  first  man. 

2.  It  must  be  obvious,  that  if  man  is  to  understand  the  sys¬ 
tem  of  created  things  into  which  he  has  come,  it  must  be  per¬ 
vaded  by  laws,  or  constructed  according  to  a  plan  in  harmony 
with  his  intellectual  constitution.  The  part  on  which  we  are 
now  entering  assumes  the  existence  of  such  a  plan ;  and  the 
treatise  on  the  Pre-adamite  Earth  was  principally  devoted  to 
the  proof  and  illustration  of  it.  In  the  midst  of  a  chaos  “  with¬ 
out  form  and  void,”  man’s  mind  itself  would  be  chaotic.  The 
subjective  would  refect  the  objective.  Darkness  would  be  up- 


352 


MAN. 


on  the  face  of  his  deep.  If  the  outer  world  is  to  be  read  by 
him,  there  must  “  be  light.”  The  uniformities  or  laws  in  ques¬ 
tion  were  necessary,  indeed,  in  order  to  the  existence  of  the 
things  themselves.  A  creation  without  law  or  plan  is  incon¬ 
ceivable.  And  hence,  for  antecedent  periods  immeasurable, 
such  a  law-pervaded  creation  had  existed  for  the  attainment, 
immediately,  of  organic  and  sentient  ends  alone.  But  on  the 
eve  of  man’s  arrival,  the  uniformities  of  Nature  were  recalled 
from  their  temporary  derangement,  in  order  to  the  attainment 
of  additional  and  loftier  ends. 

3.  A  school  was  to  be  prepared  for  man’s  education;  and  the 
great  lessons  of  creation  were  re-set.  Hence  the  new  reason  for 
the  laws  of  succession,  dependence,  and  order,  without  which 
man  would  possess  his  powers  of  observation  in  vain,  and  crea¬ 
tion  would  be  only  and  truly  “a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms;” 
and  for  that  law  of  all-connecting  relationship,  without  which, 
induction  would  be  impossible,  and  inquiry  would  be  constantly 
baffled  and  brought  to  a  pause,  but  owing  to  which,  man  is  con¬ 
stantly  ascending  to  higher  and  wider  generalizations,  and  an 
endless  multitude  of  parts  become  a  united  whole  ;  and  for  those 
laws  of  progression  and  activity,  by  which  history  is  made  pos¬ 
sible  ;  and,  in  a  word,  for  that  law  of  analogy,  without  which  he 
could  not  take  even  a  first  inductive  step,  for  Nature  would  fur¬ 
nish  him  with  no  hint  respecting  the  direction  in  which  he  should 
proceed  ;  but  by  which  he  now  possesses  a  clue  for  threading  its 
most  intricate  labyrinths,  and  may  find  himself  satisfactorily  ris¬ 
ing  from  physical  science  to  natural  theology,  and  thence  to  the 
domain  of  Revelation.  So  that  in  appointing  the  actual  laws  or 
uniformities  of  the  inorganic  world,  God  was  only  saying,  in 
effect,  Let  the  objective  conditions  of  astronomy,  physics,  and 
chemistry  exist.  In  appointing  the  uniformities  of  organized 
bodies,  He  was  providing  the  objective  conditions  of  botany  in 
its  various  branches.  And  in  arranging  the  uniformities  of  sen¬ 
tient  being,  the  external  conditions  of  animal  physiology,  classi¬ 
fication,  and  the  different  branches  ot  scientific  zoology,  were 
provided.  In  other  words,  the  Divine  Creator  was  practically 
saying,  Let  all  the  objective  conditions  of  these  various  sciences 
be  ready,  that  when  man,  the  destined  minister  and  interpreter 
of  Nature,  shall  come,  the  sciences  themselves  may  be  possible. 

4.  All  beyond  these  objective  conditions,  then,  man  was  to 
bring  in  his  own  constitution.  These  conditions,  prior  to  his 
coming,  were,  scientifically  considered,  mere  unmeaning  uni¬ 
formities.  They  were  laws  only  for  the  Divine  Lawgiver  — 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


353 


modes  or  rules  according  to  which  He  governed  and  sustained 
Nature.  If  they  are  to  be  laws  for  man,  his  mind  must,  in  so 
far,  resemble  the  mind  of  the  Lawgiver.  They  are  to  be 
manifestations  of  the  law-working  mind  of  the  Deity  to  the  law¬ 
conceiving  mind  of  man.  They  only  form  the  objective  signs 
of  the  Divine  meaning—  God’s  symbolic  autograph  to  man  ;  all 
the  subjective  conditions  for  understanding  the  writing  belonging 
to  the  mind  addressed.  Hence  the  reason  for  man’s  powers  of 
observation,  classification,  and  induction,  without  which  all  the 
uniformities  of  Nature  would  exist,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned, 
entirely  in  vain.  These  powers  or  properties  of  his  mind  are 
themselves  uniformities,  answering  to  those  in  external  Nature; 
but  with  this  immense  difference,  that  man,  the  subject  of  them, 
is  himself  conscious  of  them  as  uniformities ;  so  that,  to  him, 
they  become  laws,  governing  his  anticipations.  But,  by  this 
very  consciousness,  a  new  world  is  opened  to  him  —  the  world 
of  liis  own  interpreting  mind.  He  can  not  only  understand 
external  Nature  ;  he  can  also  analyze  and  explore  the  mind 
with  which  he  understands  it.  He,  the  understanding  subject, 
can  become  an  understood  object.  He  can  take  his  perceptions, 
thoughts,  and  conjectures,  of  yesterday,  and  place  them  before 
him  for  examination,  just  as  if  they  were  phenomena  belonging 
to  the  external  world.  Indeed,  the  creation  of  a  second  human 
mind,  endowed  with  the  power  of  imparting  its  thoughts,  actu¬ 
ally  adds  a  mental  to  his  prior  material  world.  Here,  the  very 
laws  of  all-connecting  relationship  and  analogy  which  he  before 
recognized  in  the  external  world,  are  found  to  pervade,  in  a 
higher  sense,  the  entire  range  of  his  mental  phenomena ;  for 
here  they  furnish  their  own  illustration.  Not  one  of  them  all 
could  be  absent  without  rendering  the  intellectual  knowledge  of 
himself  impossible.  Here,  also,  lie  finds  the  ideas  of  which  the 
laws  themselves  are  only  the  expression  —  ideas  of  externality 
and  number,  of  force  and  motion,  of  likeness  and  design.  So 
that,  in  constituting  the  human  mind,  the  Creator  was  saying,  in 
effect,  Let  the  subjective  conditions  of  science  be  added  to  the 
already  existing  objective  conditions.  While,  in  adding  these 
subjective  conditions,  He  was  adding  the  materials  of  a  science 
fundamental  to  all  the  rest  —  the  science  of  anthropology  —  of 
man  in  the  union  of  his  spiritual  and  animal  nature,  or  psy¬ 
chology  and  physiology.  To  the  question,  therefore,  why  man  is 
constituted  as  he  is  :  why  he  reaches  the  external  world  through 
a  body,  and  reacts  upon  it  and  upon  himself  by  a  mind,  and 

30* 


354 


MAN. 


why  he  is  conscious  of  both  ?  the  first  reply  is,  That  art  and 
science  might  be  possible. 

5.  But  science,  strictly  speaking,  is  not  philosophy.  It  gives 
an  account  of  things,  but  does  not  account  for  them.  If,  there¬ 
fore,  the  creation,  including  man,  is  to  be  known  and  appreciated 
by  him  as  the  product  and  manifestation  of  God,  it  must  be 
characterized  by  other  laws  and  properties  than  those  necessary 
for  mere  science,  and  man  must  possess  a  sensitive  and  emo¬ 
tional  as  well  as  an  intellectual  constitution.  The  province  of 
science  is  to  state,  not  to  explain.  Persons  are  apt  to  confound 
the  mere  multiplication  and  arrangement  of  phenomena  with  the 
explanation  of  them.  Thus,  according  to  M.  Comte,  gravitation, 
as  the  law  which  appears  to  bind  together  all  phenomena,  is 
henceforth  to  be  regarded  as  their  ultimate  and  sufficient  expla¬ 
nation.  But,  so  far  from  explaining  them,  it  only  aggregates  and 
generalizes  them.  If  the  gravitation  of  the  stone  be  a  mystery, 
the  discovery  that  the  entire  planet  gravitates  is  not  an  expla¬ 
nation  of  the  mystery,  but  an  addition  to  it ;  and  the  further 
discovery  that  the  solar  system  gravitates,  and  gravitates  in  a 
calculable  manner,  is  only  a  further  enlargement  of  the  wonder. 
Here  is  the  all-connecting  chain ;  where  is  the  power  that  made 
it,  and  the  hand  that  sustains  it?  What  should  we  think  of  a 
pretended  explanation  of  the  structure  of  a  steam-engine  which 
assumed  that  it  had  sprung  out  of  the  earth  like  a  tree,  or  which 
preserved  a  profound  silence  respecting  the  fact  that  it  was  made ? 
Surely,  then,  no  account  of  the  universe,  which  keeps  its  origin 
out  of  sight,  can  be  accepted  as  philosophy,  without  involving 
errors  and  evils  proportioned  to  the  supreme  importance  of  the 
subject!  Accordingly,  we  have  seen  that  it  is  covered  with 
marks  of  contingency  and  dependence,  and  that  man  is  so  con¬ 
stituted  as  to  infer  from  them  an  independent  Creator.  Were 
he  destitute  of  the  power  of  interpreting  these  marks  aright,  it 
would  not  be  the  means  of  manifesting  God  to  him,  but  would 
only  manifest  itself,  disclose  its  own  properties,  and  partially 
proclaim  its  own  nature.  Instead  of  referring  him  to  God,  it 
would  literally  stand  between  him  and  the  Creator,  and  would 
tend  to  enclose  him  in  its  own  material  mechanism.  But  he  is 
constituted  expressly  to  recognize  them ;  and  hence  it  is  only 
natural  for  him  to  inquire  into  the  origin  of  things,  and,  on  find¬ 
ing  that  nothing  in  the  things  themselves  can  account  for  it,  it  is 
further  natural  for  him  to  refer  their  origin  to  God. 

For  the  same  reason,  man’s  constitution  is  stored  with  ulti¬ 
mate  facts — facts  which  admit  of  no  self-explanation,  but  which 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


355 


repose  on  truths  beyond  themselves.  And  hence,  too,  an  ex 
animation  of  his  mind,  brings  these  necessary  truths  to  light. 
His  mind  cannot  act  without  them.  They  belong  to  its  con¬ 
stitution.  He  finds  himself  presupposing  them  in  every  in¬ 
quiry.  As  a  being  who  is  himself  capable  of  causing,  design¬ 
ing,  enjoying,  and  governing,  he  is  set  down  in  the  midst  of 
things  caused  and  designed,  as  well  as  of  gratifications,  and 
laws,  in  order  that  he  might  find  himself  face  to  face  with  the 
proofs  of  another  Being  capable  of  acting  on  a  scale  indefinitely 
greater,  and  that  he  might  refer  all  the  power  and  wisdom,  the 
goodness  and  the  holiness  manifested,  to  that  other  exalted 
Being.  So  that  in  constituting  man,  the  Divine  Creator  was 
saying,  in  effect,  Let  philosophy  be  possible,  the  philosophy 
which  ascends  from  signs  to  the  things  signified,  from  laws  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  Lawgiver.  To  the  question,  therefore, 
why  man  is  made  to  recognize  the  contingent,  the  ultimate,  and 
the  necessary  ?  the  only  reply  is,  in  order  that  he  might  have  a 
natural  theology ;  that  he  might  find  himself  in  a  temple  in 
which  every  object  is  symbolic  of  the  Divine  presence,  and  is 
ever  inviting  him  to  acts  of  grateful  self-improving  worship. 

6.  But,  chiefly,  if  the  Divine  procedure  is  to  be  known  and 
appreciated  by  man  in  such  a  manner  as  to  provide  for  his 
self-development,  a  voluntary  or  self-controlling  power  must  be 
added  to  his  intellectual  and  sensitive  constitution.  Such  a 
power  we  have  seen  that  he  possesses.  We  shall  now  see,  not 
only  that  this  is  the  grand  peculiarity  of  man’s  nature,  but  that 
it  involves  conditions  accounting  for  much  which  is  commonly 
deemed  mysterious  in  the  Divine  arrangements  both  of  the 
human  constitution,  and  of  the  universe  at  large.  As  he  is  an 
intellectual  being,  he  is  in  a  school  with  all  the  means  of  self¬ 
tuition  at  his  disposal.  As  he  is  a  being  intellectual  and  emo¬ 
tional,  his  school  becomes  a  temple,  in  which  objects  innumera¬ 
ble  compete  for  his  admiration  and  regard.  But  as  he  is,  in  ad¬ 
dition,  a  voluntary  being,  both  the  school  and  the  temple  become 
a  government,  in  which  every  part  of  his  nature  is  under  law. 
He  is  a  moral  being  whose  every  property  and  power  is  on  pro¬ 
bation,  and  every  part  of  the  system  into  which  he  has  come  is 
arranged  in  relation  to  it. 

7.  Elsewhere  we  have  seen  that  man,  as  an  organized  being, 
and  his  planetary  habitation,  are  specially  adapted  to  each 
other.  So  that  if  the  question  were  asked  why  the  strength  of 
his  bones,  the  power  of  his  muscles,  and  the  resistance  of  his 
blood-vessels  are  as  they  are,  neither  specifically  greater  nor 


356 


MAN. 


loss,  the  answer  is  —  because  he  was  not  meant  to  inhabit 
Jupiter  or  Mercury,  but  the  Earth.  In  a  similar  manner,  if  he 
is  voluntarily  to  “  till  the  ground,”  the  cultivable  nature  of  the 
soil  must  bear  some  proportion  to  his  means  of  subduing  and 
rendering  it  fertile.  If  those  means  are  reduced  below  a  cer¬ 
tain  point,  he  will  abandon  the  attempt  in  despair;  if  they  are 
increased,  or  made  unnecessary,  beyond  a  certain  point,  the 
requisite  incitements  to  effort  will  be  wanting.  So  that  if  it 
be  asked,  why  it  is  that  the  earth  does  not  supersede  man’s 
labor  by  spontaneous  fertility,  the  inquirer  might  be  referred  to 
those  parts  of  the  inhabited  globe  where  this  condition  is  most 
nearly  realized,  for  a  reply.  “  The  finer  the  climate  and 
the  fewer  man’s  wants,  the  more,  generally  speaking,  he  sinks 
towards  the  condition  of  the  lower  animals.”  “  The  heart  is 
hardest  in  the  softest  climes ;  the  passions  flourish,  the  affec¬ 
tions  die.”  If  the  organic  world  is  to  be  the  means,  not  of 
depressing,  but  of  developing,  his  nature,  it  must  exhibit  neither 
a  bewildering  irregularity  on  the  one  hand,  nor  a  tame  and  un- 
instructive  sameness  on  the  other.  Accordingly  it  is  so  consti¬ 
tuted  that,  without  either  forcing  its  lessons,  or  dispensing  with 
attention,  it  invites  observation,  and  rewards  well-directed  dili¬ 
gence  of  every  kind  and  degree.  For  the  same  reason,  the 
world  of  sentient  being  is  so  made  as  to  exhibit  a  medium  be- 
tween  a  disheartening  depth  and  diversity  on  the  one  hand,  and 
a  dull  unexciting  superficiality  on  the  other.  The  result  of  the 
former  extreme  would  be,  that  the  volume  of  nature  would 
never  be  opened ;  and  the  result  of  the  latter,  that  it  would  be 
shut  almost  as  soon  as  opened.  But  constituted  as  it  is,  its  laws 
are  neither  so  obscure  as  to  defy  his  diligence,  nor  so  obvious  as 
to  force  themselves  on  his  involuntary  notice.  Its  objects  are 
so  formed  as  to  call  him  to  activity,  and  to  give  him  lessons  on 
self-government ;  its  secrets  so  hid  as  to  invite  his  discovery, 
and  to  correct  his  pre-judgments ;  and  its  events  so  intimately 
and  universally  related  as  to  reveal  to  his  attentive  eye  the  fact, 
that  all  nature  is  united  in  a  close  net-work  of  mutual  connec¬ 
tions  and  dependence. 

And,  on  the  same  account,  the  labyrinth  of  man’s  own  nature, 
considered  as  an  object  of  study,  must  not  be  so  accessible  as 
to  cost  him  no  effort,  or  it  will  yield  him  no  interest ;  neither 
must  it  be  inextricably  entangled  by  exceptional  circumstances, 
or  it  will  defy  his  utmost  diligence  and  application.  In  the  for¬ 
mer  case,  he  could  not  be  said  to  learn ;  and  in  the  latter,  his 
constitution  could  not  be  said  to  teach.  But,  formed  as  he  is, 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


357 


the  law  of  analogy  alone  becomes  in  his  hand  a  clue  with  which,  if 
he  will ,  he  may  thread  the  most  labyrinthine  recesses  of  his  con¬ 
sciousness,  and  emerge  to  find  that  he  is  an  integral  part  of  a 
law-pervaded  scheme  of  Divine  manifestation. 

8.  From  these  very  general  remarks  on  the  objective  condi¬ 
tions  of  the  method,  let  us  consider  more  particularly  some  of 
its  subjective  conditions,  and  their  inevitable  consequences.  We 
begin  with  man’s  sensational  perceptions.  Now,  bearing  in 
mind  his  voluntary  and  moral  nature,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is 
a  sense  in  which  his  sensible  impressions  must  be  optional,  and 
in  which  this  option  must  be  bounded  by  limits.  Accordingly, 
while  he  cannot  choose  what  impressions  he  shall  receive  from 
certain  objects  and  in  certain  circumstances,  he  can  determine, 
to  an  extent  amounting  to  freedom,  whether  or  not  he  will  place 
himself  in  a  given  relation  to  such  objects.  But  the  enjoyment 
of  this  power  brings  with  it  liabilities  without  number.  Pro¬ 
perly  speaking,  indeed,  there  are  no  fallacies  of  the  senses  what¬ 
ever  ;  their  laws  are  fixed.  But  man  may  rashly  make  them 
the  occasion  of  erroneous  inferences ;  or  may  confound  the  tes¬ 
timony  of  his  acquired  with  that  of  his  natural  perceptions ;  or 
may  draw  his  conclusions  in  ignorance  of  the  physical  laws 
which  are  involved;  or,  while  his  organs  of  sense  are  disor¬ 
dered.  These  are  Reid’s  four  divisions  of  the  so-called  falla¬ 
cies  of  the  senses.*  So  also  our  perception,  as  given  in  con¬ 
sciousness,  testifies  to  the  existence  of  an  external  world.  But 
in  his  admirable  dissertation  already  referred  to,  Sir  W.  Ham¬ 
ilton  has  shown  that  “  five  great  variations  from  truth  and  na¬ 
ture  may  be  conceived ;  and  all  of  these  have  actually  found 
their  advocates  according  as  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  in 
the  fact  of  perception,  is  wholly,  or  is  partially,  rejected:”  f  — 
nihilism  ;  or  the  absolute  identity  of  mind  and  matter  —  whence 
pantheism  ;  or  idealism  —  the  object  educed  from  the  subject 
or  materialism  —  the  subject  educed  from  the  object ;  or  a  hypo¬ 
thetical  realism  which  rejects  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to 
our  knowledge  of  an  external  world,  yet  inconsistently  affirms 
the  existence  of  that  world :  while,  from  these  general  views, 
other  more  special  divisions  branch  off  in  various  directions. 
The  creative  fiat,  Let  there  be  light ,  made  a  world  of  shadows 
possible ;  and  the  creation  of  a  voluntary  being  such  as  man, 
capable  and  conscious  of  sensational  perceptions,  made  possible 
a  state  in  which  he  might  either  wander  and  lose  himself  amidst 


*  Essay,  ii.  22. 


t  Page  748 


358 


MAN. 


a  world  of  shadows  of  his  own  casting,  or  in  which  he  might 
emerge  and  live  in  the  light  of  truth. 

9.  As  a  being  capable  of  attaining  conviction  on  evidence ,  he 
finds  himself  surrounded  by  objects  soliciting  attention,  and  in¬ 
viting  to  certain  conclusions.  But,  for  the  same  reason  that 
there  is  any  evidence  at  all,  that  evidence  must  be  supplied  only 
in  “  weight  and  measure.”  Its  strength  is  felt,  not  necessarily, 
but  according  to  the  degree  of  attention  given  to  it ;  but  atten¬ 
tion  itself  is  a  voluntary  power.  It  has  laws ;  but  just  as  the 
objects  of  nature  do  not  present  themselves  drawn  up  in  rank 
and  file,  but  await  his  classification,  so  he  is  left  to  evolve  the 
very  laws  on  which  all  his  generalizations  are  to  proceed.  But 
even  this  power,  “in  the  light  of  which  dwell  dominion  and  the 
power  of  prophecy,”  exposes  him  to  numerous  sources  of  error. 
He  is  liable  to  the  scepticism  which  arises  from  overlooking  the 
facts  —  that  proof,  as  a  process,  is  not  universally  necessary  nor 
possible  ;  *  that  different  subjects  require  different  kinds  of  evi¬ 
dence  ;  that  all  evidence,  not  demonstrative,  admits  of  degrees ; 
that  the  convincing  power  of  all  such  evidence  depends  materi¬ 
ally  on  the  state  of  the  mind  ;  that  the  right  order  of  examining 
the  claims  of  a  system  is  to  look  first  at  its  proofs,  not  at  the 
objections  to  it ;  and  that  there  is  a  substantial  sense  in  which 
the  belief  of  all  moral  truth  is  voluntary.  And  thus  every 
increase  of  power  involves  a  proportionate  increase  of  liability. 

10.  If  man  is  to  reason,  his  mind  must  be  constituted  to  re¬ 
ceive  certain  propositions  without  proof ;  otherwise  his  reason¬ 
ing  would  be  a  chain  suspended  from  nothing.  But  even  these 
primary  and  self-evident  truths,  by  the  possession  of  which  he 
is  made  a  sharer  of  Divine  knowledge,  must  not  proclaim  them¬ 
selves  so  as  to  prejudice  liis  responsible  freedom.  That  they 
are  really  present  to  his  mind  is  clear  from  the  amount  of  truth 
which  he  has  already  excogitated,  and  is  ever  increasing.  That 
their  development  and  application  are  optional  is  equally  clear ; 
for  experience  has  shown  that  they  render  him  liable  to  make 
his  own  mind  the  measure  of  the  universe ;  to  confound  the 
difficult  with  the  impossible,  and  the  impossible  with  that  of  which 
it  is  merely  difficult  to  conceive ;  to  become  impatient  of  obser¬ 
vation  and  experiment,  “building  a  world  upon  hypothesis,”  and 
rendering  a  Novum  Organum  necessary,  in  order  to  recall  him 
from  the  region  of  conjecture ;  to  idealize  the  universe,  and 
even  to  consider  all  reasoning  respecting  his  ideas  impossible. 


*  He  that  thinks  all  things  to  be  demonstrable  takes  away  demonstra¬ 
tion  itself. — Procl.  in  Timce ,  p.  176,  fol. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


359 


11.  Imagination,  by  giving  wings  to  the  mind,  enables  it  to 
rise  from  the  present  and  the  actual,  and  to  seek  the  invisible 
and  the  possible.  Falling  short  of  its  proper  activity,  it  leaves 
the  mind  to  gravitate  to  the  centre  when  it  should  be  soaring  to 
the  circumference,  ignorant  of  its  heirship  to  a  boundless  em¬ 
pire.  On  the  other  hand,  if  that  activity  be  unrestrained,  the 
actual  and  the  urgent  no  longer  counterpoise  the  distant  and 
the  unreal.  Everything  is  measured  by  imaginary  standards, 
and  viewed  through  painted  media.  Man  inhabits  a  phantom 
universe.  Science  may  be  retarded  for  ages  by  the  Pythago¬ 
rean  doctrine  of  perfect  numbers.  Life  may  be  wasted  in  lis¬ 
tening  for  an  inaudible  strain  —  the  fancied  music  of  the  spheres. 
Even  an  Aristotle  may  teach  that  the  celestial  motions  are  regu¬ 
lated  by  laws  proper  to  themselves ;  till  at  length  the  heavens 
may  present  to  the  eye  of  the  mind  “  cycle  on  epicycle  —  orb  on 
orb  ”  —  an  inexplicable  enigma  of  circles.  “  The  world  (says 
Plato)  is  God’s  epistle  to  mankind ;  ”  but  men,  taxing  their  in¬ 
ventive  powers,  may  come  to  conjecture  the  contents  of  the 
Divine  autograph,  instead  of  opening  and  diligently  reading  it. 
In  actual  life,  the  beautiful  may  come  to  be  divorced  from  the 
true  and  the  good.  Instead  of  laboring  to  improve  the  actual 
and  the  present,  men  may  come  to  sigh  for  a  rainbow  home 
which  recedes  or  dissolves  as  they  advance  to  reach  it.  Or  the  ‘ 
sense  of  the  beautiful  may  even  come  to  be  torn  down  in  the 
temple  of  the  soul,  and  be  replaced  by  the  worship  of  myths  and 
monsters,  compared  with  which  the  signs  of  the  zodiac  may  be 
divine  realities.  But  if  the  addition  of  this  power  brings  with 
it  all  these  liabilities,  how  important,  we  might  have  thought, 
that  it  should  be  restrained  within  certain  limits.  That  power 
of  restraint  exists,  but  it  is  lodged  with  man  himself.  And 
forcibly  to  interfere  with  it,  would  justly  empower  him  to  com¬ 
plain  that,  while  held  responsible  as  a  free  agent,  he  was  yet 
coerced  as  a  machine. 

12.  Language,  by  covering  the  entire  range  of  thought  and 
feeling,  more  than  doubles  the  liabilities,  intellectual  and  moral, 
of  the  human  being.  As  the  representative  of  the  mind,  language 
must,  on  the  one  hand,  have  laws  corresponding  to  the  laws  of 
thought.  But,  on  the  other,  these  laws,  like  those  of  thought, 
must  not  be  mechanically  inviolable ;  otherwise,  the  freedom  of 
the  mind  itself,  is,  to  that  extent,  destroyed.  The  consequence 
of  this  freedom,  however,  is  the  following  four-fold  possibility ; 
first,  the  inaccurate  and  inadequate  representation  of  the  thing 
signified ;  hence  falsehood,  in  its  various  degrees,  the  employ- 


360 


MAN. 


ment  of  vague  and  ambiguous  terms,  and  the  literal  use  of 
metaphorical  language.  Secondly,  the  identification  of  names 
with  things,  hence  realism  —  the  belief  in  the  independent  and 
separate  existence  of  whatever  has  a  separate  name.  Indeed, 
the  Greeks  had  but  one  name  (logos)  for  both  reason  and  speech. 
Words  triumphed  over  facts.  As  if  every  name  were  a  sun- 
drawn  picture  of  the  object  to  which  it  referred  —  a  photograph 
of  nature  —  they  studied  physics  in  terms,  and  not  in  things. 
Language  became  a  wall  between  them  and  the  realities  of 
nature.  Thirdly,  the  tyranny  of  words  over  the  mind.  “  Men 
believe  (says  Bacon)  that  their  reason  governs  their  words  ;  but 
it  often  happens  that  words  have  power  enough  to  react  upon 
reason.”  The  consequence  is,  that  the  sign  survives  the  depar¬ 
ture  of  the  thing  signified ;  the  names  of  false  conceptions  act 
as  incantations,  recalling  their  spectral  forms  long  after  the 
conceptions  themselves  have  been  exploded ;  and  language, 
having  once  embodied  a  doctrine,  tends  to  give  it  permanence 
quite  irrespective  of  its  truth  or  error.  Fourthly,  the  different 
conceptions  which  the  speaker  and  the  hearer  may  have  asso¬ 
ciated  with  the  same  word ;  hence,  the  possibility  of  receiving 
false  impressions  instead  of  true,  as  well  as  of  endless  verbal 
disputes. 

13.  Looks,  tones,  tears,  gestures  —  parts  of  the  great  economy 
of  natural  language  —  by  increasing  man’s  power  for  good,  pro¬ 
portionally  increase  his  power  for  evil.  The  fountain  which 
supplies  the  tear  of  pity  may  supply  the  tear  of  hypocrisy  also. 
And  who  would  exchange  the  muscular  play  and  sunlight  of 
the  human  countenance  for  the  immovable  rigidity  of  a  statue, 
because  the  same  muscles  can  convert  the  features  into  a  living 
mask  ?  As  a  being  strangely  compounded  of  matter  and  mind, 
and  living  at  a  point  where  two  worlds  meet,  man  can  view 
everything  in  a  ludicrous,  as  well  as  in  a  solemn  light.  The 
power  of  a  smile  involves  the  power  of  a  sneer.  And  the 
laughter  which  shakes  down  an  old  temple  of  superstition,  and 
ridicules  out  of  existence  a  folly  proof  against  reasoning,  may 
be  employed  also  to  intimidate  truth,  and  to  put  virtue  out  of 
countenance. 

14.  Man’s  emotional  susceptibilities  are  essential  to  his  prac¬ 
tical  appreciation  of  the  objects  around  him.  As  such,  they 
stand  between  his  intellectual  acts  and  his  volitions  —  following 
the  former,  preceding  and  influencing  the  latter.  His  responsible 
liberty  requires,  however,  that  while  his  emotions  are  necessarily 
determined  by  his  mental  perceptions,  these  perceptions  them- 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


361 


selves  should  be,  indirectly,  at  least,  voluntary.  But  this 
momentous  addition  to  man’s  constitution  may  give  occasion  to 
the  following  evils  :  by  unduly  depreciating  its  distinct  functions, 
and  confounding  it,  as  Hobbes  did,  with  perception  itself,  virtuous 
feelings  may  be  considered  nothing  more  than  just  reasonings, 
and  evil  passions  may  pass  for  mistaken  judgments,  and  schools 
of  philosophy  be  formed  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  morality. 
By  unduly  exalting  the  function  of  the  emotions,  reason  itself 
may  be  depreciated,  and  schools  of  musing  mysticism  be  warmed 
into  existence.  While  by  the  false  relation  to  the  intellect, 
which  the  emotions  may  come  to  sustain,  either  in  defect  or 
excess,  all  those  thronging  errors  and  evils  may  ensue  which 
Bacon  has  classed  under  the  idola  or  images  of  the  tribe,  the 
den,  the  market-place,  and  the  theatre. 

15.  The  relation  of  the  emotions  to  the  will  brings  us  into 
the  moral  domain  of  man’s  nature.  Here,  as  we  have  seen,  he 
is  open  to  a  four-fold  influence.  All  the  objects  around  him 
appeal  either  to  his  appetites,  his  self-love,  his  benevolent 
affections,  or  to  his  sense  of  duty,  in  its  highest  form  of  love  to 
God.  Here,  then,  are  four  great  problems  to  be  solved,  each 
of  them  requiring  a  complicated  balancing  of  influence,  com¬ 
pared  with  which  the  nicely-adjusted  play  of  forces  in  the  phy¬ 
sical  world  is  onlv  an  emblem  of  simplicity  and  ease. 

As  man  is  a  creature  of  instincts  and  appetites,  the  great 
question  to  be  solved  relates  to  the  reconciliation  of  his  material 
and  his  spiritual  nature.  There  was  a  period  in  the  progress 
of  creation  when  the  problem  had  yet  to  be  solved,  how  matter 
could  be  reconciled  with  motion,  and  how  the  centripetal  force 
of  the  planet  could  be  reconciled  with  the  centrifugal.  How 
can  the  laws  of  inorganic  matter  be  made  to  consist  with  the 
assimilating  power  of  life  ?  How  can  a  material  organ  be  made 
the  occasion  of  pleasurable  sensation  ?  But  all  the  more 
difficult  parts  of  these  problems  are  now  included  in  the  more 
profound  adjustment  of  the  animal  and  the  rational,  the  ma¬ 
terial  and  the  spiritual,  in  the  constitution  of  free  responsible 
man. 

The  question  is  not,  how  may  the  spiritual  escape  absorption 
from  the  natural  ?  nor  the  converse ;  but  how  may  the  two  be 
adjusted  in  harmonious  and  responsible  co-existence  ?  Now, 
assuming  the  constitution  of  man,  it  is  evident  that  there  must 
have  been  limits  assigned  to  all  the  created  objects  which  ap¬ 
peal  to  it  —  as  to  their  number,  form,  and  sensible  properties, 
their  accessibleness,  the  combinations  of  which  they  admit,  and 

31 


362 


MAN. 


the  purposes  to  which  they  may  be  applied.  Or,  assuming  the 
constitution  of  nature,  it  is  equally  clear  that  theie  must  have 
been  limits  assigned  to  man’s  susceptibilities  of  impression  from 
it,  and  to  his  powers  over  it.  It  is  easy  to  conceive  of  such  a 
change  in  man’s  organization  as  should  render  him  insensible 
to  the  appeals  of  external  objects,  and  annoyed  by  the  calls  of 
animal  appetite.  Every  voice  from  without  would  only  whis¬ 
per  timidly  from  the  dust ;  while  the  voice  of  reason  should 
thunder,  and  his  consciousness  be  written  over  with  the  great 
truths  of  his  spiritual  nature  in  characters  of  fire.  But  this 
would  make  virtue  impossible,  for  there  would  be  nothing  to 
resist.  Rather,  virtue  would  then  consist  in  the  cultivation  of 
the  appetites,  and  the  development  of  the  passions.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  his  animal  incitements  are  to  be  such  as  to  afford 
him  the  occasion  of  self-improvement,  they  may  also  prove  the 
means  of  his  self-degradation.  What  if  the  sensuous  should 
come  to  predominate  over  the  spiritual  ?  The  forms  of  mate¬ 
rialism  might  come  to  be  “  the  grand  idolatry,  by  which,  in  all 
times,  the  true  worship,  that  of  the  Invisible,  will  be  polluted 
and  withstood.”  Every  object  might  then  be  valued  only  as  it 
ministered  to  the  gratification  of  the  passions.  Nature  itself 
might  come  to  be  employed  as  a  great  storehouse  of  animal 
stimulants.  The  methods  of  self-indulgence  be  reduced  jto  a  fin¬ 
ished  and  costly  science ;  rewards  be  offered  for  the  invention 
of  a  new  pleasure ;  and  man  be  distinguished  from  the  brute 
chiefly  by  his  greater  sensuous  capacity. 

16.  As  a  being  capable  of  self-love,  or  of  a  regard  for  his 
well-being  on  the  whole,  a  new  difficulty  arises  —  that  of  bal¬ 
ancing  the  'present  with  the  future.  Besides  the  problem  of 
reconciling  one  part  of  his  constitution  with  another,  there  is 
now  the  additional  task  of  harmonizing  the  claim  of  every 
passing  period  of  life  with  that  of  existence  on  the  whole. 
These  two  claimants  might  be  easily  brought  into  antagonism. 
The  urgencies  and  attractions  of  the  present  are  liable  to  blind 
him  to  the  demands  of  the  future :  —  How  many  present  wants 
shall  he  have  ?  —  how  pressing  shall  they  be  ?  —  how  varied  in 
kind  and  degree  ?  —  and  of  what  increase  shall  they  admit  ? 
On  the  contrary,  the  stupendous  prospects  of  the  future  may 
cause  him  to  forget  even  that  there  is  a  present,  or  may  entirely 
incapacitate  him  for  its  duties.  How  high  shall  the  solemn 
veil  be  raised?  —  how  far  shall  he  be  able  to  project  his 
thoughts  within  ?  —  and  what  objects  shall  there  meet  his  view  ? 
These  opposite  questions  have  been  so  answered  in  man’s  con- 


REASON"  OF  THE  METHOD. 


363 


stitution  as  to  give  him  the  power  of  practically  reconciling 
them  together.  Bat  this  very  power  implies  the  responsible 
liberty  of  placing  the  two  in  conflict ;  in  which  case,  present 
victory,  on  either  side,  is  ultimate  defeat. 

17.  The  motives  implied  in  the  social  affections  present  new 

and  additional  difficulties.  How  can  man’s  well-being  as  an  indi¬ 
vidual  be  made  to  consist  with  the  free  activity  of  other  individ¬ 
uals  ?  “  Man  stands  in  the  midst  of  the  external  world,  and  the 

most  important  element  in  that  which  surrounds  him,  is  his  con¬ 
tact  with  those  who  resemble  him  in  their  nature  and  their  des¬ 
tiny.  Xow.  if  free  beings  are  to  exist  in  such  contact,  side  by 
side,  mutually  aiding:,  and  not  obstructing  one  another  in  their 
development,  this  only  becomes  possible  by  our  recognizing  an 
invisible  boundary,  within  which  the  existence  and  the  activity 
of  every  individual  must  have  a  sure  and  undisturbed  territory. 
The  rule  by  which  that  boundary,  and,  consequently,  this  un¬ 
disturbed  territory,  is  determined,  is  Law.  Therewith,  at  the 
same  time,  is  also  ascertained  the  relationship  and  the  difference 
between  law  and  morality.  Law  assists  morality,  not  by  exe¬ 
cuting  her  commands,  but  by  securing  the  free  development  of 
the  moral  power  which  dwells  in  every  individual’s  will.”  But 
whv  is  not  a  list  of  all  right  actions  inscribed  on  the  human 
heart,  and  the  conscience  made  an  infallible  index  of  all  good 
feelings,  and  the  hand  withered,  and  the  eve  and  the  tongue  re- 
strained,  at  the  verv  commencement  of  every  offence  bv  some 
admonitory  pain  ?  Because  man  is  a  moral  being,  and  not  a 
machine,  and  is  capable  of  becoming  a  law  unto  himself.  But, 
then,  the  freedom  which  this  state  implies,  leaves  him  open  to 
at  least  a  fourfold  possibility.  His  social  laws,  customs,  and 
manners,  mav  be  at  variance  with  moralitv ;  or  the  laws  them- 
selves,  being  in  harmony  with  right,  he  mav  vet  violate  them ; 
or.  mistaking  the  province  of  law,  he  may  attempt  to  carry  its 
jurisdiction  where  it  can  neither  define  nor  command ;  or,  in 
that  wide  sphere  beyond  the  domain  of  human  law,  and  where 
a  thousand  influences  of  speech,  affection,  friendship,  and  exam¬ 
ple  are  always  in  full  play,  he  may  either  spend  life  in  aiming 

to  subordinate  them  to  himself,  or  else  mav  surrender  himself  to 

'  * 

be  absorbed  by  them. 

18.  Still  profounder  is  the  problem  which  asks  for  solution 
in  the  religious  sphere ;  where  a  sense  of  duty,  accompanied  by 
unlimited  sanctions,  is  to  be  made  compatible  with  the  presence 
and  activity  of  other  and  inferior  motives.  How  can  the  infinite 
coexist  with  the  finite,  and  vet  leave  it  free  ?  How  can  inferior 

J  y 


364 


MAN. 


excellence  exist  in  the  presence  of  infinite  perfection,  so  as  to 
make  itself  be  felt  ?  Or  how  can  the  mind  be  left  free  to  ap¬ 
preciate  it  ?  The  compelled,  or  necessary  admiration  of  any 
excellence,  besides  being  a  thing  inconceivable,  would  be  alike 
unacceptable  and  useless.  And  yet  the  very  conditions  which 
leave  the  creature  voluntary  in  this  particular,  expose  him  to 
the  most  alarming  possibilities.  His  moral  freedom  requires 
that  the  period  of  the  earth’s  origin  should  be  hid  in  a  dateless 
antiquity ;  but  from  this  circumstance  he  may  take  occasion  to 
leap  to  the  irrational  conclusion  that  it  is  eternal,  and  un¬ 
created.  Because,  for  the  same  reason,  the  successive  creative 
s'. ages  of  the  ancient  earth  are  not  so  obtrusively  marked  and 
palpable  as  to  compel  the  judgment  to  a  right  conclusion,  he 
may  proceed  to  the  length  of  denying  the  existence  of  an  in¬ 
visible  Agent.  Although  owing  his  primary  origination  to 
miracle  —  to  an  exercise  of  power  unknown  to  the  present 
course  of  nature  —  he  may  come  to  be  so  enamored  of  the  uni¬ 
formities  of  nature  as  to  deny  the  possibility  of  a  miraculous 
change.  From  the  fact  that  the  few  sequences  in  the  chain  of 
cause  and  effect  which  he  sees  are  regular  and  stable,  he  may 
come  unphilosophically  to  infer  that  all  the  rest  of  the  chain  is 
iron  also,  and  even  the  Hand  that  holds  it ;  that  because  the  lit¬ 
tle  visible  is  fixed,  no  appeal  can  be  responded  to  from  the  infi¬ 
nite  Invisible.  If  man’s  free  agency  is  not  to  be  overborne  by 
the  visible  display  of  immediate  Divine  operation ;  if  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  Creative  agency  is  to  be  enough  to  convince,  but  not 
so  much  as  to  overwhelm,  the  attainment  of  this  balance  will  in¬ 
volve  relations  and  adjustments  of  infinitely  diversified  compli¬ 
cation,  and  will  form,  in  truth,  the  grand  sphere  for  the  exercise 
of  creative  wisdom  and  goodness ;  and  yet  man  may  come  to 
employ  this  very  freedom  in  questioning  the  existence  of  the 
agency  which  alone  makes  it  possible  !  Without  it,  there  could 
be  no  reasoning  —  no  man  ;  with  it,  there  may  be,  for  him,  no 
God.  In  other  words,  he  may  allow  himself  to  be  so  beset  by 
the  present  and  the  limited,  as  even  to  deny  the  existence  of 
the  Infinite  Being.  Or,  admitting  the  existence  of  God,  he 
may  not  recognize  in  Him  the  Creator  and  Governor  of  all 
things,  denying  his  own  accountability  and  dependence.  Or, 
admitting  the  existence  and  providence  of  God,  he  may  be  so 
engrossed  by  the  signs  and  exponents  of  excellence,  as  never 
to  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  the  Divine  Reality,  nor  even  to 
inquire  after  Him.  He  may  love  every  object  but  God ;  and 
thus  every  action  of  his  life,  however  consonant  with  natural 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


365 


law,  may  be  performed  without  any  reference  whatever  to  the 
authority  of  the  supreme  Will,  and  to  the  excellence  which 
should  commend  it.  Or  else,  professing  to  admit  the  exist¬ 
ence,  providence,  and  perfections  of  God,  he  may  live  for  pur¬ 
poses  which  keep  all  these  out  of  his  sight,  and  which  place 
him  in  constant  collision  with  the  Divine  will.  In  these  va¬ 
rious  respects  he  may  fail  to  subserve  the  great  end  of  his  ex¬ 
istence. 

19.  From  these  remarks  it  will  be  seen  not  only  that  every 
part  of  the  man  is  exposed,  within  its  own  sphere,  to  certain 
liabilities,  but  that  his  greatest  danger  consists  in  the  power 
which  he  possesses,  as  a  free  being,  of  developing  one  part  of 
his  constitution  into  an  ascendency  over  the  rest,  and  of  practi¬ 
cally  detaching  it  from  them.  As  an  intellectual  being,  he  may 
exaggerate  the  importance  of  the  senses,  regarding  them  as  the 
sole  sources  of  his  knowledge,  and  may  thus  land  in  a  system 
of  Materialism.  Or,  concentrating  his  attention  on  the  world 
of  mind,  he  may  be  so  dazzled  by  the  light  of  reason  as  to  look 
on  the  external  world  as  nothing  more  than  its  reflection ;  and 
thus  adopt  Idealism.  Or,  looking  away  from  both  the  external 
and  the  internal,  he  may  add  imagination  to  reason,  and  soar  on 
its  wings  to  the  great  source  of  both,  and  lose  himself  in  a  sys¬ 
tem  of  all-absorbing  Pantheism.  Thus  nature,  man,  or  God, 
may  become  his  idol,  according  as  he  surrenders  himself  chiefly 
to  a  particular  faculty.  Or,  dissatisfied  with  the  essential  con¬ 
tradictions  of  these  systems,  and  relying  on  the  critical  powers 
of  the  understanding  alone,  he  may  surrender  himself  to  Scep¬ 
ticism.  Or,  wearied  with  efforts  which  have  only  brought  him 
to  the  verge  of  a  yawning  gulf,  he  may  add  emotion  to  thought, 
and  may  watch  the  stirrings  of  his  own  bosom,  till  every  move¬ 
ment  there  becomes  an  inspiration,  and  every  whisper  an  ora¬ 
cle  ;  and  thus  he  ends  in  Mysticism. 

20.  Emotion  may  be  developed  and  indulged  without  regard 
either  to  the  thought  that  should  precede,  or  to  the  activity 
which  should  follow  it.  In  the  former  instance,  approbation  be¬ 
comes  partiality ;  aversion,  prejudice ;  and  the  mind  believes 
beyond  the  warrant  of  evidence.  In  the  latter,  it  lives  in  an 
element  of  dramatic  excitement,  “  with  feelings  all  too  delicate 
for  use,”  and  “  sighs  for  wretchedness,  but  shuns  the  wretched.” 
Sensibility  may  prompt  man  to  weep  over  the  friend  whom  his 
passions  have  led  him  to  ruin.  Taste,  which  is  discriminating- 
sensibility,  may  call  for  creations  of  artistic  beauty,  and  engage 
him  in  its  intense  worship ;  but  so  little  has  such  refinement  to 

31* 


366 


MAN. 


do  with  morality,  that,  as  the  history  of  the  Greeks  shows,  the 
intervals  of  the  service  may  be  given  to  the  most  odious  vices 
of  human  nature.  The  same  taste  may  be  kindled  to  enthu¬ 
siasm  by  the  contemplation  of  virtue  —  a  feeling  often  mistaken 
for  piety  ;  but  it  is  the  element  of  order,  beauty,  or  sublimity, 
which  is  admired ;  and  so  distinct  is  the  object  of  this  asstheticaJ 
emotion  from  the  moral  quality  which  conscience  recognizes 
and  approves,  that  man,  while  loud  in  the  praises  of  the  former, 
may  be  daily  doing  violence  to  the  latter. 

21.  As  an  active  being,  man’s  belief  is  designed  to  influence 
his  conduct.  But  so  separable  are  the  two,  that  he  may  be 
indefinitely  better  or  worse  than  his  self-taught  creed.  If  his 
passions  predominate,  they  will  impart  to  his  speculations  an 
epicurean  cast;  or,  like  Mahometanism,  they  may  take  the 
most  ennobling  and  exalting  faith  —  the  doctrine  of  immortality 
itself  —  and  mingle  with  it  the  poison  of  debasing  sensuality. 
If  his  self-love  be  nursed  into  selfishness,  it  will  degenerate 
into  the  thousand  forms  of  personal  utilitarianism,  and  put  a 
price  on  the  virtues.  His  social  affections,  if  disproportion¬ 
ately  developed,  sink  the  claims  of  the  individual  in  a  system 
of  communism,  and  shut  out  from  his  view  the  Object  of  su¬ 
preme  regard.  His  sense  of  duty,  if  cultivated  by  doing  vio¬ 
lence  to  his  appetites  and  affections,  produces  a  stoic  by  sacri 
ficing  a  man. 

22.  According,  then,  to  the  erroneous  views  which  men  have 
entertained  respecting  the  relation  of  the  human  will  to  the  Di¬ 
vine,  they  may  be  generalized  into  two  classes  —  those  who  en¬ 
deavor  to  escape  from  the  liabilities  of  freedom,  and  those  who 
affect  to  deny  or  to  enlarge  its  limits.  Perhaps  we  should  say, 
according  to  their  spirit  rather  than  their  views,  for  the  gene¬ 
ralization  includes  those  who  have  never  thought  or  reasoned 
on  the  subject,  however  decidedly  they  may  have  felt  and  act¬ 
ed.  Even  the  views  themselves  may  be  regarded  as  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  that  spirit  —  as  “  the  forms  assumed  by  antagonist 
principles  in  human  nature.”  If  it  be  true,  as  it  has  been  said, 
that  every  man  is  born  either  a  Platonist  or  an  Aristotelian,  it 
is  because  of  the  prior  truth,  that  every  man  has  a  practical 
preference  either  for  liberty  or  necessity.  This  preference  in¬ 
vades  every  region  of  thought,  feeling,  and  action.  Ascending 
to  the  loftiest  pinnacle  of  thought,  it  finds  Being  itself  distin¬ 
guishable  into  substance  and  cause  —  substance  and  its  proper¬ 
ties,  cause  and  its  effects.  And  as  the  sacred  historian  tells  us 
of  the  river  that  “  went  out  of  Eden  to  water  the  garden,”  that 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


36? 


“  from  thence  it  was  parted,  and  became  into  four  heads,”  so 
from  Edenic  times,  this  river  of  thought  has  divided  and  flowed 
through  the  world,  separating  into  schools  and  parties  the 
population  who  have  lived  and  even  fought  on  its  banks.  Giv¬ 
ing  the  preference  to  Substance,  as  implying  certain  fixed  and 
necessary  properties,  we  arrive  at  a  system  of  pantheism  which 
denies  freedom  and  personality  to  God  himself,  and  identifies 
Him  with  the  universe :  giving  the  preference  to  Cause,  as  self 
letermining,  creative,  contingent  activity,  we  may  regard  mattei 
itself  as  consisting  of  forces  and  activities,  and  arrive  at  a  system 
of  polytheism.  .  Reasoning  from  God  to  man,  the  advocate  of 
Substance  becomes  an  extreme  necessarian,  regarding  his  char 
acter  and  destiny  as  fixed :  the  advocate  of  Cause  becomes  an 
extreme  libertarian,  regarding  his  conduct  as  exempt  from  Di¬ 
vine  supervision. 

23.  But  apart  from  all  speculative  views  on  the  great  prob¬ 
lem,  the  spirit  of  the  former  is  ever  striving  —  blindly  and 
unconsciously  it  may  be,  as  to  its  ultimate  tendencies  —  to 
diminish  the  liabilities  attendant  on  freedom,  in  every  possible 
way.  It  seeks  to  escape  the  dangers  of  reasoning,  by  asking  for 
a  logic  which  shall  infallibly  conduct  it  to  truth.  On  the  same 
account,  partly,  “  method  (remarks  Bacon),  carrying  a  show  of 
total  and  perfect  knowledge,  hath  a  tendency  to  generate  acqui¬ 
escence.”  In  religious  practice,  it  aims  to  escape  from  danger, 
partly,  by  recasting  the  human  constitution — by  bodily  infliction, 
celibacy,  and  the  extinction  of  the  social  affections,  and  partly  by 
recasting  the  world — immuring  itself  in  monastic  seclusion,  and 
surrounding  itself  with  a  single  class  of  objects,  as  if  the  evasion 
of  trial  were  equivalent  to  the  conquest  of  danger.  While,  in 
religious  doctrine,  it  relies  on  the  supposed  infallibility  either  of 
an  internal  monitor,  or  of  a  church,  or  of  a  sacred  volume  whose 
inspiration  is  imagined  to  be  such  as  to  supersede  the  necessity 
of  a  painstaking  discrimination,  or  anxious  individual  thought¬ 
fulness.  On  the  other  hand,  the  spirit  of  the  latter  is  ever 
confounding  liberty  with  lawlessness.  It  aims  to  enlarge  the 
scope  of  freedom,  by  regarding  difficulty  as  a  dispensation  from 
duty  ;  and  mystery,  from  belief ;  and  by  removing  Providence 
beyond  the  circle  of  human  affairs.  It  supposes  that  it  has  suf¬ 
ficiently  vindicated  the  dignity  of  man,  by  withholding  its  homage 
from  every  object  loftier  than  man  himself.  Not  less  than  the 
former  spirit  does  it  seek  to  remodel  the  world  by  artificial  cre¬ 
ations  of  its  own.  While  both  agree,  though  in  very  different 


368 


MAN. 


respects,  in  evincing  a  degree  of  self-sufficiency  at  direct  vari¬ 
ance  with  man’s  dependent  position. 

24.  Thus  every  part  of  man’s  nature,  jointly  and  severally,  is 
on  probation.  So,  also,  is  every  period  of  his  life.  The  world 
of  infancv  is  one  entirely  of  sense:  a  little  circle  filled  exelu- 
sively  with  tastes  and  scents,  with  sounds  and  colors,  and  forms, 
and  motions.  Even  this  first  horizon  of  the  human  being  fills 
and  enlarges  around  it  very  gradually.  Intellect,  emotion,  con¬ 
science,  each  as  it  comes  into  activity,  finds  its  appropriate  class 
of  objects  waiting  to  appeal  to  it,  and  to  put  it  on  trial.  But  as 
childhood  rises  into  youth,  and  youth  emerges  into  manhood,  the 
human  being  may  be  said  to  inhabit  a  series  of  worlds,  each  in 
its  turn  preparing  him  for  the  next  in  succession.  Each  stage 
of  life  has  its  own  facility  for  forming  habits.  Each  period  re¬ 
quires  its  own  amount  of  evidence  to  induce  belief ;  but  the  man 
himself  is  always  in  the  Divine  balances  while  weighing  evi¬ 
dence  in  his  own.  “  Probability  is  the  guide  of  life but  that 
which  constitutes  probability  in  youth,  is  held  to  be  uncertainty 
in  riper  years,  and,  in  each  stage,  furnishes  a  test  of  character. 

25.  To  the  question,  then,  Why  is  man  thus  nicely  poised 
between  the  too  much  and  the  too  little  ?  we  reply,  Because  he 
is  made  capable  of  maintaining  his'  balance,  and  of  augmenting 
his  strength  by  the  effort.  It  is  a  necessary  condition  of  his 
freedom.  His  well-being  requires  it.  He  would  be  justified  in 
complaining,  were  it  otherwise.  For  how  else  is  he  to  know 
either  his  powers,  or  their  limits  ?  Mere  information  on  the 
subject  would  not  suffice.  For  this  would  leave  all  the  emotional, 
voluntary,  and  moral  part  of  his  nature,  waste  and  useless.  Be¬ 
sides,  the  case  supposes  that  the  information  is  believed ;  but  the 
belief  of  a  rational  being  must  be  based  on  evidence,  and  the 
examination  of  evidence,  by  involving  an  exercise  of  will  and 
disposition,  brings  us  back  again  to  the  idea  of  probation.  Nei¬ 
ther  would  a  higher  position  for  man  in  the  scale  of  creation 
meet  the  supposed  difficulty.  Let  his  powers  of  intuition  be 
increased  to  any  conceivable  extent,  they  could  not  exceed  the 
conditions  of  his  nature  ;  in  other  words,  they  could  not  be 
unlimited,  and  against  these  larger  limits  the  same  supposed 
difficulty  would  still  press.  Besides  which,  natural  endow¬ 
ments,  being  the  gift  of  the  Creator,  are  “  neither  the  virtue 
nor  the  effect  of  the  virtue  of  the  being  possessing  them,”  and, 
consequently,  they  place  him  in  no  relation  either  to  praise  or 
blame.  In  order  to  this,  he  must  employ  them.  As  an  agent 
capable  of  right  action,  he  must  act  rightly.  The  moral  powers 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


369 


with  which  he  is  invested  become  his  only  by  use  and  appli¬ 
cation. 

26.  The  trial,  then,  to  which  every  part  of  the  human  being 
is  subjected,  is  itself  the  means  of  knowledge,  and  may  be  the 
means  of  virtue.  And  how  else  is  this  knowledge  to  be  acquired, 
unless  by  making  men  as  gods,  enabling  them  to  understand 
without  experience  ?  But  this  we  have  seen  to  be  an  impossible 
condition.  Man  can  make  nothing  his  own,  except  by  experience. 
“  It  is  a  maxim  of  the  schoolmen,  that  contrariorum  eadem  est 
scientia :  we  never  really  know  what  a  thing  is  unless  we  are 
also  able  to  give  a  sufficient  account  of  its  opposite.”  He  that 
knows  nothing  in  science  has  no  doubts.  The  mind  is  made  to 
know  its  own  state  in  and  by  its  acts  alone.  “  Even  as  in  geo¬ 
metrical  reasoning,  the  mind  knows  its  constructive  faculty  in 
the  act  of  constructing,  and  contemplates  the  act  in  the  'product , 
so  our  actions  are  the  means  by  which  alone  the  will  becomes 
assured  of  its  own  state  our  efforts  are  the  means  by  which  we 
ascertain  to  ourselves  both  our  powers  and  their  limits. 

27.  All,  therefore,  that  man,  as  an  accountable  being,  can 
justly  require  is,  not  that  he  should  be  exempted  from  trial,  for 
this  would  rob  him  of  the  means  of  self-improvement,  but  that 
his  trials  and  his  powers  should  be  adjusted  to  each  other. 
Accordingly,  he  finds  himself  in  a  system  in  which  the  Uvo  are 
so  balanced,  that  the  matter  which  he  has  to  employ  is  mixed, 
but  separable ;  the  earth  which  he  has  to  till,  though  barren,  is 
cultivable  ;  the  animals  which  he  requires,  though  wild,  are 
domesticable.  The  materials  on  which  his  art  is  to  be  occupied, 
though  hard,  are  workable ;  and  though  shapeless,  formable. 
The  objects  around  him,  though  confused  and  infinitely  varied, 
admit  of  classification  ;  however  beautiful,  they  are  imitable ; 
however  distant,  measurable.  The  laws,  on  the  constancy  of 
which  he  has  to  rely,  however  recondite,  are  provable  ;  the  tes¬ 
timony  demanding  his  faith,  however  variable,  is  ascertainable ; 
and  the  true,  though  unseen,  is  inferable.  The  excellence  of 
every  kind  to  which  he  is  called  to  aspire,  however  difficult,  is 
attainable ;  which  is  only  saying  that  all  the  trials  which  lie  in 
his  way,  however  formidable,  are  vincible.  In  every  step  of  the 
process,  if  successful,  he  is  finding  himself,  making  himself,  im¬ 
proving  himself ;  realizing  the  Divine  design  of  what  he  should 
be.  The  comparative  ease  of  the  probation  acquaints  him  with 
his  powers ;  its  comparative  difficulty  makes  him  sensible  of 
their  limits. 

28.  If  the  further  question  be  put,  Why  are  man’s  powers 


370 


MAN. 


and  their  limits  to  be  ascertained  to  him  only  as  the  results  of 
experience  ?  the  reply  is,  That  he  might  be  made  aware  of  his 
moral  freedom,  and  of  his  dependence,  and  so  answer  the 
ultimate  end  of  his  existence.  The  extent  of  his  powers  is  the 
measure  of  his  obligation  ;  and  the  ascertainment  of  their  limits 
is  the  discovery  of  his  dependence.  Men  do  not  like,  indeed, 
to  look  at  themselves  as  reflected  from  creation  in  this  light ; 
they  would  fain  regard  creation  as  a  theatre  for  exhibition, 
or  as  a  school  for  instruction,  or  as  a  temple,  in  which  the 
symbols  shall  pass  for  realities,  and  fill  them  with  pleasurable 
excitement.  But  the  Infinite  exists  not  for  amusement.  High 
and  mighty  purposes  move  Him  in  all  that  he  does.  One  of 
His  purposes  in  creating  the  universe,  of  which  man  forms  a 
part,  is  that  man  should  know  Him  as  the  Creator.  This  is  a 
fact,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  surely  as  important  for  man 
as  the  knowledge  of  any  other  fact.  But,  regarded  as  the  fact, 
the  perception  of  which  brings  the  Creator  into  man’s  horizon 
—  which  at  once  discovers  to  him  his  own  power  in  being  able 
to  make  the  discovery,  and  tells  him  of  its  limits,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  a  discovery  of  his  dependence  —  the  knowledge  of  it 
transcends  in  importance  the  knowledge  of  every  other  fact. 
And  when  to  this  it  is  added,  that  there  is  a  kind  and  degree 
of  emotion  appropriate  to  every  perception  of  truth,  and  of 
action  proper  to  every  emotion,  the  Creator  of  man  becomes 
his  moral  Governor,  and  man  awakens  to  a  consciousness  of 
obligation. 

29.  The  value  or  virtue  of  such  emotion  and  action,  however, 
depends  entirely  on  their  being  man’s  own  ;  and  this  they  can 
be  only  as  he  approves  of  them,  and  of  whatever  leads  to 
them.  All,  therefore,  that  he  can  justly  require  is,  that  his 
obligation  to  God,  as  a  voluntary  being,  shall  not  exceed  his 
powers ;  and  especially  that  he  shall  possess  the  means  of 
knowing  the  limits  of  his  power.  The  former  is  necessary  to 
his  self-development  and  well-being ;  without  it,  he  would 
have  no  motive  to  think  or  to  act.  The  latter  is  required  by 
the  Divine  character,  and  due  to  it ;  for  how  else  is  a  man  to 
recognize  the  dependent  relation  of  the  created  universe  ? 
Accordingly,  he  finds  himself  so  constituted,  and  so  surrounded 
by  a  larger  constitution  of  things,  that  every  exercise  of  power 
is  calculated  to  tell  him  of  its  limits,  and  his  consciousness  of 
obligation  for  the  right  employment  of  that  power,  is  accompa¬ 
nied  by  a  sense  of  dependence  on  its  Source. 

The  evidence  of  the  Divine  all-sufliciency  is  so  supplied  in 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


371 


creation,  that  in  finding,  and  arranging,  and  appreciating  it. 
man  is  developing  his  own  resources.  But  such,  also,  is  the 
balanced  adjustment  of  the  two,  that  every  step  of  his  progress 
discloses  some  new  aspect  of  his  dependence.  If  he  reason  a 
priori,  he  leaves  an  ultimate  fact  behind  him ;  if  a  posteriori, 
lie  finds  a  similar  fact  lying  before  him,  and  soon  reaches  it. 
However  anxious  he  may  be  to  complete  his  natural  theology, 
he  finds  that  he  must  be  contented  to  receive  it  in  small  suc¬ 
cessive  instalments  —  that  the  kingdom  of  truth,  in  all  its  depart¬ 
ments,  like  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  must  be  entered  in  the  spirit 
of  a  little  child.  However  much  he  may  know,  “  what  he  knows 
is  little,  and  worthless,  in  comparison  with  that  which  he  be¬ 
lieves  without  knowing,  and  still  less  in  comparison  .with  that 
which  he  is  ignorant  of.”  While  his  liabilities  are  equal  to  the 
number  of  his  powers  —  of  all  the  combinations  of  which  they 
admit  —  and  of  all  the  laws  and  facts  about  which  they  may  be 
exercised.  And  thus  the  evidence  of  his  own  power — even  the 
consciousness  of  his  own  freedom  —  is  so  checked  and  qualified 
by  the  unavoidable  limits  of  the  system  in  which  it  is  exercised, 
that  it  is  a  perpetual  memorial  of  his  dependence.  The  volun¬ 
tary  energy,  of  which  he  is  conscious,  becomes,  when  viewed  in 
the  light  of  the  conditions  which  enclose  it,  the  most  solemn  re¬ 
buke  of  his  pride  —  a  constant  discipline  of  devout  humility. 

30.  The  question,  then,  why  the  experience  of  which  we  are 
now  speaking  might  not  be  dispensed  with  ?  betrays  either  men¬ 
tal  incapacity,  or  culpable  ignorance  of  the  subject.  If  man’s 
freedom  be  a  fact,  so  also  is  his  dependence ;  and  the  emotions 
and  actions  attendant  on  either  become  moral  only  in  proportion 
as  he  recognizes  them  voluntarily.  He  who  is  insensible  to  his 
dependence,  is  not  only  blind  to  his  real  position  in  the  universe, 
he  is  unacquainted  with  his  responsible  power ;  for  he  is  living 
in  a  circle  whiclrhe  has  never  explored  to  the  circumference. 
But  more,  the  very  process  by  which  he  is  made  aware  of  his 
dependence,  actually  augments  his  power,  besides  rendering  him 
more  sensible  than  ever  of  the  claims  of  Him,  on  whom  he  is 
dependent.  The  most  precious  effect  of  man’s  power  is,  that  it 
enables  him  to  ascertain  the  limit  of  his  power ;  to  reach  the 
boundary  which  joins  the  Infinite.  At  this  point,  his  well-being, 
and  the  glory  of  the  Creator,  unite,  and  become  one.  Every 
act  of  obedience,  which  is  a  free  assertion  of  power,  disposes  him 
to  confess  his  dependence ;  and  every  devout  acknowledgment 
of  dependence  increases  his  power  to  obey.  So  that  the  highest 
means  of  self-improvement  are  intelligent  and  practical  homage 


372 


MAN. 


of  the  all-sufficient  God ;  and  the  highest  adoration  is  self 
improvement,  or  a  nearer  approach  to  the  Divine  image.  And 
every  part  of  the  Divine  method  points  to  this  sublime  con¬ 
clusion. 

31.  It  is  just  conceivable  that  the  question  may  be  inconside¬ 
rately  asked,  why,  since  every  limitation  of  man’s  power  exposes 
him  to  innumerable  liabilities,  a  Being  of  infinite  benevolence 
should  have  subjected  him  to  any  limits  ?  Limitation  itself  is 
not  an  evil ;  it  can  become  so  only  on  the  supposition  either  that 
man’s  probationary  liabilities  exceed  his  powers,  or  else  that 
man  voluntarily  abuses  his  adequate  power.  The  proper  and 
sufficient  reply,  however,  is,  that  the  creation  of  a  being  without 
limits  of.  some  kind  is  simply  inconceivable  and  impossible, 
creation  itself  being  an  act  within  limits.  The  only  question, 
therefore,  which  remains  relates  to  the  particular  limits  assigned 
to  human  nature  —  why,  when  it  was  competent  to  the  Divine 
Creator  to  constitute  a  being  of  a  higher  order,  did  he  select  the 
precise  order  which  man  actually  exhibits  ?  If  this  question  be 
asked  in  the  spirit  of  complaint,  it  proceeds  on  the  erroneous 
supposition  that  the  higher  order  of  power  which  it  desiderates 
might  have  been  bestowed  without  any  corresponding  increase 
of  liability.  Whereas,  the  balance  between  the  two  must  still 
have  been  maintained ;  freedom  cannot  be  separated  from  its 
consequences ;  so  that  a  change  of  power,  whether  greater  or 
less,  would  have  involved  a  corresponding  change  of  liability. 
Besides,  the  same  question  might  continue  to  be  asked  at  every 
supposed  increase  of  human  excellence.  Amd  if  proposed  re¬ 
specting  man,  why  not,  also,  respecting  every  sentient  existence, 
from  the  microscopic  insect  upwards  ?  Each  might  alike  com¬ 
plain  that  it  was  not  all  —  the  sole  recipient  of  all  that  infinite 
goodness  was  to  impart.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  however,  in 
respect  to  man,  that,  as  a  being  capable  of  indefinite  progression, 
it  matters  little  from  what  point  of  the  scale  of  existence  he  com¬ 
mences  his  course ;  inasmuch  as  he  may  be  constantly  approach¬ 
ing  and  overtaking  every  onward  measure  of  perfection.  Whole 
in  proportion  to  the  lowness  of  the  point  from  which  he  started, 
will  be  the  advantage  attending  his  subsequent  progress,  for  the 
excellence  acquired  will  be  his  own  in  a  sense  which  will  pro¬ 
portionally  increase  his  satisfaction,  and  reflect  glory  on  the 
Being  who  gave  him  the  necessary  capabilities.  But  the  ques¬ 
tion,  Why  man’s  actual  constitution  was  assigned  to  him  ?  may 
be  asked  in  the  mere  spirit  of  inquiry.  In  which  case,  looking 
at  the  vast  and  awful  circle  of  mystery  which  surrounds  us,  as 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


373 


a  motive  to  humility,  we  state  our  conviction,  the  grounds  of 
which  will  presently  appear,  that  one  of  the  innumerable  rea¬ 
sons  is,  in  order  that  man  might  subserve  a  plan  of  such  diver¬ 
sified  creations  as  shall  demonstate  the  Divine  all-sufficiency. 


Sect.  II.  —  That  'part  of  the  reason  which  relates  to  the  Divine 
all-sufficiency,  and  so  includes  man's  destiny. 

1.  The  sentence  with  which  the  last  section  concludes  may 
possibly  suggest  to  some  minds  the  idea,  that  if,  as  we  believe, 
the  exhibition  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency  be  the  ultimate  end 
of  creation,  the  only  adequate  plan  must  be  one  which  includes 
a  graduated  scale  of  being  filling  up  the  wide  interval  between 
the  extremes  of  non-existence  and  the  highest  relative  perfec¬ 
tion.  For  all-sufficiency,  it  might  be  said,  must  be  sufficiency 
for  so  much  as  that,  and  can  be  proved  only  by  it.  But  such  a 
supposition  overlooks  two  very  important  considerations :  first, 
that  the  exhibition  is  to  be  made  to  a  being  capable  of  inferring 
beyond  the  extent  of  his  evidence,  of  reasoning  from  the  actual 
to  the  possible  —  of  perceiving  that  his  own  mind  is  not  the 
measure  of  the  universe,  and  that  the  actual  creation  is  not  the 
measure  of  the  Creative  power  —  of  concluding  from  the  finite 
to  the  infinite.  Now,  for  such  a  being,  the  physical  demon¬ 
stration  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency,  by  literally  calling  into  be¬ 
ing  all  possible  orders  of  creations,  would  appear  to  be  eminent¬ 
ly  unsuitable,  for  it  would  compel  his  belief  on  the  subject,  and 
leave  no  room  whatever  for  the  voluntary  exercise  of  his 
powers.  Whereas,  one  of  the  highest  ends  of  creation  is  his 
probationary  self-development,  which  requires  that  his  powers 
shall  neither  be  superseded  nor  overborne,  but  be  so  condi¬ 
tioned  as  to  be  kept  in  harmonious  and  ever-strengthening  ac¬ 
tivity. 

2.  And,  secondly,  the  supposition  overlooks  this  progressive 
power,  according  to  which,  the  same  race  of  beings  have  so 
much  capability  lodged  in  them  from  the  first,  that,  without 
ever  losing  their  identity,  they  can  pass  through  successive 
stages  of  knowledge  and  holy  excellence  without  intermission 
and  without  end.  “  Why  (it  might  have  been  said  at  man’s 
creation),  why  is  he  not  gifted  with  organs  of  sense  which  shall 
supersede  laborious  analysis  and  slow  experiment  ?  Why,  for 
example,  are  not  his  eyes  microscopic  ?”  Because  he  himself 
is  capable  of  inventing  a  microscope,  and  of  strengthening  his 

32 


374 


MAN. 


mental  vision  by  the  invention.  “  Why  is  not  the  earth  itself 
nearer  to  our  ideas  of  perfection  ?”  Because  he  himself  is  ca¬ 
pable  of  making  it  realize  those  ideas,  and  of  perfecting  his  own 
nature  by  the  process.  Accordingly,  the  man  of  to-day  is  a 
very  different  being  from  the  man  of  six  thousand  years  ago, 
and  the  world  he  inhabits  a  very  different  world.  The  human 
constitution,  indeed,  is  essentially  the  same,  and  the  laws  of  Na¬ 
ture  are  unaltered ;  but  he  is  reading  an  advanced  chapter  of 
the  great  volume  of  Providence,  and  his  nature  responds  to 
the  change ;  while  generation  after  generation  has  actually 
passed  off  into  other  worlds,  and  has  there  attained  unknown 
stages  of  development,  only  to  prepare  for  others  equally  un¬ 
known.  Now,  by  this  arrangement,  the  same  race  of  beings 
may  be  regarded  as  rendering  unnecessary  the  creation  of  as 
many  separate  races  as  are  the  stages  through  which  it  is  des¬ 
tined  to  pass. 

3.  But  if  the  progress  and  identity  of  the  individual  from  the 
beginning  of  his  life  to  its  close,  presuppose  the  unchanged  con¬ 
tinuance  of  the  laws  of  his  own  constitution  and  of  the  world  to 
which  he  belongs,  so  the  progress  and  unity  of  the  human  race 
presuppose  the  immutability  of  everything  characteristic  in  man 
and  in  Nature.  The  repeal  of  an  original  and  essential  law 
of  either  would  render  all  the  accumulated  knowledge  and  ex¬ 
perience  of  the  past  inapplicable  and  useless.  Practically, 
there  would  be  no  past.  Such  a  change  would  be  a  commence¬ 
ment  of  everything  de  novo  —  a  new  revelation  to  a  new  race. 
The  reason,  then,  both  for  the  method  of  the  Divine  procedure, 
and  for  its  continuance,  gains  strength  with  every  successive 
age.  Discoveries  link  on  to  each  other.  Great  men,  -without 
designing  it,  find  themselves  standing  in  a  series.  The  lamp 
passes  onward  from  hand  to  hand.  “  The  hour-glass  of  one 
man’s  life”  loses  its  insignificance  by  mingling  its  sands  witl. 
those  of  the  life  of  the  species.  The  great  plan  evolves  from 
age  to  age. 

4.  In  proportion  to  the  magnitude  of  this  plan  —  to  the  num 
ber  of  the  elements  which  it  includes,  the  multiplied  complica¬ 
tions  of  which  they  are  susceptible,  and  the  high  and  diversified 
interests  ultimately  harmonized  by  the  process,  is  the  amount 
of  the  manifestation  which  it  affords  of  the  Divine  perfection, 
and  of  the  advantage  which  it  places  within  the  reach  of  man. 
Now,  we  have  seen  that  in  the  instance  of  the  individual  man 
—  of  the  first  man  —  his  liabilities  were  indefinitely  increased 
with  the  addition  of  every  organ,  and  member,  and  faculty; 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


375 


that  they  amounted  to  the  number  of  all  his  powers,  their  pos¬ 
sible  combinations,  and  the  laws  and  objects  on  which  they 
could  operate.  But  how  would  our  conceptions  of  this  subject 
have  been  enlarged,  could  we  have  foreseen  that  even  the  natu¬ 
ral  scenery  and  productions  of  the  earth  would,  in  a  sense,  be 
conveyed  into  the  mind  of  man,  and  be  taken  up  into  his  char¬ 
acter  ;  that  every  object  and  event  in  creation  would,  in  a  va¬ 
riety  of  ways,  be  wrought  into  the  texture  of  man’s  moral  his¬ 
tory  ;  and  that  every  law  expressed,  and  every  truth  symbo¬ 
lized,  would  sooner  or  later  become  a  test  of  character? 
Separated  into  families,  dwelling  in  distinct  localities,  and  with 
distinct  interests  to  maintain,  his  probationary  field  would  have 
been  seen  still  widening.  National  peculiarities  would  further 
complicate  the  great  experiment.  The  variety  of  character  and 
experience  made  possible  by  limiting  human  life,  and  by  dis¬ 
tributing  mankind  into  ages  and  generations,  would  have  been 
justly  deemed  incalculable  and  inexhaustible.  But  a  diversity 
of  language  and  of  religion !  —  if  we  could  have  known  that 
such  a  possibility  would  be  realized,  and  have  caught  only  a 
glimpse  of  the  new  combinations  of  character  and  experience 
which  such  distinctions  would  make  possible,  we  might  well 
have  felt  overwhelmed  at  the  magnitude  of  the  process  through 
which  man  might  be  destined  to  pass  ;  a  process  to  be  limited 
only,  perhaps,  by  its  falling  into  the  stream  of  similar  processes 
in  other  worlds,  all  at  length  flowing  together  into  the  same 
boundless  ocean. 

5.  Now,  if  the  system  to  which  man  belongs  be  thus  all-re¬ 
lated  and  progressive,  it  follows,  that  however  vast  and  pro¬ 
longed  it  may  be,  no  two  human  beings  can  ever  stand  in  pre¬ 
cisely  the  same  relation  to  it.  Each,  independently  of  his 
original  difference  of  mind,  occupies  his  own  point  of  time  and 
place,  from  which  he  reaches  the  external,  and  is  reached  by  it, 
through  media,  peculiar,  in  some  respects,  to  himself.  As  every 
man  begins  each  period  and  each  day  of  his  own  life  under  new 
circumstances,  so  each  member  of  the  race  begins  and  prose¬ 
cutes  life  itself  under  circumstances  distinguishable  from  those  of 
every  other.  For  the  same  reason,  each  separate  community 
has  a  character  of  its  own.  Much  as  it  may  have  in  common 
with  other  communities,  there  are  particulars  in  which  its  mor¬ 
al,  like  its  natural  scenery,  is  peculiar.  The  very  fact  that  it 
has  certain  advantages  and  disadvantages,  implies  that  it  has 
certain  liabilities  to  evil,  against  which  it  has  especially  to  guard, 
and  certain  talents  entrusted  to  it,  which  it  is  under  peculiar  ob¬ 
ligation  to  cultivate. 


376 


MAN. 


6.  Every  form  of  association  and  government  has  its  dis¬ 
tinctive  peculiarities.  In  one  of  the  noblest  passages  of  his 
writings,  Bacon  tells  us,  “  That  there  is  no  composition  of  estate 
or  society,  nor  order  of  quality  or  persons,  which  have  not  some 
point  of  contrariety  towards  true  knowledge ;  that  monarchies 
incline  wits  to  profits  and  pleasure,  commonwealths  to  glory  and 
vanity,  universities  to  sophistries  and  affectation,  cloisters  to  fa¬ 
bles  and  unprofitable  subtlety,  study  at  large  to  variety,  and 
that  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  mixture  of  contemplations  with  an 
active  life,  or  retiring  wholly  to  contemplations,  do  disable  or 
J finder  the  mind  more.” 

7.  In  the  stream  of  human  generations,  every  age  has  its  own 
portion  of  knowledge,  its  own  facilities  for  action,  its  own  prob¬ 
lems  for  solution,  and  its  own  appointed  work.  Every  advance 
in  civilization  draws  after  it  an  increase  of  laws  and  relations, 
and  each  new  relation  multiplies  the  occasions  of  transgression, 
even  though  the  intensity  of  crime  may  be  diminished.  Every 
age  has  its  own  kind  and  amount  of  evidence  of  Truth.  Reid 
speaks  of  an  eminent  mathematician,  who  “  attempted  to  ascer¬ 
tain  by  calculation  the  ratio  in  which  the  evidence  of  facts 
must  decrease  in  the  course  of  time,  and  fixed  the  period  when 
the  evidence  of  the  facts  on  which  Christianity  is  founded  shall 
become  evanescent,  and  when,  in  consequence,  no  faith  shall  be 
found  on  the  earth.”  Such  an  attempt  shows,  indeed,  that  every 
profession  and  department  of  knowledge,  if  followed  exclusively, 
has  a  tendency  to  narrow  the  mind,  and  to  incapacitate  it  for 
general  activity.  But  however  ridiculous  the  attempt  to  mea¬ 
sure  moral  evidence  by  a  mathematical  calculus,  it  is  quite  true 
that  the  evidence  of  Christianity  chiefly  relied  on  by  the  be¬ 
lievers  of  one  age,  differs  from  that  chiefly  relied  on  by  those 
of  another.  The  miraculous  evidence  has,  in  this  respect  (though 
still  retaining  an  indestructible  value  and  a  fixed  argumentative 
position),  gradually  and  comparatively  given  place  in  populai 
use  to  the  moral,  the  objective  to  the  subjective.  The  Book 
speaks  more  for  itself. 

8.  Diversity  of  speech  may  be  said  to  place  and  keep  a  peo 
pie  in  a  world  of  their  own,  insulated  from  the  rest  of  the  spe¬ 
cies.  There  is  more  than  fancy  in  the  idea  “  that  Divine  Provi¬ 
dence,  in  distributing  to  different  human  families  this  holy  gift 
of  speech,  had  a  further  purpose  than  the  material  dispersion 
of  the  human  race,  or  the  bestowing  on  them  varied  forms  of 
utterance ;  there  was  doubtless  therein  a  deeper  and  more  im¬ 
portant  end  —  the  sharing  out  among  them  of  the  intellectual 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


377 


powers.”*  In  harmony  with  this  conviction,  Schlegel,  regard¬ 
ing  the  loss  of  the  Divine  image  as  consisting  in  the  separation 
of  the  elements  of  the  human  consciousness,  views  the  Chinese, 
in  the  first  period  of  the  world,  as  representing  the  pure  rea¬ 
son  ;  the  Indians,  the  imagination ;  the  Egyptians,  the  under¬ 
standing  ;  and  the  Jews,  the  will :  each  in  its  unnatural  and 
fatal  isolation.  Now,  without  at  present  expressing  an  opin¬ 
ion  on  such  a  classification,  or  proceeding  with  his  application 
of  the  theory  to  the  second  and  third  periods  of  the  world, 
it  is  clear  that  as  each  family  of  languages  is  distinctive,  the 
mind  of  the  people  speaking  it  must  partake  of  the  distinction. 
The  language  of  one  portion  of  the  race  was  especially  adapted 
for  stereotyping  and  retaining  knowledge ;  that  of  another,  for 
enlarging  and  imparting  it.  One  nation  found  itself  using  a 
speech  of  picture-words,  descriptive  of  objects,  and  adapted  for 
proverbs  and  poetry ;  another  was  invited  by  the  structure  of 
its  language  to  mark  the  relations  of  things,  to  lose  itself  in  ab¬ 
struse  distinctions,  and  to  multiply  schools  of  philosophy. 

9.  Even  the  world  of  one  period,  were  it  revisitable,  would 
be  new  and  strange  to  the  generations  of  a  preceding  era.  The 
introduction  even  of  a  new  esculent  has  changed  the  character 
of  a  people.  A  new  amusement  —  that  of  the  drama,  for  ex¬ 
ample  —  has  come  to  give  law  to  public  opinion,  and  to  mould 
the  laws,  and  to  affect  the  destiny  of  a  state.  Society  is  an  or¬ 
ganization  :  and  an  organic  change  in  the  human  body  —  the 
insertion  of  a  new  limb,  or  the  addition  of  a  new  function — ■ 
could  hardly  lead  to  a  greater  change  or  readjustment  of  all  the 
pre-existing  parts,  than  the  appointment  of  a  new  office,  or  in¬ 
stitution,  of  any  importance,  does  in  relation  to  the  framework 
of  society.  The  introduction  of  a  new  truth  has  sometimes 
thrown  all  its  elements  into  fermentation.  A  great  principle, 
from  the  moment  it  comes  to  be  recognized,  never  ceases  to 
struggle  for  its  right  place  and  power  in  society.  The  discovery 
of  the  “new  world”  commenced  the  re-creation  of  the  old. 
The  inventions  and  discoveries  of  science  have  gone  on  regu¬ 
larly  enlarging  the  domains  of  thought,  till  man  has  carried  his 
generalizations  beyond  the  planets.  The  telescope  has  pushed 
back  his  material  limits  so  as  to  make  him  the  inhabitant  of 
another  universe ;  and  imagination,  which  once  made  a  labo¬ 
rious  flight  to  Olympus,  and  regarded  the  mountain-bound  hori¬ 
zon  as  the  place  of  the  departed, — the  ne  plus  ultra  of  exist- 


*  Dr.  Wiseman’s  Lectures,  y.  i.,  p.  138. 

32* 


378 


MAN. 


e  .ice,  —  now  finds  no  rest  for  the  sole  of  its  foot  on  this  side 
toe  last-discovered  planet.  Man  now  consciously  looks  at  ob¬ 
jects  in  light  streaming  from  worlds  which  may  have  ceased  to 
exist  before  the  Adamic  creation  commenced. 

10.  Carrying  our  views  into  those  distant  regions,  and  on  the 
supposition  that  they  are  “  not  created  in  vain  —  that  [they  are] 
made  to  be  inhabited,”  *  how  highly  probable  is  it  that  every 
intelligent  race  by  which  they  are  peopled  (or  are  to  be  peopled, 
for  the  human  race  may  be  one  of  the  earliest)  is  advancing 
from  different  points  of  a  vast  circumference  of  being  to  the 
same  centre  as  man.  Each  world,  on  this  hypothesis,  may 
stand  in  a  relation  to  the  ultimate  history  of  the  universe,  sim¬ 
ilar  to  that  which  each  man  sustains  to  the  moral  history  of  the 
earth.  After  having  each  had  its  own  particular  starting-point, 
and  its  own  unique  course  of  discipline  and  experience,  all 
worlds  will  be  found  contributing  their  distinct  proofs  of  the 
all-sufficiency  of  Him  who  is  “  all  in  all.”  And  even  beyond 
this ;  as  in  the  history  of  our  own  globe,  the  events  of  one  era 
(say  of  the  animal  creation)  looked  forwards  to  the  coming  of 
the  human  era  for  their  ulterior  reasons,  so  events  taking  place 
to-day  in  one  part  of  the  moral  universe  may  look  back  to  an 
origin  anterior  to  the  creation  of  man,  and  forwards  to  issues  in 
worlds  not  yet  called  into  being,  and  to  points  of  duration  not 
yet  brought  within  the  limits  of  human  arithmetic.  Thus  era 
may  link  on  to  era,  as  well  as  world  to  world ;  and  yet  each, 
u  differing  in  glory  ”  from  the  rest,  may  have  this  in  common 
with  them  all  —  that  its  rays,  however  late  in  their  arrival,  shall 
finally  blend  with  the  central  glory.  Though  even,  like  erratic 
humanity,  its  orbit  may  have  its  aphelia  of  distances  fearful  to 
imagine,  it  will  finally  have  its  perihelia  also,  and  mingle  its 
radiance  with  essential  Light. 

11.  But,  as  in  the  preceding  section,  we  saw  that  each  part 
of  the  human  being,  and  each  period  of  his  life,  is  subjected  to 
a  probationary  course,  so  here  the  same  counterpoise  of  powers 
and  trials  may  be  looked  for,  on  a  yet  larger  scale.  It  is  not 
enough  that  each  number  and  each  period  of  the  great  com¬ 
munity  of  men,  or  of  worlds,  has  a  character  of  its  own  ;  that 
character  supposes  distinctive  treatment  —  treatment  correspond¬ 
ing  to  the  kind  of  danger  to  which  its  connection  with  others 
may  expos  3  it,  and  to  the  end  which  the  whole  is  destined  to 
subserve.  Now,  it  is  evident  that,  if  each  man,  for  example, 


*  Isaiah,  xlv.  18. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


379 


is  to  be  a  free  moral  agent,  notwithstanding  his  intimate,  con¬ 
tact  with  others  of  his  species,  their  power  over  him  must  be 
confined  within  certain  limits.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be 
possible  for  that  power  to  reach  those  limits,  otherwise  his  con¬ 
nection  with  his  race  will  be  less  real  than  his  relation  to  the 
dust  on  which  he  treads.  The  well-being  of  the  child  is  made 
to  depend  on  parental  influence.  Why,  then,  it  may  be  asked, 
is  not  that  influence  made  irresistible  ?  Near  as  the  parent 
may  approach  his  child,  there  is  a  central  inclosure  into  which 
he  cannot  obtrude.  Much  of  his  experience  as  he  may  impart, 
there  is  more  which  he  withholds.  Rather,  he  imparts  only  the 
results  of  his  experience.  Experience  itself  is  incommunicable 
—  the  efflorescence  of  a  man’s  own  personality.  Between  the 
individuality  of  the  parent  and  the  child  there  is  a  gulf  fixed  as 
real  and  as  impassable  as  that  which  separates  the  solar  system 
from  the  fixed  stars.  Each  has  his  inviolable  orbit.  How  else 
could  the  personal  distinctness  and  identity  of  each  moral  agent 
be  maintained  —  or  the  terrible  fiction  of  the  poet  of  the  Inferno 

•  escape  realization,  in  which  the  fiend  and  his  victim  commingle 
and  become  one,  or  that  in  which  they  exchange  their  respective 
natures  ?  The  insulation  and  seclusion  of  the  elements  of  ac¬ 
countability  are  as  essential  to  the  responsible  freedom  of  each 
human  being,  as  a  community  of  nature  is  to  the  mutual  de¬ 
pendence  of  the  species. 

12.  Each  family  is  a  world  apart.  It  gravitates  to  other  fam¬ 
ilies,  indeed  :  has  interests  in  common  with  them  ;  cannot  exist 
without  them.  Why,  then,  should  they  not  all  live  in  unre¬ 
stricted  intercourse,  and  in  sight  of  each  other?”  Because 
each  is  constituted  to  require  a  separate  space  for  the  free  de¬ 
velopment  of  its  own  powers  :  whereas,  the  communism  implied 
in  the  question  would  be  only  a  new  form  of  intolerable  oppres¬ 
sion,  in  which  one  kind  of  knowledge  would  outrun  reflection, 
and  another  kind  forestall  experience,  and  many  things  would 

„  be  disclosed  and  felt  which  would  prove  fatal  to  moral  liberty 
and  progress.  Hence,  each  family  draws  apart  from  the  rest. 
And,  as  darkness  curtains  off  each  man  from  his  fellows,  and 
puts  him  on  a  probation  distinct  from  that  of  the  day,  so  the 
local  separation  of  the  family,  and  the  seclusion  of  the  tent  or 
the  house,  place  the  family  on  a  probation  of  its  own. 

13.  Why  is  the  great  collection  of  families  distributed  into 
nations,  separated  by  mountains  and  oceans,  and  still  more  by 
diversity  of  speech  ?  Why,  if  they  have  common  interests,  is  not 
the  earth  one  vast  plain,  and  all  mankind  encamped  together  in 


380 


MAN. 


the  centre  ?  Partly,  because  they  haye  interests  in  common  — 
a  truth  so  momentous,  that  man  is  left  to  learn  it,  and  to  make  it 
his  own  by  experience.  Because  national  separation  is  as  ne¬ 
cessary  to  the  progress  of  humanity,  as  diyision  of  labor  is  to 
the  perfection  of  art ;  and  hence,  while  the  unwieldy  empires 
of  the  yast  and  unbroken  continent  of  Asia  remained  compara- 
tiyely  unchanged  for  ages,  the  indented  coasts  and  insular  lands 
of  Europe  were  the  some  of  seyeral  distinct  and  successiye 
civilizations  ;  and  because,  in  the  formation  of  its  character,  and 
the  fulfilment  of  its  distinctive  office,  each  community  may 
justly  require  that  it  shall  be  left  to  the  free  deyelopment  of  its 
powers  and  conditions.  If  the  amount  of  stimulating  influence 
from  without  fall  below  a  certain  point,  the  nation  is  in  danger 
of  becoming  stationary,  or  even  retrograde.  If  that  point  be 
exceeded,  the  equipoise  of  its  powers  is  disturbed,  and  its  free¬ 
dom  is  virtually  lost.  Laws  can  be  appreciated  only  as  they 
are  seen  or  felt  to  be  necessary.  Institutions,  abstractedly  the 
best,  may  be  practically  the  worst  for  the  nation,  until  it  has 
grown  up  to  them.  If  it  is  to  have  principles  of  its  own  in. 
harmony  with  eternal  truth,  it  must  have  an  experience  of  its 
own.  in  the  heat  and  conflict  of  which  they  have  had  time  to 
work  themselves  clear,  and  to  consolidate. 

14.  Why  are  not  all  the  nations  of  the  earth  contemporane¬ 
ous,  instead  of  being  distributed  into  ages  and  generations  ex¬ 
tending  through  thousands  of  years  ?  But  this  is  a  question 
which  involves,  not  so  much  any  modification  of  the  existing 
constitution  of  things  as  the  constitution  itself — not  so  much 
the  Divine  method,  as  the  Divine  reasons  for  the  method.  It 
questions  alike  the  reasonableness  of  individual  progress  from 
youth  to  age,  and  the  progressiveness  of  the  entire  scheme  of 
the  Divine  procedure.  This  is,  ultimately,  to  question  the  rea¬ 
sonableness,  and  even  the  possibility,  of  a  Divine  manifestation. 
If.  then,  the  great  process  through  which  humanity  is  to  be  con¬ 
ducted  asks  for  diversified  localities  and  a  succession  of  ages,  it 
follows  that  the  greater  that  diversity,  and  the  more  numerous 
the  finks  of  that  succession,  the  more  varied  the  experience  of 
the  race  will  be,  and  consequently,  the  more  conclusive  and 
complete  the  grand  result.  That  result,  however,  clearly  re¬ 
quires  that  two  extremes  should  be  avoided.  The  experience 
of  no  one  nation  or  age  must  so  stand  apart  from  that  ot  all 
others  as  to  be  incompatible  with  the  unity  of  the  whole ; 
neither  must  it  be  so  produced  by  them,  and  identified  with 
them,  as  to  possess  no  characteristic  of  its  own.  The  former 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


381 


extreme  —  that  of  too  great  isolation  —  is  guarded  against  by 
the  arrangement  which  provides  that,  however  diversified  man’s 
probationary  localities,  they  shall  all  be  on  the  same  planet ; 
and  that,  however  many  generations  may  intervene  between  the 
first  and  the  last,  they  shall  all  be  members  of  one  family  — 
partakers  of  a  common  nature.  To  provide  against  the  latter 
extreme,  each  generation,  though  bom  apparently  in  the  mould 
of  the  past,  informs  that  mould  with  a  new  spirit,  and  thus  im¬ 
perceptibly  changes  its  shape.  The  very  bonds  which  seemed 
to  threaten  its  proper  freedom,  may  only  serve  to  provoke  and 
hasten  a  Samson-like  assertion  of  that  freedom.  New  wants, 
and  dangers  unknown  before,  call  forth  powers  equally  new. 
Though  the  stadium  is  worn  by  the  feet  of  former  generations, 
each  age  resumes  the  race,  runs  for  a  new  prize,  and  contends 
for  it  in  the  presence  of  new  witnesses.  The  individuality  of 
each  is  preserved,  combined  with  the  unity  of  all. 

15.  And  can  we  suppose  that  we  have  reached  the  circum¬ 
ference  of  the  Divine  scheme,  when  we  have  found  that  the 
history  of  mere  humanity  is  a  whole  ?  If  such  were  the  little¬ 
ness  of  the  moral  plan,  the  magnitude  of  the  physical  scheme 
would  cast  it  into  utter  insignificance.  The  earth  itself  belongs 
to  a  planetary  system.  The  recent  discovery  of  a  new  planet 
has  extended  the  limits  of  the  solar  system,  two  or  three  times 
beyond  its  furthest  boundary  as  previously  known.  Yet,  even 
there,  every  movement  of  the  slow  and  solitary  traveller  in  space 
confesses  the  presence  and  power  of  a  mysterious  reality  which 
binds  it  to  the  sun,  and  to  every  material  being  within  its 
mialitv  orbit.  The  motion  of  comets  shows  that  the  same 
gravitating  power  extends  twenty  times  further  than  the  orbit 
of  that  distant  planet.  Other  planets,  therefore,  may  be  wan¬ 
dering  remoter  still.  But  could  we  reach  the  outermost-  con¬ 
fines  of  the  system,  and  look  across  the  vast  gulfs  which  sepa¬ 
rate  it  from  its  nearest  neighbors  among  the  fixed  stars,  what 
should  we  recogniz'  there  but  family  and  friendly  features? 
Radiant  heat ;  the  ah-pervading  power  of  gravitation  ;  the  pre¬ 
vailing  character  of  the  celestial  groupings  ;  the  probable  traject 
of  comets  ;  and  light,  with  its  uniform  properties  and  equal 
velocity,  conveying  information  from  every  region  of  space  to 
every  other  —  all  combine  in  proclaiming  a  unity  of  plan  and 
action  in  the  mechanism  of  the  universe.  The  countless  as¬ 
semblage  of  worlds,  though  each  with  a  voice  of  its  own,  con¬ 
fess  to  the  same  all-encompassing  physical  jurisdiction. 

Now,  in  whatever  stage  of  the  sublime  consummation  the 


382 


MAX. 


universe  may  at  'present  be,  can  we  suppose  either  that  intel¬ 
lectual  and  moral  existence  shall  ultimately  fall  far  within  the 
limits  of  the  material ;  or  that,  while  the  chorus  of  the  spheres 
is  the  Unity  of  the  Cosmos,  the  orders  of  the  spiritual  universe 
shall  never  be  able  to  combine  in  the  loftier  strain  of  their  own 
unity  ?  If  continuity  and  oneness  were  wanting  in  either,  surely 
it  would  not  be  in  the  spiritual  creation.  So  essential  does 
such  unity  appear  to  the  proof  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency,  and 
so  demonstrative  of  it,  that  the  want  of  it  would  seem  to  obscure 
every  other  illustration  that  could  be  adduced  in  its  behalf. 
But  the  absence  of  such  all-pervading  spiritual  affinity  is  incon¬ 
ceivable.  For,  as  the  relation  of  the  entire  spiritual  creation  to 
the  Creator  must  be  supposed  to  be  more  intimate  than  that  of 
the  physical,  because  connatural  with  Him,  so  also  may  the 
relation  of  every  part  of  the  spiritual  creation  to  every  other 
part.  If,  then,  (as  we  believe)  the  oneness  of  the  plan  which 
comprehends  the  material  universe  is  only  an  intimation,  a 
shadow,  of  the  union  which  pervades  all  orders  of  spiritual 
being,  why,  it  may  be  further  inquired,  should  the  visible  crea¬ 
tion  be  broken  up  as  it  is  into  spheres  and  systems,  and  be  scat¬ 
tered  through  immensity  ?  Why,  for  example,  should  our  earth 
iloat  so  far  apart  from  the  system  to  which  it  belongs  ?  Why 
should  this  system  itself  be  separated  by  such  vast  intervals 
from  the  great  astral  group  to  which  it  belongs  ?  And  this 
group  — -  why  does  it  lie  off,  an  islet  in  the  infinity  of  space  ? 
Why  do  not  all  these  wanderers  in  immensity  aggregate  and 
cohere,  and  form  one  immeasurable  mass,  on  the  wide  surface 
of  which  the  interests  of  each  order  of  intelligent  beings  shall 
be  disclosed  to  every  other,  and  become  the  interests  of  all  F 
Rather,  why,  instead  of  such  a  common  fund  of  experience, 
should  such  diversity  of  orders  exist,  to  make  it  possible  ?  for 
the  continuity  and  sameness  of  the  habitable  universe  very 
naturally  suggest  a  corresponding  sameness  in  the  nature  of  its 
inhabitants.  And  thus  this  course  of  questioning  answers  and 
dishonors  itself ;  for  it  ends  virtually  in  the  inquiry  why  the 
universe,  material  and  spiritual,  is  not  less  varied,  and  less 
ample  than  it  is,  and  therefore,  less  worthy  of  the  Divine  per¬ 
fections. 

16.  Now,  as  to  the  proximate  reason  for  the  impassable  gulfs 
which  separate  the  heavenly  bodies,  it  is  doubtless  a  physical 
ordination  for  the  stability  of  the  whole  mechanism. 

But,  regarding  the  material  creation,  as  subservient  to  the 
spiritual,  a  moral  reason  for  the  arrangement  presents  itself  to 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


383 


the  mind,  of  the  highest  significance.  Man’s  freedom  of  action 
requires  the  seclusion  which  is  thus  secured ;  and,  doubtless, 
he  needs  it  only  in  common  with  other  voluntary  natures.  Let 
it  be  supposed  that  the  conditions  implied  in  the  preceding  ques¬ 
tions  were  complied  with ;  that  the  material  masses,  emerging 
from  depths  which  no  space-penetrating  power  has  yet  explored, 
should  approach  and  cohere ;  and  that  all  the  hosts  of  intelli¬ 
gences,  in  their  distinct  communities,  and  in  their  different 
stages  of  progress,  should  come  from  their  strange  and  distant 
domains,  to  concentrate  and  to  act  within  sight  of  man,  who 
does  not  feel  that,  from  that  moment,  his  own  voluntary  agency 
would  pause  !  How  easy  to  picture  him  paralyzed  by  the  ter¬ 
rors  of  the  scene,  or  absorbed  by  its  novelty,  or  stimulated  by 
its  grandeurs,  to  frenzied  activity.  The  equilibrium  of  his  pow¬ 
ers  would  be  gone.  In  order  to  its  recovery,  therefore,  the  dis¬ 
tracting  vision  must  be  dismissed.  Those  unknown  orders  must 
cease  to  press  in  upon  him.  He  is  not  made  to  act  in  their 
presence.  He  must  “  know  only  in  part.”  If  his  probationary 
freedom  is  to  be  resumed,  the  vast  material  continent  must  be 
broken  up,  and  each  island  world  float  back  to  its  remote  orbit. 
There,  the  doings  of  each  order,  hidden  from  the  far-reaching 
gaze  of  his  eye,  aided  by  all  the  resources  of  art,  must  be  left 
to  *his  imagination  alone.  And  thus  is  it  wisely  ordered,  ac¬ 
cording;  to  the  existing  arrangement,  that  although  the  material 
system  is  detached  and  secluded  from  the  group,  and  the  planet 
from  the  system,  age  from  age,  and  the  nation  from  the  world, 
the  family  from  the  nation,  and  the  individual  from  the  family, 
each  can  stand  in  the  midst  of  these  concentric  circles  with  in¬ 
fluences  streaming  in  upon  him  from  every  part  and  point  of  the 
vast  circumference,  yet  be  really  and  consciously  free.  With  lines 
of  convergence  reaching  him  from  every  part  of  the  surround¬ 
ing  universe,  he  presents  the  spectacle  of  a  being  universally 
related,  yet  individually  free. 

17.  And  then,  in  the  infinite  complication  of  adjustments 
necessary  to  attain  this  end,  for  every  being  of  every  other 
order,  as  well  as  for  man,  we  are  pointed  to  the  ultimate  reason 
of  the  whole  —  the  manifestation  of  Divine  Perfection.  The 
bare  fact  that  each  human  probationer  occupies  a  post  of  obser¬ 
vation  differing  in  some  respects  from  that  of  every  other  mem¬ 
ber  of  his  own  race,  reminds  us  that  every  order  of  intelligence 
has  its  own  experience,  and  each  individual  of  each  order  his 
own  character.  A  mere  glance  in  this  direction  overwhelms  the 
mind.  The  conditions  necessary  for  such  an  administration  are 


384 


MAN. 


inconceivable.  The  Being  who  can  harmonize  such  dependence 

with  such  freedom,  and  such  variety  with  unitv.  must  be  all- 

»  • 

sufficient!  We  have  just  been  speaking  of  gravitation  as  an 
all-pervading  principle.  Possibly  it  is  almost  the  only  physical 
law  which  our  planet  may  have  in  common  with  some  other  of 
the  distant  parts  of  the  material  universe.  The  law  is  here  so 
overlaid  by  corpuscular  forces,  so  concealed  by  the  distracting 
influences  of  other  phenomena,  that  it  is  necessary  to  look  away 
from  the  surface  of  the  planet,  and  to  contemplate  the  celestial 
movements,  in  order  to  recognize  the  sublime  and  mysterious 
reality.  Very  different  may  be  the  local  forces,  and  the  intricate 
play  of  the  forces,  which  constitute  the  life  of  other  globes. 
For  these  distinctive  phenomena,  each  world  must  have  cal¬ 
culations  and  tables  of  its  own.  But  all.  on  turning  from  the 
individual  details  of  their  respective  worlds,  and  looking  out  at 
the  free  movements  of  these  worlds  in  Space,  may  perceive,  as 
man  does,  that  they  are  surveying  the  empire  of  a  universal  law. 
Here,  losing  sight  of  the  variety  arising  from  the  qualitative 
heterogeneousness  of  matter,  a  variety  which  distinguishes  each 
world  from  all.  tliev  are  invited  to  survey  the  disengaged  and 

mr  m' 

unimpeded  operations  of  a  law  which  unites  them  all  into  one 
grand  whole. 

18.  Xow,  is  it  not  more  than  probable  that  the  material  i*in 
this  respect  a  shadow  of  the  spiritual  ?  We  cannot  suppose  that 
the  moral  history  of  our  own  race  is  the  exact  repetition  of  that 
of  any  other  race.  We  have  ground  to  believe,  rather,  that  in 
all  its  details,  at  least,  it  is  specific ;  that  the  history  tvhich  may 
most  nearly  resemble  it,  is  yet  characteristically  different.  And 
this  difference  may  be.  not  the  measure,  indeed,  but  a  sample  of 
the  variety  which  distinguishes  each  from  every  other.  What. 

W  * '  • 

then,  is  the  great  uniting  principle  of  which  these  varieties  are 
only  the  particular  modifications  ?  Could  we  make  the  tour  of 
the  intelligent  universe,  can  we  conceive  of  our  finding  anv  race 
where  the  obligation  of  supreme  love  to  supreme  excellence  is 
not  binding?  Probably  there  is  no  world  in  which  its  operation 
appears  in  precisely  the  same  results.  But  looking  away  from 
each  specific  variety  arising  from  the  varied  media  through 
which  it  operates,  we  should  find  no  order  of  beings  whose 
world  might  not  be  heard.  Sinai-like,  uttering,  in  its  own  pecu¬ 
liar  manner,  the  one  law — ••  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God 
with  all  thy  heart.*’  This  is  the  all-pervading  law  essential  to 
the  stability  and  well-being  of  the  spiritual  universe.  Amd  then, 
as  the  law  of  gravitation,  after  taking  us  to  a  height  from  which 


EE  AS  ON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


385 


all  the  material  creation  is  seen  generalized  into  a  single  fact, 
leaves  ns  standing  in  the  felt  presence  of  the  Lawgiver,  so  the 
law  which  unites  all  the  spiritual  creation  into  one  moral  govern¬ 
ment.  leaves  us  consciously  in  the  awful  presence  of  the  infinite 
Governor.  And  if,  in  that  presence,  we  try  to  conceive  what  He 
must  be  whose  eve  surveys  at  once  both  the  united  whole,  and 
the  infinite  variety  of  the  parts,  we  can  only  seek  relief  in  the 
admission  that  He  is  God  all-sufficient. 

19.  Indefinitelv  neater  are  the  views  of  the  Divine  resources 
suggested  bv  the  reflection  that  the  unitv  of  the  creation  is  of  a 
kind  to  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the  fact,  that  it  is  ever  re¬ 
ceiving  accessions,  making  advances,  entering  into  new  internal 
relations,  always  Becoming.  As  a  new  generation  is,  at  this 
moment,  graduallv  and  silentlv  mingling  with  the  stream  of  the 
world’s  population,  so  may  new  orders  of  accountable  beings  be 
imperceptibly  taking  their  reserved  and  appointed  places  in  the 
great  eommunitv  of  mind.  As  every  human  being  retains  his 
individualitv,  notwithstanding  his  community  of  nature  and  con- 
dition  with  his  species,  and  even  though  his  individuality  varies 
from  hour  to  hour,  so.  in  the  great  family  of  worlds,  no  two  or- 
ders  of  being  probably  exist  in  precisely  the  same  stage  of  pro¬ 
gress,  or  sustain  exactly  the  same  relations  to  the  immense  whole. 
It  has  been  adduced  as  a  striking  illustration  of  the  Divine  fore- 

o 

sight,  that  the  season  of  the  birth  of  the  voung  of  certain  animals 
should  be  adjusted  to  the  season  of  the  year,  and  to  the  period 
of  the  food  most  conducive  to  its  well-being  :  the  preparation  for 
the  birth  of  the  animal,  and  the  preparation  for  the  birth  of  its 
food.  ( say  the  larvae  of  insects,)  dating  from  very  different  points 
of  time.  TThat,  then,  shall  we  say  of  the  plan  which  provides 
for  the  accountable  freedom  of  successive  generations  of  human 
beings,  and  which  provides  for  it,  partly,  by  occupying  them  for 
ages  in  discovering  and  applying  the  material  provisions  which 
had  been  slowly  laying  up  for  them  uncountable  ages  before  the 
first  of  their  race  was  called  into  being  I  And  what  shall  we  say, 
further,  of  the  plan  which  provides  that  such  a  world,  freighted 
with  the  responsible  and  immortal  interests  of  unknown  myriads, 
should  silently  take  its  place,  and  hold  on  its  course,  amidst  a 
vast  family  of  worlds,  in  which  each  differs  from  all,  and  is  yet 
in  perfect  harmony  with  the  well-being  ot  all ;  and  which,  as 
thev  have  emerged  from  the  unfathomable  depths  of  the  past, 
are  all  moving  on  to  an  endless  future,  along  every  point  of  which 
they  are  waited  for  by  similar  interests,  to  advance  together  to- 

33 


386 


MAN. 


wards  ever  augmenting  issues  !  The  bare  imagination  of  such 
a  plan  is  suggestive  of  a  Being  of  infinite  resources. 

20.  A  probable  limit  to  this  view  of  the  indefinite  variety  of 
worlds  and  systems  possibly  included,  at  any  one  time,  under  the 
Divine  administration,  we  referred  to  at  the  commencement  of 
this  section — namely,  that  the  same  race  of  beings  by  passing 
through  successive  stages  of  experience,  might  render  unneces¬ 
sary  the  creation  of  as  many  separate  orders  as  the  stages  they 
pass  through.  And  this  arrangement,  though  limiting  the  variety 
of  the  orders  of  beings  created,  would  obviously  enlarge  our  con¬ 
ceptions  of  the  Divine  resources  by  furnishing  a  severer  test  of 
all-sutficiency ;  just  as  a  single  mechanism,  capable  of  a  thousand 
diversified  applications,  would  be  justly  regarded  as  a  production 
incomparably  more  astonishing  than  that  of  a  thousand  machines 
each  susceptible  of  only  one  such  application. 

In  the  history  of  man,  such  an  arrangement  exists.  But  who 
could  undertake  to  specify  the  conditions  involved  even  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  this  single  race,  without  feeling  his  presumption  rebuked 
at  the  first  step  ?  Even  if  man  had  perished  in  his  first  sin,  his 
brief  existence  here  would  have  involved  provisions  too  compli¬ 
cated  for  any  created  mind  to  expound.  But  his  continuance 
here  in  successive  generations  adds  indefinite  complication  to 
those  conditions  at  every  step.  Not  only  does  his  life  depend 
on  the  nice  adjustment  of  his  constitution  to  the  size,  the  density, 
the  path  of  the  earth  —  each  of  which,  as  it  is  one  only  out  of 
millions  of  possible  combinations,  is  evidently  the  result  of  de¬ 
sign —  his  science,  the  gradual  education  of  his  intellect,  involves 
dependences  indefinitely  more  profound  and  delicate  still.  Not 
only  does  his  physical  well-being  depend  on  a  certain  number  of 
materials  being  laid  up  in  the  earth  for  his  use  ;  his  progress  in 
the  arts,  and  his  moral  welfare,  require  that  they  shall  be  laid 
up  in  a  certain  manner,  be  discovered  and  applied  with  certain 
difficulty,  admit  of  certain  combinations,  at  certain  stages  of  civ¬ 
ilized  development,  and  be  limited  in  their  moral  influences 
within  certain  calculable  bounds.  Not  only  (if  mind  is  to  tri¬ 
umph  over  matter)  must  the  planet,  in  all  its  laws  and  properties, 
be  relative  to  the  powers  of  the  human  being,  it  must  be  relative, 
also,  to  the  tract  of  time  allotted  for  the  continuance  of  the  race 
upon  it,  and  to  the  opportunities  man  may  have,  during  that  time, 
for  understanding  and  subduing  it.  Let  us  not  wonder  (says 
Seneca,*  in  a  lofty  strain)  that  what  is  so  deep  is  brought 


*  Qusest.  Nat.,  vii.,  25,  30,  31., 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


387 


out  so  slowly.  It  is  not  yet  fifteen  hundred  years  since  Greece 
reckoned  the  stars,  and  gave  them  names.  These  things  can  be 
explained  only  by  a  long  succession  of  inquiries.  We  have  but 
just  begun  to  mark  some  of  them.  “  The  members  of  future 
generations  (he  remarks)  will  know  many  of  which  we  are  igno¬ 
rant.  Many  things  are  reserved  for  ages  to  come,  when  our 
memory  shall  have  passed  away.  The  world  would  be  a  small 
thing,  indeed,  if  it  did  not  contain  matter  of  inquiry  for  all  the 
world.  Eleusis  reserves  something  for  the  second  visit  of  her 
worshipper.  So,  too,  Nature  does  not  all  at  once  disclose  all  Her 
mysteries.  We  think  ourselves  initiated;  we  are  but  in  the 
vestibule.  The  arcana  are  not  thrown  open  without  distinction, 
and  without  reserve.  This  age  will  see  some  things ;  that  which 
comes  after  us,  others.” 

21.  Not  only  may  man’s  wants  vary  and  increase  as  he  advances 
through  time,  some  of  these  may  be  of  a  nature  to  require  that 
Divine  provision  should  not  be  made  for  them,  or,  at  least, 
should  not  be  made  known,  till  they  actually  arise,  and  are  felt. 
Such  is 'one  of  the  conditions  of  any  revelation  from  God  to  man. 
Though  given,  in  parts,  to  individuals,  it  must  be  adapted  as  a 
whole  to  the  species.  Though  given  progressively,  it  must, 
when  completed,  be  adapted  to  a  race  still  in  progress,  and  be 
calculated  to  promote  it.  In  meeting  the  difficulties  of  one  age, 
it  must  not  supersede  the  diligence  of  another,  but  inspire  and 
reward  it.  Though  present  to  guide  the  first  step  of  the  first 
human  being,  it  must  await  each  succeeding  generation  on  a 
higher  level,  and  at  a  new  starting  point,  and  yet  be  found 
present  with  the  last,  pointing  to  unattained  heights  of  knowledge 
and  excellence.  Though  adapted  to  universal  man,  it  must  be 
so  specific  as  to  individualize  and  address  every  human  being 
of  every  age  and  every  state  of  society.  Who  does  not  see  that 
if  the  Divine  administration  is  to  be  unfolded,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  if  man’s  moral  freedom  is  to  be  held  sacred,  on  the  other, 
the  fulfilment  of  these  conditions  demands  the  resources  of  an 
Infinite  Mind?  Man’s  highest  wisdom  consists  in  sounding  these 
“depths  of  wisdom  and  knowledge  though  his  line  after  all 
touches  only  here  and  there,  where  they  rise,  reef-like,  near  the 
surface  of  his  course.  His  highest  virtue  consists  in  clearly 
perceiving  all  the  objections  properly  and  necessarily  belonging 
to  a  plan  constructed  for  his  probation,  and  yet  surrendering 
himself  to  the  balance  in  favor  of  its  celestial  claims. 

22.  The  compounded  constitution  of  man  made  possible  from 
the  first  an  indefinite  diversity  of  natural  and  virtuous  character. 


388 


MAN. 


But  the  disturbance  and  derangement  of  that  constitution  by  sin, 
increased  that  possible  diversity  beyond  all  conception.  The 
greater  the  possible  perfection  of  the  human  being,  and  the 
more  complicated  his  nature,  the  greater  the  multitude  of  his  pos¬ 
sible  aberrations.  And  the  longer  his  race  is  continued,  the  more 
extended  his  opportunity  of  further  multiplying  these  aberia- 
tions,  and  of  aggravating  the  original  evil.  If  an  error  of  eight 
minutes  in  the  calculations  of  the  Ptolemaic  hypothesis,  involved 
Astronomy  in  a  cloud  of  errors  which  called,  according  to  Kep¬ 
ler, *  for  an  entire  reform  of  the  science  :  if  “  a  trivial  slip  in  the 
elementary  precepts  of  a  Logical  theory,  becomes  the  cause  of 
mightiest  errors  in  that  theory  itself  :”t  if,  as  in  the  ethical  sys¬ 
tems  of  Zeno  and  Epicurus,  partial  truth  may  be  practically 
equivalent  to  absolute  falsehood,  who  can  preconceive  the  variety 
and  amount  of  evil  possibly  resulting  from  the  taint  and  derange¬ 
ment  of  the  nature  of  the  astronomer,  the  logician,  the  moralist, 
himself?  For  sin  is  the  error  of  the  Ptolemaic  system  of  the 
universe  repeated  in  the  spiritual  universe.  It  is  a  false  premiss, 
a  fundamental  error  in  the  logic  of  man’s  moral  nature."  It  is  a 
parent  fault  more  generative  than  the  nature  which  it  infests, 
and  capable  of  unlimited  reproduction. 

23.  The  possible  diversity  of  which  we  speak  may  be  en¬ 
larged  yet  further  by  the  perversion  of  every  Divine  remedial 
interposition.  Whether  that  intervention  consist  of  a  law  im¬ 
posed,  a  truth  revealed,  a  gift  bestowed,  or  a  deed  performed, 
its  heavenly  origin  implies  its  excellence,  and  its  relation  to  a 
free  agent  implies  its  pervertibleness.  But  as  the  possible 
caricatures  of  a  perfect  model  are  innumerable  ;  so  the  erroneous 
combinations  of  a  single  truth,  and  the  modes  of  violating  a  single 
law,  are  endless.  Sin  is  a  virtual  attempt  to  break  away  from 
all  law,  and  to  revel  in  a  field  which  has  no  assignable  limits. 
The  very  element  of  mercy  itself,  therefore,  may  be  perverted 
into  the  means  of  aggravating  and  multiplying  evils  which  it 
was  calculated  to  remedy.  Like  the  addition  of  an  unit,  in  a 
vast  reckoning,  it  may  change  the  relation  of  every  figure  pre¬ 
viously  set  down,  and  increase  the  total  amount  a  million-fold. 

24.  What,  then,  if  man’s  well-being  —  his  consciousness  of 
dependence  —  should  require  that  he  be  allowed  to  exhaust  all 
these  possible  diversities  of  evil  on  his  way  to  good  ?  As  sin 
is  a  voluntary  departure  from  perfection,  man  may  be  inclined 
to  try  and  to  tax  every  means  of  self-sufficiency,  rather  than 


*  De  Stell.  Mart,  P.  11,  c.  19. 


t  Galen  De  Temperamentis,  1.  i.,  c.  5 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


389 


recognize  the  fact  of  his  dependence  on  God.  What  if  the 
time  should  come  when  it  may  be  said  —  “  hardly  any  experi¬ 
ment  can  be  imagined  which  has  not  already  been  tried  by  man ; 
displaying  in  the  infinite  varieties  of  human  genius  and  pursuits, 
the  astonishingly  diversified  effects  resulting  from  the  possible 
combinations  of  those  elementary  faculties  and  principles,  of 
which  every  man  is  conscious  in  himself?  Savage  society,  and 
all  the  different  modes  of  civilization ;  the  different  callings  and 
professions  of  individuals,  whether  liberal  or  mechanical ;  the 
prodigies  effected  by  human  art  in  all  the  objects  around  us ; 
laws,  government,  commerce,  religion  ;  but  above  all,  the  records 
of  thought,  preserved  in  those  volumes  which  fill  our  libraries, 
what  are  they,”*  if  traced  either  to  their  origin,  or  to  their 
general  application,  but  experiments  on  the  extent  of  man’s 
independent  resources  ?  parts  of  a  persevering  process  by  which 
man  is  too  commonly  laboring  to  conceal  from  himself  his  true 
relations  to  God  ?  What  if  the  time  should  come  when  all  the 
fallacies  of  which  human  reasoning  is  susceptible  shall  be  known 
to  man,  from  his  having  actually  employed  them  in  his  pursuit 
of  knowledge ;  and  when  the  record  and  classification  of  them 
shall  come  to  form  an  essential  part  —  as  a  memorial  and  a 
warning-  —  of  every  treatise  on  logic  ?  when  false  methods  of 
interpreting  nature  and  attaining  truth  shall  have  been  perse¬ 
vered  in  so  long,  that,  not  he  who  makes  a  discovery,  but  he 
who  points  attention  to  the  right  method  of  discovery,  shall  be 
considered  the  greater  man  ?  When  one  shall  be  able  to  show, 
for  example,  that  all  the  possible  forms  of  fatalism  have  been 
actually  broached  and  maintained  ?  and  another,  that  all  the 
false  hypotheses  of  the  universe  have  had  their  day  ?t  and  a 
third,  that  of  the  four  great  systems  of  philosophy  possible  to 
the  human  mind  —  Sensualism,  Idealism,  Scepticism,  and  Mys¬ 
ticism —  there  is  not  one  which  has  not  been  adopted  and 
repeated  ;  1  slowly  traversing  the  globe  and  successively  assum¬ 
ing  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  different  branches  and 
eras  of  the  human  family?  and  when  even  eclecticism  itself 
shall  be  only  reproduction  ! 

25.  Here,  again,  however,  we  must  demur  to  the  idea  that 
man  is  necessitated  to  exhaust  all  the  forms  of  error  prior  to  his 


*  Slightly  altered  from  the  Prel.  Diss.  to  the  Encv.  Brit.,  xlv.,  xlvi. 
t  Cudworth’s  Intellectual  System,  cc.,  i.,  ii.,  iii. 

t  M.  Cousin’s  Kistoire  de  la  Philos.,  au  18me  Siecle,  (Corns  de  Philo¬ 
sophic.) 


33* 


390 


MAX. 


attainment  of  truth,  or  that  it  is  his  destiny  to  try  all  the  possi¬ 
bilities  of  evil  on  his  way  to  good.  Such  a  view  might  suit  a 
system  of  Fatalism  ;  but  the  Divine  Government  of  free  agents 
rejects  it.  Accordingly,  as  we  just  now  suggested  a  limit  to  the 
view  of  the  existence  of  all  possible  worlds,  so  here  we  are 
reminded  of  a  limit  to  the  view  that  this  world  is  to  be  conducted 
through  all  possible  stages  of  experience.  Man  is  to  be  reclaimed 
to  a  sense  of  his  dependence  in  a  manner  accordant  with  his 
responsible  freedom.  This  agrees  with  the  first  of  the  two 
limiting  considerations  with  which  this  section  opens.  While 
his  proneness  to  lose  sight  of  his  dependence,  on  the  one  hand, 
may  require  that  he  should,  to  a  certain  degree,  be  left  to  him¬ 
self,  that  certain  means  and  influences  should  be  withheld  from 
him  which  might  seem  to  be  the  onlv  things  necessarv,  in  order 
to  bring  him  into  a  right  course,  and  that  he  should  be  left  to 
experiment  on  an  indefinite  variety  of  his  own  devices,  his  free 
agency  on  the  other,  requires  that  the  demonstration  should  not 
be  such  as  to  compel  him  to  certain  conclusions,  and  to  leave  no 
scope  for  'his  voluntary  powers.  If,  as  a  dependent  being,  he 
must  be  left  without  excuse  for  aiming  at  independence,  so,  also, 
as  a  free  being,  he  must  not  have  to  complain  that  no  option  is 
left  him  to  avow  his  dependence.  His  homage  to  the  right 
object,  if  it  is  to  be  virtuous  and  acceptable,  always  supposes 
that  there  are  wrong  objects  yet  untried,  and  inviting  his  trust. 

26.  If,  in  an  argument  for  the  Divine  all-sufficiency,  the 
power  of  conducting  the  same  race  through  several  successive 
stages  of  experience  be  more  than  equivalent  to  the  creation  of 
as  many  distinct  races,  so  the  power  of  limiting  the  experience 
of  that  one  race  in  such  a  way  as  to  balance  the  conditions  of 
its  freedom  and  of  its  dependence  at  every  step,  implies  greater 
resources  than  the  absence  of  such  a  limit  would  indicate.  It  is 
the  nice  adjustment  of  the  centripetal  and  the  centrifugal  forces 
brought  into  the  domain  of  moral  government.  The  projectile 
force  of  freedom  harmonized  with  the  gravitating  law  of  depend¬ 
ence,  varying  with  each  order  of  beings,  yet  adjusted  to  the 
grand  community  of  orders.  And,  as  each  planet  rotates  on  its 
own  axis,  requiring  the  further  adjustment,  that  the  velocity  of 
its  rotation  should  be  such  as  to  be  controlled  by  the  gravitation 
arising  from  its  mass,  so  each  member  of  the  human  race  exem¬ 
plifies  the  constant  interaction  of  opposing  forces  in  his  own 
particular  experience.  The  complicated  interdependence  of  the 
entire  moral  universe  may  thus  be  said  to  be  condensed  and 
repeated  in  each  man’s  life,  but  repeated  in  each  uwith  a 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


391 


difference,”  the  very  difference  suggesting  that  the  Being  capable 
of  originating  and  conducting  such  a  system,  could,  if  he  saw  fit, 
make  each  man  the  type  of  a  distinct  race,  and  conduct  that  race 
through  ages  and  stages  of  experience  differing  from  that  of 
every  other. 

27.  What  must  that  perfection  be  which  seeth  the  end  of  the 
great  process  from  the  beginning,  which  is  never  baffled,  never 
has  to  retrace  its  steps,  never  to  perform  an  isolated  act ;  which 
employs  the  same  means  for  the  attainment  of  an  unknown 
variety  of  ends,  and  directs  innumerable  agencies  to  the  same 
end ;  which  in  a  vast  family  of  transgressors  springing  from  the 
same  parentage,  leaves  each  member  in  the  possession  of  indi¬ 
viduality  and  freedom ;  which  can  wait  for  any  period,  while 
man  is  wearying  himself  out  in  acts  of  hostility,  and  can  then 
take  occasion  from  that  hostility  to  make  a  new  display  of  good¬ 
ness  and  grace  ;  which  can  make  its  richest  exhibitions  of  mercy 
the  occasion  for  proclaiming  its  everlasting  foundations  of  truth 
and  equity ;  which,  while  providing  for  the  race,  adapts  its  pro¬ 
visions  and  its  discipline  to  the  case  of  each  individual ;  which, 
amidst  the  whirl  and  play  of  the  universal  scheme,  assigns  to 
every  man  a  distinct  orbit  of  his  own,  and  which  makes  his 
every  movement  a  part  of  the  connected  history  of  the  universe, 
and  of  eternity  ? 

28.  “  Such  knowledge  is  too  wonderful  for  us !”  While  in 
its  probationary  state,  each  race  probably  has  to  confine  itself 
chiefly  to  its  own  special  history,  and  each  individual  chiefly  to 
his  own  particular  responsibilities.  The  god-like  employment 
of  marking  how  each  separate  part  falls  in  with  the  general 
plan,  and  contributes  to  form  a  sublime  whole,  is  reserved  for 
the  era  of  results,  the  distant  future.  Why,  then,  have  we  ad¬ 
verted  to  that  infinite  variety  in  ultimate  unity?  For  the  same 
reason  that  the  Divine  Being  himself  has  been  pleased  to  afford 
us  a  few  suggestive  hints  respecting  it  —  to  remind  us  that 
creatures  who  are  in  possession  of  hints  and  conjectures  only 
are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  foretel  results,  and  to  pronounce 
final  judgments.  How  necessary  it  is  that  man  should  confine 
himself,  for  the  present,  to  particulars,  if  only  for  the  purpose 
of  preparing  himself  for  the  final  generalization  !  How 
humbling  (if  he  be  proud)  to  find  that  at  present  he  is  not  only 
secluded  in  a  small,  dim  cell,  but  that  he  actually  needs  the 
seclusion ;  that  he  could  not  be  taken  out  to  look  at  the 
Divine  plan,  without  being  incapacitated  by  the  vision !  How 
instructive  (if  he  be  humble)  to  find  that  he  belongs  to  a  race 


392 


MAX. 


of  beings  prone  to  pronounce  as  confidently  on  the  farthest 
results  of  the  great  plan,  as  if  they  lived  at  its  centre,  and  saw 
all  round  to  the  circumference,  as  if  all  the  data  of  the  universe 
were  before  them,  though  they  have  yet  to  know  even  them¬ 
selves  ! 


Sect.  HI.  —  The  twofold  reason  of  the  method  in  its  application 

to  the  frst  man. 

1.  We  have  been  referring  to  the  inexplorable  conditions  of 
that  scheme  which,  while  it  maintains  every  part  of  the  human 
family  in  complicated  relationship  to  every  other  part,  and 
world  to  world,  and  the  remotest  past  to  all  the  future,  harmo¬ 
nizes,  with  the  utmost  accuracy,  in  the  case  of  every  individual, 
and  through  every  moment  of  time,  the  claims  of  his  freedom 
with  the  fact  of  his  dependence.  We  have  now  to  carry  our 
thoughts  back  to  the  moment  when  the  first  of  our  race  silently 
took  his  place  in  this  all-related  system,  and  was  formally  ap¬ 
prised  that  his  probation  had  commenced.  And,  with  the  les¬ 
sons  of  modesty  derivable  from  the  preceding  section,  we  have 
to  approach  the  first  great  practical  event  in  man’s  history  — 
his  guilty  fall. 

2.  In  order,  at  once,  to  disarm  prejudice,  as  far  as  is  consist¬ 
ent  with  fidelity  to  truth,  we  may  be  permitted  to  premise,  first, 
that  the  existence  of  sin  is  assumed.  Even  the  rejector  of  reve¬ 
lation  will  surely  allow  that  “  there  is  something  else  than  good¬ 
ness  in  the  world that  every  virtue  finds  its  antithesis  here ; 
that  every  man  believes  that  eveiy  other  man  might  be  some¬ 
what  better  than  he  is ;  that  moral  evil  ranks  as  truly  among 
the  realities  of  the  earth  as  poisons,  storms,  and  volcanic  fires. 
Secondly,  that  man’s  sinful  condition  is  not  his  normal  and 
original  state ;  that  disorder  could  not  have  been  a  law  ot  his 
primary  condition ;  that  in  no  sense  can  God  be  regarded  as 
the  author  of  sin ;  that  its  origin  commenced  after  man  became 
a  free  agent.  Thirdly,  that  unless  the  existence  of  sin  itself 
could  be  disproved,  the  rejection  of  the  Biblical  account  of  its 
introduction  would  avail  nothing.  Even  if  that  account  had 
never  been  supplied,  or  were  it  to  be  now  entirely  set  aside,  the 
presence  of  sin  would  still  remain  the  same  dreadful  reality  as 
ever.  We  are  not  sinners  because  the  Bible  affirms  the  fact ; 
the  Bible  affirms  it  because  we  are  sinners.  It  is  a  prior  and 
independent  fact  of  our  consciousness.  And  fourthly,  that  to 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


393 


reject  the  scrip  ural  representation  of  the  origin  of  human  sin¬ 
fulness —  a  subject  on  which  inspiration  alone  is  competent  to 
speak,  and  on  which  no  other  report  worthy  of  serious  attention 
has  ever  been  ventured  —  is  irrational  and  suspicious ;  espe¬ 
cially,  too,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  all  the  leading  accompani¬ 
ments  of  the  events,  as  scripturally  related,  are  strictly  conge¬ 
nial  with  whatever  we  know  of  human  nature,  and  of  moral 
government.  This  accordance  it  will  be  our  duty  to  demon¬ 
strate.  And  our  conviction  is,  that,  as  a  subject  for  devout  ad¬ 
miration,  next  to  the  mercy  which  caught  man  in  his  guilty 
fall,  and  provided  the  means  of  his  recovery,  is  the  holy  benevo¬ 
lence  which  placed  man  on  the  height  from  which  lie  fell  — 
within  one  easy  step  of  endless  life. 

3.  Before  proceeding  to  expound  the  reasons  of  the  probationary 
law  in  its  harmony  with  man’s  nature  and  destiny,  let  us  glance 
at  the  condition  in  which  it  found  him,  as  implied  in  the  law  it¬ 
self.  Whatever  the  nature  of  the  primal  law  might  have  been, 
and  whatever  the  result  of  its  enactment,  it  would  surely  have 
been  a  subject  of  profound  retrospective  interest  to  every  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  race  of  man.  If  a  nation,  which,  in  the  lapse  of  ages, 
has  acquired  historical  distinction,  looks  back  with  interest  to  its 
first  rude  efforts  at  legislation,  and  discovers  with  delight  the 
earliest  records  or  intimations  of  its  laws,  how  much  more  in¬ 
teresting  should  it  be  for  every  descendant  of  Adam  to  look 
back  on  the  first  law  given  verbally  by  the  Divine  Legislator 
to  the  father  of  the  race !  To  know  the  statute  by  the  enact¬ 
ment  of  which  the  Creator  first  announced  the  responsibility  of 
his  creature,  and  by  which  moral  government  formally  com¬ 
menced  on  earth,  is  surely  a  subject  to  absorb,  for  a  time,  the 
most  incurious  mind.  Law  —  even  human  law  —  is  now 
everywhere.  As  domestic,  or  social,  or  national,  or  internation¬ 
al,  it  is  everywhere  —  in  private,  in  the  family,  in  public  life,  on 
the  land,  on  the  sea,  by  night  and  by  day ;  while  the  law  of 
God,  ubiquitous  like  Himself,  is  felt  to  be  present  with  the 
movements  of  the  mind  within,  and  to  surround  us  like  an  at¬ 
mosphere  from  which  there  is  no  escape  ;  surely  it  must  inter¬ 
est  every  man  to  know  how  positive*  law  began,  or  what  was 
the  form  which  it  first  assumed.  Now,  Divine  revelation  in- 


*  Positive  law  as  distinguishable  from  moral  law ;  the  latter  being  of 
immediate  obligation,  the  former  only  of  mediate  obligation ;  binding,  that 
is,  not  owing  to  anything  right  in  itself,  but  on  account  of  its  depend¬ 
ence  in  something  which  is  right  in  itself — obedience  to  the  will  of  God. 


394 


MAN. 


forms  us.  Taking  us  back  to  the  earliest  moments  of  man’s 
existei  ce,  it  shows  us  the  Creator  in  the  act,  so  to  speak,  of 
binding  the  creature  to  Himself  by  the  first-made  verbal  law. 
“  And  Jehovah  God  commanded  the  man,  saying,  Of  every  tree 
of  the  garden  eating  thou  mayst  eat ;  but  of  the  tree  of  the 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil  thou  shalt  not  eat  of  it ;  for  in  the 
day  that  thou  eatest  thereof,  dying  thou  shalt  die.” 

4.  On  considering  the  nature  of  this  command,  we  think  we 
may  confidently  affirm,  that  had  it  remained  inviolate,  no  one 
would  ever  have  thought  of  impeaching  its  rectitude  or  pro¬ 
priety  ;  but  that  all  would  have  joined  in  admiring  its  simplicity, 
easiness,  and  adaptation,  and  in  adoring  the  sovereign  goodness 
of  the  Lawgiver.  Or,  even,  when  violated,  had  the  attendant 
penalty  been  a  mere  momentary  infliction  on  the  transgressor, 
each  of  all  his  posterity  would  doubtless  have  acquiesced  in  the 
Divine  arrangement.  The  quarrel  is,  then,  not  with  the  nature 
of  the  law,  but  with  the  supposed  consequences  of  its  violation. 
Its  character  is  left  unconsidered,  and  all  that  is  thought  of  is  its 
issue.  Or,  if  its  character  be  glanced  at,  it  is  only  to  impugn 
it  on  account  of  its  issue.  And  thus,  indulging  in  the  very 
spirit  which  led  to  the  transgression  of  the  law,  men  judge  of 
its  character  by  its  results.  The  first  transgressors  acted  on 
the  persuasion  that,  judging  by  the  fallacious  advantage  of  its 
violation,  it  would  be  better  to  break  it  than  to  keep  it;  their 
posterity  are  apt  to  think  that  it  would  have  been  better  had  it 
not  been  enacted;  —  both  uniting  in  the  implied  sentiment,  that 
man’s  will,  and  not  God’s,  should  rule.  The  first  law  appears 
to  be  as  good  a  test,  still,  of  man’s  moral  disposition,  as  it  was 
on  the  day  of  its  Divine  appointment. 

5.  In  our  sketch  of  man’s  primeval  condition,  in  a  previous 
chapter,*  we  saw  that  his  first  exercises  were  those  of  a  man, 
and  not  of  a  child ;  that  his  powers,  physical,  mental,  and 
moral,  were  capable  of  adult  activity,  and,  as  such,  responded 
to  their  appropriate  objects.  We  saw,  also,  that  the  theology  of 
unfallen  man,  as  implied  especially  in  the  primal  law,  was  —  a 
powerful,  wise,  and  beneficent  Creator ;  that  Creator  his  equit¬ 
able  moral  Governor ;  and  immortal  life  or  gain  in  prospect  as 
the  reward  of  his  obedience ;  and  a  threatened  death  or  loss  as 
the  deserved  penalty  of  disobedience.  We  have  now  to  consider 
man’s  condition  as  a  oeing  placed  by  that  law  on  probation. 
And  first,  the  law  implied,  as  it  issued  from  the  mouth  of  God, 


*  Supra,  p.  179,  etc. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


395 


that,  at  that  moment,  man’s  constitution  was  in  harmony  with 
itself* — the  lower  powers  being  subordinated  to  the  higher, 
- —  and  that  he  was  enabled  and  required  so  to  maintain  it ;  but 
that  if  he  willed  the  subversion  of  this  internal  harmony,  a  state 
of  derangement  and  evil  would,  not  arbitrarily,  but  naturally, 
ensue.  We  know,  indeed,  from  familiar  experience,  that  we 
cannot  will  anything  leading  to  such  derangement,  even  igno¬ 
rantly ',  without  incurring  the  evil  effects.  Nor  do  we  see  why, 
in  equity,  the  first  man  might  not,  as  far  as  his  own  personal 
responsibility  alone  was  concerned,  have  been  left  to  the  same 
liability.  But  let  it  be  remarked,  that  from  all  such  danger 
(one  point  excepted)  the  prohibition  implies  that  he  was  spe¬ 
cially  protected.  From  that  solitary  point,  nothing  was  with¬ 
drawn,  we  believe,  in  the  hour  of  trial ;  but  man  simply  remain¬ 
ed  without  any  special  protection  at  that  point,  as  he  might  have 
been  left  in  every  other  particular. 

6.  It  implied,  again,  that  the  whole  of  man’s  subjective  na¬ 
ture  was  in  harmonious  relationship  to  the  whole  objective  uni¬ 
verse,  including  God  himself ;  and  that  man  was  enabled  and 
required  to  maintain  himself  in  this  position ;  but  that  if,  know¬ 
ing  this  to  be  the  will  of  God,  he  yet  willed  to  do  anything  con¬ 
trary  (though  it  should  be  only  the  performance  of  a  physical 
act,  such  as  eating  and  drinking)  then,  besides  the  internal  evil 
flowing  naturally  from  the  act,  he  will  become  conscious  of  guilt 
in  having  violated  his  relations  to  God. 

We  have  said  “if  he  willed  to  do  any  thing  contrary;”  but 
that  which  demands  peculiar  attention  is,  that  there  was  only 
one  thing  contrary  to  the  will  of  God  which  the  first  man  was 
left  in  danger  of  doing.  The  law  implies  that  every  avenue  of 
evil  was,  for  him,  closed  up,  one  excepted.  For  surely  it  was 
not  to  be  understood  that  lie  might  violate  every  other  obliga¬ 
tion,  natural  and  moral,  with  impunity.  Neither  could  it  have 
meant  that,  if  left  to  himself,  there  was  no  other  liability  to 
which  he  was  exposed  than  the  one  specified.  As  a  free  agent, 
his  liabilities  would,  apart  from  a  special  provision  to  the  con¬ 
trary,  be  co-extensive  with  his  multiplied  obligations.  His  na¬ 
ture  is  a  living  law-table.  IIow  is  it,  then,  that  his  attention  is 
drawn  off  from  every  other  point  of  duty,  as  a  point  of  danger, 
to  be  concentrated  exclusively  on  this  solitary  liability  ?  How 
is  it  that  his  well-being,  involving  as  it  does  the  discharge  of 
numerous  and  diversified  obligations,  should  be  suspended  on 
this  one  point?  We  can  account  for  the  fact  only  by  conclud¬ 
ing  that,  by  a  special  provision, yhe  first  man  was  preserved,  in 


396 


MAN. 


a  manner  consistent  with  his  moral  freedom,  from  violating  any 
duty  excepting  that  of  the  prohibitory  law. 

Here,  again,  we  believe  that,  viewing  the  first  man  in  his 
personal  as  distinguished  from  a  representative  capacity,  he 
might  have  been  left  equitably  without  any  such  special  pro- 
vison.  He  was  a  free  agent,  capable  of  self-government,  and 
held  responsible  for  a  life  of  obedience.  Nor  was  the  Divine 
Being  under  any  obligation  to  put  it  out  of  his  power  to  violate 
any  one  of  the  diversified  duties  binding  on  him.  And  yet  the 
probationary  law  implies  that  such  an  arrangement  actually 
existed ;  that,  by  a  Divine  influence,  or  sovereign  appointment, 
of  some  kind,  man’s  thousand  liabilities  were  reduced  to  one. 
He  was  rendered  invulnerable,  excepting  at  one  point.  Look¬ 
ing  abroad  over  the  wide  field  of  duty,  he  might  already  fore¬ 
taste  the  security  of  heaven,  save  in  one  spot.  This  was  moral 
liability  reduced  to  its  minimum. 

7.  And  the  law  implied  further,  that  man,  continuing  in  his 
present  state  of  inward  and  outward  conformity  to  the  Divine 
will,  should  continue  to  enjoy  the  ever-enlarging  results,  in  the 
growing  excellence  of  his  character,  and  the  corresponding  im¬ 
provement  of  his  outward  condition,  or  the  corresponding  man¬ 
ifestations  of  the  Divine  favor ;  but  that,  voluntarily  failing  in 
obedience  to  the  one  probationary  law,  he  would  experience  a 
change  of  condition  answering  to  his  change  of  character  and 
relations  —  he  would,  in  some  sense,  die.  And  it  implied, 
moreover,  that,  as  the  head  and  representative  of  his  race, 
the  consequence  of  his  obedience  would  be  the  perpetuation 
of  life,  such  as  he  enjoyed,  to  his  posterity ;  while  his  failure 
would  incur  the  forfeiture  of  that  life  for  them,  as  well  as  for 
himself. 

And  here,  again,  we  behold  an  arrangement  immeasurably 
exceeding  all  that  equity  could  have  required,  and  calculated  to 
astonish  by  its  goodness.  Man,  we  have  seen,  had  come  into  a 
pre-existing  constitution,  in  which  physical  evil,  or  pain  and 
death,  were  already  known ;  and  as  the  partaker  of  a  material 
nature,  he  was  naturally  subject  to  all  the  material  laws  of  the 
constitution.  Why  should  he  be  specially  exempted  from  the 
law  of  dissolution  ?  Why  should  not  his  enjoyment  of  life  be 
subject  to  the  same  simple  condition  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  all 
the  animal  tribes  that  have  preceded  him  —  that  of  eventually 
surrendering  it  ?  But  this  is  not  all ;  his  posterity  are,  condi¬ 
tionally,  exempted  also.  Why  should  “  the  way  of  all  flesh  ” 
be  suspended  —  a  law  of  nature  be  repealed  —  for  a  race  of  be- 


397 


REASON  ^OF  THE  METHOD. 

ings,  of  which  the  progenitor  alone  is,  as  yet,  in  existence  ? 
Even  if  he  himself  should  be  exempted  from  mortality,  as  a  por¬ 
tion  of  the  reward  of  abstaining  from  a  single  act,  why  should 
each  of  all  his  posterity  be  included  in  the  same  exemption  ? 
He  might  have  lived  on  for  ever  without  “  tasting  death  ;  ”  but, 
surely,  equity  did  not  require  that  they  should  not  “  see  death,” 
on  their  way  to  immortality.  Still  less  could  it  require  that,  in 
their  way  to  a  higher  economy,  they  should  be  exempted  from 
the  actual  dangers  of  a  probationary  state ;  that,  on  account  of 
his  refraining  from  a  single  act  of  disobedience,  they  should  be 
raised  above  the  danger  of  disobedience  for  ever.  Yet  such 
appear  to  have  been  the  grand  and  sovereign  provisions  of  the 
first  law. 

8.  Even  in  the  event,  then,  of  that  special  economy  never 
having  been  instituted,  or  of  its  having  been  withdrawn  before 
the  hour  when  Adam  violated  it,  he  could  have  had  no  just 
ground  for  complaint,  supposing  his  moral  constitution  to  have 
been  left  unimpaired.  Neither  have  his  posterity  any  equitabie 
reason  for  complaint,  because  of  its  failure  when  it  had  been 
instituted,  any  more  than  they  would  have  had  if  it  had  never 
existed.  We  do  not  say  that  they  are  not  affected  by  the  fall. 
But  we  do  say  that  there  is  no  ground  to  believe  that  they  now 
stand  on  a  lower  level  than  they  would  have  been  placed  on, 
had  he  never  occupied  the  lofty  height  from  which  he  fell ;  that 
while  his  trial,  if  successful,  would  have  exempted  them  from 
the  pre-existing  law  of  death,  and  from  the  dangers  of  a  pro¬ 
bationary  state,  his  failure  has  only  left  them  where  they  would 
probably  have  been  (as  responsible  beings)  in  these  very  re¬ 
spects,  if  that  transient  experimental  economy  had  never  ex¬ 
isted  ;  —  for  assuredly,  in  that  case,  they  must  be  conceived  of 
as  sinning  individually.  Admiring  the  lofty  state  which  that 
special  arrangement  made  possible,  they  forget  both  the  fact 
that  the  arrangement  itself  might  never  have  existed,  and  the 
question  what  their  condition  in  that  case  would  have  been.  It 
was,  indeed,  an  amazing  display  of  pure  Benevolence,  not 
merely  reducing  man’s  liability  to  its  lowest  point,  but  suspend¬ 
ing  on  that  point  the  highest  conceivable  good,  and,  by  involv¬ 
ing  also  the  well-being  of  his  descendants,  raising  his  motives 
to  obedience  to  their  maximum  —  an  arrangement  which  could 
never  be  repeated  under  equally  advantageous  circumstances. 
But  though  it  passed  away  as  a  mere  glorious  possibility,  its 
departure  has  left  us,  as  free  agents ,  no  more  ground  for 
complaint  than  as  if  it  had  lost  us  the  possible  enjoyment  of  a 

34 


398 


MAN.  , 


sixth  or  seventh  sense,  a  capacity  for  flight,  or  the  use  of  (harlots 
of  fire. 

9.  In  proceeding  to  illustrate  the  reasons  for  the  probationary 
arrangement,  we  have  to  show,  first,  that  considering  mar/s  rela 
tions  to  his  Maker,  the  appointment  of  such  a  law  was  promotive 
of  the  great  end  of  the  Divine  manifestation ;  and,  as  such,  might 
have  been,  a  priori,  expected.  In  other  words,  the  law  was 
objectively  reasonable,  or  adapted  to  man  as  the  being  to  whom 
the  Manifestation  is  to  be  made.  Let  his  position,  at  that  mo¬ 
ment,  be  imagined.  The  whole  external  universe  was,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  both  as  to  its  creation  at  all,  and  then  as  to 
its  particular  constitution,  entirely  dependent  on  the  will  of  God  ; 
and,  in  both  respects,  it  was  specifically  and  supremely  designed 
to  answer  one  great  end — the  manifestation  of  the  Divine  char¬ 
acter.  But  how  ?  Evidently  the  creature  to  whom  it  is  to  be 
revealed  must  be  made  capable  of  knowing  that  the  external 
universe  is  the  expression  of  the  Divine  will,  or  he  will  be  left 
in  ignorance  of  the  Divine  character — of  the  very  fact  he  was 
designed  to  recognize.  Even  apart  from  this  chief  design  of  his 
intellectual  endowment,  there  could  have  been  no  fact  equally 
important  for  him  to  know  (regarded  merely  as  one  truth  among 
many)  as  that  the  world  had  a  Creator,  and  that  the  creation 
was,  as  far  as  it  went,  an  expression  of  his  character.  If  it  was 
important  for  man  to  know  any  of  his  relations,  it  must  surely 
have  been  most  important  for  him  to  know  that  relation  which 
comprehended  every  other  —  his  relation  of  dependence  on  God. 
To  know  this  was  to  be  in  the  secret  of  nature,  and  in  possession 
of  the  key  of  happiness ;  to  remain  ignorant  of  it  would  have 
been  to  remain  ignorant  of  the  great  fact  for  which  an  under¬ 
standing  had  been  given  him.  This,  then,  regarding  man  as  an 
intellectual  creature  merely,  was  the  great  point  to  be  provided 
for.  True,  every  law  of  nature  proclaimed  it,  and  every  object 
around  him  virtually  repeated  it.  For  even  by  the  taste  of  one 
fruit,  and  by  the  effects  of  another,  the  Creator  had  said  to  man 
—  “  Of  this  thou  mayest  eat ;  and  of  this  thou  shalt  not.”  And 
from  these  general  laws  and  arrangements  of  nature,  God  might 
have  left  him  slowly  to  infer  the  great  doctrine  of  universal 
dependence.  If,  however,  he  choose  to  adopt  any  simple  expe¬ 
dient  for  giving  voice  and  emphasis  to  the  truth,  man  will  surely 
be  grateful ;  for  God,  by  so  doing,  will  only  be  fu  'nishing 
another  instance  of  his  benevolence. 

But  what  if,  besides  an  understanding  to  recognize  the  Divine 
character,  in  the  character  and  dependence  of  the  external  uni- 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


399 


verse,  man  should  receive  a  will ,  by  which  he  will  be  able  to 
withdraw  his  attention  from  this  dependence,  if  he  choose,  and 
to  act  in  a  manner  opposed  to  it  ?  What  if,  in  the  exercise  of 
this  will,  given  him  supremely  to  control  his  thoughts,  and  of  a 
conscience  to  influence  his  will,  he  should  will  to  place  himself 
in  hostility  to  the  will  of  God,  as  if  he  were  independent  of  Him  ? 
The  point  to  be  supremely  guarded  is  now  changed  from  the 
understanding  to  the  will,  and  the  consequences  of  failure  incon¬ 
ceivably  augmented.  He  is  the  first  being  of  a  new  race, 
constituted  expressly  to  recognize  the  dependence  of  all  things, 
including  himself,  on  the  will  of  God,  and  voluntarily  to  appre¬ 
ciate  and  to  act  in  harmony  with  this  great  fact.  By  the  good 
pleasure  of  God,  he  is  made  a  free  agent ;  while,  by  moral 
necessity,  he  can  answer  the  end  of  his  existence,  and  enjoy 
well-being,  only  by  conforming  his  free  will  to  the  Divine  will. 
Without  exercising  his  voluntary  powers,  he  cannot  serve  God 
acceptably ;  and  yet  without  recognizing  his  dependence,  he  will 
be  acting  a  falsehood  —  for  dependent  he  is  necessarily  —  and 
will  be  robbing  God  of  his  glory.  His  well-being  depends, 
not  as  a  matter  of  contingent  arrangement,  but  of  natural  neces¬ 
sity,  on  the  perfect  union  of  his  free-agency  with  his  sense  of 
dependence  ;  in  other  words,  on  the  entire  coincidence  of  his 
will  with  the  Divine  will.  This  coincidence  preserved,  every¬ 
thing  is  preserved  ;  this  disturbed,  everything  is  disturbed.  If 
his  will  rebel,  his  whole  nature  will  be  in  revolt,  and  every 
existing  law  of  the  Divine  manifestation  be  violated ;  if  his  will 
remain  loyal,  guilt  will  be  impossible,  and  every  known  law 
of  the  manifestation  will  be  honored. 

Here,  then,  was  the  great  —  indeed,  the  only  point  to  be 
guarded,  for  here  is  the  only  inlet  to  danger.  How  important 
that  man  should  be  early  and  emphatically  apprised  of  the  fact ! 
No  holy  being,  it  might  be  supposed,  could  have  known  man’s 
position,  without  being  conscious  of  an  earnest  desire  that  his 
relation  and  obligation  should  be  placed  before  him  in  the  most 
striking  light !  True,  again,  every  law  of  Nature  was  calculated 
to  remind  him  of  it ;  and  his  own  consciousness  responded  to 
it.  But  if  in  the  hypothetical  case  of  man’s  being  a  creature  of 
mere  intellect,  it  would  have  been  important  for  him  to  be 
aided  by  some  expedient  for  giving  voice  to  the  dependence 
of  Nature,  and  kind  in  God  to  devise  it,  how  much  more  im¬ 
portant  that  some  expedient  should  be  resorted  to  for  reminding 
man  that  his  will  must  be  harmonized  with  that  dependence  — 
an  expedient  energetic  in  proportion  to  the  exigency  of  the 


400 


MAN. 


case  —  and  how  worthy  of  God  to  adopt  it!  Surely,  if  the 
Creator  had  not  spontaneously  resorted  to  such  an  arrangement, 
the  creature  himself  would  have  asked  it  as  a  favor ;  and,  in  the 
event  of  a  refusal,  his  guilty  posterity  would  have  readily  ascribed 
his  defection  to  the  want  of  some  mode  of  duly  impressing  him 
with  the  fact  of  his  dependence,  and  with  the  duty  of  obedience. 

10.  Secondly,  we  have  to  name  some  of  the  respects  in  which 
the  probationary  law  was  specifically  adapted  to  the  constitution 
and  well-being  of  man,  and  thus  magnified  still  further  the  holy 
Benevolence  of  the  Being  who  appointed  it.  In  other  words, 
we  can  show  that  it  was  subjectively  suitable,  or  adapted  to  the 
being  by  whom,  as  well  as  to  whom,  the  Divine  manifestation 
is  to  be  made. 

We  have  shown,  generally,  that  man’s  well-being  depended 
on  the  coincidence  of  his  will  with  the  Divine  will.  But  here 
the  question  arises,  What  was  likely  to  disturb  that  coincidence  ? 
It  will,  we  think,  be  found  (as  already  intimated)*  that  man’s 
danger  may,  in  this  respect,  be  threefold :  he  may  be  ignorant 
of  his  moral  relations ,  or  he  may  be  unconscious  of  the  obliga¬ 
tions  arising  out  of  those  relations,  or  he  may  not  feel  the  motives 
necessary  to  induce  him  voluntarily  to  discharge  those  obliga¬ 
tions.  And  these  we  believe  to  be  the  only  points  of  danger. 

Now,  it  will  appear  that  the  law  selected  and  enjoined  was 
adapted  to  meet  this  threefold  exigence.  Both  the  grant  accom¬ 
panying  it,  and  the  prohibition  expressed  in  it,  recognized  the 
vital  fact,  and  emphatically  affirmed  it,  that  the  relation  of  man 
to  God  was  one  of  entire  dependence.  And  this  provided  for  the 
first  of  these  liabilities. 

On  the  ground  of  this  relation,  the  law  enforced  the  corre¬ 
sponding  obligation  of  unconditional  obedience  to  the  will  of  God, 
for  the  precept  was  not  a  moral,  but  a  positive  one ;  and  thus  if 
provided  for  the  second  contingency.  Every  moral  duty  incum¬ 
bent  on  unfallen  man  is  presupposed.  Nor  could  any  one  of 
these  be  singled  out  and  enjoined  alone,  without  implying  that 
the  others  were  comparatively  unimportant.  Besides,  a  moral 
duty  might  have  recommended  itself  by  its  own  obvious  and  in¬ 
herent  fitness,  and  not  as  the  mere  expression  of  the  Divine  will. 
Whereas,  man’s  obligation  to  obey  the  Divine  will  —  of  which 
the  moral  law  is  only  the  utterance  —  is  the  very  thing  which 
is  to  be  made  known  and  enforced ;  and  this  could  be  effected 
only  by  the  enactment  of  a  positive  precept.  By  making  his 
well-being  contingent  on  an  action  neither  good  nor  evil  in  itself. 


*  Supra,  pp.  264,  279. 


REASON  OF  TRE  METHOD. 


401 


but  so  far  only  as  it  was  the  subject  of  Divine  law  —  an  act, 
therefore  in  which  the  mere  will  of  God  was  his  only  rule  — ■ 
man  was  most  emphatically  taught  his  obligation  and  dependence. 

And  this  obligation  was  enforced  by  the  strongest  motives  — 
regard  for  the  Divine  will,  together  with  the  love  of  happiness 
and  the  dread  of  punishment,  of  a  happiness  or  a  punishment 
to  be  perpetuated  both  for  himself  and  for  his  descendants  ;  and 
thus  the  law  guarded  against  the  third  liability.  Had  man  been 
only  an  intellectual  being,  indeed,  a  mere  statement,  or  bare 
instruction,  on  the  subject  might  have  sufficed.  But  as  a  volun¬ 
tary  being,  influenced  by  motives,  and  responsible  for  his  actions, 
it  would  have  been  cruel  to  conceal  from  him  the  motives  to 
obedience  arising  from  the  consequences  of  his  conduct.  For 
even  if  the  actual  law  had  been  couched  in  the  form  of  a  mere 
request  or  desire,  man  could  not  have  disregarded  it  without 
exhibiting  a  spirit  of  disobedience  which  must  have  incurred 
the  Divine  displeasure  ;  in  which  case,  he  might  have  plausibly 
pleaded  that,  had  he  only  known  beforehand  that  such  would 
have  been  the  result  of  disobedience,  he  should  have  been  cer¬ 
tainly  deterred  from  committing  the  offence.  If,  then,  obedience 
is  to  be  enforced  by  motives,  it  appears  desirable  that  they  should 
be  accumulated  to  the  utmost  degree  of  strength  compatible  with 
man’s  free  agency.  Accordingly,  the  sanctions  of  the  first  law 
appear  to  have  reached  this  point. 

11.  But  is  man,  thus  protected  from  moral  failure  at  all 
points  but  one,  and  thus  armed  with  motives  even  at  that  one 
point,  to  be  jealously  secluded  also  from  every  counter-influence 
from  without?  Would  not  this  be  to  make  his  sense  of  depend¬ 
ence  overbear  his  sense  of  freedom  ?  Amidst  the  ten  thousand 
voices  telling  him  of  his  obligations,  shall  there  be  no  voice  to 
remind  him  of  his  moral  liberty  ?  If  his  trial  is  to  be,  not 
nominal  merely,  but  real,  all  the  influences  which  bear  on  him 
must  not  be  exclusively  on  one  side.  But  whence  can  any 
counter-influence  come  ?  He  himself  is  the  first  of  his  race,  for 
the  nature  and  perfection  of  his  trial  appear  to  require  that  he 
should  come  directly  from  God,  and  be  exempted  from  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  the  evil  example  of  any  human  beings.  What,  then,  if, 
as  the  Divine  voice  hath  said,  Thou  shall  not,  another  voice 
should  whisper,  Thou  const !  Now,  such  was  the  nature  of  the 
temptation.  It,  at  least,  reminded  man  of  his  power,  and  of  the 
possible  results  of  its  exercise.  His  liberty  was  thus  placed 
over  against  his  dependence,  and  his  nature  left  in  equipoise. 
His  strength  had  been  pre-adjusted  to  his  foreseen  trial.  So  that 

34* 


402 


MAN. 


the  trial  itself,  instead  of  being  an  evil,  was  required  by  the 
constitution  of  man,  and  was  looked  for  in  the  provisions  of  the 
probationary  arrangement. 

12.  Here,  then,  were  reasons  for  the  arrangement,  objective 
and  subjective,  —  reasons  adapted  to  man  both  as  the  being  to 
whom,  and  as  the  being  to  and  by  whom  the  Divine  manifesta¬ 
tion  is  to  be  made.  Respecting  the  probable  reasons  for  the 
particular  act  prohibited,  nothing  need  be  said.  That  some¬ 
thing  else  might  have  been  forbidden  —  the  use  of  a  particular 
stream,  or  an  approach  to  a  particular  spot  —  and  that  the  same 
truths  might  have  been  taught  by  such  prohibition,  is  quite  possible. 
But,  still,  for  reasons  such  as  those  adverted  to  in  a  previous 
chapter,*  if  for  no  others,  there  is  ground  to  conclude  that,  in 
the  eye  of  infinite  wisdom,  the  one  selected  was  preferable  to 
every  other.  And,  when  it  is  remembered  that,  as  a  positive 
precept,  the  law  was  only  in  harmony  with  the  contingent 
arrangements  of  all  external  nature,  that  it  was  intended  to  teach 
the  same  truth  as  those  arrangements  teach,  and  especially  to 
point  to  the  fact  that  they  do  teach  it :  namely,  the  great  doctrine 
of  our  dependence  on  the  Divine  will ;  and  that,  in  this  way,  it 
is  to  be  viewed  as  forming  part  of  the  universal  system,  and 
tending  to  the  same  end  as  every  other  part  of  that  system, 
nothing  but  a  state  of  mind  akin  to  that  which  led  to  the  first 
sin,  prevents  man  from  recognizing  in  it  a  marked  display  of 
Divine  benevolence. 

13.  A  reason  for  the  representative  aspect  of  the  arrange¬ 
ment  has  been  suggested,  as  brought  to  light  by  the  representa¬ 
tive  character  of  the  grand  remedial  economy  which  followed. 
Foreseeing  that  men,  if  placed  on  probation  individually,  would 
all  incur  the  penalty  of  transgression,  God  was  pleased  to  make 
their  escape  from  such  an  issue  possible,  by  the  representative 
arrangement  which  we  have  been  considering,  in  order  (it  has 
been  said)  to  foreshadow  the  representative  nature  of  the  evan¬ 
gelical  economy.  The  first  was,  in  this  particular,  a  rehearsal 
of  the  second.  Adam  was  “  the  figure  of  him  that  was  to  come.” 
“  The  gospel  was  preached  before  unto  ”  Adam.  Now,  doubtless, 
the  event  has  disclosed  the  analogous  relation  of  the  first  consti¬ 
tution  to  the  second  ;  and  inspiration  itself  affirms  a  resemblance. 
And  a  grand  display  it  presents  of  the  all-related  and  compre¬ 
hensive  nature  of  the  Divine  plans.  Still,  we  can  only  regard 
the  analogy  supplied  as  an  incidental,  not  a  primary  or  leading 


*  Page  291. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


ton 

reason  for  the  existence  of  the  economy  which  supplies  it.  For, 
from  the  moment  the  first  became,  in  the  particular  in  question, 
an  analogy  of  the  second,  the  second  itself  was  actually  pro¬ 
mised.  In  the  same  moment  in  which  the  shadow  appeared,  the 
substance  itself  was  coming  into  view. 

But  with  any  ulterior  reasons  for  the  probationary  arrange¬ 
ment  we  have  not  here  to  do,  otherwise  we  might  glance  at  the 
over-balance  of  happiness  which  the  prospective  failure  made 
possible,  and  at  the  larger  view  afforded  to  us  of  the  resources 
of  Him  who  can  thus  replace  one  economy  by  another,  and  yet 
harmonize  at  every  step  the  wants  of  his  subjects  with  the 
claims  of  his  government  and  the  benevolence  of  his  character. 
But  all  such  references  take  for  granted  the  failure  of  man’s 
probation,  and  its  consequences.  Of  some  of  these  consequences 
we  have  now  to  speak. 

14.  Of  the  fall  itself,  as  an  historical  fact,  we  have  already 
spoken  under  the  “  law  of  change.”  We  there  saw  that,  with 
every  suitable  inducement  to  obey,  man  chose  to  transgress ; 
that,  not  satisfied  with  freedom,  he  essayed  independence  ;  and 
that  thus  “  the  commandment,  which  was  ordained  to  life,  he 
found  to  be  unto  death.”  The  enactment  of  that  law,  we  have 
seen,  implied  three  tilings  —  that  man’s  constitution  was  all  har¬ 
mony  within;  that  it  was  in  adjusted  relationship  to  the  objec¬ 
tive  universe,  including  God  himself ;  and  that,  continuing  to 
guard  the  single  point  at  which  he  was  left  exposed,  man  him¬ 
self,  and  his  posterity  after  him,  should  continue  to  enjoy  the 
kind  of  life  which  he  then  enjoyed,  to  the  exclusion  even  of  the 
physical  suffering  and  death  to  which  all  mere  sentient  natures 
had  ever  been,  and  still  were  subject.  In  now  proceeding  to 
show  that  the  consequences  of  sin  affected  him  in  this  threefold 
respect,  we  shall  limit  our  remarks  almost  entirely  to  their 
bearing  on  the  first  man,  personally  considered.  The  examina¬ 
tion  of  their  relative  bearing,  as  involving  his  posterity,  belongs 
to  the  family  dispensation. 

15.  It  can  hardly  be  necessary  to  preface  our  remarks  on  the 
consequences  of  the  first  sin  by  repeating  the  fact  that  the  par¬ 
ticular  prohibition  was  only  the  indirect  occasion  of  transgres¬ 
sion.  The  same  spirit  of  disobedience  would  have  been  devel¬ 
oped,  it  may  be  assumed,  in  some  other  manner  (although  not 
necessarily),  even  if  that  prohibition  had  never  existed.  In¬ 
deed,  the  probability  is  that  the  probationary  arrangement  did 
not  even  hasten  the  moment  of  transgression,  but  actually  de¬ 
layed  it.  For  had  not  the  entrance  of  evil  been  provided 


404 


MAN. 


against  at  every  avenue  save  one,  the  likelihood  is  that  it  would, 
in  however  mitigated  a  form,  have  earlier  made  its  appearance. 
Neither  must  it  be  imagined  that  the  outward  act  itself  consti¬ 
tuted  the  guilt  of  the  first  transgressor.  This  was  only  the 
external  manifestation  of  the  fatal  change  within.  Had  the 
forbidden  object  eluded  his  grasp,  or  vanished  from  his  sight, 
as  he  essayed  to  take  it,  the  sin  would  yet  have  been  completed 
in  purpose,  and,  therefore,  in  the  eye  of  'God  and  of  conscience, 
though  still  incomplete  in  outward  and  muscular  action.  So 
that  the  consequences  which  ensued  are  not  to  be  viewed  as 
resulting  from  the  outward  breach  of  a  positive  law,  however 
reasonable  and  benevolent  that  law  might  be,  but  from 
that  breach  as  indicating:  the  internal  change  of  man’s  nature, 
or  his  disregard  to  the  will  of  God  formally  and  solemnly  ex- 
pressed.  And,  accordingly,  it  will  be  found  that  the  threatened 
consequences  resulting  from  his  disobedience  are  not  arbitrary, 
but  the  constitutional  and  properly  retributive  effects  of  it. 

16.  How  sin  is  metaphysically  possible  in  a  perfect  being,  we 
know  not.*  And  as  if  to  take  the  subject  out  of  our  hands,  and 
to  leave  us  to  deal  with  it  only  as  an  historical  fact,  the  Bible 
teaches  that  the  thought  of  man’s  first  sin  did  not  originate  with 
himself,  but  in  the  mind  of  a  being  already  fallen,  and  of 
another  order.  But  the  temptation  from  without  was  met  by 
the  consenting  movement  of  the  mind  within :  and  thus  to  man 
belonged  the  guilt  of  adopting  and  making  it  his  own.  As  a 
temptation,  the  act  originated  without ;  as  a  sin,  it  truly  and 
properly  originated  in  man’s  own  will.  His  outward  act  of  sin 
implied  that  the  harmony  of  his  moral  constitution  was  dis¬ 
turbed,  and  its  balance  gone ;  that  the  higher  part  of  his  nature 
had  succumbed  to  the  lower  —  the  will  had  yielded  to  desire. 
On  this  point  the  Bible  and  a  true  psychology  are  one.  For, 
if  the  question  be  asked,  how  did  sin  begin  ?  both  point  for  the 
occasion  to  the  desires  or  sensitive  part  of  the  man,  and  for  the 


*  Innumerable  solutions  have  been  attempted.  "  According-  to  my 
conviction,  the  origin  of  evil  can  only  be  understood  as  a  fact  —  a  fact 
possible  by  virtue  of  the  freedom  belonging  to  a  created  being,  but  not  to 
be  otherwise  deduced  or  explained.  It  lies  in  the  idea  of  evil  that  it  is 
an  utterly  inexplicable  thing,  and  whoever  wonld  explain  it  nullities  the 
very  idea  of  it.  It  is  not  the  limits  of  our  knowledge  which  make  the 
origin  of  sin  something  inexplicable  to  us :  but  it  follows  from  the  essen¬ 
tial  nature  of  sin  as  an  act  of  free  will,  that  it  must  remain  to  all  eternity 
an  inexplicable  fact.  It  can  only  be  understood  empirically  by  means  of 
th?  moral  self-consciousness,”  —  Dr.  A.  Xeander.  Biblical  Cab.,  xxxvi., 
p.  38. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


405 


cause ,  to  his  will.  The  cause  could  not  be  in  the  feelings  or 
desires,  for  these,  apart  from  the  conscience  and  the  will,  have  no 
moral  character  whatever  —  as  in  infants  and  irrational  animals. 
Nor  could  the  occasion  be  in  the  will ;  for  this  acts  only  in  the 
view  of  motives,  of  occasions  supplied  to  it.  In  the  probation¬ 
ary  act,  these  inducements  came  from  two  quarters  — -  God  and 
Nature ;  or  through  conscience  and  sense.  Those  supplied  to 
unfallen  man  by  his  conscience  could  lead  only  to  right  voli¬ 
tions.  It  was,  then,  by  his  freely  accepting  those  supplied  by 
sense,  and  consciously  and  voluntarily  violating  the  rights  of 
conscience  in  so  doing,  that  his  mind  became  vitiated  and  de¬ 
praved. 

17.  But  how  did  this  voluntary  act  of  transgression  deprave 
the  first  man  ?  We  have  seen  that  the  human  being  is  com¬ 
pounded  of  parts  or  powers  of  different  values  ;  and  that  his 
well-being  consists  in  the  maintenance  of  these  powers  in  their 
respective  offices.  In  this  arrangement,  the  desires  and  sus¬ 
ceptibilities  are  to  be  subordinated  to  the  law  of  conscience. 
But,  in  the  instance  before  us,  this  order  was  reversed.  The 
will  took  occasion  from  the  desires  to  silence  conscience,  prac¬ 
tically  placed  them  over  it,  and  destroyed  their  subordination 
to  it.  No  power  was  lost  from  the  soul.  Man’s  emotions  re¬ 
tained  their  susceptibility,  though  diverted  from  their  highest 
object.  His  power  of  moral  discrimination  was  not  destroyed, 
though  overruled.  His  will  may  have  remained  as  active  and 
energetic  as  before ;  but  his  chosen  motives  came  now  from 
the  domain  of  the  passions,  of  self,  and  of  the  instinctive  de¬ 
sires,  to  the  prejudice  of  those  from  the  higher  region  of  duty 
and  regard  for  the  will  of  God.  Susceptibilities  whose  excite¬ 
ments  (even  by  temptation),  if  kept  within  certain  limits,  would 
have  been  perfectly  innocent,  were  permitted  to  reach  a  point 
of  activity,  and  to  exercise  a  power,  in  relation  to  a  proscribed 
object,  in  violation  of  those  limits.  Thus,  though  the  powers  of 
his  mind  remained,  each  was  placed  in  a  new  and  a  false  rela¬ 


tion  to  the  others.  Their  right  order  was 


gone. 


Their  de¬ 


rangement  appeared  in  the  ascendancy  acquired  by  an  inferior 
class  d  motives  —  emotions  excited  by  earthly  and  even  for¬ 
bidden  objects  —  over  motives  which  ought  to  have  been  held 
supreme.  For  the  evil  did  not  consist  in  a  mere  indifference 
to  the  holy  and  the  divine.  Had  this  been  all,  it  might  have 
been  remedied  by  recalling  them  to  his  attention.  But  the 
depraving  act  tended  to  repeat  itself,  and  to  become  habit. 
Depravity  develops  itself,  we  think,  in  this  order  —  first,  desires, 


406 


MAN. 


harmless  in  themselves,  but  made  wrong  by  their  exclusiveness  : 
next,  these  desires,  already  wrong  by  their  exclusion  of  higher 
objects,  acquiring  an  intensity  immeasurably  beyond  the  value 
of  the  things  which  excite  them ;  and  then,  awakening  aversion 
for  everything  which  condemns  them,  which  proposes  to  become 
a  substitute  for  the  objects  exciting  them,  or  which  exhibits  a 
character  in  strong  contrast  with  them.  Thus,  at  each  step,  it 
becomes  less  necessary  for  the  will  to  put  forth  an  effort  in 
order  to  gratify  the  desire ;  while  the  incitements  to  the  grati¬ 
fication,  and  the  likelihood  of  its  repetition,  are  regularly  in¬ 
creasing. 

18.  On  this  part  of  the  subject,  three  things  are  especially 
deserving  of  attention.  First,  that  the  depravation  of  which  we 
are  speaking  involved  no  loss  of  constitutional  powers.  If 
man’s  power  of  voluntary  determination  had  departed,  his  re¬ 
sponsibility  would  have  vanished  also.  If  the  power  of  distin¬ 
guishing  between  good  and  evil  had  been  lost,  his  sanity  would 
have  ceased  with  it.  But  can  we  doubt  his  readiness  to  have 
acknowledged,  at  any  moment  after  his  fall,  that  he  knew  better 
than  he  acted  ?  or  his  consciousness  of  a  reserved  power,  even 
at  the  worst,  to  resist  the  evil  to  which  he  yielded  ?  Second!} , 
that  the  depravation  of  man,  as  a  state,  lies  essentially  in  the 
sensitive  part  of  his  constitution.  Although  its  influence  extends 
into  every  part,  and  although  the  consent  of  the  will  is  essential 
to  sin,  the  vitiosity  or  depravity  itself  has  its  root  in  the  sphere 
of  the  susceptibilities.  And  thirdly,  that  this  depravation  was 
not  an  arbitrary  infliction,  but  a  natural  result.  By  an  act  of 
its  own,  the  soul  lost  its  normal  state.  It  chose  to  violate  its 
own  constitution.  The  divine  archetype  was  not  withdrawn 
from  it.  The  mind  consciously  put  forth  its  own  power  in  the 
act  which  lost  it.  An  arbitrary  act  of  God  alone  could  have 
prevented  the  loss.  And  this  loss,  or  the  abnormal  state  of 
mind  which  it  denotes,  is  depravity. 

19.  But  man  violated  more  than  the  law  of  his  own  constitu¬ 
tion  ;  he  violated  also  a  known  objective  law  of  God.  Here 
was  more  than  the  depravation  of  his  own  mind ;  here  was 
actual  sin  —  the  infraction  of  a  Divine  prescription.  “  Sin  — 
pecccrtum  —  denotes,  in  theological  usage,  sometimes  a  state  of 
the  free  being  himself,  sometimes  a  conscious  property  of  his 
feelings  and  acts.  The  former  is  sin  in  the  abstract;  the 
latter,  sin  in  the  concrete ”  *  The  former  denotes  a  state  of  de- 

*  See  “  Bretschneide  vs  Dogm.,”  ii.  pp.  5,  6 ;  and  u  Vitringa’s  Obser- 
vatt.  Sac.,’  lib.  vi..  c.  15 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


407 


pra  nation;  the  latter,  that  state  concreted  or  developed  in  feel¬ 
ing,  intention,  or  actual  volition,  in  opposition  to  the  known  will 
of  God. 

Now,  the  primal  law,  implied,  as  we  have  seen,  not  only  that 
the  whole  of  man’s  constitution  was  in  harmony  with  itself,  but 
that  it  was  in  perfect  adjustment  to  the  whole  objective  uni¬ 
verse,  including  God  himself.  Sin,  then,  involved  the  infraction 
of  this  objective  adjustment.  It  placed  man  in  conscious  .oppo¬ 
sition  to  God.  It  was  an  attempt  to  achieve  independence,  or 
to. render  himself  happy  irrespective  of  God.  It  is  the  funda¬ 
mental  law  of  the  constitution  of  things  into  which  he  had  come, 
that  the  will  of  God  should  be  supreme ;  but  here  was  an  at¬ 
tempt  at  autonomy  —  at  raising  his  own  will  into  the  place  of 
God’s.  And  thus  followed  another  part  of  the  curse  or  conse¬ 
quence  of  sin.  By  taking  him  out  of  harmony  with  the  Divine 
will,  it  lost  him  the  Divine  complacency,  and  filled  him  with 
the  consciousness  of  guilt.  Here,  again,  be  it  remarked,  there 
was  no  arbitrary  infliction,  but  only  a  natural  result.  An  arbi¬ 
trary  intervention  alone  could  have  prevented  it.  Nothing  less 
could  have  kept  him  from  being  conscious  of  the  nature  of  his 
own  act ;  and  this  consciousness  involved  a  sense  of  demerit, 
and  of  such  consequent  pain  as  is  self-punishment. 

20.  And,  as  a  third  consequence,  this  change  of  character , 
and  of  relation  to  the  Divine  government,  involved  a  corres¬ 
ponding  change  of  condition.  Now,  if  any  part  of  the  conse¬ 
quences  of  the  first  transgression  could  be  regarded  as  arbitrary, 
it  must  surely  be  the  altered  condition  to  which  man  was  now 
adjudged ;  and  yet  a  little  consideration  will  show  that  it  only 
involved  the  ivithdrawment  of  a  gratuitous  or  conditional  ap¬ 
pointment. 

21.  We  have  seen,  for  example,  that  probationary  man  was, 
by  a  special  provision,  protected  from  moral  failure  at  every 
point  but  one.  This  is  implied  in  the  very  fact,  that  the  law 
discharged  him  from  attending  to  every  other  point  of  duty  as 
a  point  of  danger,  in  order  that  he  might  concentrate  his  powers 
chiefly  on  a  single  obligation.  The  nature  of  the  agency  or  in¬ 
fluence  by  which  his  obedience  was  made  certain  in  every  other 
respect,  is,  at  present,  immaterial.  The  material  point  is,  that 
such  agency,  or  influence,  was  not  essential  to  his  free  agency. 
He  would  have  been  accountable  without  it.  It  was  superin¬ 
duced  on  a  nature  already  endowed  with  all  the  elements  of  re¬ 
sponsibility  :  a  nature  as  capable  and  responsible,  in  relation  to 
every  othe^  obligation,  as  to  the  particular  one  in  which  he  was 


408 


MAN 


not  specially  protected.  When,  therefore,  man  sinned,  this  su¬ 
perinduced  provision  was  simply  withdrawn ;  its  special  object 
had  been  defeated.  Man  was  now  to  be  left,  in  respect  to  every 
other  law,  as  he  had  been  left  in  relation  to  the  probationary 
law  —  to  his  own  responsible  powers  as  a  being  fitted  for 
moral  government.  Thus  he  might  have  been  left  from  the 
first,  as  far  as  equity  was  concerned ;  and  thus  he  now  was  left. 

22.  As  a  mere  sentient  being,  man’s  paradisiacal  state  was  as 
purely  artificial,  or  arbitrary,  as  the  special  provision,  of  which 
we  have  been  speaking,  rendered  his  moral  state.  They  were 
two  parts  of  the  same  peculiar  provision.  He  was  condition 
ally  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  pain  and  disso 
lution,  laws  which  had  before  universally  prevailed.  But  the 
purpose  for  which  he  had  been  so  raised  having  failed,  the  pro¬ 
visional  exemption  was  repealed,  and  he  was  allowed  to  fall 
down  to  the  level  of  the  pre-existing  law.  He  was  recalled  to 
the  condition  above  which  equity  did  not  require  that  he  should 
ever  have  been  promoted.  Like  other  animal  natures,  he  must 
go  forth  into  the  common  world  of  thorns  and  briars ;  must 
hunt  or  toil  for  food ;  be  conscious  of  pain ;  return  to  dust ; 
while  his  sinful  spirit,  separated  from  the  body,  should  go  to 
“  its  own  place,”  and  experience  the  equitable  results  of  its  dis¬ 
obedience. 

23.  Here,  then,  is  nothing  arbitrary  or  irrespective  of  char¬ 
acter.  In  eating  of  the  prohibited  tree,  man  does  not  appear  to 
have  violated  any  physical  law ;  the  fruit  was  pleasant  to  the 
eye,  and  good  for  food.  And,  by  eating  it,  man’s  hunger  prob¬ 
ably  was  as  much  appeased,  his  taste  gratified,  and  his  bodily 
system  as  much  nourished  (even  supposing  its  properties  to 
have  been  exciting)  as  by  eating  many  other  kinds  of  fruit.  To 
have  prevented  this  physical  benefit  from  following,  would  have 
required  an  arbitrary  intervention.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
equally  would  it  have  required  a  special  intervention  to  have 
prevented  the  moral  evil  of  the  act  from  following,  for  man  had 
voluntarily  disobeyed  the  known  will  of  his  Maker.  He  was 
called  to  suffer  the  consequences  of  those  laws  only  which  he 
had  actually  violated.  Physically,  he  did  not  directly  suffer ; 
nor  did  he  directly  suffer  intellectually.  Probably,  as  we  have 
already  remarked,  his  body  was  nourished ;  and  we  know  that 
his  experimental  knowledge  was,  also,  fatally  increased.  He 
left  paradise  with  the  same  elements  of  responsibility  as  he 
possessed  when  he  entered  it.  From  that  day,  indeed,  he  be¬ 
gan  to  suffer  both  in  body  and  in  mind ;  but  this  was  not  the 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


409 


direct,  but  the  indirect  effect  of  a  moral  evil,  operating  on  an 
all-related  constitution.  The  act  which,  in  itself,  was  purely  in¬ 
different,  became  in  its  reaction  as  a  moral  evil,  intellectually 
injurious  by  perverting  the  understanding,  and  corporeally  in¬ 
jurious  by  impairing  the  health.  But,  directly  and  primarily, 
the  effects  of  sin  fell  on  man’s  moral  nature ;  and  as  the  primal 
law  was  only  a  declaration  of  man’s  obligation  to  obey  the  will 
of  God,  accompanied  with  a  statement  of  the  conditional  results, 
so  the  subsequent  sentence  was  only  the  exposition  of  man’s 
changed  condition.  It  was  the  announcement  that  a  universal 
law  had  come  into  operation,  according  to  which  character  and 
condition  are  always  approximating. 

24.  But  what  is  the  effect  of  man’s  fall  on  his  posterity  ? 
The  reply  to  this  question  belongs,  as  I  have  intimated  before, 
to  the  next  dispensation,  when  the  character  and  condition  of 
his  descendants  come  into  view.  At  the  risk,  however,  of  be¬ 
ing  misunderstood,  owing  to  the  brevity  of  the  statement,  and 
without  stopping  to  point  out  its  relation  to  the  views  of  Augus¬ 
tine  and  Pelagius,  or  of  any  subsequent  writers  on  the  subject,* 
I  will  here  add,  provisionally,  that  as  to  the  first  consequence 
of  the  fall  —  man’s  moral  depravation  —  I  believe  that  we  are 
placed  by  it  in  precisely  the  same  state  as  we  should  have  been 
in  if  the  representative  relation. had  never  existed,  but  Adam 
had  violated  some  one  or  other  of  the  moral  laws  under  which 
he  was  placed,  in  his  own  individual  capacity  alone.  That  he 
would  have  sinned  in  that  capacity  appears  to  be  likely,  from 
the  fact  that  he  did  sin  under  circumstances  studiously  designed 
to  secure  his  obedience.  And  that  if  he  had  so  sinned,  the  de¬ 
pravation  of  his  race  would  have  ensued,  seems  equally  certain. 
For  while  his  federal  obedience  would  have  secured  for  them 
exemption,  for  all  time,  from  the  danger  of  such  depravation,  I 
believe  that  the  depravation  itself,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  trans¬ 
mitted  paternally  ;  and  consequently,  that  every  parent  stands, 
in  this  respect,  in  the  same  relation  to  the  transmission  as  our 
first  father  did.  This  I  believe  to  be  the  doctrine  of  Scripture ; 
and  this  alone  seems  adequate  to  account  for  the  universality 
of  the  evil. 

25.  The  second  consequence  of  the  fall,  as  the  infraction  of  a 
known  law  of  God,  was  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  and  its  atten¬ 
dant  remorse.  In  this  respect,  again,  our  relation  to  the  first 


*■  For  these  and  their  opinions,  see  “  Hagenbach’s  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines,”  §§  59,  198,  176,  245.  , 

35  A 


410 


MAN. 


man  is  the  same  as  if  the  sin  had  been  committed  in  his  own 
private  or  individual  capacity,  irrespective  of  any  probation¬ 
ary  law.  The  guilt  of  the  sin  is  exclusively  his  own.  Who, 
of  all  his  posterity,  ever  shared  with  him  in  the  consciousness 
of  it  ?  This  is  a  commutation  which  the  constitution  of  the  hu¬ 
man  mind  makes  impossible.  Even  Eve,  who  “  was  first  in  the 
transgression,”  was  conscious  only  of  her  own  demerit,  and  was 
held  guilty  only  because  she  had  actually  participated  in  the 
transaction. 

26.  And  is  not  our  present  condition  precisely  the  same  as  it 
would  have  been  if  no  probationary  law  had  existed,  but  the 
first  man  had  been  guilty  of  some  other  act  of  disobedience  ? 
That  is  to  say,  the  blessing  forfeited  would,  in  that  case,  never 
have  been  heard  of.  Not  having  existed,  even  in  prospect,  they 
could  not  have  been  lost.  For  surely  it  will  not  be  contended 
that  any  special  protective  influence  would  have  been  essential 
to  Adam,  in  order  to  his  progress  in  excellence,  independently 
of  the  probationary  arrangement  (what  might  have  been  gra¬ 
ciously  accorded  to  him  is  a  distinct  question)  ;  such  a  suppo¬ 
sition  would  involve  the  gravest  consequences.  Even  the  silent 
implications  of  Scripture  contain  nothing  to  countenance  it. 
And  not  having  himself  enjoyed  it,  in  the  case  supposed,  he 
could  not  have  forfeited  it  for  js.  Independently  of  the  proba¬ 
tionary  law,  “  death  must  have  been  the  result  to  Adam  of  any 
moral  failure  whatever.”*  And  as  we  suppose  such  moral  fail¬ 
ure  to  have  been  foreseen,  followed,  not  necessarily,  but  cer¬ 
tainly,  by  the  failure  of  the  race,  death  would  have  “  passed 
upon  all  men,  for  that  all  [would]  have  sinned.”  Then,  as  now, 
death  would  have  been  introduced  objectively  with  Adam,  but 
would  have  been  continued  subjectively  by  ourselves,  by  the 
continuation  of  depravity  in  the  race.  Glorious  as  our  condi¬ 
tion  might  have  been,  then,  if  our  representative  head  had 
maintained  his  standing,  I  do  not  regard  it  as  worse  now  that 
he  has  fallen,  than  it  would  have  been  if  such  a  prospect  had 
never  been  placed  within  his  reach,  but  he  had  been  left  to  fail 
in  an  ordinary  manner.  On  him  the  consequences  fell  as  a 
punishment ;  on  his  posterity  it  comes  as  a  legal  loss,  but  the 
loss  only  of  a  sublime  possibility,  leaving  us  no  more  just  ground 
of  complaint  than  as  if  it  had  never  existed,  and  man  had  been 
left  to  his  own  moral  resources. 

27.  Had  the  design  of  this  section  been  to  vindicate  tb  e 


*  Dr.  Payne’s  Lectures  on  Original  Sin,  p.  73. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


411 


penalty  of  the  tirst  transgression,  we  might  have  shown  that,  as 
the  laws  of  the  moral  world  are,  at  least,  as  important  as  those 
of  the  material,  and  as  the  least  deviation  of  the  earth  from  its 
appointed  orbit,  would  certainly  be  followed  by  material  ruin  to 
an  unknown  extent,  so  it  might  surely  have  been  expected, 
even  had  no  threatening  accompanied  the  law,  that  the  known 
violation  of  it  by  the  being  into  whose  hand  the  earth  had  been 
given,  would  be  followed  by  evil  results  of  unknown  magnitude. 
“  Sin,  in  the  abstract  [or  depravation,]  is  the  want  of  coincidence 
between  free  beings  and  the  commands  of  God ;  or,  which  is 
the  same  thing  between  those  beings  and  the  end  for  which 
they  were  created.”*  By  proposing  an  end  of  his  own,  in  op¬ 
position  to  the  divine  command,  man  brought  himself  into  con¬ 
flict  with  the  will  of  God,  and  disqualified  himself  for  answering 
the  great  end.  His  guilt  consisted  not  in  the  mere  excess  of  his 
sensuous  desires  —  indeed,  the  fact  that  he  was  induced  to  sin, 
partly,  by  the  desire  of  knowledge,  intimates  this  —  but  in  that 
spirit  of  autonomy  by  which  he  attempted  to  become  a  separate 
power.  And  is  moral  government  —  the  great  rule  of  right  be¬ 
tween  the  Supreme  lawgiver  and  his  subjects  —  the  only  law 
which  is  to  be  violated  with  impunity  ? 

28.  We  might  have  shown,  also,  that  although  the  probation¬ 
ary  arrangement  was  in  its  highest  character,  perfectly  unique, 
yet  that  so  much  of  its  fundamental  principle  pervades  the  his¬ 
tory  of  families  and  communities,  as  to  prove  that  ii  forms  a 
part  of  the  great  system  of  Divine  government.  Men  continue 


*  Bretschneider’s  Dogm.,  ii.  p.  5.  See  also  Doederlein’s  Inst.,  ii  o.  99 ; 
and  Reinhard’s  Dogm.,  p.  297. 

According  to  Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  (Lib.  i.  P.  6,  c.  1 — 22,)  “  the  first  sin 
was  the  twofold  disobedience  to  the  law  of  nature  and  the  law  of  disci¬ 
pline.  Man,  abandoning  the  right  medium,  desiring  the  higher  good, 
rising  above  himself,  and  striving,  in  the  pride  and  presumption  of  his 
heart,  both  to  be  equal  to  God.  and  to  possess  him  before  the  appointed 
time,  fell  from  his  state  of  innocence.  According  to  ‘  Deutsche  Theo- 
logie,’  c.  2,  the  Scriptures  say  that  sin  is  only  the  turning  of  the  creature 
from  the  unchangeable  to  the  changeable  —  i.  e .,  from  the  perfect  to  the 
imperfect  and  incomplete,  and  principally  to  himself.  Now  observe,  when 
man  puts  himself  in  possession  of  anything  that  is  good,  or  appropriates 
it,  as  being  —  when  he  imagines  that  he  has  his  being  from  himself ;  as 
life  —  when  he  imagines  that  he  has  life  in  himself;  and  as  knowledge — 
imagining  that  he  knows  much,  and  can  do  much ;  in  short,  Avhen  he  en¬ 
deavors  to  obtain  all  that  which  is  called  good,  imagining  that  he  is  the 
same,  or  that  the  same  belongs  to  him,  then  he  rebels  against  his  Maker. 
Adam  fell  by  accepting,  assuming,  or  appropriating  to  himself  that  which 
belonged  to  God.”  —  Hagenbach’s  Hist,  of  Doctrines,  vol.  ii.,  §  176. 


412 


MAN. 


to  suffer  in  their  spiritual  as  well  as  their  temporal  interests, 
by  the  guilty  conduct  of  parties  from  whom  they  have  not 
even  descended.  So  that  no  objection  can  be  alleged  against 
the  consequences  of  the  primary  probation,  the  spirit  of  which 
is  not  applicable  against  the  entire  plan  of  the  Divine  adminis¬ 
tration. 

29.  But  this  points  to  the  grand  inquiry,  Why  has  God  al¬ 
lowed  the  existence  of  evil  in  any  degree,  and  in  any  form  ? 
And,  first,  did  H e  foresee  its  existence  ?  That  He  did  so  might 
be  shown  from  the  infinite  perfection  of  his  nature.  His  pre- 
s-.-ience  comprises  alike  the  futura  necessaria  and  the  futura  con- 
tingentia.  And  this,  as  we  have  before  seen,  without  any  inter¬ 
ference  with  man’s  freedom ;  for  man  performs  not  the  given 
action  because  it  is  foreknown  by  God,  but  God  foreknows  the 
action  because  man,  as  a  free  agent,  would  perform  it.  Nor 
did  his  foreknowledge  of  the  certainty  of  man’s  defection  affect 
the  freedom  of  the  sinner  any  more  than  his  foreknowledge  of 
the  certainty  that  they  will  never  apostatize  affects  the  freedom 
of  the  blessed  in  heaven.  But,  besides  that  it  would  be  incon¬ 
sistent  with  every  just  view  of  the  character  of  God  to  suppose 
that  He  was  disappointed  by  the  entrance  of  sin  into  the  world, 
or  was  taken  by  surprise  by  it,  events  immediately  subsequent 
evinced  that  the  plans  which  Providence  had  arranged  clearly 
presupposed  that  man’s  earthly  condition  would  be  one  of  sin¬ 
fulness. 

30.  Could  God  have  'prevented  the  entrance  of  sin?  The 
majority  of  the  answers  which  have  been  given  to  this  question 
amount  simply  to  this,  —  that,  constituted  as  man  is,  he  could 
not  be  restrained  from  sinning,  without  having  a  restraint  placed 
on  his  free  agency.  But  “  we  are  but  little  enlightened  by 
learning  that  any  being  in  the  state  of  man  must  suffer  what 
man  suffers,  when  the  only  question  that  requires  to  be  resolved 
is,  why  any  being  is  in  this  state  ?”*  And  yet  the  acutest  minds 
are  in  danger  of  being  ensnared  by  this  fallacy.  Thus,  “  the 
difficult  question,  whence  comes  evil?  (says  Archbishop  King)f 
is  not  unanswerable.  For  it  arises  from  the  very  nature  and 
constitution  of  created  beings,  and  could  not  be  avoided  without 
a  contradiction.”!  Lord  Brougham,  in  his  profound  and  mas¬ 
terly  dissertation  on  the  origin  of  evil,  after  exposing  the  soph¬ 
ism  concealed  in  this  statement  —  the  assumption  that  the  exist¬ 
ing  constitution  of  things  is  absolutely  unavoidable  even  to  God 


*  Dr.  Johnson’s  Works,  vol.  viii.,  p.  39. 


f  Chap,  iv.,  §  9. 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


413 


—  entangles  himself  in  the  same  fallacy.  After  admitting  that 
death  is  an  evil,  he  adds,  “  that  man  might  have  been  created 
immortal,  is  not  denied ;  but  if  it  were  the  will  of  the  Deity  to 
form  a  limited  being,  and  to  place  him  upon  the  earth  for  only 
a  certain  period  of  time,  his  death  was  the  necessary  consequence 
of  this  determination.”*  True  ;  but  the  question  is,  why  a  be¬ 
ing  subject  to  this  determination  should  be  created,  not  whether 
the  determination  itself,  if  formed,  would  be  certainly  carried 
into  effect. 

31.  An  attempt  is  then  made  to  answer  the  question,  by  say¬ 
ing,  that  as  moral  excellence  cannot  exist  without  free  will,  nor 
free  will  without  the  capability  of  evil  as  well  as  of  good,  the 
creation  of  a  moral  agent  necessarily  supposes  the  possibility  of 
evil.  But  if  by  possibility  be  meant  liability ,  in  the  sense  of 
danger ,  we  reply,  that  not  only  is  this  to  beg  the  entire  ques¬ 
tion,  but  that  facts  disprove  the  truth  of  the  statement.  With¬ 
out  adverting  to  the  ever-blessed  God,  in  whose  nature  infinite 
liberty  and  absolute  holiness  meet,  and  are  one,  what  shall  we 
say  of  the  unfallen  angels  ?  and,  still  more,  of  the  spirits  of  the 
just  made  perfect  ?  They  lose  not  their  moral  liberty  by  en¬ 
tering  Heaven,  and  yet  their  standing  is  supposed  to  be  then 
made  infallibly  secure  ?  If,  however,  by  liability  to  sin  be 
meant  simply  the  power  of  sinning,  we  freely  admit  that  we  can¬ 
not  conceive  of  a  created  free  agent  naturally  exempted  from 
such  power ;  we  cannot  conceive  of  that  power  being  withdrawn 
from  his  nature,  even  in  Heaven,  for  it  seems  an  essential 
element  of  moral  agency.  Our  only  difficulty  in  admitting  this 
view,  if  we  feel  any,  must  arise  from  an  impression,  however 
faint  or  latent,  that  power  to  sin  will,  sooner  or  later,  end  in 
actual  sinning ;  that  power  and  danger,  in  this  instance,  mean 
the  same  thing ;  that  what  can  be,  will  be ;  that  the  power  of 
acting  wrong  cannot  be  conjoined  with  the  certainty  of  acting 
right.  Yet  the  power  of  acting  wrong  existed  in  “  the  Holy 
One  of  God,”  as  a  moral  agent,  conjoined  with  as  infallible  a 
certainty  of  acting  right,  as  if  he  could  not  have  acted  other¬ 
wise.  It  is,  therefore,  quite  conceivable  of  a  race  of  moral 
agents,  that  they  should  possess  the  power  of  sinning,  while  en¬ 
tirely  exempt  from  the  liability  or  danger ;  the  former,  as  an 
essential  element  of  free  agency,  the  latter,  owing  primarily  to 
a  sustaining  influence  acting  on  the  native  excellence  of  their 
characters,  and  next,  to  the  law-like  stability  resulting  from 


*  Diss.  on  Paley,  vol.  ii.,  p.  71. 

35* 


414 


MAN. 


holy  habits.  So  that  if  it  be  an  affair  of  Divine  ability  merely, 
or  a  question  whether  or  not  God  could  have  so  constituted 
man  as  to  prevent  the  entrance  of  evil  —  apart  from  every 
other  consideration  —  we  are  constrained  to  reply  in  the  affirm¬ 
ative. 

32.  Then  returns  the  great  question,  Why  did  God  create 
man  in  a  state  in  which  he  would  be  liable  to  sin?  We  stop 
not  to  notice  the  theories  which  have  been  devised  to  account 
for  the  existence  of  evil,  from  the  Maniehean  hypothesis  of  two 
eternal  principles,  or  from  the  earlier  Determinism  of  Chrysip- 
pus,  to  the  Optimism  of  Leibnitz  and  Wolff.  We  have  re¬ 
pudiated  the  notion  entertained  by  some,  that,  as  material 
qualities  are  known  only  by  their  opposites,  or  as  knowledge  is 
divided  into  the  two  branches  of  negative  and  positive,  so  good 
could  be  known  to  us  only  as  it  is  seen  on  a  dark  ground  of 
evil.  Neither  can  we  believe,  with  others,  that  the  misery  of 
one  world  is  to  be  perpetuated,  in  order  to  enhance,  by  contrast, 
the  happiness  and  the  sense  of  obligation  of  other  worlds. 
Still,  when  we  reflect  on  the  immense  preponderance  of 
benevolent  design  which  characterizes  the  works  of  God;  on 
the  fact  that  evil  never  appears  to  exist  in  any  form  as  an  end, 
but  only  as  an  incidental  effect ;  that  good,  on  the  contrary, 
appears  to  exist  for  its  own  sake,  because  it  is  pleasing  to  God, 
and  as  an  ultimate  end ;  and  that  in  proportion  as  we  escape 
from  our  ignorance,  apparent  anomalies  and  evils  are  found  to 
be  real  benefits,  we  can  well  believe  that  there  are  lofty  ends 
to  be  answered  by  the  permission  of  evil  which  could  not  be 
attained  in  any  other  way.  Such,  for  example,  may  be  the 
essential  nature  of  created  mind,  that  it  could  not,  except  by 
the  personal  experience  of  evil,  be  capable  of  the  highest  degree 
of  holiness  and  enjoyment.  This  view,  it  is  admitted,  would 
avail  only  in  relation  to  those  in  whom  all  evil  is  to  be  ulti¬ 
mately  extinguished.  For  the  reasons  assigned,  however,  we 
are  justified  in  the  firm  persuasion  that  the  plan  which  ac¬ 
tually  permits  the  existence  of  evil,  will  ultimately  be  found 
productive  of  a  greater  amount  of  good  than  a  plan  which  en¬ 
tirely  excludes  it,  and  that  the  evil  is  permitted  for  the  sake  of 
the  good. 

33.  Further,  our  theory  points  us  for  the  ultimate  reason  of 
the  permission  of  evil  to  the  final  design  of  all  things  —  the 
manifestation  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency,  which  also  implies 
the  highest  excellence  of  the  creature.  Sin  itself,  indeed,  is 
without  reason, — is  against  it.  Objectively  considered,  it  is  a 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


415 


causeless  act.  As  such,  it  is  inherently  and  essentially  inexpli¬ 
cable,  and  “whoever  would  explain  evil,  nullifies  the  very  idea 
of  it.”  And  being  without  any  objective  cause,  it  could  not  have 
been  designed ,  or  have  entered  into  the  Divine  plan  as  a  primary 
and  essential  part  of  it.  But  although  evil  owes  its  existence  to 
nothing  causative  in  the  Divine  purpose  —  although  it  is  so  far 
from  being  dependent  on  him  in  this  respect,  that  its  very  essence 
lies  in  its  being  an  effect  independent  of,  and  hostile  to  him  — 
we  may  confidently  affirm  that  he  would  not  have  permitted  its 
existence  if  he  could  not  have  made  it  the  occasion  for  an  ulte¬ 
rior  display  of  his  inexhaustible  resources  of  excellence. 

The  creation  of  innumerable  worlds,  each  differing  in  some 
respects  from  all  the  rest,  illustrates  the  plenitude  of  the  Divine 
power.  And  our  theory  suggests  the  analogous  inquiry,  whether 
or  not  it  may  not  be  the  design  of  God  to  demonstrate  the 
plenitude  of  his  moral  excellence  by  “conducting  many  [worlds] 
to  glory,”  each  varying  in  its  moral  character  from  all  the  rest 
—  each  starting  from  a  different  point  in  the  ascending  scale  of 
spiritual  excellence,  and  passing  through  different  states  of  moral 
discipline ;  and  whether  or  not  the  human  race  may  not  be  one 
of  the  orders  of  beings  by  whom  and  to  whom  the  demonstration 
is  to  be  made  —  one  of  the  earliest ,  perhaps  —  and  destined  to 
exercise  a  moral  influence  on  every  other  order  of  responsible 
beings  yet  to  come.  Though  the  existence  of  evil  itself,  there¬ 
fore,  is  without  reason  or  foundation,  the  permission  of  it  may 
repose  on  the  profoundest  of  all  reasons  —  on  the  occasion  which 
it  supplies  for  the  demonstration  of  the  infinite  holiness  and  un¬ 
bounded  grace  of  God  in  the  highest  well-being  of  the  creature. 
For  by  the  remedial  method  which  He  has  been  pleased  to 
adopt,  every  moral  attribute  of  the  Godhead  has  been  placed 
before  the  universe  in  a  light  in  which  we  cannot  conceive  that 
it  could  ever  otherwise  have  been  seen.  To  “the  principalities 
and  powers  in  heavenly  places,”  depths  of  the  Divine  excellence 
are  made  accessible,  which  must  else  have  forever  remained 
unfathomed,  and  immeasurable  means  of  happiness,  and  motives 
to  improvement,  placed  before  them. 

34.  But  that  which,  at  this  point  of  our  subject,  is  especially 
deserving  of  attention  is,  that  while  the  objectiv<  existence  of 
evil  is  thus  reconcilable  with  the  character  of  God  for  a  given 
end,  that  very  end  is,  that  He  may  show  his  subjective  hatred 
and  utter  irreconcilableness  to  evil,  and  his  power  to  rescue 
from  its  grasp.  Hence,  the  commission  of  the  first  sin  was  forth¬ 
with  followed  by  a  self-executing  sentence  expressive  of  the 


416 


MAN. 


Divine  displeasure  ;  and  that  sentence  was  accompanied  by  a 
gracious  intimation  that  a  conflict  with  evil  had  commenced,  des¬ 
tined  to  end  in  triumph.  According,  also,  to  our  view,  the  Divine 
permission  of  evil  must  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the  free 
agency  and  guiltiness  of  the  sinner.  Only  on  this  condition  is 
the  proof  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency  possible.  Had  the  first 
sinner  been  entitled  to  say,  “Why,  then,  doth  he  yet  find  fault, 
for  who  hath  resisted  his  will  ?”  any  display  of  mercy  would 
have  been  impossible.  The  promised  remedy  would  only  have 
been  an  act  of  justice  —  the  reparation  of  injustice.  There  could 
be  no  more  of  mercy  in  the  promise  than  there  was  of  justice  in 
the  threatening.  The  “exceeding  riches  of  grace”  in  the  remedy, 
presupposed  “the  exceeding  sinfulness  of  sin”  in  the  sinner. 
Accordingly,  his  own  nature  was  against  him.  The  moral  con¬ 
sequence  arose  not  out  of  any  arbitrary  arrangement  of  man’s 
constitution,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  things.  So  conscious 
was  he  of  his  demerit,  that  his  own  conscience  forestalled  the 
sentence  of  the  law,  and  began  to  anticipate  its  execution,  while 
the  promise  which  inspired  him  with  hope  was  the  first  intima¬ 
tion  of  a  scheme  of  all-sufficient  grace.  Even  that  grace,  however, 
is  not  a  rescue  of  man  from  justice,  but  only  from  the  punish¬ 
ment  to  which  he  had  made  himself  liable.  The  same  justice 
is  still  on  the  throne ;  and  the  grand  expedient  of  mercy  is  the 
highest  homage  to  its  claims. 

35.  One  important  deduction  results  from  the  preceding  re¬ 
marks  on  the  probationary  arrangements,  and  its  issue.  If  we 
had  been  only  now  made  acquainted  with  the  trial  of  man  as  a 
recent  event,  we  should,  we  think,  be  warranted  in  expecting 
that  whatever  great  principle  God  intended  to  illustrate,  or  what¬ 
ever  leading  end  he  proposed  to  gain,  by  that  primary  arrange¬ 
ment.  He  would  not  abandon  at  the  termination  of  that  particular 
trial,  but  would  steadily  keep  in  view,  through  every  subsequent 
stage  of  his  intercourse  with  man,  until  the  principle  was  fully 
received  by  man,  and  the  end  perfectly  attained  by  God.  Now, 
we  have  seen  that  the  object  was  unquestionable ;  to  exhibit  the 
great  fact,  that  so  absolute  are  the  claims  of  God  on  man’s  volun¬ 
tary  obedience,  and  that  so  necessary  is  man’s  dependence  on 
God,  that  his  well-being,  and  his  consequent  power  of  answering 
the  great  end  of  his  creation,  depend  on  the  perfect  coincidence 
of  his  will  with  the  Divine  will ;  to  exhibit  this  fact  so  as  to 
respect  man’s  moral  freedom,  or  to  leave  him  at  liberty,  if  he 
will,  to  act  independently  of,  and  in  opposition  to,  the  Divine 
will ;  and,  in  the  event  of  man’s  failure,  to  take  occasion  from  it 


REASON  OF  THE  METHOD. 


417 


so  to  display  the  Divine  resources  as  shall  still  further  illustrate 
the  all-sufficiency  of  God,  and  the  dependence  of  man,  and  aug¬ 
ment  his  motives  to  entire  obedience.  That  this  was  the  great 
end  proposed,  we  say,  is  obvious,  for  this  was  the  end  actually 
gained ;  and  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  any  other  end  was 
aimed  at  than  that  which  was  attained. 

36.  But  if  such  was  the  design  of  that  primary  dispensation, 
we  know  of  no  reason,  we  say,  why  it  should  be  viewed  as  an 
isolated  act,  or  as  involving  principles  never  to  be  illustrated 
again ;  and  not  rather  as  the  first  in  a  series  of  arrangements, 
the  great  principle  of  which  it  foreshadowed  and  embodied. 
On  the  contrary,  we  do  see  greater  reason  than  ever,  why  these 
principles  should  now  become  permanent  characteristics  of  the 
Divine  procedure.  For  if,  when  man  had  as  yet  evinced  no 
symptoms  of  autonomy,  or  self-will,  the  Supreme  Governor 
saw  fit,  by  a  distinct  enactment,  to  place  his  obligation  in  the 
strongest  light,  the  necessity  for  impressing  him  with  the  fact 
of  his  obligation  and  dependence  is  not  diminished  by  his  exhi¬ 
bition  of  self-will,  but  immeasurably  increased.  If,  as  the 
event  proved,  there  was  reason  for  making  this  the  first  end 
which  God  aimed  at  with  unfallen  man,  surely  every  act  of 
disobedience  strengthens  the  reason  for  continuing  to  aim  at 
the  same  end  even  to  the  last. 

37.  And  is  not  this  conclusion  further  corroborated  by  all 
that  we  are  warranted  to  infer  respecting  the  probation  of  the 
angelic  race  ?  Whether  sin  had  come  into  the  universe  before 
them,  or  was  absolutely  originated  by  them ;  where  they  spent 
their  probation ;  what  was  made  the  test  of  their  obedience ; 
and  what  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  awful  defection  of 
some  of  them,  are  questions  on  which  we  stop  not  to  speculate. 
It  is  enough  for  us  to  know  that,  with  every  suitable  induce¬ 
ment  to  stand,  they  fell;  that  (judging  from  certain  glcam-like 
hints)  the  defection  commenced  even  with  their  chief;  that  the 
crown  fell  from  the  head  of  created  beings.  In  him  all  creation 
was  humbled.  Nor  does  the  fact,  that  the  defection  was  numeri¬ 
cally  partial,  neutralize  the  great  lesson  of  created  dependence. 
It  only  proves  that  each  member  of  the  race  occupied  (unlike 
man)  a  separate  standing ;  that  the  sin  of  one  did  not  necessitate 
the  sin  of  another ;  that  that  which  is  temptation  to  one  may  not 
be  the  same  to  another ;  and  that  those  who  fell  might  have  re¬ 
tained  their  ground  of  holy  obedience  like  the  rest  of  their  race 
But  though  many  of  them  maintained  their  allegiance  then ,  it  did 
not  follow  that  they  would  necessarily  retain  it  through  all  sub 


418 


MAN. 


sequent  time.  The  great  truth,  which  they  must  have  deduced 
from  the  appalling  event,  was,  that  they  themselves  were  in 
danger  of  defection.  And  though  the  vivid  apprehension  of  this 
danger  would  naturally  exercise  a  salutary  preventing  influence, 
it  proclaimed  anew  the  fact  of  their  dependence,  and  demon¬ 
strated  that  they  could  find  security  only  in  a  Divine  confirma* 
tion.  The  great  moral  of  man’s  defection  is  but  the  repetition 
of  a  lesson  already  taught  to  an  elder  family  of  creation. 

38.  We  may  confidently  look  on  it,  therefore,  as  a  leading 
principle  of  the  Divine  procedure,  that  all  the  successive  dispen¬ 
sations  of  God  to  man  will  aim,  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
man’s  free  agency,  to  impress  him  with  his  obligations  and  de¬ 
pendence  ;  to  increase  his  motives  to  obedience ;  and,  by  taking 
occasion  from  his  vain  endeavors  at  independence,  to  enlarge 
the  display  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency.  This,  indeed,  is  only 
the  legitimate  extension  and  application  of  that  law  of  the  Divine 
manifestation  which  stands  at  the  head  of  this  “  Part,”  and 
which  we  have  called  “  The  Reason  of  the  Method.”  Besides 
which,  and  chiefly,  the  expectation  that  the  principle  described 
will  be  invariably  pursued,  is  in  harmony  with  the  great  end, 
and  is  essential  to  it.  That  end  is  the  manifestation  of  God’s 
all-sufficiency.  But  a  spirit  of  autonomy  and  independence  is 
a  virtual  protest  against  that  end,  and  the  hostile  introduction'of 
a  separate  end.  And  the  triumph  of  that  all-sufficiency  is  to 
appear  in  the  restoration  of  harmony  between  the  Supreme  will 
and  the  subordinate,  in  a  manner  which  shall  accord  with  the 
freedom,  and  secure  the  blessedness  of  the  creature,  and  redound 
to  the  glory  of  Him,  for  whom,  and  by  whom,  all  things  consist. 


419 


THIRD  PART. 

THE  ULTIMATE  END  OF  THE  METHOD. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Sect.  I.- — Power. 

1  We  now  advance  to  the  consideration  of  the  great  princi¬ 
ple,  that  both  the  laws  of  the  method,  and  the  proximate  reason 
of  it,  find  their  chief  end,  in  this  stage  of  the  Divine  procedure, 
in  contributing  to  prove  the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Holiness 
of  God.  In  remarking  on  this  subject,  under  the  first  law, 
we  stated  that  we  do  not  claim  for  this  opening  human  dispen¬ 
sation  a  display  of  holiness  exclusively,  but  pre-eminently. 
Having  shown,  also,  that  each  preceding  display  of  the  Divine 
perfection  may  be  expected  to  be  brought  forwards  and  en¬ 
larged  through  each  successive  stage  of  creation,  and  having 
assigned  the  grounds  of  this  expectation,  we  have  now  to  begin 
by  remarking  on  its  fulfilment  in  the  continued  exercise  of  the 
Divine  Power. 

2.  From  that  point  in  duration,  unimaginably  remote,  when 
the  material  of  the  universe  first  came  into  being,  the  argument 
for  the  power  of  God  had  gone  on  increasing  during  every  mo¬ 
ment  of  the  period.  At  the  coming  of  man,  not  only  were  all 
the  pre-existing  forces  of  nature  continued  in  activity,  but  new 
displays  of  power  were  added  to  them.  The  inorganic,  the 
organic,  and  the  sentient  worlds,  felt  anew  the  impress  of  the 
Creative  will. 

3.  But  here  —  besides  that  the  Creator  still  “  upholdeth  all 
things  by  the  word  of  his  power,”  and  has  more  than  ever  to 
uphold  —  here  is  a  creature  with  a  will,  the  very  image  of  the 
Divine  will,  and  therefore  of  the  Divine  power ;  for  the  will  of 
God  is  the  producing  power,  or  cause,  of  the  created  universe. 
Here  is  a  being  wdio,  in  the  exertion  of  his  will,  first  obtains 
the  conception  of  a  cause,  —  an  agent,  who,  because  he  is  not 


420 


MAN. 


blindly  and  necessarily  determined  from  without,  but  is  con¬ 
scious  that  he  himself  really  produces  an  effect,  finds,  in  that 
consciousness,  the  primitive  idea  of  a  cause.  This  being,  armed 
with  a  muscular  mechanism  of  most  diversified  application,  is 
placed  here  in  the  midst  of  a  wide  theatre  filled  with  a  variety 
of  objects  to  be  laid  hold  of,  and  dealt  with,  and  acted  upon,  as 
the  energy  ot  his  will  shall  direct.  Man,  “  the  great  power  of 
God,”  has  come  into  the  creation  as  a  new  antecedent  in  the 
sphere  of  causation,  to  produce  new  consequents. 

4.  Some,  indeed,  have  conjectured  that  unfallen  man  could 
command  the  laws  of  nature ;  that,  to  him,  that  which  is  now 
preternatural  was  natural  and  easy.  Nor  do  we  know  of  any 
valid  objection  to  the  view ;  for,  fatal  as  such  a  prerogative 
would  be  to  man  in  his  fallen  condition,  we  cannot  conceive  of 
his  using  it  in  the  case  supposed,  except  under  the  direction  of 
the  Supreme  will.  As  an  illustration  of  our  present  subject, 
however,  the  opinion,  besides  being  conjectural,  is  quite  unne¬ 
cessary.  Here  are  the  kingdoms  of  nature,  inorganic,  vege¬ 
table,  and  animal,  hitherto  destitute  of  a  free  finite  will ;  and 
man  is  brought,  and  set  down  in  the  midst  of  them,  with  a  will, 
with  the  muscular  means  of  exerting  his  will  upon  them  all, 
and  with  authority  to  do  so.  The  very  first  effort  which  his 
will  makes  to  move  his  arm,  awakens  in  him  the  idea  of  a  caus¬ 
ative  power.  He  has,  then,  a  will  to  act,  a  muscular  apparatus 
to  act  with,  and  a  world  of  objects  to  act  upon ;  some  of  these 
he  will  appropriate  and  apply  to  uses  which  they  never  before 
served ;  others  he  will  mould  into  new  shapes ;  some  he  will 
destroy ;  others  he  will  cultivate  and  develop ;  here,  dividing 
unity  into  plurality  ;  there,  reducing  plurality  to  unity ;  adding 
to  his  own  muscular  apparatus  the  force  of  the  elements,  and 
the  muscular  mechanism  of  the  brute ;  and,  by  falling  in  with 
the  laws  of  matter,  arming  himself  with  their  unknown  powers. 
For  the  charter  from  the  Supreme  will  ran  thus:  “Replenish 
the  earth,  and  subdue  it,  and  have  dominion  over  the  whole.” 
And  in  the  very  power  with  which  man  was  endowed  for  sub¬ 
jecting  the  world,  he  became  enabled  to  apprehend  the  power 
which  had  created  it.  By  his  will  it  is  that  the  external  crea¬ 
tion  becomes  to  him  a  manifestation  of  the  Divine  power ;  while 
that  same  will  constitutes  a  manifestation  of  power  immeasura¬ 
bly  surpassing  that  creation  itself. 

5.  In  this  way  it  is  that  man  is  enabled  to  reason  from  a  lim¬ 
ited  effect  to  an  unlimited  cause  —  from  a  bounded  creation  to 
a  Creator  of  boundless  power.  The  method  and  the  validity 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


421 


of  such  reasoning  we  have  examined  and  illustrated  already, 
and  shall  not  here  reconsider  them.*  As  an  intelligent  being, 
man  perceives  that  the  necessity  for  a  limited  creation  lies  in 
the  material  itself,  and  that  he  cannot  therefore  justly  infer  from 
such  inherent  and  necessary  limitation  any  limitation  of  Crea¬ 
tive  power.  As  a  being  causative  as  well  as  intelligent,  he  in¬ 
terprets  all  that  the  Creator  has  done,  not  as  the  measure,  but 
the  sample,  of  what  He  can  do.  Conscious,  himself,  of  a  con¬ 
stant  reserve  of  power,  he  instinctively  looks  on  the  creation  as 
the  shadowing  forth  of  a  power  not  exhausted,  but  simply  ex¬ 
emplified.  “  Lo,  these  are  parts  of  His  ways,  but  the  thunder 
of  His  power  who  can  understand  !  ”  As  a  being  moral ,  or  re¬ 
sponsible,  as  well  as  voluntary  and  intelligent,  he  has  to  remem¬ 
ber  that  even  if  a  creation,  metaphysically  infinite  were  possi¬ 
ble,  the  evidence  of  the  fact,  as  a  proof  of  the  infinite  power 
of  God,  must  not  be  such  as  to  compel  his  belief ;  that  it  must 
and  would  be  limited,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  of  respect 
for  his  moral  nature.  And  when  he  remembers  that  he  stands 
in  the  midst  of  a  universe  which  practically,  and  for  him,  has 
no  limits  ;  that  it  is  perpetually  diversified  with  changes  innu¬ 
merable,  and  with  the  play  of  forces  unimaginable,  as  if  for  the 
purpose  of  putting  all  thought  of  a  limited  agency  to  flight ; 
and  that  the, whole  is  progressive  —  the  “arm  of  God  being 
still  bare,”  still  evolving  and  working  out  the  immeasurable 
scheme,  every  new  moment  bringing  with  it  an  incalculable 
amount  of  new  evidence  of  the  Divine  power  to  be  added  to  all 
the  accumulations  of  the  past,  and  that  of  such  increase  there  is 
no  prospect  of  an  end,  —  he  cannot  but  feel  himself  in  the  pre¬ 
sence  of  a  God  all-sufficient. 

6.  But  man’s  profoundest  conceptions  of  power  arise  from  his 
own  influence  over  mind.  His  sway  over  nature,  indeed,  is 
great,  and  is  ultimately  traceable  to  his  intelligence.  His  dis¬ 
covery  and  application  of  the  Mechanical  Powers  put  back  the 
limits  of  his  power  immeasurably.  When  he  first  announced 
the  theoretic  possibility  that,  with  a  point  to  stand  on,  he  could 
lift  the  world,  he  seemed  to  lift  higher  the  arched  heavens  above 
him,  and  indefinitely  enlarged  the  horizon  of  his  mental  activity. 
Could  the  father  of  the  race  have  foreseen  the  energy  which 
the  human  will  would  put  forth  on  the  external  world,  genera¬ 
tion  after  generation,  his  prophetic  tongue  would  surely  have 
hesitated  to  foretel  a  thousandth  part  of  its  vast  and  varied 


Pre-Adamite  Earth,  pp.  130  — 146. 

36 


422 


MAN. 


efforts.  But  the  power  which  man  was  constituted  to  put  foith 
in  self-government  was  of  a  surpassing  order.  The  volcano, 
the  tempest,  and  all  the  great  elements  of  nature  in  their  most 
active  form,  are  only  emblems  of  energies  enclosed  in  the  human 
breast ;  and  in  keeping  them  tranquil,  and  even  resolutely  still¬ 
ing  them,  in  the  presence  of  exciting  causes,  he  is  putting  forth 
a  godlike  power,  and  governing  a  world.  Still  loftier  does  our 
conception  of  human  power  become,  when  the  example  of  indi¬ 
vidual  self-government  is  seen  commanding  the  esteem,  and 
silently  swaying  the  movements  of  the  multitude,  and  carrying 
all  their  diversified  characters,  like  a  single  energy,  in  its  own 
direction.  The  power  which  noisily  proclaims  itself  in  the 
storm  is  less  than  the  silent  power  which  pervades  the  calm. 
In  proportion  as  immorality  attains  perfection,  it  labors  with 
ever-deepening  hostility  to  subvert  every  trace  of  virtue ;  but 
its  utmost  spasms  of  energy  fall  short  of  the  quiet  might  appro¬ 
priate  to  the  self-governed  spirit.  Such  a  mind  is  in  sympathy 
with  Power  in  its  fountain,  and  touches  in  its  movements  all  the 
laws  and  outward  expressions  of  that  Power.  But  the  sub- 
limest  of  all  its  efforts  is  that  in  which  it  repairs  to  that  Foun¬ 
tain  —  goes  into  the  presence  of  God  —  and  there  puts  forth  its 
highest  energy  in  a  direct  appeal  to  the  Divine  will.  By  such 
an  act,  it  has  “  power  with  God ;  ”  unites  itself  with  His  power, 
and  becomes  possessed  of  a  subordinate  omnipotence. 


Sect.  II.  —  Wisdom. 

1.  In  the  constitution  of  man,  Power  is  seen,  as  in  the  Pre- 
adamite  Earth,  subservient  to  Wisdom.  Here,  also,  all  the 
displays  of  wise  design,  or  final  causes,  characteristic  of  organ¬ 
ized  and  sentient  existences,  are  again  repeated.  But,  here, 
new  and  surpassing  illustrations  of  wisdom  appear. 

2.  The  relations  which  met  in  the  first  human  being  are,  to 
us,  innumerable.  As  to  his  objective  relations,  what  evidence 
of  design  appears  merely  in  his  means  of  knowledge !  that  his 
senses,  overpassing  the  media  of  perception,  should  perceive 
only  the  objects  themselves  which  it  is  useful  for  him  to  know : 
that  the  senses  should  be  adjusted  and  adapted  to  their  proper 
objects  —  the  eye,  for  instance,  being  neither  microscopic  nor 
telescopic  —  and  the  ear  placing  us  neither  in  a  world  of  whis¬ 
pers,  nor  of  perpetual  thunders:  that  the  senses  should  have 
been  perfectly  adapted  to  each  other  —  sight  and  touch  for  ex- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


423 


ample,  not  contradicting,  but  corroborating,  each  other  :  and  that 
the  mind  should  be  so  constituted  as  to  collect  and  combine  the 
notices  of  the  several  senses  into  the  unity  of  knowledge. 

3.  Again,  that  as  individual  objects  are  innumerable,  and 
consequently  could  not  be  remembered,  but  would  overwhelm 
the  mind  with  confusion,  it  should  have  been  made  capable  of 
recognizing  the  relations  which  exist  among  them,  and  of  ar¬ 
ranging  them  accordingly.  That  is  to  say,  that  as  the  uni¬ 
verse  has  its  plan,  so  the  mind  should  have  a  power  of 
arranging  correspondent  with  it ;  that,  as  God  has  classed  and 
continues  everything  in  genera  and  species,  “after  its  kind,” 
man  should  be  able  to  classify  them  on  the  same  principle  ;  thus 
placing  and  distributing  a  world  of  objects,  and  reproducing,  in 
the  inner  circle  of  his  own  mind,  however  imperfectly,  parts  of 
the  great  plan  of  the  Creator  of  the  universe !  An  exercise 
of  this  description  was  one  of  the  first  to  which  the  Divine 
Creator  solicited  the  mind  of  his  new-made  creature.  For, 
it  is  recorded  that  when  the  Lord  God  had  formed  the  crea¬ 
tures,  “  He  brought  them  to  Adam  to  see  what  he  would  call 
them.”  And  although  this  first  effort  at  generalization  may 
have  been  only  on  a  small  scale,  yet  must  it  be  regarded  ns  ex¬ 
hibiting  the  promise  of  all  subsequent  efforts,  inasmuch  as  it 
evinced  the  existence  of  the  powers  necessary  to  make  them. 
And  again ;  that,  as  all  external  objects,  so  related  among  them¬ 
selves,  are  also  related  to  the  Great  First  Cause  of  the  whole, 
the  mind  should  feel  itself  led  away  frtfm  the  visible  to  the 
invisible  to  seek  for  Him  ;  that  since  Nature,  as  Bacon  observes, 
ascends  “  like  a  pyramid  ”  from  multitude  to  unity,  the  mind 
should  be  prepared  to  ascend  also  till  it  finds  its  Maker  enthroned 
on  the  summit ;  all  this  “  cometh  forth  from  him  who  is  won¬ 
derful  in  counsel,  and  excellent  in  working  !  ” 

4.  Equally  replete  with  the  indications  of  Divine  design  is 
man’s  emotional  nature.  Such,  for  instance,  is  that  curiosity  which 
prompts  the  desire  of  knowing,  what,  as  yet,  we  know  not ;  and 
the  love  of  novelty  which  prevents  us  from  limiting  our  attention 
to  a  single  object ;  the  love  of  truth  which  disposes  us  to  know 
and  to  represent  things  as  they  are ;  and  the  love  of  communi¬ 
cating  truth  which  impels  us  to  diffuse  our  knowledge  ;  the  hope 
which  impels  us  forwards  where  success  is  possible ;  and  the 
fear  which  detains  us  from  unnecessarily  incurring  danger.  All 
these  are  necessary,  and  all  these  exist  and  concur,  as  means  or 
as  motives,  in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  alone.* 


*  Admirable  illustrations  of  Design  derived  from  Psychology  are  to  be 


424 


MAN. 


5.  But  even  these  means  and  motives  would  be  useless  to 
man,  as  an  accountable  being,  without  the  concurrence  of  other 
and  higher  powers.  Accordingly,  he  is  not  only  capable  of  being 
moved,  his  will  enables  him  to  determine  the  direction  of  the 
movement,  and  his  conscience  indicates  the  direction  which 
ought  to  be  taken.  Now,  if  we  imagine  a  being  entirely  desti¬ 
tute  of  either  of  all  these  faculties,  we  imagine  a  being  entirely 
unfit  for  Eden  or  for  earth ;  and  yet  all  these  faculties  are 
united  man. 

6.  But  even  when  we  have  enumerated  all  man’s  objective 
relations,  (which  we  have  not,)  “  the  half  hath  not  been  told.” 
His  subjective  relations  still  remain.  Descending  into  the  world 
within  him,  we  find  that  he  is  capable  of  operating  on  the  phe¬ 
nomena  of  his  own  mind,  and  that  all  these  sustain  relations 
among  themselves.  By  one  provision,  a  single  thought  is  made 
the  means  of  recalling  a  train  of  other  thoughts ;  by  another, 
the  mind  is  enabled  to  arrest  any  single  thought  in  this  train, 
and  to  make  it  the  subject  of  fixed  attention ;  and,  by  another, 
it  is  made  conscious  of  pleasure  or  pain,  of  approbation  or  dis¬ 
approbation,  according  as  it  deems  the  act  to  be  right  or  wrong. 
This  last  provision  evinces  the  highest  wisdom.  For,  while  as 
an  intellectual  being,  man  perceives  that  certain  acts  conduce 
only  to  his  animal  gratification,  and  certain  others  to  the  present 
gratification  of  his  affections,  and  others  still  to  the  purpose  of  his 
welfare  at  a  future  point  of  time,  his  moral  nature  involves  the 
reason  why,  and  the  amount  to  which,  these  classes  of  action 
are  to  be  performed,  by  referring  him  to  the  will  of  God  as  his 
highest  rule,  and  to  the  enjoyment  of  his  favor  as  the  highest 
happiness.  So  that  if  the  wisdom  of  the  means  are  to  be  esti¬ 
mated  by  a  reference  to  the  end,  here  is  adaptation  which  evinces 
the  hand  of  God. 

7.  But  nearly  all  that  we  have  said  under  this  particular,  re¬ 
spects  faculties  and  relations  which  co-exist  in  the  human  mind. 
Regarding  man  as  a  'progressive  being,  other  remarkable  provi¬ 
sions  come  to  light.  Some  of  these,  indeed,  are  presupposed 
already,  but  their  manifestation  depends  on  man’s  successive 
existence.  There  is  the  provision  by  which,  having  attended 
to  the  present,  we  are  enabled  to  recall  it  when  past;  and 
especially  the  arrangement,  that  this  power  of  memory  should 
be  most  tenacious  of  things  interesting,  things  well  considered, 


found  in  Lord  Brougham’s  “Prel.  Discourse  to  Paley’s  Nat.  Theology,” 
pp.  15  — 152.  And  these  are  ably  supplemented  and  remarked  on  in  Dr 
Turton’s  “  Nat.  Theology,”  pp.  65,  etc. 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


425 


things  felt  to  be  intrinsically  valuable,  things  which  there  is  an 
anxiety  to  remember.  There  is  the  provision  by  which  we  can 
anticipate  and  imagine  the  future.  There  is  the  wonderful  effect 
of  habit,  by  which  exertion,  which  might  have  become  increas¬ 
ingly  difficult  and  distasteful  by  repetition,  becomes  more  and 
more  easy  and  agreeable.  There  are  the  marvellous  phenomena 
of  the  imagination,  co-extensive  with  the  entire  range  of  the 
mind’s  activity ;  aiding  it  even  in  the  department  of  demonstra¬ 
tive  science ;  peopling  the  distant  and  the  future  with  creations 
of  its  own ;  and,  like  the  setting  sun,  when  it  bathes  and  blends 
in  the  same  radiance  the  mountain  top,  and  the  cloud  resting 
there,  uniting  earth  with  heaven.  And  then  there  are  those 
primary  elements  of  reason,  or  fundamental  laws  of  belief,  pre¬ 
supposed  in  all  the  operations  of  the  mind,  and  by  which  it 
establishes  its  kindred  to  the  Divine  Mind. 

8.  Even  in  this  specification,  numerous  indications  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  wisdom  in  the  constitution  of  man  have  been  omitted. 
Those  of  his  bodily  frame  in  which  he,  more  or  less,  resembles 
the  animal  kingdom ;  as  well  as  the  peculiar  distribution  and 
office  of  his  nerves ;  the  mechanism  of  his  hand ;  the  erect  pos- 
;ure  of  his  body ;  the  exquisite  concurrence  of  means  which  re¬ 
sults  in  the  power  of  speech ;  and  the  orderly  succession  in 
which  his  powers,  both  bodily  and  mental,  come  into  exercise, 
and  arrive  at  maturity.  By  the  plan  which  we  have  prescribed 
for  ourselves,  or  rather  which  God  has  prescribed  —  for  we  fol¬ 
low  His  own  objective  plan  —  we  pass  over,  in  this  estimate  of 
individual  man,  all  those  indications  of  design  which  the  consti¬ 
tution  of  the  family,  and  of  society,  will  bring  to  light  —  such 
as  the  influence  of  anger  in  restraining  injustice ;  of  shame,  in 
preventing  the  world  from  becoming  one  wide  scene  of  open 
licentiousness ;  and  the  wonderful  arrangement  by  which  a 
world  of  conscious  agents,  each  of  which  is  aiming  only,  in 
certain  particulars,  at  his  own  good,  should  be  found,  by  the 
result,  to  have  been  unconsciously  promoting  the  good  of  the 
whole ! 

9.  But  limited  as  our  view  must  be,  what  a  profound  impres¬ 
sion  of  the  Divine  wisdom  is  it  calculated  to  produce  !  When 
it  is  remembered  that  “  of  the  twenty  independent  circumstances 
which  enter  into  beneficial  concurrence  in  the  formation  of  an 
eye,”  it  is,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  probabilities,  more  than 
a  million  to  one  that  none  of  them  should  occupy  an  indifferent 
or  a  hurtful  position,  who  shall  calculate  the  proofs  of  intelli¬ 
gent  contrivance  in  the  human  constitution,  considering  that  the 

36* 


426 


MAN. 


eye  itself  is  but  a  fraction  of  the  multitudinous  arrangements 
which  meet  and  harmonize  in  man ;  and  that  it  is  the  product 
of  all  these  members  which  represents  the  amount  of  evidence 
afforded  by  them  of  a  wise  Designer ! 

10.  Does  it  say  much  for  the  wisdom  of  a  designer,  when 
those  who  have  profoundly  studied  his  arrangements,  feel  as 
certain  that  parts  which  they  cannot  understand,  will  finally 
prove  to  conduce  to  the  end  he  has  in  view,  as  much  as  the 
parts  which  they  do  comprehend  ?  Yet  this  is  the  confidence 
which  the  mind  entertains  relative  to  the  Divine  arrangement 
of  the  human  constitution;  a  confidence  justified  by  the  fact  that 
time  only  serves  to  shame  us  out  of  our  suspicions  by  explain¬ 
ing  its  mysteries,  and  by  increasingly  disclosing  the  hand  of  the 
Maker.  Does  it  reflect  credit  on  the  skill  of  an  artist,  when  the 
attempt  of  every  other  artist  to  improve  on  his  design  ends  in 
utter  failure  ?  Such  has  been  the  fate  of  every  attempt,  how¬ 
ever  innocently  designed,  and  however  long  persevered  in,  to 
force  or  to  modify  the  constitution  of  man.  The  best  aims  in 
its  behalf  are  found  to  be  the  soonest  attained  by  adapting  the 
means  employed  to  its  recognized  laws.  Does  it  evince  the 
harmony  and  unity  of  a  complicated  design,  when  no  one  part 
can  be  affected  without  every  other  part  sharing,  more  or  less, 
in  the  effect  ?  Mho  does  not  know  that  this  is  eminently  the 
case  with  the  constitution  of  man ! 

11.  And  yet  long  and  intently  as  the  human  mind  has  been 
occupied  in  gazing  at  itself,  and  much,  at  length,  as  it  may  have 
ascertained  concerning  itself,  it  is  conscious  of  complexities  in 
its  phenomena  too  close  to  be  analyzed ;  of  relations  too  delicate 
to  be  traced,  too  evanescent  to  be  classed,  or  even  named ;  of 
parts  unexplored  and  unknown.  Now,  with  all  these  wonderful 
capabilities  shut  up  in  his  nature,  did  the  first  man  stand  erect 
in  Paradise  in  the  first  hour  of  his  existence.  In  the  moment 
of  his  creation,  while  yet  he  may  be  said  to  have  been  under 
the  hand  of  his  Maker,  he  was  to  be  regarded  only  in  relation 
to  space  ;  but  with  the  first  moment  of  consciousness  commenced 
his  relations  to  time,  and  Providence  began  to  encircle  him.  A 
moment  before,  and  unnumbered  relations  were  unapplied,  and 
agencies  unemployed ;  a  moment  after,  and  they  were  gathering 
around  him,  and  beginning  to  take  effect.  Each  sensation  of 
which  he  became  conscious,  each  faculty  of  his  mind  as  it  came 
into  activity,  each  step  he  took,  disclosed  new  relations  between 
the  phenomena  within,  and  placed  him  in  new  relations  to  the 
world  without.  With  that  first  moment  ends  began  to  be  an- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


427 


swered  by  means  which  had  been  originated  unknown  ages  be- 
fore !  Into  what  a  school  was  man  then  introduced !  What 
materials  for  instruction,  wonder,  and  admiration  lay  around 
nim  —  a  world  of  prepared  and  selected  objects !  Could  he 
iiave  foreseen  the  process  of  education  and  intellectual  improve¬ 
ment  through  which  his  race  would  pass  ;  could  he,  as  he  began 
to  breathe,  have  foreseen  one,  three  or  four  thousand  years  sub¬ 
sequent,  weighing  the  air  he  inhaled ;  and,  two  thousand  years 
after  that,  others  busied  in  compressing  it,  expanding  it,  analyz¬ 
ing  and  reducing  it  to  its  elements ;  could  he,  as  he  first  gazed 
at  the  starry  heavens,  have  foreseen  one  measuring  the  dis¬ 
tances,  and  calculating  the  magnitudes  and  velocities  of  the 
heavenly  bodies ;  another  describing  the  principle  which  holds 
them  all  together,  ascertaining  the  weight  of  bodies  at  the  sur¬ 
face  of  distant  worlds,  calculating,  to  a  second  of  time,  the  pe¬ 
riods  of  their  reappearance,  after  the  revolutions  of  centuries ; 
others  sagaciously  conjecturing  the  existence  of  planet  after 
planet,  and  the  position  of  their  orbits  ;  or  anticipating,  by  ages, 
the  discovery  of  truths  the  most  remote  from  ordinary  appre¬ 
hension,  and  even  inventing  the  calculus  which  would  make 
such  anticipations  possible ;  could  he,  as  he  first  stood  erect  on 
w  the  firm-set  earth,”  have  foreseen  the  discovery,  that  it  is 
in  rapid  whirl,  (a  discovery  calculated  to  set  all  thought  in 
motion  also.)  and  could  he  then  have  looked  into  his  own  mind, 
and  have  marked  the  multitudinous  subjective  relations  which 
these  discoveries  presuppose,  as  well  as  the  exquisite  corres¬ 
pondencies  of  the  subjective  to  the  objective,  must  he  not  have 
trembled  at  the  consciousness  of  his  own  capabilities,  and  have 
reached  by  a  single  step,  that  inevitable  conclusion  of  natural 
theology,  “  He  that  formed  the  eye,  shall  he  not  see  ?  He 
that  planted  the  ear,  shall  he  not  hear  ?  He  that  teaeheth  man 
knowledge,  shall  he  not  know  ?”*  The  addition  of  that  single 
mind  —  the  lighting  up  of  that  one  intelligence  —  was  like  a 
second  creation,  for  it  gave  significance  and  value  to  the  prior 
creation. 

12.  And  is  it  for  man  to  set  any  limits  to  the  wisdom  that  has 
thus  endowed  him?  We  might  proceed  to  show  that  the  man¬ 
ner  in  which  the  material  is  made  to  balance,  yet  subserve,  the 
spiritual  in  his  constitution,  and  in  which  the  conditions  of  lib 
erty  and  of  government  are  harmonized,  imply  relations  and 
adjustments  unfathomably  profound.  But  this  would  be  to  an* 


*  Psalm  xciv.  9. 


428 


MAN. 


ticipate  the  remaining  sections ;  and,  as  a  proof  of  unlimited 
wisdom,  it  is  unnecessary.  The  recognition  of  that  wisdom  — 
of  a  few  of  its  more  superficial  traces — constitutes  man’s  science. 
That  science  he  never  expects  to  complete.  Every  step  in  ad¬ 
vance  is  a  protest  against  such  an  expectation,  for  it  only 
affords  him  a  more  commanding  view  of  the  vast  unknown. 
Every  such  step  admonishes  him  also  that  his  own  mind  is  only 
as  yet  in  process  of  development,  for  it  appeals  to  hidden  rela¬ 
tions,  and  puts  him  in  possession  of  new  powers.  Let  him  wait 
till  he  has  exhausted  the  works  of  God,  before  he  thinks  of 
assigning  limits  to  His  wisdom.  “  There  is  no  searching  of  His 
understanding.”  And  every  act  by  which  the  mind  recognizes, 
in  its  own  adjustment  to  the  universe,  a  manifestation  of  the 
Divine  wisdom,  reflects  the  mirrored  glory  of  the  whole  on  the 
mind  of  the  Maker. 


Sect.  III.  —  Goodness. 

1.  When  speaking  of  the  animal  dispensation  as  an  illustra¬ 
tion  of  the  Divine  benevolence,  we  saw  Goodness  where  before 
we  beheld  only  Wisdom  and  Power,  for  we  saw  that  both  the 
productions  of  power  and  the  arrangements  of  Wisdom  had 
waited  to  answer  an  end  in  the  service  of  Benevolence.  In 
the  human  dispensation,  this  is  not  merely  repeated,  but  ex¬ 
ceeded.  For  not  only  are  the  same  special  provisions  for 
enjoyment  to  be  found  in  man  which  we  recognized  in  the  ani¬ 
mal  (and  which  we  shall  not  here  re-consider),  some  of  these 
provisions  are  enlarged,  and  other  and  higher  provisions  are 
superadded. 

2.  In  the  constitution  of  the  first  man,  considered  as  a  sinless 
being,  we  behold  a  creature  whose  every  susceptibility  and 
power  tends  to  enjoyment.  Regarded  merely  as  a  partaker  of 
animal  existence,  the  consciousness  of  life  alone  is  the  conscious¬ 
ness  of  enjoyment.  Additional  enjoyment  was  provided  for  him 
in  the  gratification  of  each  of  those  appetites  which  relate  to  the 
support  and  continuance  of  life.  As  a  percipient  being,  every 
organ  of  sense  was  an  avenue  of  distinct  and  additional  grate¬ 
ful  sensations.  As  a  reflective  and  rational  being,  the  mere 
exercise  and  expansion  of  his  intellectual  faculties  would  occa¬ 
sion  him  enjoyment :  improvement  itself  would  be  pleasure. 
The  emotions  of  novelty  and  curiosity,  of  anticipation  and  hope, 
of  cheerfulness  and  love,  are  only  other  names  for  happiness ; 
and  yet  this  is  the  only  class  of  emotions  of  which  unfallen  man 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


429 


would  be  conscious.  The  consciousness  of  a  power  to  will  — 
of  his  doing  what  he  did  from  choice  —  this  was  another  and  a 
deep  source  of  enjoyment.  And,  then,  the  highest,  the  most 
exquisite  of  all,  was  the  consciousness  that  he  had  done  morally 
right,  that  he  had  acted  in  harmony  with  the  objective  and  su¬ 
preme  will. 

3.  The  constitution  of  man,  regarded  as  successively  existent, 
renders  the  goodness  of  the  Creator  more  apparent  still.  How 
remarkable,  for  instance,  is  that  provision  by  which  the  limita¬ 
tion  and  apparent  defect  of  memory,  owing  to  which,  many 
things  are  forgotten,  are  made  subservient  to  the  more  easy  and 
prompt  exercise  of  the  judgment,  which  would  otherwise  be 
confounded  and  oppressed  by  the  bewildering  details  of  the  past. 
And  that  emotional  provision,  by  which,  besides  the  pleasure 
we  feel  in  merely  intending  good  to  another,  the  object  of  our 
kind  intention  feels  pleasure  in  the  mere  knowledge  of  our  in¬ 
tention  ;  this  operating,  further,  as  a  motive  to  the  fulfilment  of 
the  intention ;  in  which  fulfilment,  again,  we  experience  plea¬ 
sure,  and  the  object  of  our  regard  again  experiences  pleasure 
in  being  the  actual  recipient  of  our  kindness  ;  while  the  fore¬ 
knowledge  oi  this,  again,  impels  us  to  the  act.  And  in  this 
way,  the  feeling  of  kindness  not  merely  survives  the  act  which 
it  prompts  us  to  perform :  it  is  even  strengthened  by  the  act, 
and  would  feel  a  pleasure  in  immortalizing  its  objects.*  And 
that  remarkable  arrangement  by  which  the  impulse  of  compas¬ 
sion  is  strong  in  proportion  to  the  helplessness  of  the  object,  and 
help  is  rendered  with  a  promptness  which  does  not  wait  for  the 
decisions  of  reason ;  so  that  our  instinctive  nature  is  made  to 
subserve  our  highest  well-being.  For  all  such  instances,  besides 
the  preceding,  accompanying,  and  resulting  pleasure  they  yield 
as  instinctive  acts,  are  capable  of  yielding  additional  pleasure 
when  conscience  has  pronounced  them  to  be  on  the  side  of  vir¬ 
tue.  And  then  there  is  the  power  of  habit,  by  which  every 
voluntary  course  of  conduct  essential  to  our  well-being  becomes 
increasingly  easy  and  pleasant.  Who  but  must  perceive  and 
admire  the  beneficence  of  this  provision,  by  which  every  suc¬ 
cessive  hour  in  which  the  first  man  persevered  in  obedience  to 
the  command  of  his  Maker,  rendered  his  failure-  less  and  less 
likely,  and  his  obedience  more  agreeable  and  consciously  em 
nobling ! 

4.  The  condition  of  innocent  man  answered,  in  beneficeo* 


*  Dr.  Chalmers'  Bridgewater  Treatise,  vol.  i.,  c.  2. 


m 


MAN. 


contrivance,  to  his  constitution.  He  found  himself  the  inhabi¬ 
tant  of  a  place  in  which  every  object  and  arrangement  had 
been  Divinely  appointed  to  minister  to  his  happiness.  Was 
the  active  employment  of  his  powers  essential  to  his  enjoyment  ? 
He  had  to  gather  the  fruits  which  he  needed,  and  “  to  keep  the 
ground  ”  which  he  occupied.  It  is  by  no  means  unusual  for  the 
sceptic  to  speak  of  man’s  appointment  to  labor  as  if  the  Bible 
had  made  it  to  originate  in  the  primal  curse,  and  then,  having 
shown  that  labor  is  in  reality  a  condition  of  our  nature  and  a 
blessing,  to  exult  as  if  he  had  convicted  the  Bible  of  inconsis¬ 
tency.  Now,  the  only  rest  which  the  Bible  promises  even  in 
Heaven,  is  rest  from  suffering ,  the  only  labor  which  it  denounces 
as  curse  is  toil ,  producing  the  “sweat  of  the  brow”  and  the  “sor¬ 
row”  of  the  heart  —  a  curse  from  which  the  mass  is,  at  this  mo¬ 
ment,  laboring  to  escape.  But  healthy  bodily  occupation  was 
made  a  necessity  and  a  duty  in  Paradise  itself.  Hence,  too, 
the  appointment,  from  the  first,  of  a  day  of  rest.  And  it  is  wor¬ 
thy  of  remark  and  remembrance,  that,  in  this  respect,  the  Bible 
is  alone ;  that  while  the  representations  which  are  found  in  the 
writings  of  Hesiod,  Plato,  and  the  ancient  classics  generally,  de¬ 
scribe  the  happy  state  as  one  of  indolence  and  ease,  or  only  of 
optional  activity,  the  writings  of  Moses  evince  the  superiority  of 
their  origin  by  representing  labor  as  a  condition  of  happiness, 
and  a  duty. 

In  a  similar  manner,  man:s  intellectual  powers  were  called 
into  easy  activity  by  the  office  assigned  to  him  of  comparing, 
discriminating,  and  giving  names  to  objects ;  and  his  sense  of 
obligation,  by  an  easy  law  relating  to  his  appetites  and  senses  — 
a  law  requiring  him,  not  to  perform,  but  simply  to  omit  the 
performance  of  a  single  action.  And  thus,  by  a  threefold  act, 
the  hand  of  Goodness  gave  an  impulse  to  his  powers,  physical, 
mental,  and  moral,  and  called  the  whole  into  pleasurable 
activity. 

o.  Would  it  conduce  to  the  happiness  of  a  holy  being  to  be 
made  sensible  of  his  dependence  on  his  all-sufficient  Creator, 
and  of  the  kind  care  of  the  Creator  to  provide  for  his  wants  ? 
The  creation  of  woman  was  calculated  to  answer  this  twofold 
end.  The  desire  of  man  for  a  “  help-meet”  was,  perhaps,  one 
of  the  first  of  which  he  was  conscious;  and  to  awaken  this 
desire,  was,  probably,  judging  from  the  phraseology,  one  of  the 
Divine  designs,  in  bringing  the  animals  in  pairs  into  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  Adam.  The  immediate  production  of  woman,  then, 
was  calculated  to  deepen  his  sense  of  dependence  and  obliga- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


431 


tion ;  while  the  particular  method  of  her  formation  which  God 
was  pleased  to  select  was  calculated  “  to  give  his  newly-created 
children  a  lively  sense  of  their  reciprocal  duties.” 

6.  Would  it  still  more  conduce  to  man’s  enjoyment  that  he 
should  hold  intercourse  with  his  Maker?  This  must  be  regarded 
as  the  crown  of  the  creature’s  happiness.  And  yet  direct  com¬ 
munion  with  his  Maker  appears  to  have  been  man’s  familiar 
privilege.  If  “  he  that  walks  with  a  wise  man  becomes  wise,” 
what  must  he  become  who  walks  with  “the  only  wise  God!” 
If  the  external  creation  was  calculated  to  reproduce  itself,  in  a 
living  paradise,  within  his  bosom,  what  could  be  the  effect,  had 
it  been  long  continued,  of  his  habitually  coming  into  the  felt 
presence  of  the  Creator  himself,  but  to  be  rapidly  advanced  in 
every  intellectual  and  moral  excellence !  Hence,  also,  “  God 
blessed  the  seventh  day,  and  sanctified  it ;  because  that  in  it  He 
had  rested  from  all  his  work  which  God  had  created  and  made.” 
Thus,  from  the  beginning,  “the  sabbath  was  made  for  man;” 
and  for  what  assignable  object  could  it  be  made  for  man  in  para¬ 
dise,  but  for  his  progress  in  knowledge  and  holiness,  by  holding 
communion  with  God  ?  Indeed,  the  reason  assigned  for  its  con¬ 
secration  implies  this,  as  well  as  the  statement  that  God  sancti¬ 
fied  it  —  or  set  it  apart  from  a  common  to  a  religious  use ;  and 
that  He  blessed  it  —  or  made  it  a  source  of  peculiar  advantage 
to  man.  For  in  what  other  way  could  God’s  cessation  from  the 
work  of  creation  form  a  reason  tor  the  institution  of  the  sabbath, 
except  as  its  completion  filled  up  that  outline  of  his  character 
which  it  was  for  his  glory  to  display,  and  for  man’s  highest  ad¬ 
vantage  to  contemplate  ?  Thus,  a  rich  objective  provision  was 
made  answering  to  every  part  of  man’s  subjective  nature,  and 
calculated  to  fill  him  with  grateful  admiration  of  the  Divine 
goodness. 

7.  Still  further  was  this  goodness  displayed  in  the  progressive¬ 
ness  of  its  exercise.  The  work  of  creation  had  now  paused,  and 
Providence  had  commenced  its  reign  ;  henceforth  the  character 
of  God  was  to  be  learned  not  merely  from  the  adaptation  of  his 
works  to  man’s  constitution  considered  co-existently,  but  also 
from  the  manner  in  which  they  were  effected  and  disclosed. 
Accordingly,  we  find  his  goodness  exemplified  in  the  manner 
in  which,  step  by  step,  He  was  pleased  to  adapt  his  conduct  to 
man’s  constitution,  considered  as  successively  existent.  Having 
formed  his  creature  in  a  locality  of  general  adaptation,  the  Crea¬ 
tor  then  conducted  him  into  a  scene  of  special  adaptation,  as  if 
to  impress  him  from  the  first  with  a  sense  of  his  Maker’s  good- 


432 


MAN. 


ness.  There,  the  first  day  which  dawned  on  him  was  a  sabbath 
and  the  first  being  with  whom  he  found  himself  in  communion 
was  his  Divine  Creator.  The  manner  in  which  all  the  trees  of 
the  garden  (with  one  exception)  were  given  him  to  awaken  and 
gratify  his  appetite,  and  to  regale  his  senses ;  the  simple  and 
easy  manner  in  which  his  mind  was  first  called  into  exercise, 
in  naming  the  animals ;  the  natural  manner  in  which  his  conse¬ 
quent  sense  of  superiority  was  gratified,  by  being  invested  with 
an  easy  dominion  over  them ;  the  mode  of  appealing  to  his 
social  nature,  and  of  then  gratifying  it  by  the  creation  of  a  help¬ 
meet  for  him ;  and  then  the  easiness  of  the  command  which 
appealed  to  his  sense  of  duty ;  —  indeed,  the  whole  train  of  cir¬ 
cumstances  appears  to  have  been  arranged  with  the  benevolent 
design  of  easily  and  successively  developing  the  various  parts 
of  his  constitution,  and  of  enlarging  his  view,  at  each  step,  of 
the  goodness  of  his  Creator. 

The  supposition  that  man  was  not  merely  potentially,  but  ac¬ 
tually,  perfect,  from  the  earliest  moment  of  his  creation,  besides 
contravening  the  true  theory  of  human  nature,  is  out  of  harmony 
with  the  inspired  narrative,  and  impairs  our  view  of  the  Divine 
goodness.  That  his  nature  was  potentially  perfect,  or  capable 
of  all  perfection,  we  affirm,  in  effect,  when  we  say  that  he  was 
made  in  the  Divine  image.  Besides  which,  being  created  with 
all  his  capacities  in  a  state  of  mature  readiness  for  exercise  and 
development,  and  having  nothing  to  unlearn,  his  progress  would 
be  distinguished  by  corresponding  rapidity.  But  still  that  pro¬ 
gress,  however  rapid,  implied  successive  steps  —  greater  attain¬ 
ments  to-day  than  yesterday,  and,  in  consequence,  preparation 
for  greater  still  to-morrow.  And  the  method  employed  by  God 
to  secure  this  progress  exhibits  Him  in  the  relation  of  a  wise 
paternal  instructor  aiming  at  once  to  engage  the  affections,  and 
to  improve  the  opening  faculties  of  his  child.  In  this  light,  the 
test  of  the  creature’s  obedience  (not  to  eat  of  a  certain  fruit) 
appears  to  be,  what  it  really  was  —  a  first  lesson  in  moral  obli¬ 
gation  —  morality  made  easy. 

8.  When  showing,  in  a  preceding  chapter,  that  man’s  every 
movement  is  right  or  wrong  in  relation  to  that  constitution  of 
nature  into  which  he  has  been  introduced,  his  condition,  viewed 
in  connection  with  his  want  of  experience,  may  possibly  have 
awakened  the  idea  of  hardship.  Now,  the  sufficient  reply  to 
this  (if,  indeed,  it  deserves  or  requires  any)  as  far  as  the  para¬ 
disiacal  state  is  concerned,  is,  that  his  every  movement  there 
might  have  been  regulated  by  a  reference  to  the  Divine  will. 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


433 


Judging  from  the  instructions  which  were  afforded  to  man,  it  is 
only  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  longer  his  obedience  con¬ 
tinual,  lesson  after  lesson  would  have  been  imparted  and  mul¬ 
tiplied  on  everything  essential 'to  his  safety  and  enjoyment. 
The  goodness  which  left  him  not  to  discover  what  were  whole¬ 
some  fruits  by  leaving  him  to  partake  of  unwholesome,  but  which 
surrounded  him  with  such  only  as  were  “good  for  food,”  would 
have  maintained  consistency  in  every  other  respect. 

9.  Animal  pain  and  death,  rightly  considered,  appear  to  be 
perfectly  compatible  with  Benevolence ;  for  they  are  only  the 
necessary  limitations  of  a  progressive  system.*  But  sinless 
man  was  to  be  exempted  even  from  these.  Not  only  was  his 
sentient  nature,  like  that  of  the  animal  world  into  which  he  had 
come,  constructed  for  enjoyment,  actually  provided  with  the 
means  of  enjoyment,  and  designed  to  find  existence  synonymous 
with  enjoyment,  but,  as  the  partaker  of  a  higher  nature,  he  was 
to  know  nothing  even  of  the  incidental  evil,  death.  He  was  to 
live  in  the  happy  consciousness  of  an  invulnerable  and  indis¬ 
soluble  life.  It  imported  not,  whether,  after  a  season  of  preter¬ 
natural  security,  he  was  to  be  translated  bodily  to  a  benigner 
stage  of  being ;  or  whether  his  pure  spirit  was  so  to  assimilate 
its  material  frame  to  its  own  immortal  nature,  as  to  render  all 
the  laws  and  substances  of  the  earth  alike  innocuous  and  even 
congenial  to  it.  Every  change  around  him  told  him  to  look 
only  for  good,  for  all  the  changes  which  preceded  his  coming 
had  been  made  to  minister  to  his  advantage.  While  every 
change  within  him  was  to  be  a  change  from  glory  to  glory.  His 
path  was  to  lie  ever  onwards,  upwards,  towards  a  future  stored 
with  unknown  forms  of  good.  Happy  as  he  already  was,  his 
eye  had  not  seen,  nor  his  heart  conceived,  the  blessedness  which 
awaited  him. 

10.  Nor  does  the  Divine  benevolence  suffer  any  abatement 
from  the  nature  of  man’s  probation.  It  was  a  covenant,  not  of 
“works,”  but  of  the  richest  grace.  Specially  defended  from 
danger  at  every  point  except  one,  and  that  one  the  easiest  and 
the  least,  man  had  merely  to  leave  a  single  object  untouched, 
on  his  way  to  a  state  where  crowns  of  life  were  piled  up,  reach¬ 
ing  from  earth  to  heaven,  awaiting  himself  and  all  his  posterity. 
Infinite  goodness  alone  could  have  made  such  an  arrangement 
possible. 

11.  “  But  man  was  made  not  only  with  the  power  of  sinning, 


*  Pre- Adamite  Earth,  180 — 184. 

37 


434 


MAN. 


(this  his  moral  freedom  rendered  unavoidable,)  but  with  the 
Divine  foresight  that  the  possibility  would  be  actualized.’ 
Granted.  We  believe  that  God  was  under  no  natural  neces¬ 
sity  for  creating  a  free  being  such  as  man ;  that  man  was  made 
such  as  he  was,  therefore,  because  it  pleased  the  Creator  so  to 
constitute  him :  that  God  was  so  pleased,  for  the  attainment  of 
an  end  infinitely  honorable  to  himself;  and  that  of  that  end 
He  is  infallibly  certain.  But  if  that  end  be  worthy  of  Divine 
Benevolence,  the  foresight  and  permission  of  evil  must  be  com¬ 
patible  with  that  Benevolence  also.  Accordingly,  we  believe 
that,  while  man’s  moral  power  makes  the  guilt  of  sinning  ex¬ 
clusively  his  own,  and  while  the  Divine  Being  could  have  pro¬ 
tected  man  from  evil  at  all  points  if  He  had  aimed  only  at  an 
inferior  good.  He  permitted  evil  to  enter  only  because  it  was 
incidental  to  a  sublimer  good.  In  other  words,  we  believe  that 
Infinite  Benevolence  would  not  have  suffered  man  to  abuse  his 
freedom,  supposing  that  in  all  other  respects  the  system  to 
which  he  belongs,  and  the  ends  to  be  attained  by  it,  would 
have  been  equally  good ;  that  the  foreseen  evil,  therefore,  is 
permitted,  'not  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  that  greater 
good  which  the  system  makes  possible ;  and  further,  that,  in 
relation  to  this  entire  system,  the  amount  of  evil  permitted  to 
exist  is  precisely  that  amount  which  can  be  made  subservient 
to  the  greatest  amount  of  good ;  and  that  the  amount  of  the 
good  would  be  reduced  by  any  change  in  the  amount  of  the 
evil,  either  more  or  less.  While,  in  conducting  the  great 
scheme  to  its  remotest  issues,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  power  of 
man  was  always  made  the  measure  of  his  responsibility,  and 
that  no  form  of  evil  ever  came  into  being  for  which  that  scheme 
did  not  contain  the  most  benevolent  provision.* 

12.  Into  such  a  scheme  the  new-made  man  was  introduced. 
The  world  into  which  he  came  had  long  been  one  of  the  un¬ 
numbered  residences  of  Goodness  already.  Nor  could  man 
have  read  the  records  of  former  animal  creations,  written  on 
the  mountains  and  in  the  valleys ;  and  then  have  heard  of  the 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  living  species,  and  have  known  that 
the  actual  multiplication  of  some  of  them,  prodigious  as  it  is, 
is  as  nothing  compared  with  their  possible  increase,  without 
feeling  that,  subjectively,  the  Creative  goodness  can  know  no 
limitation;  and  that,  objectively,  He  is  all-sufficient  for  re¬ 
plenishing  alike  a  single  planet,  or  ten  thousand  worlds,  with 


*  Supra ,  p.  413. 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


435 


sentient  enjojment,  and  for  sustaining  the  whole  for  an  age,  or 
forever.  As  a  proof  of  such  all-sufficiency,  then,  man's  coming 
was  unnecessary.  And  yet  his  capacity  for  enjoyment  exceeds 
that  of  all  the  prior  creations  combined.  As  a  sinless  being,  all 
causes  of  dread  were  unknown  to  him.  He  had  a  property 
in  everything  around  him.  He  lived  in  conscious  harmony  and 
joyous  fellowship  with  all  the  purposes  of  God.  He  could  com¬ 
mit  himself  to  the  great  laws  and  elements  of  nature  as  to  an 
ark  in  which  nothing  but  good  could  come  to  him.  The  enjoy¬ 
ment  daily  of  even  one  sensation  of  pure  happiness  would  have 
been  much ;  the  unlimited  enjoyment  of  one  source  or  form  of 
happiness,  more ;  but  man’s  nature  was  a  permanent  constitu¬ 
tion  for  happiness,  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral,  with  the  ex¬ 
ternal  world  studiously  adjusted  to  his  desires ;  with  the  power 
of  reaching  to  other  worlds,  and  of  commanding  their  resources  ; 
and  with  the  prospect  of  endless  increase.  Moving  in  the  light 
of  the  Divine  complacency,  he  radiated  joy  around  him,  and 
received  in  return  the  commending  looks,  and  mute  homage,  of 
the  creation. 

13.  But  rich  and  varied  as  were  the  manifestations  of  Good¬ 
ness  to  unfallen  man,  could  he  have  been  conscious  of  those 
which  the  family  and  society  would  develop,  and  those  which 
the  discoveries  of  successive  ages  would  bring  to  light,  with 
what  a  fulness  of  gratitude  would  he  have  exclaimed,  “  The 
whole  earth  is  full  of  His  goodness.”  Could  he  have  known 
how  nicely  the  productiveness  of  the  soil  on  which  he  stood  was 
calculated  for  the  intellectual  as  well  as  the  bodily  wants  of  man 
—  requiring  labor,  but  not  labor  without  leisure  ;  how  liberally 
the  earth  was  stored  up  to  the  surface  with  the  fuel,  the  minerals, 
and  the  metals,  on  which  the  temporal  welfare  of  his  posterity 
would  depend  —  with  the  provident  savings  of  successive  worlds, 
arranged  and  laid  up  in  the  only  way  in  which  they  could  be 
accessible  to  man ;  how  time  would  bring  to  light,  and  turn  to 
account,  the  correspondences  of  earth  with  other  planets,  show¬ 
ing  that  the  good  of  man  was  blended  with  the  vast  generalities 
of  a  universal  system ;  or  could  he  have  foreseen  the  provision 
made  for  infantine  happiness,  and  have  foretasted  the  stream  of 
enjoyment  which,  through  all  generations,  would  be  flowing 
through  the  parental  heart,  and  issuing  from  the  other  relations 
of  life,  what  an  expanded  view  would  it  have  given  him  of  the 
benevolence  of  Him  who  is  the  Fountain  whence  all  these 
streams  descend  !  But  his  views  of  the  Divine  beneficence  were 
limited,  at  first,  to  such  as  his  constitution  and  relations  required ; 


436 


MAN. 


and  this  limitation  itself  was  an  illustration  of  that  beneficence. 
Nothing  was  wanting  to  his  present  enjoyment;  while  before 
him  lay  a  cloudless  and  unbounded  prospect. 

Sect.  IV. — Holiness. 

1.  What  are  the  conditions  on  which  the  conclusion,  that  the 
constitution  and  condition  of  the  first  man  are  calculated  to 
illustrate  the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Divine  holiness,  might  be 
reasonably  accepted  ?  There  was  a  point  in  the  flow  of  dura¬ 
tion,  when  the  question  first  received  an  objective  answer, 
whether  or  not  the  creation  of  a  holy  being,  capable  of  moral 
government,  was  possible.  A  race  of  angelic  beings  formed  the 
Divine  reply.  And  when  some  of  their  order  sinned,  the  Holi¬ 
ness  which  had  radiated  complacency  upon  them  as  long  as  they 
retained  their  moral  excellence,  now  further  vindicated  its  claims 
by  flaming  against  them  in  acts  of  retributive  justice.  Neither 
those  who  retained  their  holiness,  nor  those  who  had  lost  it, 
probably,  required  any  illustration  additional  to  that  which  their 
own  experience  supplied,  to  convince  them  of  the  infinitude  of 
the  Divine  holiness. 

2.  But  as  if  to  place  this  fact  beyond  question,  He  created 
man  —  a  being  with  a  different  constitution,  and  placed  in  a 
different  condition  —  and  vet  designed  to  exhibit  the  same 
spiritual  excellence.  But  was  the  first  man  formed  for  the 
manifestation  of  holiness  ?  Our  first  reply  to  this  inquiry  is, 
that  even  his  bodv  is  evidently  meant  to  be  the  ark  of  moral 
law.  The  Jewish  tabernacle,  built  after  a  Divine  model,  was, 
in  the  very  act  of  its  dedication,  lighted  up  with  the  Divine  glory. 
What  more  could  be  necessary  to  denote  that  it  was  sacred  to 
the  Holy  One  of  Israel,  except  that  judgments  should  alight 
on  any  who  dared  to  profane  it  ?  In  the  case  of  the  human 
structure,  the  proof  that  it  was  destined  to  the  service  of  truth, 
and  temperance,  and  chastity,  and  benevolence,  is  still  stronger. 
Every  violation  of  these  moralities  is  an  outrage  which  the 
very  temple  itself  resents.  The  stone  crieth  out  from  the 
wall.”  The  fleshly  shrine,  protesting  against  its  profanation, 
dissolves  connection  with  the  sacrilegious  spirit,  and  hastens 
to  rejoin  those  physical  laws  which  cannot  disobey  their  Ma¬ 
ker’s  will. 

3.  Still  more  apparent  is  the  rectitude  of  the  Creator  in  the 
remarkable  fact,  that  our  instincts  should  have  been  made  sub¬ 
servient  to  our  virtue,  and  our  self-love  to  our  highest  well- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


437 


being.  These  instincts,  such  as  anger,  fear,  and  parental  affec¬ 
tion,  are  possessed  by  animals  in  common  with  man.  But  as 
the  animal  is  incapable  of  virtue,  they  can  only  be  regarded,  in 
its  case,  as  so  many  special  provisions,  by  which  Divine  benevo¬ 
lence  secures  the  continuance  and  enjoyment  of  animal  life.  In 
the  instance  of  man,  however,  besides  increasing  his  enjoyment, 
and  thus  exhibiting  the  goodness  of  God,  the  very  fact  that  they 
do  not  terminate  on  their  immediate  objects,  but  that  they  tend 
to  subserve  a  moral  purpose,  speaks  emphatically  of  a  moral 
administration.  The  pity  which  prompts  man  to  relieve  dis¬ 
tress,  leaves  less  for  virtue  to  perform.  The  anger  which,  by 
kindling  against  injustice  or  evil  solicitation,  keeps  both  in  check, 
leaves  less  for  virtue  to  resist.  Thus,  these  instinctive  emo¬ 
tions  “  mav  at  once  lighten  the  tasks,  and  lessen  the  temotations 
of  virtue.”  But  these  very  actions,  impulsively  performed,  are 
subsequently  susceptible  of  moral  approbation  ;  and  thus,  besides 
affecting  his  condition,  they  are  carried  forwards  to  his  charac¬ 
ter.  Impulse  comes  to  the  aid  of  principle.  The  prophet  not 
merely  lives  in  the  den  of  lions,  but  is  guarded  by  them.  Or, 
like  the  animal  forms  which  sustained  the  brazen  laver  in  the 
temple,  our  instincts  and  impulses  are  brought  into  the  very 
sanctuary  of  our  nature,  and  subordinated  to  its  holiest  ends. 
Those  pre-existing  parts  and  passions  which  we  share  in  com¬ 
mon  with  inferior  beings,  and  which  illustrate  the  power,  and 
wisdom,  and  goodness  of  God,  are  here  seen  ministering  to  its 
moral  excellence  as  means  to  an  end ;  and  thus  proclaiming  that 
man  is  made  for  holiness. 

4.  Ascending  from  the  physical  structure  of  man,  and  from 
his  sensibilities,  to  his  intellect,  we  find  him  made  for  appre¬ 
hending:  the  eternal  and  irreversible  nature  of  moral  distinctions. 

* — * 

Reason  takes  him  into  a  region  where  immutability  reigns. 
Here,  right  and  wrong  are  seen  in  unchangeable  hostility. 
Truth  never  becomes  inexpedient ;  nor  gratitude  unnatural ; 
nor  obligation  unsettled.  Every  principle  is  beheld  on  its  way 
from  one  eternity  to  another ;  or  rather  forms  a  part  of  the 
arch  which  spans  both,  and  on  which  the  Eternal  himself  is  en¬ 
throned. 

5.  The  office  of  conscience  renders  the  Divine  rectitude  still 
more  apparent.  Should  we  be  ready  to  admit  that  we  were 
under  a  moral  administration,  if  we  conld  see  the  throne  of 
God,  however  dimly  and  distantly,  and  hear  his  voice,  though 
only  in  a  whisper,  addressing  us  in  the  language  of  authority, 
and  behold  his  smile  or  his  frown  following  our  every  act  ?  By 

37* 


438 


MAN. 


making  conscience  a  part  of  our  nature,  arming  it  with  author¬ 
ity  over  every  other  part,  by  enlisting  all  that  authoritv  on  the 
side  of  righteousness,  and  by  accompanying  it  with  sanctions  for 
the  enforcement  of  its  dictates,  this  truth  is  more  emphatically 
proclaimed,  for  the  whole  of  that  tribunal  is  set  up  within  the 
human  breast.  Every  emotion  of  which  our  nature  is  capable, 
points,  under  the  guidance  of  conscience,  to  a  moral  purpose. 
Every  intellectual  state  is  equally  subject  to  its  control ;  for  by 
influencing  the  will,  it  commands  the  attention,  and  thus  indi¬ 
rectly  affects  the  formation  of  opinion.  And,  as  opinion  be¬ 
comes  embodied  in  conduct,  all  the  authority  of  conscience  is  on 
the  side  of  justice  and  truth,  humanity  and  gratitude.  It  not 
only  harmonizes  with  these  principles,  but  is  ever  calling  for 
them,  denouncing  .everything  opposed  to  them,  and  following  it 
up  with  retribution.  The  whole  man  is  given  into  its  hand.  It 
has  a  complete  judicature  of  its  own,  and  a  heaven  and  a  hell ; 
and  in  this  awful  domain  (even  though  he  could  be  guaranteed 
against  all  infliction  from  without)  the  sentence,  Thou  hast  vio¬ 
lated  the  infinite  and  immutable  right,  fills  him  with  remorse. 
He  “  hath  wronged  his  own  soul.”  And  in  this  self-executino- 
law,  which  denounces  the  wrong,  we  read  the  holy  character  of 
the  Lawgiver. 

6.  Would  it  enhance  our  view  of  the  holy  excellence  of  the 
Creator,  if  it  should  appear  that,  besides  the  pleasure  attending 
an  act  as  virtuous,  the  very  consciousness  of  the  act  itself  should 
be  made  pleasureable  ?  Now,  such  is  the  fact.  There  is  a 
happy  serenity  in  the  bare  consciousness  of  good  intentions. 
Enjoyment  attends  the  very  desire  to  diffuse  enjoyment.  In 
the  act  of  proposing  an  exalted  end,  man  feels  himself  lifted  into 
a  nobler  region.  The  consciousness  of  light  within  generates 

o  o  o 

around  him  an  atmosphere  of  light.  u  Virtue  is  not  merely  en¬ 
joyed  as  right,  and  approved  as  useful,  but  relished  as  delicious. 
TTe  are  indebted  for  consciousness  to  the  first,  to  experience  for 
the  second,  but  the  third  is  a  physical  arrangement,  an  instant 
enjoyment,  ascribable  only  to  the  good  pleasure  of  Him  who  in 
thus  identifying  holiness  with  happiness  in  man’s  constitution, 
was  illustrating  the  excellence  of  his  own  character.”  And  the 
fact  to  be  remarked  here  is  that  “  the  more  exclusively  he  aims 
at  the  virtue  for  its  own  sake,  the  less  will  he  think  of  its  actual 
enjoyment,  and  yet  the  greater  will  his  actual  enjoyment  be.” 
He  is  loved  all  the  more  for  aiming  only  to  be  lovely. 

7.  Another  distinct  corroboration  of  the  Divine  holiness  is 
found  in  man’s  nature,  considered  as  successively  existent,  or  in 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


439 


relation  to  the  law  of  habit.  If,  on  examining  the  constitution 
of  the  first  man.  we  had  felt  constrained  to  admire  the  rectitude 
of  the  Being  who  had  even  organized  his  material  framework 
for  virtue,  who  had  enlisted  his  very  instincts  on  the  side  of  it, 
who  had  made  its  immutable  obligations  a  truth  of  his  reason, 
who  urged  him  to  it  by  a  voice  of  authority  in  the  centre  of  his 
being,  and  who  had  so  formed  him  that  the  very  conception  of 
virtue  should  be  sweet  to  him,  would  it  have  served  to  heighten 
our  admiration  to  find  that,  by  another  law  of  his  nature,  every 
holy  act  would  ripen  into  a  holy  habit,  and  that  the  result 
would  be  the  permanent  establishment  of  a  holy  character? 
Would  it  have  elevated  our  conception  of  the  Divine  holiness 
to  find  that  the  constitution  of  his  creature  provided  that  the 
accumulating  consequences  of  all  his  acts  should  abide  with 
him ;  so  that,  on  looking  onwards  in  his  moral  history,  it  should 
be  found  that  every  successive  moment  of  his  obedience  to  the 
Divine  will  rendered  the  continuance  of  that  obedience  more 
and  more  easy  and  certain,  and  that  every  act  of  virtue  made 
him  more  apt  and  vigorous  in  its  service  ?  Now,  such  is  the 
law  of  man’s  constitution.  As  if  the  Creator  had  been  imjia- 
tient  to  diminish  man’s  liability  to  sin  as  rapidly  as  consistent 
with  the  freedom  of  his  nature,  by  the  law  of  habit  He  strength¬ 
ens  and  makes  surer  man’s  resistance  to  temptation,  while  He 
makes  easier  and  surer  the  most  difficult  duties  of  virtue  ;  until, 
by  repetition,  man  comes  to  perform  them  spontaneously,  and  as 
a  happy  moral  necessity.  Now,  the  contingent  union  of  all 
these  ultimate  facts  in  man’s  constitution  gives  a  multiple  force 
to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  made  for  virtue,  and  for  the  mani¬ 
festation  of  a  holy  Creator. 

8.  But  do  the  subjective  arrangements  of  man’s  constitution 
find  their  counterparts  in  the  objective  universe  ?  If  they  do 
not  —  if  even  one  of  them  is  unrecognized  and  unprovided  for 
from  without,  so  as  to  be  left  dormant  or  useless,  the  argument 
for  the  Divine  holiness,  derivable  from  man’s  objective  relations, 
is  so  far  impaired.  On  the  other  hand,  if  no  such  defect  exists, 
but  if  every  part  of  man’s  moral  constitution  has  its  appropriate 
sphere  of  exercise,  and  its  ever-appealing  objects  —  its  Sinai 
and  its  probationary  Eden  —  in  the  external  universe,  the  dis¬ 
play  of  that  holiness  is  augmented,  while  power,  and  wisdom, 
and  goodness  are  found  to  be  made  subservient  to  it. 

9.  Now,  in  adverting  to  these  correspondencies  between  the 
individual  man,  regarded  as  a  moral  being,  and  the  universe  of 
mind  and  matter,  of  which  he  stands  the  centre,  we  can,  for  the 


440 


MAN. 


present,  do  little  more  than  glance  at  some  of  those  impressive 
illustrations  which  man’s  progressive  history  has  brought  to 
light.  For  example,  we  have  spoken  of  his  body  as  intended 
to  be  the  shrine  of  a  pure  spirit ;  and  as  obvious  is  it  that  the 
earth  was  meant  to  be  the  shrine  of  such  a  bodv.  Let  his  ma- 

w 

terial  organization  be  perverted  into  “  instruments  of  unright¬ 
eousness,”  and  nature  itself  proclaims  against  him.  He  finds 
that  he  is  at  cross  purposes  with  a  system  which  steadily  ad¬ 
vances  to  its  end,  despite  his  folly  and  his  guilt,  and  which 
thwarts  and  threatens  him  at  every  step.  Ever  and  anon,  some 
natural  phenomenon,  or  law,  comes  forth  at  the  awful  call  of 
justice,  and  stands  like  an  angry  angel  in  his  path. 

10.  We  have  also  found  that  even  the  instinctive  and  invol¬ 
untary  part  of  our  nature  is  engaged  on  the  side  of  virtue. 
And,  in  external  correspondence,  who  does  not  know  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  shame,  in  withholding  from  impurity ;  of  anger,  in  in¬ 
timidating  injustice ;  of  pity,  in  alleviating  suffering ;  and  of  a 
desire  for  the  good  opinion  of  others,  in  leading  to  a  course  of 
conduct  worthy  of  that  opinion?  Further;  is  man  made  to 
conceive  of  the  true  and  the  right  as  immutable  ?  He  cannot 
represent  this  ultimate  fact  to  his  mind  apart  from  an  august 
objective  Personality  ever  executing  the  laws  of  right.  Every 
conviction  of  responsibility,  as  it  comes  up  from  the  depths  of 
his  moral  being,  points  with  unwavering  finger  to  the  invisible 
tribunal,  (too  spiritual  and  awful  to  be  seen,)  and  to  the  endless 
future,  as  stored  with  the  instruments  and  agents  of  justice. 

11.  Has  conscience  its  laws  within  the  breast  ?  Society  has 
transcribed  them  on  its  tables,  and  God  has  repeated  them  from 
his  throne.  Man  is  constantly  moving  in  the  presence  of  ob¬ 
jects  which  are  ever  ready  to  memorialize  his  conscience,  and 
to  maintain  it  in  activity.  If  it  accuse  him,  all  nature  seems  to 
enter  into  a  conspiracy  with  it  to  destroy  his  peace.  If  it  ap¬ 
prove,  all  nature  joins  it  in  a  chorus  of  praise.  The  sanctions 
of  the  invisible  power  within  are  responded  to,  and  ratified  by 
the  course  of  external  events ;  and  man’s  happiness  or  misery 
is  found  to  be  referable  incomparably  less  to  his  condition  than 
to  his  character. 

12.  Is  there  a  pleasure  or  a  pain  in  the  very  consciousness 
of  moral  qualities?  How  admirably  is  this  arrangement  re¬ 
sponded  to  in  the  reciprocal  influences  of  mind  and  mind.  We 
have  seen  that  the  bare  intention  of  good  is  pleasant  to  the  con¬ 
scious  subject  of  it;  but  so  it  is  also  to  the  object  of  it  as  soon 
as  he  is  made  aware  of  the  intention.  Li  the  performance  of 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


441 


the  intended  act,  the  pleasure  is  repeated,  and  so  it  is,  also,  in 
the  reception  of  it.  The  knowledge  of  this,  again,  is  delightful, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  exercise  of  gratitude  delightful  on  the 
other.  But  equally  painful  is  the  reciprocation  of  the  malevo¬ 
lent  affections.  So  that  the  effect  of  this  arrangement  is  greatly 
to  increase  the  pleasures  of  virtue,  and  to  aggravate  the  mise¬ 
ries  of  vice.  And  that  which  is  to  be  especially  remarked  is, 
that  these  pleasures  and  pains  may  be  quite  independent  of  ex¬ 
ternal  acts.  There  is  no  commensurability  between  man  and 
a  material  gift.  Its  value  consists  in  the  intention  ;  for  in  that 
I  give  a  portion  of  myself ;  and,  in  designing  evil,  I  aim  at  a 
collision  of  spirits.  And  thus,  apart  from  all  gross  and  visible 
reciprocations,  a  heaven  of  right  intentions  is  possible  to  the 
virtuous,  and  a  hell  of  evil  intentions  to  the  vicious,  even  on 
earth. 

13.  In  the  law  of  habit,  we  recognized  a  provision  for  man’s 
constant  progress  in  holiness.  And  what  vast  eternal  scope  for 
the  beneficial  operation  of  this  law  would  have  existed  for  un¬ 
fallen  man  in  the  family ;  in  the  arrangement  by  vdiich  the 
susceptibilities  of  youth  would  have  been  all  placed  under  the 
formative  and  ennobling  influence  of  confirmed  excellence ! 
The  tendency  of  man’s  earliest  acts  would  have  been  towards 
habits  of  excellence  ;  wdiile  each  generation  might  have  started 
from  a  loftier  point.  Even  as  it  is,  the  avowed  tendency  of 
education  is  in  this  direction,  however  ignorantly  and  faultily 
it  may  be  conducted ;  and  to  each  age  is  given  the  opportunity 
of  rearing  a  comparatively  virtuous  generation.  But  this  is  to 
anticipate. 

14.  These  are  some  of  the  great  and  simple  phenomena  of 
our  moral  constitution  and  condition,  by  which  God  not  merely 
discloses  his  love  for  virtue,  and,  therefore,  the  holiness  of  his 
character,  but  tire  boundless  resources  of  his  holiness.  Others, 
indeed,  might  easily  be  named.  There  is  that  endowment,  for 
example,  by  wdiich  we  perceive  the  beautiful,  and  admire  the 
sublime,  in  connection  with  that  law  by  which  we  associate  all 
that  is  beautiful  and  sublime  in  material  nature  with  all  that  is 
attractive  and  venerable  in  virtue.  Everything  in  nature 
answers  to  a  moral  quality ;  is  an  externization  of  virtue.  The 
poet  needs  not  put  the  shell  to  his  ear  in  order  to  hear  its 
music ;  and  sees  further  into  celestial  space  without  the  tele¬ 
scope  than  with  it.  And  so,  for  unfallen  man,  all  the  sounds  of 
earth  were  set  to  the  music  of  virtue ;  and  earth  itself  was  a 
holy  place,  in  which  there  was  no  veil  to  conceal  the  present 


442 


MAN. 


God.  And  still,  all  its  symbols,  rightly  interpreted,  express  and 
reinforce  the  hopes  of  the  good,  or  call  forth  and  exasperate  the 
fears  of  the  wicked. 

15.  Further;  we  might  adduce  the  fact  that  truth  and  trust, 
answering  to  each  other,  are  essential  to  the  well-being,  and 
even  to  the  existence,  of  society ;  and  that,  on  the  largest  scale, 
there  is  an  inseparable  connection  between  the  morality  of  a 
community  and  its  substantial  happiness.  All  sin  is  selfish; 
but  man  is  placed  in  such  relation  to  his  fellows,  that  he  cannot 
indulge  in  selfishness  without  wounding  the  most  sensitive  part 
of  their  nature,  and  arming  them  all  against  him.  Society 
itself  is  a  system  of  checks  against  it;  a  standing  protest  in 
behalf  of  sympathy  and  benevolence.  And  thus  morality  and 
happiness,  virtue  and  utility,  are  placed,  by  God,  in  harmony 
with  each  other.  Virtue  (as  it  has  been  well  expressed)  is  not 
right  because  it  is  useful ;  but  God  hath  made  it  useful  because 
it  is  right.  He  hath  so  constructed  both  the  system  of  human¬ 
ity,  and  the  system  of  external  nature,  that,  in  effect  and  his¬ 
torical  fulfilment,  the  greatest  virtue  and  the  greatest  happiness 
are  at  one. 

1 6.  Now,  as  a  mere  proof  of  the  holiness  of  the  Creator,  here 
is  evidence  in  superfluity.  Assuming,  for  a  moment,  that  this 
perfection  of  the  Deity  were  in  question  prior  to  the  creation 
of  the  first  man,  no  rational  being  could  have  had  these  pheno¬ 
mena  expounded  to  him  without  feeling  that,  if  there  is  any 
arguing  from  effect  to  cause,  the  Maker  of  such  a  creature  must 
be  holy.  Not  .even  one  of  these  moral  elements  could  have 
been  consistently  inserted  into  the  human  constitution  by  a 
Being  in  love  with  evil.  The  union  of  any  two  of  them  would 
have  indicated  design ;  and  if  that  design  was  not  to  produce 
a  creature  who  should  hate  his  Creator,  that  Creator  must  be 
holy.  What,  then,  could  the  feeling  have  be£n  when  a  third 
and  a  fourth  of  these  phenomena  came  into  view,  but  a  pro¬ 
found  conviction  that  God  was  expounding  and  illustrating  the 
resplendent  holiness  of  his  own  perfect  nature ;  and  when  we 
saw  that  in  the  complicated  framework  of  the  human  being 
there  was  no  part  irrelevant  or  neutral ;  that  every  power  and 
property  consented  to,  and  cried  out  for  holiness  as  its  ultimate 
want ;  and  that  this  being  was  placed  amidst  the  play  of  forces 
and  influences  from  without,  leading  to  the  same  high  result, 
we  must  have  felt,  long  before  the  investigation  ended,  that  the 
Maker  of  such  a  being  could  never  be  at  a  loss  for  means  to 
illustrate  his  holiness.  Every  part  of  man’s  nature,  as  we  have 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


443 


seen,*  abounds  with  materials  for  theories  of  virtue.  So  coin¬ 
cident  is  morality  and  happiness,  that  one  insists  that  the  good 
of  self  is  the  only  aim  of  virtue.  So  graceful  and  majestic  is 
virtue,  that  a  second  regards  it  as  an  object  of  taste.  No,  says 
a  third,  it  is  based  on  the  emotions,  which  all  vibrate  to  it. 
Virtue,  affirms  another,  is  its  own  reward ;  the  bare  conscious¬ 
ness  of  it  is  happiness.  The  foundation  of  all  morality,  adds 
another,  is  the  right  of  God  to  the  obedience  of  his  creatures. 
No,  it  is  added,  the  will  of  God  is  only  the  rule  of  man’s  duty ; 
its  foundation  rests  on  that  eternal  and  immutable  excellence 
of  which  the  Divine  character  is  the  sum ;  for  reason  tells  me 
that  rectitude  has  a  substantive  existence,  anterior  to  all  law. 
The  inference  is  obvious  :  so  temple-like  is  man’s  nature,  that 
to  fix  attention  on  any  one  part  of  it  exclusively,  is  to  arrive  at 
the  conclusion  that  such  part  can  be  no  other  than  “  the  holy 
of  holies.” 

17.  Thus  was  answered  the  great  question,  whether  or  not, 
in  this  part  of  the  universe,  as  well  as  elsewhere,  God  could 
make  a  creature  in  his  own  image.  Many,  indeed,  of  man’s 
moral  tendencies  and  endowments  to  which  we  have  adverted, 
depended  for  development  on  the  progress  of  events.  But  He 
who  had  made  man  knew  that  they  were  all  deposited  in  his 
nature,  or  made  possible  to  it,  as  the  counterparts  of  His  own 
excellence.  God  is  knowable,  and  man  was  constituted  to  know 
him  —  to  read  his  character  in  his  works,  regarding  them  as 
shadows  of  the  great  substance,  symbols  of  the  Divine  Idea, 
means  of  intercourse  between  the  Infinite  mind  and  the  finite. 
God  is  infinitely  excellent,  and  man  was  made  capable  of  loving 
Him  supremely.  After  taking  all  created  excellence  to  his 
heart,  and  lavishing  his  affections  on  it,  he  would  still  have 
affection  to  spare,  capacities  unoccupied,  boundless  love  unem¬ 
ployed.  And  the  loftiest  height  of  human  perfection  would 
only  furnish  him  with  a  point  from  which  to  soar  away  in  quest 
of  Him  who  challenges  all  the  love  of  which  he  is  capable. 
The  will  of  God,  as  the  expression  of  his  character,  is  the 
standard  of  all  excellence,  so  that  nothing  can  be  right,  nor  an¬ 
swer  the  end  of  its  creation,  nor  any  other  desirable  end,  excepf 
in  so  far  as  it  harmonizes  with  that  standard ;  and  man  was 
made  capable  of  willing  to  be  so  conformed  to  it,  of  choosing  it 
as  his  highest  good,  of  even  aspiring  to  live  for  the  very  same  end 
as  that  for  which  God  himself  lives  and  reigns,  for  the  manifes¬ 
tation  of  His  glory. 


*  Supra ,  p.  319. 


444 


MAN. 


18.  We  say  not,  indeed,  that  there  is  no  property  or  perfec¬ 
tion  in  God  which  has  not  its  counterpart  in  man.  Even  that 
which  we  do  represent  and  know  of  the  Deity  is  imperfect.  We 
see  it  through  a  glass,  darkly.  The  infinite  resists  the  absolute 
intuition  of  the  finite.  How  different  from  ours  must  that 
power  be  which  wills  effects  more  easily  than  we  speak  of  them ; 
and  that  knowledge  in  which  there  is  no  induction,  no  emblem, 
no  phenomenon,  but  which  penetrates  and  possesses  the  essences 
of  things ;  and  that  freedom  which  rests  immutably  on  an  im¬ 
mutable  judgment !  And  our  knowledge  of  God  is  incomplete. 
Properties  and  attributes  exist  in  Him  of  which  we  have  no 
conception.  Man  occupies  his  own  peculiar  point  of  view ; 
and  the  angel,  his.  Neither  can  pass  from  his  own  sphere,  and 
appropriate  the  views  or  invade  the  conditions  of  the  other. 
And  even  if  orders  of  intelligences  exist  by  myriads,  and  one 
reason  pervade  them  all,  the  peculiar  conditions  of  each  would 
impart  a  corresponding  peculiarity  to  the  knoAvledge  which 
each  possesses  of  the  Godhead,  and  leave  them  all  penetrated 
with  the  conviction  that  what  they  know  of  Him  is  as  nothing 
compared  with  what  remains  to  be  known  of  Him  ;  that  He  can 
never  come  forth  from  the  eternity  which  He  inhabits  so  as  to 
bring  Himself  within  created  limits  ;  and  that  as  to  any  compre¬ 
hension  of  His  essence,  or  of  His  mode  of  being,  the  whole 
created  universe,  including  themselves,  is  only  “  an  altar  with 
this  inscription,  To  the  unknown  God.” 

Man’s  great  intellectual  prerogative  consists  in  being  able  to 
apprehend  the  limits  of  his  resemblance,  and  to  look  from  those 
limits  into  the  ocean  beyond.  He  is  constituted  to  feel  that 
though  properties  belong  to  the  Divine  nature  of  which,  in  the 
present  state,  he  can  have  no  conception,  there  can  be  no  excel¬ 
lence  in  himself  of  which  the  counterpart  does  not  exist  in  God. 
But  by  a  rebound  of  the  mind  from  all  the  limits  and  conditions 
of  his  own  nature,  he  thinks  of  the  same  excellences  in  God  as 
infinitely  superior.  Intuitively  he  glances  from  the  shadow- 
profile  to  the  bright  Original.  Attributes  which  he  can  name 
as  they  exist  in  himself,  are  nameless  as  they  exist  in  God,  and 
can  only  be  spoken  of  as  mfinite,  immutable,  ^comprehen¬ 
sible. 

19.  But  now,  when  the  holiness  of  God  had  received  this 
new  illustration  in  the  creation  of  man,  it  remained  to  be  seen 
whether  or  not  his  'probation  could  be  reconciled  with  the  in¬ 
terests  of  righteousness.  To  this  inquiry,  the  Divine  Being 
replied  by  an  arrangement  which  not  merely  solved  the  prob- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


445 


iem  whether  or  not  man  could  be  so  tried,  but  which  made  the 
trial  itself  subserve  His  righteous  design.  It  showed  that  such 
trial  might  be  good  in  itself  as  well  as  in  its  results.  This, 
indeed,  is  a  triumph  of  a  kind  repeated  by  the  Creator  in 
every  part  of  the  human  constitution,  for  we  see  Him  not  mere¬ 
ly  surmounting  difficulty,  but  employing  it,  converting  appa¬ 
rent  obstacles  into  actual  facilities  for  the  attainment  of  his 
ends.  Thus,  can  matter  and  spirit  co-exist  in  the  same  being. 
He  not  only  affirms  the  possibility  in  the  creation  of  man,  but  ac¬ 
tually  makes  the  body  the  means  of  the  mind’s  activity,  and  the 
occasion  of  its  development.  Can  He  reach  the  mind  of  man 
through  external  nature,  can  spirit  speak  to  spirit  through  mere 
mechanism ;  will  not  a  material  medium  obstruct  and  make  im¬ 
possible  such  intercourse  ?  He  so  constitutes  man,  that  the  ma¬ 
terial  actually  tells  him  of  the  spiritual,  and,  in  its  higher  and 
invisible  forms,  becomes  an  emblem  of  it.  Nature  itself  awa¬ 
kens  in  him  conceptions  of  excellence  which  God  alone  can  sat¬ 
isfy.  By  suggesting  kinds  and  degrees  of  perfection  which  it 
cannot  exhibit,  it  points  him  beyond  itself.  This  is  its  highest 
function,  to  make  the  mind  feel  its  own  superiority  to  all  out¬ 
ward  things,  even  to  those  which  come  direct  from  the  Creator, 
and  thus  to  awaken  in  the  consciousness  of  its  connaturalness 
with  Him.  Can  He  convey  to  the  finite  ideas  of  the  infinite  ? 
He  creates  a  being  capable  of  rising  from  the  feeling  of  his  own 
identity  to  the  conception  of  the  indivisible  and  the  immutable, 
and  for  whom  the  limited  presupposes  the  unlimited.  Can  he 
combine  freedom  with  necessity,  mechanism  and  causality  ?  In 
the  constitution  of  man,  He  has  not  merely  overcome  the  diffi¬ 
culty,  but  has  turned  it  to  the  highest  account,  for,  in  the  gov¬ 
ernment  of  himself,  man  augments  his  liberty  in  the  very  act 
of  asserting  it,  and  in  subordinating  his  own  material  organiza¬ 
tion,  he  takes  an  acknowledgment  from  all  external  nature  of 
his  prerogative  over  it. 

Having  thus  illustrated  the  fulness  of  its  resources,  by  con¬ 
verting  apparent  hindrances  into  helps,  the  Divine  sufficiency  * 
proceeded  to  show  that  man’s  probationary  trial  might  be  not 
merely  reconcilable  with  rectitude,  but  promotive  of  its  inter¬ 
ests.  It  was  of  a  kind  to  teach  man  the  subordination  of  his 
whole  nature  to  his  conscience,  and  of  his  conscience  to  God. 
It  appealed  to  his  appetite,  for  the  fruit  of  “  the  tree  was  good 
for  food  and  to  the  sense,  for  it  was  “  pleasant  to  the  eyes 
and  to  the  intellect,  for  it  was  “  the  tree  of  the  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil and,  therefore,  to  the  emotions ;  for  it  was  a 

38 


446 


MAN. 


tree  to  be  “  desired  to  make  one  wise  ;  ”  and  to  the  will,  for  the 
very  command  not  to  partake,  implied  the  power  of  man,  as  a 
free  agent,  to  partake  if  he  would ;  and  then  the  same  com- 
mand,  by  signifying  that  it  was  the  will  of  God  for  him  to  re¬ 
frain,  denoted  that  every  other  part  of  his  nature  was  to  be  sub¬ 
ordinated  to  his  sense  of  duty,  and  his  sense  of  duty  to  receive 
its  dictates  from  the  will  of  God,  however  that  will  might  be 
made  known.  Both  the  felt  supremacy  of  his  conscience  within, 
and  the  law  from  without  which  thus  appealed  to  it,  solemnly 
apprised  him  that,  ultimately,  he  was  constructed  for  moral  gov¬ 
ernment,  that  he  was  one  entire  constitution  for  holiness.  And 
we  have  seen,  also,  that  man’s  probationary  danger  was  reduced 
to  a  single  point ;  that  while  eternal  consequences  urged  him  to 
stand,  his  liability  to  fall  was  minified  to  the  utmost;  —  an  ar¬ 
rangement,  this,  which  still  further  distinctly  announced  the 
Divine  jealousy  for  the  interests  of  holiness,  and  implied  that 
even  this  solitary  avenue  for  the  possible  entrance  of  evil  should 
itself  be  closed  up,  if  those  interests  could  be  equally  attained 
without  it.  Thus,  the  very  nature  of  man’s  trial  was  calculated 
immeasurably  to  deepen  his  conviction  of  the  Divine  holiness, 
and  to  enlarge  his  views  of  its  resources. 

20.  But  what  if  even  man’s  actual  sin  should  be  the  occasion 
of  placing  the  righteousness  of  God  in  a  still  stronger  light,  — 
this  would  seem  to  leave  nothing  further  necessary,  or  even  pos¬ 
sible,  in  proof  of  the  all-sufficiency  of  his  holy  government ! 
We  have  seen  that  this  proof  was  not  wanting.  With  man’s 
first  moment  of  conscious  guilt  commenced  a  process  of  self¬ 
punishment;  for  that  very  consciousness  involved  suffering. 
Even  before  his  doom  was  formally  pronounced,  nature  itself 
had  assumed  a  look  of  judicial  severity,  and  had  found  a  voice 
to  say,  “  Let  there  be  no  peace  to  the  wicked.”  The  external 
sentence  only  interpreted  man’s  fears,  and  ratified  his  self-pi\> 
nounced  condemnation.  Now,  that  his  first  sin  should  be  the 
means  of  arming  the  best  part  of  his  own  nature  against  him ; 
that  the  violation  of  holiness  should  be  the  occasion  of  calling 
into  existence  a  whole  order  of  emotions  entirely  unknown  to 
him  before  —  shame,  compunction,  and  remorse  —  yet  all  of 
them  capable  of  serving  him  as  auxiliaries  in  the  attainment  of 
a  higher  order  of  holiness ;  that  the  penal  flame  self-kindled 
within  him  should  have  brought  out  and  made  legible  new  char¬ 
acters  of  law  before  hidden  from  his  consciousness ;  that  his 
very  first  act  of  self-judgment  should  be  responded  to  from 
without,  as  if  “  the  vast  pyre  of  the  last  judgment,  already  kin- 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


447 


died  in  an  unknown  distance,  were  darting  and  alighting  in 
flashes  upon  the  face  of  his  soul ;  ”  in  a  word,  that  his  first  act 
of  transgression  should  be  the  occasion  of  raising  his  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  Divine  holiness  to  the  highest  point  which  it  had  yet 
attained,  was  an  arrangement  calculated  to  remove  all  limit  from 
his  views  of  the  resources  of  the  Divine  government. 

21.  Up  to  the  moment  of  the  fall,  everything  in  the  constitution 
and  history  of  man  was  illustrative  of  the  benevolence  of  God. 
“  The  earth  was  full  of  his  goodness ;  ”  and  man  was  heir  of 
the  whole.  In  proportion,  then,  to  the  strength  of  the  argu¬ 
ment  for  the  Divine  goodness,  arising  from  the  affluence  of 
man’s  means  of  happiness,  was  the  strength  of  the  argument 
for  the  Divine  holiness  arising  from  man’s  forfeiture  of  the  whole, 
by  sin.  If  the  former  demonstrated  the  fulness  of  God’s  love 
for  happiness,  the  latter  proved  that  his  love  of  holiness  is 
greater  still.  If  the  sufficiency  of  Goodness  appeared  in  the 
fact  that  all  the  products  of  Power  and  Wisdom  ministered  to 
its  ends,  what  shall  we  say  to  the  all-sufficiency  of  Holiness 
when  we  behold  Goodness  itself  surrender  all  its  agents  and 
instruments  to  be  employed  in  vindication  of  its  awful  claims ! 
What  must  be  the  enormity  of  sin  in  the  Divine  estimation, 
and  what  the  terrible  importance  of  the  sinner,  when  his  first 
violation  places  him  in  a  hostile  relation  to  the  universe !  What 
must  be  the  sublimity  of  that  moral  order  which  man  had  dis¬ 
turbed,  when  the  order  of  universal  nature  was  made  to  give 
way,  and  God  himself  descended,  to  its  vindication !  And  how 
can  a  Being,  to  whom  all  things  offer  themselves  as  instruments, 
and  in  whose  service  even  obstacles  become  agents,  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  less  than  all-sufficient  in  the  accomplishment  of  his 
holy  ends ! 

22.  We  have  remarked  already  that  the  unfallen  angels  may 
have  been  previously  convinced  of  the  boundless  resources  of 
Holiness  by  the  history  of  their  own  race.  What  the  moral 
character  of  God  might  prove  to  be  was  a  question  (if  we  can 
suppose  there  ever  was  a  moment  when  it  yet  remained  to  be 
disclosed  to  them)  of  the  profoundest  interest.  That  He  in¬ 
habited  eternity,  they  knew ;  for  had  there  ever  been  a  period 
when  he  was  not,  He  would  not  now  have  been ;  but  had  He 
filled  the  past  eternity  with  evil  or  with  good  ?  That  He  was 
the  High  and  Lofty  One,  they  knew ;  and  this  gave  an  infinite 
importance  to  the  question,  what  will  be  the  character  of  his 
government  ?  will  it  be  a  dominion  of  law  or  of  force  ?  and,  if 
of  law,  what  will  be  its  nature  ?  what  will  be  punished  ?  what 


448 


MAN. 


rewarded  ?  Tell  us  (they  might  have  anxiously  exclaimed) 
what  have  we  to  expect  ?  Eternity  is  before  us ;  what  awaits 
us  in  that  boundless  future  ?  O,  that  we  knew  the  character 
of  God ;  that  we  might  at  least  conjecture  what  he  has  stored 
up  for  us  there  ! 

But  even  supposing  that  there  was  ever  a  moment  when  this 
vast  disclosure  remained  to  be  made  to  them,  it  could  not  have 
been  for  more  than  a  moment.  They  had  only  to  look  within, 
in  order  to  perceive  that  they  themselves  were  made  for  holi¬ 
ness.  They  had  only  to  study  the  manifestations  of  his  charac¬ 
ter,  in  order  to  see  that  holiness  sums  up  all  his  attributes ;  that 
He  loves  holiness  for  itself ;  that  He  has  nothing  to  hope,  and 
yet  He  is  holy  —  nothing  to  fear,  and  yet  He  is  holy ;  that  He 
and  holiness  are  one.  They  had  only  —  tremendous  experi¬ 
ment  !  —  they  had  only  to  sin ;  and  all  the  order  of  nature  was 
thrown  into  confusion,  the  universe  armed  to  resist  the  infrac¬ 
tion,  and  Justice  flamed  forth  in  a  fire  never  t«>  be  quenched. 
Where  can  such  holiness  dwell,  when  even  the  heavens  are  not 
clean  in  its  sight!  Who  shall  dwell  with  it,  when  even  his 
angels  are  charged  with  folly  !  when  the  only  condition  on 
which  even  his  holiest  creatures  are  allowed  to  dwell  with  Him 
is  —  (he  has  even  made  it  a  law  of  their  nature)  —  that  they 
shall  never  remain  for  a  moment  at  a  stand  in  holiness,  but  be 
always  advancing  to  higher  and  higher  degrees.  And  when 
they  begin  to  praise  his  holiness,  they  feel  as  if  they  could 
never  satisfy  themselves  with  the  adoring  exclamation,  “  Holy, 
Holy,  Holy,  is  the  Lord  God  Almighty !”  And  when  He  calls 
them  nearer  to  his  throne,  they  can  see  but  one  sight  —  that 
“  He  is  glorious  in  holiness !”  And  when  He  calls  them  nearer 
still,  a  single  look  overpowers  them,  “and  the  wing  which  has 
taken  them  there  veils  their  faces  as  they  fall  prostrate  before 
Him !” 

They  were  well  prepared,  therefore,  to  look  on  this  new  dis¬ 
play  of  holiness  in  the  opening  history  of  man.  It  was  a 
recapitulation  of  their  own  history,  with  sublime  additions. 
The  moral  well-being  of  a  race  was  involved.  But  both  svs- 
terns  were  seen  to  be  under  one  administration.  Law  took  a 
wider  range.  In  man’s  painful  consciousness  of  guilt,  every 
part  of  his  nature,  every  member  of  his  race,  virtually  joined 
them  in  the  adoring  strain,  “  Who  shall  not  fear  thee,  0  Lord, 
and  glorify  thy  name  ?  for  thou  only  art  holy :  for  thy  judg¬ 
ments  are  made  manifest.” 

23.  For  anything  we  knew  to  the  contrary,  this  may  be  one 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


449 


of  the  highest  proofs  of  the  Divine  all-sufficiency  —  the  crown¬ 
ing  proof —  to  be  able  not  only  to  conduct  a  single  process  of 
manifestation  —  not  only  to  conduct  more  than  one  separately, 
but  to  be  able  to  allow  them  to  blend  at  a  certain  point ;  to 
show  them  in  harmony  with  each  other,  and  with  loftier  issues 
still  beyond.  Let  it  be  only  imagined  what  confusion  would 
ensue  in  the  planetary  system,  were  its  present  arrangement  to 
be  disturbed  bv  the  admission  of  some  new  astronomical  body, 
however  small.  Who  can  foresee  the  multiplied  adjustments, 
and  the  complicated  balancings  necessary,  in  order  to  restore 
the  system  to  harmony !  What  then  shall  we  say  of  the  new 
combinations,  infinitely  multiplied,  necessary  to  harmonize  two 
distinct  processes  of  Divine  manifestation ;  and  what  a  sublime 
view  does  it  afford  of  the  all-sufficiency  of  the  Being  who  is 
able  to  effect  it ! 

In  the  wide  realms  of  the  Divine  government,  indeed,  nume¬ 
rous  other  orders  of  accountable  beings,  besides  angels  and  men, 
may  exist,  or  may  hereafter  be  created,  and  may  exhibit  an 
ascending  scale  of  races,  in  corresponding  stages  of  excellence. 
Or.  as  the  nebulous  masses  are  conjectured  to  be  in  every  stage 
of  formation,  so  every  perfection  of  the  Divine  character  may 
be  seen  somewhere  in  every  phase  and  stage  of  manifestation. 
And  it  may  constitute  an  important  element  in  the  happiness  of 
the  blessed,  and  be  employed  as  the  grand  means  of  securing 
their  stability  in  holiness,  to  be  admitted  to  behold  the  confluence 
of  all  these  stupendous  processes  —  to  be  placed  at  a  point  where 
the  moral  influences  of  all  worlds  are  concentrated,  and  act  on 
them  together. 

24.  It  says  much  for  the  amplitude  of  the  Divine  resources 
that  they  should  not  only  awaken  such  conjectures,  but  justify 
them.  Or,  if  the  conjectural  character  of  such  views  are  ob 
jected  to,  it  says  still  more  for  those  resources  that  they  justify 
the  conviction  that  our  loftiest  flight  of  conjecture  falls  immea¬ 
surably  below  the  stupendous  reality,  and  will  hereafter  be 
found  to  have  left  us  settled  near  the  base.  Without,  therefore, 
re-opening  the  question  of  the  Divine  permission  of  evil,  we 
must  admit  with  Leibnitz,  in  the  grand  passage  which  closes 
the  first  part  of  his  Theodicee,  that  “those  attempts  of  our  reason 
in  which  there  is  no  necessity  for  absolutely  confining  ourselves 
to  certain  hypotheses,  only  serve  to  make  us  conceive  that  there 
may  be  a  thousand  ways  of  justifying  the  conduct  of  God;  and 
that  all  the  evils  we  see,  and  all  the  difficulties  we  suggest  to 
ourselves,  ought  not  to  prevent  our  believing  that  there  is 

38* 


450 


MAN. 


nothing  so  exalted  as  the  wisdom  of  God,  nothing  so  just  as 
his  judgments,  nothing  so  pure  as  his  holiness,  and  nothing 
more  immense  than  his  goodness.”  And  if  such  are  even  our 
assured  convictions,  what  must  theirs  be,  who,  having  emerged 
into  unclouded  light,  are  no  longer  left  to  conjecture,  but 
directly  look  on  a  thousand  actual  ways  of  justifying  the 
Divine  conduct,  each  brightening  under  their  gaze  into  a  new 
occasion  of  awful  admiration.  Whatever  mystery,  in  angelic 
eyes,  may  have  attended  the  fresh  incursion  of  evil  in  the  fall 
of  man,  doubtless  their  own  experience  taught  them  to  expect 
that  Holiness  would  take  occasion  from  it  to  clothe  itself  in  new 
glories  :  that  Evil  itself  would  ultimately  be  vanquished  and  led 
in  triumph  through  the  universe,  or  that  its  existence  would  make 
possible  a  height  of  excellence,  and  a  fulness  of  enjoyment,  other¬ 
wise  unattainable ;  and  that,  in  either  case,  the  end  would  be 
attained  in  a  manner  still  further  illustrative  of  the  all-suffi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Blessed  God. 

25.  But  man  must  wait  for  the  full  solution ;  and  well  he 
may.  Even  as  a  physical  being,  he  is  momently  enjoying  the 
results  of  material  laws  and  influences,  which  came  into  activity 
“  a  limited  eternity  ”  before  he  himself  was  called  into  existence ; 
and  which  yet  did  not  find  their  highest  ends  until  he  came. 
As  an  intellectual  being,  he  finds  himself  the  inhabitant  of  a 
material  system,  which  is  itself  subject  to  secular  perturba¬ 
tions  —  deviations  of  orbit  which  go  on  increasing  for  a  course 
of  ages  before  they  attain  their  maximum,  and  begin  to  return. 
But  if  all  such  variations  of  the  system  are  ultimately  corrected 
by  its  own  laws,  may  he  not  hope  that  provision  is  made  for 
correcting  the  more  fearful  disorders  of  the  moral  economy? 
And  if  the  restoration  of  the  material  derangements  requires 
enormous  periods,  (some  of  them  are  going  on  still  in  the  same 
direction  in  which  they  were  at  the  commencement  of  historic 
time,)  surely  an  equal  extent  of  duration,  at  least,  may  be  con¬ 
ceded  for  the  vindication  of  laws  dating  from  eternity.  If  each 
oscillation  of  the  celestial  mechanism  requires  a  period,  in  the 
presence  of  whose  vastness  and  regularity  the  turbulence  of 
human  passion  stands  rebuked  and  subsides,  how  patient  and 
confident  of  the  results  should  man  feel  in  the  presence  of  the 
Infinite  Patience  —  the  Eternal  himself  —  who  has  the  whole 
extent  of  duration  to  work  in !  As  an  accountable  being,  the 
mystery  of  evil  is  one  of  man’s  own  creation  ;  he  may  well 
await  the  justification  of  that  plan  which  only  made  it  possible, 
since  he  himself  has  made  it  actual ;  and  rejoice  in  the  thought 


THE  ULTIMATE  END. 


451 


that,  in  proportion  t :>  the  length  of  the  time  which  the  process 
requires,  will  be  the  magnitude  of  the  results  accruing  to  the 
interests  of  holiness.  As  the  head  of  a  race  destined  to  exist 
generation  after  generation,  what  if  the  first  man  could  have 
caught  glimpses  of  the  manner  in  which  Law  would  retrieve  its 
honors,  and  Holiness  embody  itself,  and  Humanity  be  more 
than  restored,  in  the  person  of  the  Son  of  man,  and  the  image 
of  God  gloriously  reappear  in  a  number  which  no  one  can  num¬ 
ber  ;  surely  the  view  must  have  made  him  feel  that  no  plan 
was  deserving  of  less  than  adoration  which  included  such  pros¬ 
pects,  no  time  to  be  deemed  slow  which  was  occupied  in  work¬ 
ing  out  their  realization.  And  what  if,  as  an  heir  of  immor¬ 
tality,  he  could  have  foreseen  that  all  that  number  were  destined 
to  share  the  inheritance  with  him ;  and,  more  than  this  —  im¬ 
mortality  with  constant  progression  —  progression  in  excellence, 
progression  in  happiness,  progression  for  ever ;  the  mind  ever 
augmenting  its  stores  of  enjoyment,  and  enlarging  only  to  aug¬ 
ment  them  more ;  ever  ascending,  and  attaining  the  loftiest 
throne  it  had  previously  beheld,  only  to  see  others  loftier  still, 
and  to  ascend  to  them ;  in  a  word,  all  the  resources  of  God 
thrown  open,  and  an  infinity  of  duration  in  which  to  enjoy  them 
—  he  could  only  have  cast  himself  unreservedly  on  those  re¬ 
sources,  and  have  felt  that  he  was  reposing  on  All-sufficiency. 
But  this  is  to  forestall. 

26.  By  the  creation  of  man,  the  earth  itself  may  be  said  to 
have  been  transfigured,  for  its  new  inhabitant  consciously  radi¬ 
ated  the  Divine  image.  In  its  constitution,  dominion,  and  far- 
reaching  relations,  he  stood  forth  the  embodiment  of  a  Divine 
idea  —  the  “  Type  of  him  that  was  to  come.”  His  probation 
raised  the  earth  into  a  scene  of  moral  government.  Sinai 
itself  was  anticipated,  and  even  surpassed,  in  him ;  for  his  con¬ 
stitution  was  a  living  court  of  Divine  judicature.  His  tempta¬ 
tion  announced  that  he  had  joined  the  solemn  march  of  events 
at  a  period  when  the  great  conflict  between  good  and  evil  had 
already  begun,  and  that,  as  a  moral  agent,  he  could  not  but 
take  part  in  it.  His  first  sin  —  by  which  the  crown  fell  from 
the  head  of  creation  —  may  be  regarded  as  a  foreshadowing  for 
all  time  of  the  kind  of  contest  which  he  would  be  likely  to  wage  : 
presuming  on  his  sufficiency  for  himself,  he  brought  his  will 
into  collision  with  the  Supreme  will.  And  the  first  great  lesson 
taught  him  by  experience,  (the  lesson  already  deposited  in  the 
archives  of  angelic  experience,)  that  the  well-being  of  the 
creature  lies  in  obedience  and  dependence,  may  be  regarded  as 


452 


MAN. 


a  prophecy  of  the  moral  of  man’s  entire  history.  There  can, 
indeed,  be  no  second  fall  of  man ;  for  never  again  can  there  be 
a  first  man,  insulated  from  all  the  influences  of  his  race,  yet 
representatively  related  t®  them  all.  Probation,  in  this  sense, 
can  never  be  repeated.  The  first  stage  of  man’s  experimental 
history  is  over  —  over  for  the  race ;  but  not,  therefore,  is  his 
career  to  cease.  His  nature,  unlike  that  of  any  of  the  races 
which  have  here  preceded  him,  admits  of  a  prolonged  process 
of  development ;  and,  from  this  point,  a  new  stage  of  his  event¬ 
ful  history  is  to  begin,  and  a  new  aspect  of  the  Divine  character 
to  be  disclosed.  And  the  spirit  of  the  first  sin,  we  repeat,  will 
be  found  reappearing  in  every  stage  of  the  ever-deepening  pro¬ 
cess,  and  the  accompanying  lesson  of  his  dependence  will  be 
heard  “  waxing  louder  and  louder.”  Meantime,  the  first  great 
crisis  has  arrived.  By  aiming  at  self-sufficiency,  man  has  ren¬ 
dered  himself  more  dependent  than  ever.  His  self-apotheosis  has 
involved  his  degradation.  Aspiring  to  raise  himself  superior  to 
Law,  he  has  left  himself  no  resource  but  Mercy.  And  we  know 
the  manner  in  which  the  Divine  All-sufficiency  was  pleased  to 
meet  the  greatness  of  the  occasion. 


453 


NOTE 


OX  THE  ORDER  OE  THE  ORIGINATION  OE  MATTER 

AND  MIND. 


Reference  is  made  in  the  preceding  pages  to  the  relations 
probable  sustained  by  the  angelic  order  to  the  human  economy. 
On  this  subject,  two  of  the  reviewers  of  the  “  Pre-Adamite  Earth” 
amicably  inferred,  that  the  principles  there  propounded  would 
involve  the  conclusion  that,  in  the  ascending  order  of  the  Divine 
procedure,  the  creation  of  the  material  universe  preceded  the  crea¬ 
tion  of  spiritual  beings,  and  that  man,  as  coming  after  the  angelic 
order,  in  some  sense  transcends  it. 

Both  of  these  propositions  I  believe,  (though  the  latter  view 
does  not  necessarily  follow,  from  anything  which  I  had  there 
stated ;)  and  in  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  Biblical  Preview, 
for  January,  1848,  I  stated  some  of  the  scriptural  grounds  for  my 
belief.  The  arguments  which  were  adduced  in  that  article,  in 
support  of  the  former  of  these  views,  I  here  repeat ;  but  with  this 
precautionary  remark,  that  their  reception  or  their  rejection  does 
not  affect  the  truth  and  applicability  of  any  of  the  principles  of 
this  book  to  the  human  economy.  My  reasons  for  not  here  insist¬ 
ing  on  the  latter  of  the  two  propositions  —  namely,  the  inferiority 
of  the  angelic  constitution  and  destination  as  compared  with  those 
of  man  —  are,  that  the  discussion  would  undesirably  swell  the  size 
of  this  volume ;  that  it  will  be  more  in  place  in  that  stage  of  this 
series  in  which  we  shall  treat  of  the  Christian  revelations  ;  and 
that  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  view  still  less  affects  the  validity 
of  anything  advanced  in  the  preceding  pages,  than  even  the  charac¬ 
ter  of  the  former  proposition  does.  All  that  our  principles  appear 
to  require  is,  that,  whatever  the  rank  of  the  angelic  order  may  be, 
the  process  of  the  Divine  manifestation  to  it  observe  the  sap*^ 


454 


NOTH. 


order  as  it  does  to  man.  This  conceded,  we  can  easily  conceive 
that  the  period  of  their  creation  did  not  fall  into  any  of  the  inter¬ 
vals  of  the  earthly  process,  and  that  their  constitution  may  so  far 
differ  from  man’s  as  to  render  a  comparison  of  the  two  exceed¬ 
ingly  difficult ;  and  yet  that  the  song  of  their  history  will  ulti¬ 
mately  symphonize  with  his,  though  his  will  have  notes  beyond 
their  reach. 

With  these  cautionary  observations,  I  proceed  to  illustrate  the 
proposition,  that  the  creation  of  matter  preceded  the  production 
of  mind.  The  general  opinion  is,  I  presume,  that  angels  were 
created  before  the  earth  existed ;  and  that  this  is  equivalent  to 
saying  that  mind  was  created  before  matter.  Now,  that  angels 
existed  before  man,  is,  I  believe  a  truth  inferable  from  revelation. 
And  it  is  easy  to  infer,  further,  that  they  existed  prior  to  the  last 
formation  of  the  earth,  as  a  habitation  for  man.  But  to  infer  from 
this  that  they  existed  prior  to  the  original  creation  of  the  matter 
of  which  the  earth  is  formed,  is  a  far  different  conclusion,  and  one, 
not  only  unwarranted,  but,  as  I  believe,  directly  negatived  by  the 
word  of  God. 

1.  For,  first,  if,  as  we  believe,  there  is  but  one  purely  spiritual 
and  uncompounded  being  —  the  Father  of  spirits  himself;  and  if, 
therefore,  the  angels  are  invested  with  a  material  vehicle  of  some 
kind,  however  ethereal,*  analogy  would  lead  us  to  infer  that  the 
vehicle  was  prior  to  and  prepared  for  the  reception  of  the  spirit 
which  was  to  actuate  it.  “  Flesh  and  blood,  indeed,  cannot  inherit 
the  kingdom  of  God.”  But  “  there  is  a  natural  (or  psychical) 
body,  and  there  is  a  spiritual  body  ;f  the  one  requiring  animal 
nourishment  and  repose  —  the  other  superior  to  such  conditions. 
And  the  Apostle  argues,  that,  as  the  organizations  of  earth  differ 
from  one  another,  so  also  the  heavenly  bodies  exhibit  a  gradation 
of  differences ;  leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  there  is  a  spirit-body 
as  suited  to  the  conditions  of  heaven  as  the  soul-body  is  to  the 
conditions  of  earth.J  Now,  supposing  an  analogy  to  have  existed 
between  the  order  of  the  creation  of  the  soul-body  for  Adam  and 
of  the  spirit-body  for  angels,  the  creation  of  their  material  vehicle 


*  Some,  indeed,  infer  that  they  are  purely  spiritual  because  they  are  called  “  minis¬ 
tering  tzvev fiara,  sprints .”  But  “  there  is  a  spiritual  body.”  The  phrase  only  proves 
that  they  are  not  grossly  material  and  organized  as  we  now  are,  but  that  they  inhabit 
vehicles  as  ethereal  as  our  bodies  will  be  when  we  shall  be  “like  unto  the  angels”  — 
when  that  which  “  is  sown  in  corruption  shall  be  raised  in  incorruption.”  The  reason¬ 
ing  generally  employed  to  prove  that  angels  are  absolutely  bodiless  would  prove  that 
the  saints  will  be  so  likewise,  even  after  the  resurrection. 

t  1  Cor.  xv.  44. 

t  See  Calvin  on  this  verse,  and  Billroth.  Bib.  Cab.  xxiii.  p.  110. 


NOTE. 


455 


must  be  supposed  to  have  been  prior  to  that  of  the  indwelling 
spirit. 

2.  If,  as  we  believe,  heaven  is  a  place,  as  well  as  a  state,  the 
preparation  of  the  place  must  have  taken  precedence  of  the  crea¬ 
tion  of  its  occupants ;  just  as  the  garden  of  Eden  was  prepared 
for  the  coming  of  man.  And  though  this  would  not  prove  that 
the  substance  of  our  planetary  system  preceded  the  creation  of 
their  “  heavenly  places,”  it  would  prove  all  that  we  are  now  in¬ 
sisting  on  —  namely,  that,  taking  the  universe  as  a  whole,  matter, 
and  not  mind,  was  the  first  production  of  Omnipotence  ;  that  it  is 
as  true  that  the  mansions  of  the  angels  were  prepared  for  their 
inhabitants  as  it  is  that  the  existence  of  the  earth  preceded  the 
creation  of  man. 

3.  Still  more  apparent  will  this  view  become  if  it  be  remem¬ 
bered  that  there  is  no  reason  whatever  to  believe  that  their  present 
abode  has  been  always  their  residence,  any  more  than  there  is 
that  the  present  will  be  always  the  residence  of  man.  Their  pro¬ 
bationary  abode  may  have  been  planetary,  similar  to  ours.  To 
infer  that  because  the  Bible  speaks  of  them  as  being  at  present 
inhabitants  of  heaven,  therefore  they  have  never  inhabited  any 
other  world,  is  to  reach  a  conclusion  without  premises.  They 
“  kept  not  their  first  estate”  —  “  they  left  their  habitation.”  So, 
also,  did  our  first  parents  ;  and  yet,  who  infers  from  this  that 
Eden  was  in  heaven  ?  Theology  would  seem  to  require  that  the 
place  of  reward  should  be  somewhat  different  from  the  place  of 
trial,  and  analogy  sanctions  the  supposition.  If,  then,  the  “  first 
habitation”  of  the  angels  were  analogous  to  our  own,  like  the  earth 
it  was  doubtless  prepared  for  their  arrival. 

4.  The  Bible  opens  with  the  sublime  affirmation  that  the  first 
act  of  creation  was  the  origination  of  the  material  universe :  “  In 
the  beginning  God  created  the  heavens  and  the  earth.”  In  the 
appendix  to  the  “  Pre-Adamite  Earth,”  it  was  shown  that  this 
language  denotes  the  proper  origination  of  the  matter  of  the  visi¬ 
ble  universe.  It  is  now  proposed  to  show  that  this  verse  distinctly 
affirms  that  the  origination  of  matter  was  the  first  act  of  creation. 
This  verse  could  not  have  been  intended  merely  to  answer  the 
question,  “  TTere  the  heavens  and  the  earth  created  ?”  in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  the  hypothesis  of  their  eternity ;  nor  the  question,  “  Who 
was  their  Creator  ?”  in  opposition  to  the  “  lords  many  and  gods 
many”  of  heathen  mythology.  For  then,  apparently,  the  sufficient 
answer  would  have  been,  “  God  created  the  heavens  and  the 
earth ;”  the  first  word,  “  God,”  would  have  answered  the  first 
question ;  and  the  second  word,  “  created,”  would  have  answered 


456 


NOTE. 


the  second  question.  The  phrase,  “  in  the  beginning,”  would 
have  been  superfluous.  But  if  we  ask  also  the  question,  “  What 
was  the  first  production  of  Almighty  power  ?”  this  part  of  the 
verse  is  a  direct  reply  to  the  inquiry  ;  for  it  declares  that,  “  in  the 
beginning,”  before  God  created  anything  else,  He  created  the 
heavens  and  the  earth. 

With  this  view  agrees  the  rendering  of  the  Arabic  version, 
Primum  quod  creavit  Deus,fuit  codum  et  terra  —  that  which  God 
created  first  was  heaven  and  earth.  It  is  a  rule  of  Hebrew  syn¬ 
tax  that,  in  the  tranquil  and  natural  arrangement  of  a  sentence, 
“  the  more  important  words  should  take  precedence  of  those  that 
are  less  important.”  Under  this  rule,  Hurwitz  remarks,*  “  The 
order  of  words  in  the  first  verse  of  the  Book  of  Genesis  may,  per¬ 
haps,  appear  an  exception,  as  it  begins  with  a  word  apparently 
the  least  expressive.  But  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  inspired 
penman,  by  adopting  this  arrangement  in  preference  to  the  many 
which  he  might  have  chosen,  intended  to  impress  on  our  minds, 
first,  that  this  world  had  a  beginning ,  in  contradiction  to  those  who 
maintained  its  eternity  ;  secondly,  that  it  was  not  the  production 
of  chance,  but  a  creation,  a  calling  into  existence  by  the  Divine 
will.”  Doubtless,  the  verse  was  designed  to  teach  both  these  fun¬ 
damental  truths.  But  the  second  truth  includes  the  first.  And, 
for  reasons  already  stated,  as  well  as  for  others  which  follow,  the 
clause,  in  the  beginning,  must  be  regarded  as  denoting  what  was 
the  primary  act  of  creation. 

This  appears  to  be  the  Psalmist’s  exposition  of  the  verse,  in 
Psa.  cii.  25,  “  Thou,  Lord,  in  the  beginning ,f  hast  laid  the  founda¬ 
tion  of  the  earth,  and  the  heavens  are  the  work  of  thy  hands.” 
Still  further  is  this  view  corroborated  by  Prov.  viii.  22,  23,  “  The 
Lord  possessed  me  in  the  beginning  of  his  way,  before  his  works 
of  old.  I  was  set  up  from  everlasting,  from  the  beginning,  or 
ever  the  earth  was.”  Here  the  design  is  two-fold ;  to  impress  us 
with  the  fact  that  Wisdom  preceded  the  existence  of  every  created 
thing ;  and  to  do  this  we  are  emphatically  assured  by  a  singular 
accumulation  of  sentences,  that  Wisdom  preceded  the  existence 
of  the  material  universe :  evidently  implying,  secondly,  that  no 
created  thing  preceded  the  material  creation.^ 

5.  If  it  be  objected  to  the  view  I  have  taken,  that  the  design 


*  Heb.  Gram.  p.  250. 

t  Sept.  /car’  upxug  ;  from  which,  probably,  the  apostle  quotes,  Heb.  i.  10. 

t  “  It  cannot  be  said  that  angels  were  created  before  the  heavens  and  the  earth,  for 
according  to  the  style  of  speaking  adopted  by  the  Scriptures,  nothing  which  was  not 
eternal  existed  before  the  world ;  and  in  no  other  way  do  they  describe  eternity  to  us 
than  by  saying.  In  the  beginning .”  —  B.  Pictet’s  Christian  Theol.,  B.  iii.  c.  iv. 


NOTE. 


457 


of  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis  is  only  to  describe  the  order  in 
which  the  visible  universe  was  created,  and  cannot,  therefore,  be 
supposed  to  determine  the  period  of  the  spiritual  creation,  I  rejoin 
that  in  the  opening  verses  of  St.  John’s  Gospel  the  phrase,  in  the 
beginning,  is  evidently  employed  to  take  us  back  to  a  period  ante¬ 
rior  to  the  creation  of  angels.  ‘’In  the  beginning  was  the  Word, 
and  the  Word  was  with  God,  and  the  Word  was  God.  The  same 
svas  in  the  beginning  with  God.  All  things  were  made  by  Him ; 
and  without  Him  was  not  anything  made  that  was  made.”  Here, 
it  is  evident  that  the  phrase  is  employed  to  affirm  that  before 
anything  existed,  extra  Deum,  the  Word  existed;  for  the  design 
of  the  inspired  writer  is  to  prove  that  everything,  ad  extra ,  was 
brought  into  existence  by  him.  If  Scripture,  then,  is  to  be  its  own 
interpreter,  we  must  infer  that  the  phrase,  in  the  beginning ,  as  em¬ 
ployed  in  the  Book  of  Genesis,  takes  us  back  to  the  same  period. 
And  this  conclusion  becomes  inevitable,  when  we  remark  that  the 
Gospel,  in  opening  with  this  phrase,  designedly  imitates  the  language 
of  the  Mosaic  history.  If  the  Mosaic  use  of  the  phrase,  therefore, 
does  not  take  us  back  to  a  period  anterior  to  the  creation  of  angels, 
it  cannot  be  justly  inferred  that  the  Evangelic  sense  of  the  phrase 
does,  but  that  the  ”  all  things  made  bv  Him”  means  onlv  all  visible 
things :  and.  therefore,  that  angels  were  not  made  bv  Him ;  for 
if  the  Evangelist  copies  the  phrase,  the  only  just  inference  is,  that 
he  employs  it  in  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  it  was  employed 
by  the  inspired  writer  from  whom  he  derives  it.  And,  if  so,  the 
only  conclusion  left  us  is,  that  the  creation  of  matter  preceded  the 
production  of  mind. 

6.  The  same  idea  appears  to  be  included  in  the  grand  principle 
laid  down  by  the  Apostle,  1  Cor.  xv.  46,  “  Howbeit  that  was  not 
first  which  is  spiritual,  but  that  which  is  natural ;  and  afterwards 
that  which  is  spiritual.”  It  is  here  implied,  says  Theophylact,  that 
“  our  interests  are  alwavs  advancing  towards  what  is  better.”  This 
is  implied,  but  much  more  than  this.  These  words  are  to  be  re¬ 
ferred.  not  to  verse  45,  which  is  parenthetical,  but  to  verse  44, 
which  affirms  that  there  is  a  psychical,  or  animal  body,  and  also  a 
spiritual  body.  And  it  replies  to  the  supposed  inquiry,  why  the 
spiritual  body  had  not  preceded  the  animal  body.  “  The  answer 
is,”  remarks  Bloomfield,  “  by  a  reference  to  the  Divine  decree, 
that  the  animal  must  precede,  the  spiritual  follow.  The  reason 
for  this  procedure  is  suggested  in  the  very  nature  of  the  terms 
themselves,  psychical  or  animal,  and  spiritual,  which  imply  that 
the  latter  is  far  more  perfect  than  the  former.  Since  it  is  agree¬ 
able  to  the  usual  course  of  God’s  operations,  both  in  the  physical 

39 


458 


NOTE. 


and  moral  world,  that  the  more  perfect  should  succeed  the  less 
perfect,  and  not  vice  versa ;  and  from  the  natural  to  proceed  to 
the  supernatural.”  Enlarging  on  this  view,  Barnes  very  justly 
observes,  “  The  idea  is,  that  there  is  a  tendency  towards  perfec¬ 
tion  ;  and  that  ’  God  observes  the  proper  order,  by  which  that 
which  is  most  glorious  shall  be  secured.  It  was  not  His  plan  that 
all  things  in  the  beginning  should  be  perfect ;  but  that  perfection 
should  be  the  work  of  time,  and  should  be  secured  in  an  appro¬ 
priate  order  of  events.”  The  value  of  this  great  principle  in  re¬ 
lation  to  our  present  subject,  consists  in  its  universality.  The 
Apostle  is  not  accounting  for  one  instance  of  the  antecedency 
of  the  inferior  to  the  superior,  by  merely  adducing  a  parallel  in¬ 
stance  of  the  same  kind.  He  affirms  that  the  antecedency  of  the 
natural  body  to  the  spiritual  body  is  only  a  harmonious  part  of  a 
great  whole  ;  that  it  is  strictly  analogous  with  the  order  observed 
in  all  the  Divine  operations ;  and  that  the  principle  of  that  order 
is  progress.  From  which  it  follows,  that  the  material  creation 
preceded  the  spiritual ;  and,  therefore,  that  the  angelic  order  of 
beings  was  called  into  existence  subsequent  to  the  origination  of 
matter. 

For  the  reasons  already  assigned,  I  forbear  repeating  here  the 
remainder  of  the  article  referred  to,  respecting  the  comparative 
status  of  the  angel  and  the  man.  It  may  not  be  amiss,  however, 
to  say  that  the  proposition  on  the  subject  amounts  to  this,  that 
while  the  present  condition  of  angels  is,  in  some  respects,  superior 
to  that  of  man  during  his  earthly  sojourn,  they  are  inferior  to  him 
both  as  it  respects  his  original  constitution,  and  his  ultimate  desti¬ 
nation.  The  contrary  opinion  is,  I  think,  popularly  or  generally 
made  out  in  this  way  (quite  as  much*  at  least,  as  by  any  of  the  pas¬ 
sages  of  Scripture  which  appear  to  favor  it)  by  taking  it  for  granted 
that  they  have  always  been  inhabitants  of  heaven  ;  and,  consequent¬ 
ly,  investing  their  entire  history  with  its  grandeur ;  by  vaguely  asso¬ 
ciating  with  the  mention  of  their  name  all  that  is  said  in  Scrip¬ 
ture  respecting  the  uncreated  Angel  of  Jehovah,  and  the  grand 
symbolic  beings  existing  only  in  vision  ;  by  transferring  to  man 
comparisons  of  inferiority  belonging  to  different  members  of  their 
own  order  ;  by  forgetting  that  while  man  is  still  a  probationer, 
they  are  a  stage  beyond  him,  having  entered  on  their  future  state  ; 
and  by  instituting  comparisons,  not  as  justice  would  require,  be¬ 
tween  a  fallen  man  in  perdition  and  a  fallen  angel,  or  between 
“  the  elect  angels”  and  “  the  spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect,” 
but  between  a  holy  angel  and  unreclaimed,  depraved  man  ;  which 
is  pretty  much  as  if  we  should  infer  the  rank  of  an  unfallen  angel 


NOTE. 


459 


from  one  of  the  11  unclean  spirits”  in  “  the  herd  of  swine,”  as  com¬ 
pared  with  the  loftiest  of  the  redeemed  in  heaven.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  sufficiently  considered  that,  in  their 
history,  the  process  of  the  Divine  manifestation  is  only  carried 
directly  to  the  point  of  holiness  and  justice,  that  here  it  stops ; 
that,  in  the  history  of  man,  the  process  not  only  goes  over  the 
same  ground,  but  advances  beyond ;  that  the  nature  taken  into 
mvsterious  and  indissoluble  union  with  the  Divine  nature,  is  that 
of  man  ;  and  that,  thus  ineffably  exalted,  it  occupies  the  highest 
throne  in  heaven. 


460 


INDEX. 


Action,  moral  approbation  of,  prior  to  any 
thought  of  its  utility,  146. 

Actions  generalized,  264. 

Activity,  love  of,  87 ;  law  of,  208 ;  of  man, 
necessary  to  his  development,  209  ;  the 
world,  a  call  to  it,  210 ;  highest  form  of, 
210 ,  of  Eden,  211 ;  of  heaven,  212. 

Affection,  what,  86 ;  social,  subordination 
of.  236  ;  objects  of,  237  ;  liabilities  of,  363. 

Age,  of  the  world,  every  one  its  own  expe¬ 
rience,  376,  377. 

Analogical,  Mosaic  account  of  creation,  14 ; 
relation  of  man  and  nature,  320. 

Analogy,  reason  of,  314 ;  of  man’s  creation 
with  prior  creations.  321 ;  of  man  with 
nature,  322 — 421 ;  of  moral  difficulties 
with  natural,  328- 

Angels,  prior  to  man,  3 ;  some  had  sinned, 
7 ;  probable  relation  of,  to  the  human 
economy,  32,  448 ;  their  views  of  the 
Divine  holiness.  345,  447  ;  their  mutual 
relations,  different  from  ours,  347,  417 ; 
the  great  lesson  of  their  fell,  417. 

Animal  mind,  202. 

Antecedents,  logical  and  chronological,  71. 

Anthropopathic,  Mosaic  account  of  crea¬ 
tion.  9 

Appetites,  what,  86  ;  subordination  of,  235  ; 
objects  of,  236,  237  ;  have  their  value, 
238  ;  liabilities  of,  361. 

Approve,  disposition  to,  91. 

Arguments,  a  priori  and  a  posteriori,  72. 

Art,  53,  218. 

Attention,  what,  122  ;  effects  of,  123,  125  ; 
advantages  of,  124. 

Barbarism,  man’s  first  condition  not  one  of, 
162—170. 

Beauty  and  sublimity,  emotions  of,  92. 

Being,  an  infinite,  apprehensible,  63. 

Belief,  voluntary,  123,  251 ;  man,  responsi¬ 
ble  for,  249—251 ;  aids  understanding, 
124 ;  of  an  external  universe,  an  ultimate 
fact,  302  ;  liabilities  of,  358,  363. 

Beliefs,  primary,  characteristics  of,  55 ; 
presupposed  in  creation,  55,  72  ;  relation 
to  the  mind,  58  ;  number  of,  64 ;  princi¬ 
ple  which  should  determine  it,  65  ;  what 
they  must  include,  65 ;  validity,  66 ; 
grounds  for  expecting,  70. 

Brain,  human,  relative  properties  of,  192. 

Categories,  different  kinds  of,  65. 

Cause,  idea  of,  how  given,  47 ;  final,  51 ; 
an  ultimate  fact,  302  ;  man,  a  cause,  303. 

Change,  a  law  of  the  universe,  2,  259,  321 ; 


reason  of,  339 :  time  of.  neither  necessary 
nor  capricious,  340;  in  relation  to  the 
first  man,  341 ;  conditions  of,  fulfilled, 
342—350. 

Changes,  physical,  greater  before  man,  2. 

Chaos,  probable  extent  of,  16 ;  probable 
volcanic  cause  of,  18. 

Character,  and  motive,  reaction  of.  111 ; 
nothing  indifferent  to,  214,  269  ;  what, 
and  its  relation  to  habit.  250,  439  ;  pros¬ 
pective,  275 ;  not  formed  by  the  external, 
280  ;  its  Divine  model,  283  ;  a  self-forma¬ 
tion,  303  ;  endless  diversity  of,  possible, 
388. 

Characteristic  of  the  new  economy,  5. 

Chronology,  sacred,  181. 

Classification,  methods  of,  43 ;  of  man.  243, 
334  ;  universal,  principles  of,  330  ;  illus¬ 
tration  of,  330 ;  characteristics  of,  332  ; 
grounds  of,  336 ;  the  final.  337 ;  man's 
power  of,  illustrates  Divine  wisdom,  423. 

Co-existence  and  successive  existence,  74. 

Conception,  what,  51. 

Conscience,  essential  to  responsibility,  132  ; 
universality  of,  134 ;  uniformity,  want  of, 
135  ;  a  distinct  faculty,  147 ;  its  function, 
148 ;  in  relation  to  the  motives,  151 ;  to 
the  will,  151 ;  universal  for  the  mind  — 
unintermitting,  152 ;  supreme,  153,  236, 
238,  437  ;  non-compulsory,  155  ;  its  per¬ 
version  within  limits,  155 ;  its  external 
relations,  221, 440  ;  obligations  of,  245. 251. 

Consciousness,  ultimate  authority  of,  67, 
302  ;  no  other  ground  of  knowledge  con¬ 
ceivable,  67 ;  of  obligation.  149. 

Continuity,  law  of,  180  ;  physiological,  with¬ 
in  limits,  183. 

Creation  of  man,  3.  21 ;  time  of,  contingent, 
285,  322  ;  in  analogy  with  prior  creations, 
321 ;  related  to  the  physical  condition  of 
the  earth,  222 ;  not  deranging  the  uni¬ 
formity  of  nature,  222  ;  six  days’  process 
of,  15 ;  of  woman,  23  ;  truths,  logically 
presupposed  in,  60,  72 ;  a  syllogism,  74, 
80 ;  order  of,  229. 

Creations  prior,  16 ;  all  possible,  not  desi¬ 
rable,  373 ;  nor  necessary.  371. 

Credibility  of  testimony,  16l. 

Death,  the  kind  of,  threatened,  178. 

Deduction,  illustrated,  74. 

Dependence,  a  law  of  the  universe,  285 ; 
illustrated  by  the  time  of  man’s  creation, 
286 ;  by  his  first  locality,  286 ;  his  con¬ 
stitution.  287 ;  his  knowledge  of,  essen¬ 
tial,  291 ;  everything  signified  it,  292 


INDEX 


461 


his  subjective,  how  it  agrees  with  free¬ 
dom,  theories  of.  292  ;  the  first  man,  made 
to  feel  his,  344 ;  the  necessity  for  teach¬ 
ing  it  increased  by  sin,  416. 

Design,  idea  of.  how  given,  51 ;  Divine,  man 
an  illustration  of,  422 — 498. 

Desires,  87. 

Development,  law  of,  185 ;  conditions  of 
356 ;  irregular,  dangers  of,  365 ;  advan¬ 
tages  of,  370 ;  possible,  373. 

Difficulties,  moral,  in  analogy  with  natural, 
328 :  harmonized  in  moral  government, 
361. 

Dispensation,  the  probationary,  its  great 
lesson,  416  ;  its  lesson  increasingly  neces¬ 
sary,  417. 

Dispositions,  impartative,  89. 

Earth,  already  a  scene  of  Divine  power, 
3 ;  wisdom,  4 ;  goodness,  5  ;  now,  of  mor¬ 
al  government,  6, 9, 174, 265, 277 ;  Adamic, 
made  from  pre-existing  matter,  14 ;  the 
term  variously  applied,  16 ;  man’s  physi¬ 
cal  relations  to,  215,  322  ;  and  man  mu¬ 
tually  adapted,  288. 

Eden,  probable  situation  of,  17  ;  man’s  con¬ 
dition  in,  167,  290,  430.  431 ;  scene  of 
moral  government,  174,  242,  265, 277 ;  his 
activity  in,  211 ;  his  relations  in,  224  ; 
man's  being  placed  in,  dependent  on 
God,  286 ;  everything  there,  signified  his 
dependence,  293. 

Embryotic  theory,  unfounded,  193. 

Emotions,  necessary,  85  ;  nature  of,  86  ;  di¬ 
vision  of,  87  ;  appropriate,  87  ;  impar¬ 
tative,  89  ;  arrestive.  91 ;  perfective,  92  ; 
further  generalization  of,  95  ;  relation  to 
the  great  scheme,  96 ;  eo-extensive  with 
means  of  knowledge,  97 ;  to  be  cultivated, 
98  ;  affording  a  scale  for  the  valuation  of 
objects,  98,  99 ;  its  external  relations,  219  ; 
obligations  of,  245,  249 ;  liabilities  of,  360, 
365  ;  illustrative  of  Divine  wisdom,  442  ; 
subservient  to  virtue,  437. 

Esteem,  love  of,  88 

Evidence,  degrees  of.  77 ;  man’s  liabilities 
respecting,  358,  363. 

Experience,  logically  presupposes  primary 
beliefs,  56 ;  of  freedom  and.  dependence, 
necessary,  368  ;  conditions  of,  369  ;  why, 
284 ;  incommunicable,  379. 

Externality,  idea  of,  how  given,  49 ;  essen¬ 
tial  to  reasoning,  49. 

Fall  of  man,  change  involved  in,  179  ;  not 
without  pre-intimations,  326,  336  ;  of  pro¬ 
found  interest,  343  ;  consequences  of, 
personal.  403 ;  consequences,  not  arbi¬ 
trary,  408  :  relative  effects,  409  ;  made 
illustrative  of  holiness,  447. 

Final  cause,  idea  of,  how  given,  51 ;  science 
recedes  from,  how,  78. 

Foreknowledge,  mode  of  Divine  and  human, 
different,  107. 

Freedom,  of  will,  false  views  of,  102 ;  the 
earth  specially  adapted  for  it,  289 ;  agrees 
’vrh  subjective  dependence,  292  ;  moral, 


idea  of,  necessary,  311 ;  dangers  of,  342, 
361,  366. 

Future,  why  more  important  than  the 
present,  237 ;  and  the  present,  balanced, 
361. 

God,  holiness  and  justice  of,  what,  6  ;  love 
due  to,  supreme,  220,  317  ;  law  of  the  uni¬ 
verse,  384 ;  man’s  relations  to,  profound, 
222 ;  will  of,  supreme,  236,  238 ;  man's 
obligation  to  obey,  251 — 255 ;  obedience 
to,  happiness,  273 ;  sustains  man,  yet 
leaves  him  free,  293 ;  holiness  of,  ade¬ 
quately  illustrated,  345 — 350,  436—452 ; 
resources  of,  unlimited,  391 ;  his  hatred 
of  sin,  415 ;  power  of,  illustrated,  420 — 
442 ;  his  wisdom,  422 — 428  ;  liis  goodness, 
426—136 ;  inconceivably  excellent,  444, 
449. 

Goodness,  Divine,  man  an  illustration  of, 
428 — 436 ;  subservient  to  holiness,  446. 

Habit,  law  of,  325  ;  advantages  of,  126 ; 
evil,  127 ;  confirmation  of,  269 ;  relation 
to  character,  270  :  subservient  to  virtue, 
439,  441. 

Holiness,  what,  6 ;  all-sufficiency  of,  illus¬ 
trated,  345,  448  ;  man  made  for,  436 — 452. 

Idealism,  the  reaction  of  representational 
ism,  40. 

Ideas  of  space  and  time,  how  given,  45 , 
cause  and  effect,  47  ;  substance  and  attri 
bute,  48 ;  externality,  49 ;  resemblance, 
50 ;  final  cause,  51 ;  logical  and  chrono¬ 
logical,  59. 

Identity,  of  meh,  not  dependent  on  species, 
24 ;  personal,  200. 

Ignorance,  its  relation  to  guilt,  261,  265, 
270. 

Image  of  God,  man  made  in,  8,  9,  180,  432 
443 ;  man  has  the  idea  of  it,  283,  335 ; 
might  have  constantly  approached  it,  283 
departure  from  it,  diversified,  284. 

Imagination,  works  of,  anticipate  criticism 
82 ;  distinguished  from  fancy,  83  ;  relates 
to  the  possible,  83  ;  to  the  moral,  84,  272 
425  ;  its  external  relations,  217  ;  obliga¬ 
tions  of,  244 ;  liabilities  of,  358. 

Immortality,  of  man,  implied  in  his  proba¬ 
tion,  175 ;  not  inherently  necessary,  290  , 
natural  suggestions  of.  1,  324. 

Individuality  of  an  object,  what,  50. 

Induction,  logic  of,  52  ;  illustrated,  76. 

Infinite,  our  notion  of,  62  :  Being,  appre¬ 
hensible,  63. 

Influence,  law  of,  230  ;  man’s,  over  him¬ 
self,  231 ;  capable  of  increase,  231 ;  ovei 
nature,  -232  ;  with  his  fellow-men,  233 
421;  with  God.  234 ;  of  rature  on  man,  234 

Instinct,  what,  203  ;  an  ultimate  fact,  206 
in  man  subservient  to  virtue,  436,  440. 

Justice,  Divine,  what,  6  ;  sentiment  of,  hi 
man,  90. 

Knowledge  of  objects,  immediate,  39 — 4J 


462 


INDEX 


certainty  of,  66 ;  love  of,  87 3  kind  and 
degree  of,  dependent  on  the  will  of  God, 
289 ;  means  of,  illustrates  Divine  design, 
422. 

language,  what  it  includes,  157  ;  origin  of, 
163  ;  primitive,  165  ;  obligations  of,  245, 
248  ;  its  analogies  and  relations,  316  ; 
dangers  it  involves,  359 ;  diversities  of, 
insulate  mankind,  376. 

law,  idea  of,  necessary,  313 3  primal,  see 
probationary. 

laws,  general,  obedience  to,  essential  to 
happiness,  253,  273 ;  not  causes,  259 ; 
m^ans  of  ascertaining  them,  261 ;  in  suf¬ 
ficiency  of  264 ;  do  not  exclude  Provi¬ 
dence  266  277  ;  do  not  explain  phenom¬ 
ena,  295 ;  are  not  causes,  295 ;  idea  of, 
necessary,  313. 

Liberty,  love  of,  90  ;  of  the  will,  false  views 
of,  102  ;  of  indifference,  114. 

Life  an  ultimate  fact,  300  ;  human,  a  pro¬ 
bation,  308. 

Logic,  science  of,  51. 

Man,  the  earth  prepared  for  him,  1,  426 ; 
his  creation  of  deep  interest,  3,  21 ;  his 
constitution,  8  ;  chosen,  287  ;  in  the  Di¬ 
vine  Image,  9,  180.  432.  443 ;  embodies 
pre-existing  laws.  21,  31 ;  made  of  the 
common  earth,  22  ;  organic,  22  ;  animal, 
23  ;  not  a  transmuted  being,  23  ;  instinc¬ 
tive,  30 ;  belongs  to  the  original  scheme 
of  organization,  32  3  intelligent,  the  being 
to  and  by  whom  the  manifestation  is 
made,  35,  38  ;  must  be  placed  in  sensible 
communication  with  nature,  35  ;  his  ear¬ 
liest  sensations,  42  ;  reflective,  43 ;  ration¬ 
al,  54 ;  imaginative,  81 ;  emotional,  85  ; 
voluntary,  100  ;  recognizes  moral  quality 
in  actions,  134 :  primitive  condition  of, 
166,  428—435  ;  probationary,  174  ;  im¬ 
mortal,  175  ;  recency  of,  182  ;  his  struc- 
.  ture,  superiority  of,  185  ;  social,  189  ; 
perceptions,  as  compared  with  his  organs, 
191 ;  brain,  192  ;  his  relative  superiority, 
207,  242  ;  his  activity,  208  ;  relations,  212  ; 
to  God,  223  :  in  Eden,  225  ;  his  relation 
to  order,  226 ;  his  influence,  230,  238 ; 
his  subordination,  235  ;  classification  of, 
243,  334.  336  ;  obligations,  243  ;  well-be¬ 
ing,  267 ;  everything  belonging  to  him 
important,  268  ;  his  dependence,  285  ; 
sustained,  yet  free,  292 ;  a  combination 
of  ultimate  facts,  308  3  by  necessary  truth 
communes  with  the  Infinite,  313 ;  in 
analogy  with  the  great  system.,  314  3 
made  to  know  and  love  God.  316  ;  can¬ 
not  change  a  law  of  nature,  323  ;  law  of 
change  respecting,  336 ;  his  fall,  343  ; 
consequences  of,  403  5  Divine  Method, 
reason  of,  in  relation  to,  351 3  his  condi¬ 
tions  of  development,  355  ;  his  liabilities, 
357 — 387 ;  every  part  of,  on  probation, 
368  ;  potential,  374  ;  every  individual, 
has  distinct  treatment,  375 ;  why  sepa¬ 
rated  into  families  and  nations,  379 ; 


possible  aberrations  of,  endless,  388  5  his 
probationary  trial,  373 — 392  3  himself,  a 
power,  420  ;  an  illustration  of  Divine 
wisdom,  395 — 400  3  of  Goodness,  428 — 
436  ;  of  Holiness,  436 — 449  j  may  well 
await  results,  450. 

Matter.  Adamic  earth  made  from  pre-exist¬ 
ing,  14  3  origination  of,  15,  477  3  existence 
of,  an  ultimate  fact,  299. 

Memorv,  nothing  absolutelv  lost  from  it, 
214,  217,  270. 

Method,  divine,  in  creation,  reason  of,  351  j 
why  necessary  for  man,  352  3  in  relation 
to  God,  373  5  reason  for,  gains  force  with 
time,  374  ;  extends  to  worlds,  378  ;  each 
distinct,  yet  part  of  a  whole,  380  3  ever 
receiving  accessions,  385  3  complications 
of,  infinite,  387. 

Mind,  like  matter,  known  by  its  properties, 
49 ;  has  truths  of  its  own,  57 ;  involves 
the  highest  truths,  70 ;  transcends  na¬ 
ture,  72 ;  simple  and  indivisible,  148, 201 5 
and  matter,  distinct,  197  ;  animal,  203 ; 
human,  superiority  of,  206  3  agrees  with 
its  design,  207  ;  lofty  position  of,  207  3  an 
ultimate  fact,  302. 

Minds,  divine  and  human,  must  have  some 
things  in  common,  35. 

Moral  government,  earth  a  scene  of,  6,  9  5 
in  Eden,  174,  242,  265,  277  ;  the  proper 
notion  of,  275 ;  not  fully  developed  on 
earth,  276  3  its  perfection,  277  3  no  viola¬ 
tion  of  nature,  323  ;  certain  problems  of, 
361. 

Moral  science,  province  of,  133. 

Morality,  see  Tirtue. 

Mosaic  account  of  creation  characterized, 
10—14. 

Motives,  conditionally  resistible,  103 ;  the 
strongest,  104  ;  force  of,  differs  from  phy¬ 
sical  causation,  106  3  not  external,  110  5 
and  character  re-act,  111 ;  conditions  of 
volition,  113 ;  concurrence  of,  with  the 
will,  114,  305 ;  graduated  scale  of,  238, 
315  ;  obligations  of,  246  ;  subjective,  305  ; 
of  different  kinds,  to  be  balanced,  361, 
366. 

Muscular  system  given  to  the  will,  127. 

Nature,  and  man  proceed  inversely,  76  ; 
theories  of,  296  ;  forces  of.  297  ;  sustained 
by  God,  299 ;  a  limited  prediction  of  man 
320  3  subject  to  a  law  of  change,  2,  259 
321. 

Natural  religion,  means  of,  261 — 264.  277, 
318.  426  ;  insufficiency  of.  264, 279  3  office 
of,  278  3  conditions  of,  354. 

Necessary  truth,  characterized,  55,  59.  309, 
310  ;  and  contingent,  73  ;  presupposed  m 
every  generalization.  309  ;  means  of  com¬ 
munion  with  the  Infinite,  313. 

Objects,  methods  ofi'classifying,  44. 
Objective  and  subjective,  nice  adjustment 
of,  54  3  relation  between,  68. 

Obligation,  consciousness  of,  ultimate.  1*0  , 
law  of,  243  3  man;s  internal,  243 ,  ev«r 


INDEX 


463 


increasing.  246  ;  extent  of,  246,  318  ;  to' 
God,  supreme,  251  ;  continuous,  253  ; 
ever  increasing,  254  ;  varying,  254 ;  uni¬ 
versal,  255  ;  failure  in,  remediless,  255  ; 
susceptible  of  increase  from  without,  257  ; 
ground  of,  257 ;  moral,  distinct  from 
wrong,  260. 

opinions,  man  responsible  for,  251. 

Optical,  Mosaic  account  of  creation,  11. 

Order,  physical  laws  recalled  in,  20  ;  law  of, 
in  creation,  226 ;  illustrated  in  man’s 
functions  and  development,  227  3  of  crea¬ 
tion,  229. 

Organization,  an  ultimate  fact,  300. 

Pain,  office  of,  276. 

Passion,  what,  86. 

Past,  brought  forwards,  10  ;  the  law  illus¬ 
trated,  15,  20 — 24,  30,  31. 

Perception,  of  objects,  phenomenal,  36  3 
and  real,  37 ;  conditions  of,  constant,  41 3 
superior,  as  compared  with  his  organs, 
191. 

Perfection,  man’s  yearning  after  ideal,  283  ; 
idea  of,  necessary,  312,  335. 

Philosophy,  positive,  what,  297  3  conditions 
of,  354. 

Phrenology,  195. 

Power,  idea  of,  how  given,  47  3  love  of,  88  ; 
man’s  greatest,  on  what  it  depends,  238 — 
242  3  an  ultimate  fact,  303  ;  of  God,  illus¬ 
trations  of,  418. 

Prayer,  influence  of,  99,  234,  422  ;  spirit  of, 
obligatory,  256  ;  compatible  with  Divine 
immutability,  306  5  efficacy  .of,  an  ulti- 

-  mate  fact,  307. 

Presuppositions,  in  creation,  56,  59 ;  what 
they  must  include,  66,  72. 

Primary  qualities  of  matter,  37 :  distinc¬ 
tion  from  secondary,  relatively  accounted 
for,  38. 

Probationary,  law,  its  import,  173,  282,  291, 
393 — 402 :  no  violation  of  nature,  323 :  in¬ 
capable  of  repetition,  349  :  problems,  361 
— 364 :  human  life,  367  :  necessary’,  368  : 
why,  369  :  discipline  of  every  man  differ¬ 
ent.  374:  conditions,  379:  consequences 
of  violation,  403  :  breach  of,  worse  than  of 
a  material  law,  411 :  principle  of,  uni¬ 
versal.  412  :  illustrative  of  holiness,  444. 

Progression,  law  of,  34 :  groundaof,  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  man,  34 :  perception,  34 :  reflec¬ 
tion,  43 :  reason,  54 :  imagination,  81 : 
emotions,  83  :  will,  100 :  conscience,  131 : 
language,  156 :  paradisiacal  condition, 
166 :  law  of,  subject  to  a  wider  law,  340  : 
human,  possible,  373 :  illustration  of 
Goodness,  431. 

Providence,  man’s  superior  capacity  for, 
242 :  not  excluded  by  natural  laws,  266 : 
administers  laws,  277 :  distinguished  from 
creation,  290  :  how  lost  sight  of,  299 :  the 
first  man,  an  illustration  of,  426  :  plans 
of,  vast,  450. 

Reason,  54 :  practical  and  speculative,  60  : 
facts  of,  exist  as  beliefs,  61 :  see  Beliefs  ; 


its  external  relations,  217  :  obligations  of 
244,  248  :  liabilities  it  involves,  358  :  sub¬ 
servient  to  virtue,  437. 

Recency  of  man's  creation,  181. 

Reflection,  man  capable  of,  43  :  its  externa 
relations,  216 :  obligations  of,  245,  248. 

Relations,  of  objects,  where  are  they  ?  44 
law  of  in  creation,  212 :  man’s  internal 
212,  314 :  his  external,  215,  314,  320 :  tc 
God,  223 :  innumerable,  224 :  continu 
ous,  and  increasing,  225 :  liabilities  of 
355 :  proofs  of  design,  426. 

Representationalism,  occasions  of,  29. 

Resemblance,  idea  of,  how  given,  50. 

Revelation,  the  kind  of  necessary,  263, 
280 :  direct,  no  violation  of  natural  law, 
327. 

Right,  means  more  than  useful,  147 :  and 
wrong, distinction  between  immutable, 311. 

Sabbath,  primaeval,  institution  of,  171 
illustration  of  Goodness,  430. 

Science,  pure  and  exact,  whyr  so  called,  46 
becoming  deductive,  79 :  conditions  of 
352 :  province  of,  354  :  not  philosophy 
354. 

Scriptures,  laws  of  the  will  implied  in,  130 

Secondary  qualities  of  matter,  what,  37,  49 

Self-government,  man’s  power  of,  231,  240, 
422,  438  :  conditions  and  advantages,  238 
—243. 

Self-love,  subordination  of,  235 :  object  of, 
236,  237  :  liabilities  of,  362. 

Sensation,  man  capable  of  knowing  the  oc¬ 
casion  of,  36 :  conditions  of,  36 — 41 :  con¬ 
stant,  41 :  its  external  relations,  216  :  ob¬ 
ligations  of,  243,  248  :  an  ultimate  fact, 
301 :  liabilities  of,  358. 

Sensibility,  what,  86. 

Sin,  implies  freedom  of  will,  117 :  tends  to 
repeat  itself,  127,  255,  269  :  includes  its 
own  punishment,  276,  325,  436 :  makes 
possible  endless  moral  deformities,  284, 
388  :  materializes,  305  :  subjective  exist¬ 
ence  of,  ultimate,  307 :  the  first,  343 : 
existence  of,  assumed,  392 :  how  it  com¬ 
menced,  404 :  how  it  depraves,  405 :  ab¬ 
stract  and  concrete,  406,  411 :  the  first, 
guilt  of,  411 :  the  first,  foreseen,  412 : 
preventible,  412  :  occasion  of  good,  414, 
433  :  God's  hatred  of,  415. 

Sinning,  the  power  and  danger  of,  distinct, 
412. 

Social,  man,  not  gregarious,  189. 

Society,  love  of,  88,  90. 

Space  and  time,  ideas  of,  how  given,  45. 

Species,  what,  24  :  human,  unity  of,  24 : 
plurality  of,  involves  greater  difficulties, 
30,  52. 

Speech,  see  Language. 

Structure,  man’s  superiority  of,  185- 

Subjective  and  objective,  nice  adjustment 
of,  54,  318,  320  :  relation  between,  67. 

Subordination,  disposition  to,  91 :  law  of, 
235 :  of  man’s  appetites,  235  :  self-love, 
236 :  social  affections,  236  :  advantages  of 
273. 


480 


INDEX, 


Substance,  idea  of,  how  given,  48. 

Synthesis  and  analysis,  74. 

Taste,  what,  86 :  ultimate  relations  of,  221, 
442. 

Temperament,  what,  86. 

Temptation,  the  fatal,  401. 

Testimony,  credibility  of,  161. 

Thought,  forms  or  laws  of,  44. 

Transmutation,  theory  of,  unfounded,  183, 
193. 

Truth,  necessary,  characteristics  of,  55  : 
and  contingent,  73  :  power  of,  238 :  mor¬ 
al,  the  mightiest,  239. 

Truths,  logically  presupposed  in  creation, 
60:  conditional  and  unconditional,  60, 
71. 

Ultimate  fact,  what,  395 :  instances  of,  299. 

Unconditioned,  our  notion  of  the,  62. 

Uniformity,  or  law,  why  necessary,  258 : 
of  nature,  258 :  physical,  its  necessity 
conditional,  259 :  see  Laws  :  man’s  crea¬ 
tion  no  violation  of,  322. 

Unity  of  species,  24 :  Scriptural  intimations 
of,  25 :  difficulties  of  the  view,  diminish¬ 
ing,  25  :  evidence  of,  anatomical,  26 : 
physiological,  26  :  psychological,  26  :  his¬ 
torical,  27  :  philological,  27  :  analogical, 
29  :  chronological  objection  to,  not  insur¬ 
mountable,  29 :  plurality  of,  involves 
greater  difficulties,  30  :  evidence  of  unity, 
mutually  aiding,  31. 

Utility,  why  not  the  ground  of  virtue,  143 : 
may  ultimately  coincide  with  it,  142, 214, 
267,  442. 

Virtue,  notion  of,  not  derived  from  arbi¬ 
trary  appointment,  137 :  nor  from  intel¬ 
lectual  intuition,  138  :  nor  judgment,  139 : 
nor  association,  140 :  nor  utility,  141  : 
nor  from  expediency,  141 :  why  not  from 
a  calculation  of  consequer  ces,  143 :  has 


an  objective  existence,  147, 222, 251 :  may 
ultimately  coincide  with  utility,  142,  214, 
268,  442  :  ground  of,  257  :  idea  of,  ulti¬ 
mate,  307  :  immutable,  310  :  different 
grounds  of,  assigned,  what  it  indicates, 
319,  443  :  made  pleasurable,  438,  440  ; 
man  made  for,  436 — 448. 

Volitions,  consciously  free,  109. 

Voluntary  acts,  made  easy  by  repetition, 
124. 

Well-being,  law  of,  267 :  man’s,  coincident 
with  the  Divine  glory,  268  :  conditions  of, 
268, 275  :  physical,  268,  271 :  intellectual, 
272  :  conditional,  analogies  of,  325 

Will,  why  necessary,  101  :  what,  102  :  its 
freedom,  false  views  of,  102:  a  conditioned 
cause,  106:  objections  to,  and  replies, 
108  :  consciously  free,  109  :  ultimate,  109 : 
gives  the  idea  of  cause,  111 :  no  illusion, 
111 :  essential  to  moral  government,  113  : 
a  particular,  co-existing  with  a  universal, 
116:  and  with  the  laws  of  nature,  118: 
laws  of,  in  relation  to  motives,  121 :  mus¬ 
cular  system  placed  at  the  service  of,  127  : 
has  power  with  God,  1 28 :  laws  of,  im¬ 
plied  in  Scripture,  130 :  a  novelty  on 
earth,  130 :  image  of  the  Divine,  132 : 
constitutes  man  a  person,  132  :  its  exter¬ 
nal  relations,  220 :  power  of,  231:  obliga¬ 
tions  of,  245,  250  :  not  without  foreshad¬ 
owings  in  nature,  325  *  Labilities  of,  361, 
366. 

Wills,  union  of,  mighty  for  good,  128. 

Wisdom,  of  God,  man  an  illustration  of 
422—428. 

Woman,  creation  of,  23  :  a  second  mind 
an  addition  to  man’s  means  of  know 
ledge,  170 :  creation  of,  illustration  of 
Providence,  430. 

World,  every  age  of,  its  own  character 
376,  377  :  each,  its  own  discipline,  378. 

Wrong  and  guilt,  distinct,  260,  265. 


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